Operation Banner Primer: An Account of the British Military's Deployment to Northern Ireland, 1969-2007

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Foreword

Following a request by the Operation Kenova police investigation team to include an authoritative narrative (or 'primer') of the Operation Banner period as part of their final report, in late 2020 the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London was commissioned to produce an independent narrative covering the operational and strategic role of the Army in Northern Ireland during Operation Banner (1969-2007).

This narrative is intended to set the military operation in context and is therefore a historic account of events set against the political background. As such it will provide insight into the origins and evolution of Operation Banner and of the operating environment. It is intended to give the reader a sense of the situation on the ground as faced by the military and to open the door to many of the themes that will be developed within the Operation Kenova report.

In this sense, the narrative seeks to provide a primer for all stakeholders involved in the legacy processes and to help explain the context of the operations conducted and the experience of those involved in these matters. The British Army's 2009 Counterinsurgency Field Manual says, 'the failure to capture the lessons of Northern Ireland and to analyse fully how success was gained is a stark omission'.[1] As discussed in the introduction the primer is not intended as a history of Operation Banner or of what have come to be known as the 'Troubles'.

In undertaking this work, King's College London has maintained academic and editorial control over the project. This report is therefore an independent and impartial account of aspects of Operation Banner and the Army's role in that operation on the basis of the best available evidence. The content and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of the British Army, Ministry of Defence (MoD), or any other government department, existing or dissolved.

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[1] British Army, *British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10: Countering Insurgency*, Army Code 71876 (Warminster: Ministry of Defence, 2009), CS1-6.

1. Introduction

Reproduced from Operation Banner (2006)[2]

The British military's operation in Northern Ireland[3] between 1969 and 2007, codenamed Operation Banner, is the longest in its history. Operation Banner was extremely demanding and placed a significant burden on the United Kingdom's (UK's) armed forces and in particular the Army. Over the course of 38 years, more than 250,000 military personnel served in Northern Ireland, with over 30,000 deployed at its peak in the summer of 1972. In the early 1970s, as the security situation deteriorated, there were routine deployments of 10,000+ troops across the province.

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[2] Chief of the General Staff, *Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2006), 1-1. Hereafter 'CGS, *Operation Banner*'. This document was released in 2006, 'inadvertently' according to MoD. It has been widely used and quoted by writers and academic scholars of the Troubles for more than 15 years. The MoD has since stated that it 'was never intended to provide an official MOD history' and has 'withdrawn' it, stating that it contains 'a serious error which associated the death of an innocent young man with acts of terrorism'. While it is therefore not intended as a document 'of public record', under the Freedom of Information Act, it is still released by MoD if requested. MoD, 'Freedom of Information: FOI2018/00417', 30 January 2018, accessed February 2022. In the absence of other documented errors, this document is drawn upon in the following primer where it adds to the account. https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/456245/response/1106092/attach/3/20180130%20Sheridan%20FOI 2018%2000417.pdf?cookie_passthrough=1

[3] Hereafter 'NI', and interchangeably used with 'the province', and 'the six counties'. The term 'province' is used as it regularly appears in original documents and secondary sources. It should be noted however that the traditional 'Province of Ulster' incorporated three other counties outside the six which today constitute Northern Ireland.

More than 700 troops were killed as a result of hostile action during the operation according to the most recent estimates.[4] The first soldier to die from hostile action is generally believed to have been Gunner Robert Curtis, who was killed by a sniper on 6 February 1971. Twenty-six years later Lance-Bombardier Stephen Restorick, the last British soldier to be killed by paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, was shot by a sniper on 12 February 1997.[5]

To put this into context, 456 British troops died in Afghanistan in Operations Herrick and Toral between 2001 and 2015.[6] The conflict, also known as the Troubles, resulted in 2% of Northern Ireland's population being killed or injured. As John Newsinger notes: '[m]ore people have died as a result of political violence in Northern Ireland since 1969 than in the rest of the European Community put together over the same period'.[7] The violence was not limited to Northern Ireland, with the mainland and British military installations in Great Britain and more widely overseas suffering numerous bombings and deaths over the course of the Troubles. It is important to note that while much scrutiny has focused on the alleged violence perpetrated by members of the security forces, including this primer which necessarily deals with the actions of the British Armed Forces, the official inquiry into the murder of Belfast lawyer Pat Finucane recognised that the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 'was the single greatest source of violence during this period,' adding that 'a holistic account of events of the late 1980s…would reveal the full calculating brutality of that terrorist group'.[8] Chart 10 in the Appendices of this report puts de Silva's comments into stark perspective. Another source calculates that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is the only terrorist organisation to have executed all security force personnel they held prisoner, a record which, the author notes, exceeds even that of (so-called) Islamic State.[9]

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[4] Differing estimates of the casualty figures are discussed in the conclusion. Several sources put the figure at 709 (including the Ulster Defence Regiment and Royal Irish Regiment) but this may also include negligent discharges. The MoD has recently listed 1,436 total deaths from August 1969 to March 2007, of which 646 were listed as a result of hostile action. See MoD, 'Freedom of Information: Army Sec/06/06/09633/75948', 23 November 2015, accessed February 2022 at http://historyhubulster.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Army-FOI-2016-09633-Information-of-service-men-and-women-death-while-on-operations-in-Northern-Ireland-on-Op-Banner-Iraq-and-Afghanistan-1.pdf.

[5] Trooper Hugh McCabe of the Queen's Royal Irish Hussars was shot by the Royal Ulster Constabulary in disputed circumstances on 15 August 1969, while off-duty.

[6] 406 were killed as result of hostile action. MoD, 'British Fatalities: Operations in Afghanistan', *UK Government*, accessed December 2021 at https://www.gov.uk/government/fields-of-operation/afghanistan.

[7] John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 2nd Ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 157.

[8] Desmond de Silva, *The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review*, Vol. 1, HC 802-I (London: The Stationery Office, 2012) (hereafter 'de Silva, Vol. 1'), 24.

[9] William Matchett, *Secret Victory: The Intelligence War that Beat the IRA* (2016: self-published), 46.

Against this violent backdrop, there is debate regarding the nature of the British military's mission in Northern Ireland. Many accounts indicate that the military, at least at the beginning of the operation, was engaged in a classic counterinsurgency (COIN) mission against paramilitaries in the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the IRA and what would emerge as the PIRA, especially once the initial civil disorder period had passed. But, as John Bew argues, Operation Banner:

> cannot be classified as a COIN campaign in any meaningful sense of that term. Though it had elements which might fall loosely under the rubric of COIN, the state's attempt to manage the threat posed by the Provisional Irish Republican Army…is better understood as a long-haul domestic counter-terrorism campaign, running alongside a commitment to reaching a political settlement acceptable to a majority of people in Northern Ireland.[10]

For the purpose of this study, it is also useful to consider the British Army's distinction between terrorism and insurgency, specifically as it related to Northern Ireland:

> the differences between insurgency and terrorism can be considered as those of mass, means and methods. 'Insurgency' generally includes large numbers of insurgents using moderately conventional weapons, organisations and tactics. By comparison 'terrorism' is more selective and often more sophisticated in its means and methods of attack, whilst employing generally smaller numbers. These features broadly apply to Northern Ireland. A different approach would be to define terrorism as a tactic and therefore a terrorist organisation as one which acts largely covertly and deploys terrorism as its main means of violence. Conversely, insurgency presupposes an insurgent body (as the Official IRA (OIRA) and PIRA[11] could both be described in the early 1970s) which employs fairly

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[10] John Bew, 'Mass, Methods, and Means: The Northern Ireland "Model" of Counter-insurgency' in Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones, and M.L.R. Smith (eds.) *The New Counter-insurgency Era in Critical Perspective* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 156.

[11] The 'Officials' was one of two IRA factions which emerged in December 1969. While both shared the goal of Irish re-unification, PIRA's decision to prioritise violent confrontation with Westminster as part of its strategy to end British rule brought it into dispute with the IRA's historic leadership, to whom OIRA remain loyal. As the Troubles progressed, PIRA grew from the minority faction to dominate Republican paramilitarism. Following its 1997 ceasefire, PIRA's political wing, Sinn Féin, was admitted to the negotiations which culminated in the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.

direct action to achieve its aims although operating under the cover of the local population. These definitions also generally apply to Northern Ireland. [12]

It is also instructive to draw upon the British Army's assessment that the conflict unfolded in four broad phases. The first phase, from 1969 to 1971, centred around public disorder and rioting. The second phase, from 1971 to the mid-1970s, is characterised as a 'classic insurgency', although December 1972 'marked the beginning of the end of the insurgency phase'. The third phase, from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, can be categorised by PIRA terrorist tactics and 'police primacy' over the security mission. As Bew points out: '[t]his third phase, then, which necessitated a counter-terrorism campaign rather than a COIN, constitutes by far the longest portion of the campaign'.[13] The fourth, and final, phase was from the early 1990s to 2007. This phase saw the intensification of peace negotiations and the conclusion of a political settlement between the majority Unionist and minority Nationalist communities.[14]

Thus, while most of Operation Banner should not be viewed through the lens of a classic COIN operation, the initial phases of the campaign had significant COIN elements to them. The history of the island of Ireland had led to the self-identification of the Official and later the Provisional IRA as (in their eyes) the 'legitimate' Army of Ireland fighting a British occupation. PIRA organised itself as an 'Army' with an Army Council, battalions, brigades, and quartermaster, taking advantage of the disturbances of 1969/70 the IRA claimed to be defending the Catholic population: attacking the forces and institutions of the British State. For many in the military a COIN campaign was therefore a natural starting point. Moreover, particularly in the early phases of the campaign, the military relied on tactics and techniques used in previous COIN operations in Aden, Cyprus, Kenya, Malaya and Oman.[15]

As the main threat increasingly came from PIRA with the split in the Republican movement at the end of 1969/1970, so its structures proved open to penetration by intelligence and it responded by adopting a classic terrorist cell structure within the decade, requiring the security forces to switch to a counter-terrorist, intelligence-led campaign. The growth of so-called Loyalist paramilitaries prepared to engage in terrorist attacks, including random assassination

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[12] CGS, *Operation Banner*, 1-4.
[13] Bew, 'Mass, Methods, and Means', 157.
[14] CGS, *Operation Banner*, 1-3.
[15] Bew, 'Mass, Methods, and Means', 159.

of Catholics, some of whom, were alleged to have links to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), placed the Army in an acute dilemma. On the one hand, some of these were armed groups resisting PIRA and, in a COIN context, potentially useful. On the other hand, these were groups engaging in deeply criminal activity that it was the duty of the Army to suppress, especially as the campaign's focus shifted to counter-terrorism. Moreover, Loyalist organisations more widely were willing to use their industrial muscle to coerce the Army, as in the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) strike in 1974. The security forces were also acutely aware that Protestant groups could potentially not only outnumber Republican paramilitaries but also pose security challenges that they would be hard pressed to resist in extreme scenarios. As the military's operation evolved, it moved into an extended counter-terrorism phase, interspersed with intense periods of public disorder.

What follows is not a history of the Troubles or of Operation Banner, but rather a primer on certain key aspects of the longest operational deployment of the British armed forces.[16] Its main focus is on the regular (and reserve) units of the Army, sometimes referred to in historic and some contemporary accounts as the 'Green Army', rather than special or covert forces, due to the availability of information and its classification. When relevant - and where documented material is available in the public domain - special forces and intelligence organisations linked to the Army's prosecution of Operation Banner are discussed, however much of these aspects of the story remain classified and primary evidence scarce. While there is some discussion in the secondary sources on these aspects of the Troubles, the MoD has a policy of not commenting on such material and those secondary sources that are cited have not been verified or confirmed by the MoD, and in some cases should therefore be treated with caution. Nonetheless primary documentary releases on this period of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's history are adding to this story regularly, with new information enriching the existing account. Where available this now open primary information has been used and drawn upon to support the narrative and provides detail that has previously only appeared in secondary sources. This narrative is therefore a snapshot of the currently available story.

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[16] The mainland campaigns by Irish Republican terror organisations are beyond the scope of this paper. During Operation Banner the mainland was targeted by Republicans using a range of tactics from assassination to disruption of transport systems, from crude attacks on civilian and military targets to more sophisticated strikes against economic targets. Three main bouts of mainland activity were experienced: the early 1970s, including the bombing of two pubs in Birmingham and a coach in 1974 (a year in which 46 were killed on the mainland); the early 1980s following hunger strikes by Republican prisoners in Northern Ireland, culminating in the attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in Brighton; and a third campaign from 1988 to 1994 which saw the largest peacetime bombings of London at St Mary Axe and Bishopsgate. Some 124 were killed on the mainland out of over 3600 deaths in the Troubles.

2. The Initial Deployment & Public Order Operations, 1969-1971

Historical Context

The events that led to the deployment of British troops onto the streets of Northern Ireland in August 1969: 'had roots going back many decades, for Northern Ireland never resembled a place at peace with itself…Viewed from this perspective the troubles can be seen as a more violent expression of existing animosities and unresolved issues of nationality, power and territorial rivalry'.[17]

Established through English and Scottish settlement in the 16th and 17th centuries, resistance to British rule by the Catholic community developed in the 19th Century. By the 20th Century, following repeated Home Rule crises before the First World War, Unionists fearing home rule was likely to be forced upon them smuggled thousands of weapons from Germany into Ireland, creating the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and in response Nationalists formed their own groupings - a civil war appeared inevitable. The First World War prevented this and even the Easter Rising of 1916 in Dublin did not change the stalemate until the Anglo-Irish War of Independence of 1919-21, during which the IRA began to wage a guerrilla war against the Royal Irish Constabulary. With the passing of the Government of Ireland Act in 1920, Ireland and its 32 counties was divided between the Irish Free State with 26 counties in the south and Ulster, in the North with six counties remaining part of the UK.[18]

As such the Province's status was contested from the start. The North was granted its own parliament, Stormont, which meant that Westminster did not have direct control over Northern Ireland affairs. A proposal to institute proportional representation in elections to Stormont, intended to safeguard the interests of the Catholic minority, was abandoned to ensure that 'all significant posts in the Administration of the province were held by Protestants'.[19] The creation of Stormont allowed the British government to distance itself from Irish affairs and 'successive British Governments drifted into a policy of letting what was virtually a one-party Government in Stormont go its own way'.[20]

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[17] David McKittrick and David McVea, *Making Sense of the Troubles: History of the Northern Ireland Conflict,* (London: Viking, 2012), 1.

[18] The exclusion of the three Catholic counties of Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan (historically part of Ulster) ensured a Protestant majority in the new Ulster.

[19] The National Archives (hereafter 'TNA'), WO305/6509, MoD, 'Narrative of the Military Operations in Northern Ireland which began in August 1969', Vol. 1 (hereafter 'MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 1'), I-2.

[20] MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 1, 1-3.

By the early 1960s, institutions of state in the North had developed in a manner to benefit the Protestant community, through gerrymandering. The police force, now the RUC, had only 12% of its ranks made up by Catholic officers, and its auxiliary, the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC or B Specials), was 100% Protestant. Of the population of one and a half million, two thirds were Protestant, most identifying themselves as British and one third were Catholics, most regarding themselves as Irish (although not necessarily Republicans according to some sources). A border campaign by the IRA from 1956-62, Operation Harvest, against infrastructure targets had failed, in part because of tough security measures taken on both sides of the border with the Republic of Ireland, including internment on either side, which saw over 500 detained and the IRA virtually extinct.[21] Serious rioting occurred in Belfast in 1964 following a march by Unionists into Republican districts and the following year the UVF was re-formed.

In June 1966 riots had broken out between police and Catholic residents during Loyalist marches and during that year three people were killed. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was formed the following year as an umbrella organisation bringing together a variety of campaigners agitating for political reform. It organised a number of marches in 1968, which were brutally disrupted by police reservists and rioting followed. Under pressure from London for radical reform, the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, Terrence O'Neill, announced a programme of reforms, prompting NICRA to suspend its marches and demonstrations on 9 December. The NICRA organisation split and from this emerged a new body, the People's Democracy, which announced a new march from Belfast to Londonderry for 1-4 January 1969.

Political Context

The political situation deteriorated from the start of 1969 after a Loyalist mob (including it was alleged off-duty B Specials) attacked the People's Democracy march at Burntollet in January 1969, despite the presence of an RUC police escort, hospitalising 87; as rioting spread to Londonderry, the RUC aggressively raided the Nationalist Bogside area.[22] O'Neill, who had previously announced a series of reforms to extend civil rights to the Catholic minority under

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[21] On the border conflict see M.L.R. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland: The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement* (Routledge: London, 1995), 66-72.
[22] Newsinger, 160-1.

pressure from London, faced Protestant demands to quell the rioting. Experiencing discontent within his own party and opposition to his reform package from the radical Protestant Reverend Ian Paisley, O'Neill called a general election. He was narrowly returned.

The General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Northern Ireland, Lieutenant General Sir Ian Harris had warned the Vice Chief of the General Staff in late November 1968 that things were 'now at a flashpoint' and the Army might soon be asked to provide military assistance, noting that the RUC had had 400 officers on duty the weekend before in Londonderry (including reinforcements from Belfast) to control a crowd of 15,000. If military forces were called for, Harris warned 'the situation would deteriorate considerably'.[23]

The febrile political atmosphere leading up to the election prompted the Labour government in London to consider scenarios where direct rule would have to be imposed in the province. Arrangements were so advanced that a top-secret legislative bill was drafted to enable the UK government to assume responsibility for Northern Ireland. In a meeting with the Prime Minister Harold Wilson and other ministers, the Defence Secretary Denis Healey outlined the circumstances in which the military could be deployed to maintain law and order. He estimated that up to two divisions of troops might be necessary and put in place contingency plans to transfer troops from Great Britain to Northern Ireland.[24] The Home Secretary James Callaghan 'thought it right…to take into consideration the worst case, in which the United Kingdom Government might have to assume direct responsibility for Northern Ireland'.[25] The government, however, was extremely concerned about deploying troops or disbanding Stormont – both of which were considered options of last resort. Nevertheless, events in the province were being closely monitored in London; between February and August, Harold Wilson chaired a committee of ministers to discuss the situation in Northern Ireland on five occasions.[26]

Callaghan was also pressing O'Neill to introduce his reform package to enable greater freedoms for the Catholic minority. However, amid continuing rioting in Catholic areas,

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[23] TNA, DEFE 25/257, 'Harris to Victor Fitzgeorge-Balfour: Military Assistance to the Northern Ireland Government', 20 November 1968.

[24] TNA, PREM 13/2842, 'Ministerial Meeting', 19 February 1969.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ronan Fanning, 'Playing It Cool: The Response of the British and Irish Governments to the Crisis in Northern Ireland, 1968-9', *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 12 (2001), http://www.jstor.org/stable/30002059, 65.

O'Neill's reform agenda also sparked violent reaction from the UVF. On 20 April 1969, the UVF bombed the Silent Valley reservoir in an attempt to force O'Neill from office – a feat that they ultimately succeeded in. (The UVF had hoped that the IRA would be blamed and initially it was – it has since come to be accepted that the UVF was responsible.)[27] That evening, the Northern Ireland Cabinet successfully petitioned London to deploy troops for 'the passive defence of key installations'.[28]

The 1st Battalion, Prince of Wales's Own Regiment of Yorkshire (PWO) was sent to Northern Ireland for the task, reinforcing the province's existing two infantry battalions and an armoured car squadron stationed at Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn. The PWO was originally scheduled to deploy to the province for four months before returning to the UK and was going to be gapped – meaning its replacements would not immediately arrive as it departed.[29] As O'Neill's position became increasingly precarious, Wilson expressed his serious concerns about intervening in Northern Ireland: 'if it became necessary for the troops to intervene, they would be thought to be doing so in order to maintain the Orange faction in power. The constitutional consequences might be very grave, and once we were involved it would be difficult to secure our withdrawal'.[30] On 28 April, O'Neill resigned and several days later was replaced by James Chichester-Clark. The Chief of the General Staff (CGS), General Sir Geoffrey Baker visited the province in May, highlighting concerns in his post-visit report about the RUC and its Special Branch (SB), particularly in terms of leadership and administration.

By summer 1969, public disorder had become commonplace. That July, violence erupted during the annual Protestant Orange Order parades. Further concerns were raised in London about probable disorder at the Protestant Apprentice Boys march in Londonderry the following month. The British government was anxious that if 'rioting does break out again in Londonderry and becomes more serious than before, there is a danger that the police will lose control of the situation, and that the Northern Ireland Government will then have to ask for military assistance to restore order'.[31] On 14 July troops were positioned near Londonderry but

[27] David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney and Chris Thornton, *Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles* (London: Mainstream, 2000) 30.
[28] TNA, PREM 13/2842, 'Note of Telephone Conversation', 21 April 1969.
[29] TNA, CAB 129/144/7, 'Memorandum by the Minister of Defence Administration', 28 July 1969.
[30] TNA, CAB 128/44/19, 'Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting', 24 April 1969.
[31] TNA, CAB 129/144/8, 'James Callaghan: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department,' 28 July 1969.

were not called upon to deploy. Then in early August troops were moved into a police station near the Unity Flats in Belfast, but once again were not deployed onto the streets.

Whilst Callaghan was hopeful that reforms could be implemented to address the Catholic community's 'main grievances' and result in a de-escalation of violence,[32] he was prepared to intervene directly in Northern Ireland if the situation spiralled out of control. In early August, Callaghan warned Chichester-Clark that if troops were deployed on a continuous basis, as opposed to 'a solitary occasion', the British government would be forced to 'assume…control of the circumstances in which the troops were used. This would mean in some senses assuming responsibility for Northern Ireland affairs'.[33]

On 12 August, the government's fears were realised as the Apprentice Boys march in Londonderry resulted in widespread violence and several deaths; amid the disturbances, known as the Battle of the Bogside, Nationalists erected barricades to protect their areas from Loyalist vigilantes. However, the RUC demonstrated its partisan nature against the Catholic community by taking down the barriers allowing violent Loyalist mobs into the areas.[34] In the days that followed, rioting and violence broke out across Northern Ireland, but was particularly severe in Belfast. The violence was so ferocious that between July and August 1969, 10 people were killed and approximately 900 were injured. Some 200 houses had been ruined and double that number had been damaged. In Belfast, 1,820 families, mainly Catholics, were driven from their homes by sectarian mobs.[35] The poorly-manned and poorly-equipped security forces – consisting of 3,000 RUC personnel and 10,000 B Specials – proved incapable of dealing with the escalating violence and were on the verge of collapse.[36] Control was being lost. This resulted in troops being placed on standby.[37] On 14 August, at 1635hrs, the RUC Inspector General requested that Callaghan authorise Military Aid to the Civil Power (MAC-P) and deploy troops onto the streets.[38] The response was affirmative:

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[32] TNA, CAB 129/144/8.

[33] TNA, PREM 13/2843, 'Brian Cubbon to Peter Gregson', 6 August 1969.

[34] CGS, *Operation Banner*, 2-3.

[35] Newsinger, 163.

[36] Rod Thornton, 'Getting It Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British Army's Deployment to Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972)', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30:1 (2007), https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390701210848, 75.

[37] BBC News, 'On This Day: 14 August 1969: British troops sent into Northern Ireland', *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/14/newsid_4075000/4075437.stm

[38] Aaron Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles: Operation Banner 1969–2007* (Oxford and New York: Osprey Publishing, 2011), 29.

The General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland (the GOC) has been instructed to take all necessary steps, acting impartially between citizen and citizen, to restore law and order. Troops will be withdrawn as soon as this is accomplished.[39]

The prime minister and home secretary envisaged an isolated security operation to be strictly limited in scope.

Troops Deploy onto the Streets

Twenty-five minutes after the request for a MAC-P deployment, 300 troops from the 1st Battalion, PWO (which had been sent to Northern Ireland in April) were deployed to Londonderry behind police lines to restore the rule of law and act as a peacekeeping force, primarily protecting the Catholic community from Loyalist mobs.[40] The RUC then withdrew at the request of the Bogsiders and there was an immediate cessation of rioting. The British government and the Army were so unprepared for what was to follow that the five infantry companies (one company from another battalion had been added to the PWO to strengthen it) deployed in Londonderry that afternoon represented <u>half</u> the deployable infantry strength in the whole of Northern Ireland that day.[41] Crucially, the deployment was not against the wishes of the Bogside residents and the five companies were able to seize the initiative. The RUC however had suffered a major setback and were exhausted and demoralised; Army commanders talked privately of the RUC having been 'defeated' by the events of previous days.[42]

it was internal security, but there was a sense of unreality in many ways: This is the United Kingdom. These things didn't happen in our country: riots, killings, torching of vehicles, barricades. The Army was initially extremely popular…we were seen as saving

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[39] Quoted in Desmond Hamill, *Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland, 1969-1984* (Methuen: London, 1985), 7.

[40] Peter Taylor, *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein* (London: Bloomsbury, 1997), 56.

[41] Before the PWO's deployment to the province in the Spring, this would have represented over 80% of the deployable infantry strength in Northern Ireland.

[42] Between 12-16 August there were 10 deaths and almost 900 injuries (290 Catholics; 231 Protestants; 368 RUC; and, 10 Fire Service). MoD, *Narrative,* Vol. 1, II-29.

them from the Protestants and also from the RUC…of course, the mood soured quite quickly, but initially…the Catholics certainly were pleased to see us. [43]

The following day (15 August), troops were also deployed in Belfast where rioting had also flared up, but only the remaining five companies were available for this operation, in a city more than seven times the size of Londonderry.[44] The hope of the military was that the decisive action of the PWO in Londonderry could be replicated in Belfast – but it was not. Despite their best effort the force was spread far too thinly across a large urban area and was totally inadequate to the task, or the expectations of a significant section of the population. (Rioting had broken out in four other towns and the border was also judged to be vulnerable to IRA incursion.)

The level of commitment that had been agreed by Westminster at this stage (and the lack of preparation) was so insufficient for the spiralling situation that the troops in Belfast were incapable of protecting even those civilians that were being directly attacked. The perception that the British Army was not protecting the Catholic population from attack quickly spread. The remaining five companies of infantry that were not already deployed in Londonderry numbered probably 400-500 (a year later in July 1970 almost 1,500-2,000 soldiers deployed to the Falls Road district of Belfast alone).[45]

Reinforcements from the mainland rapidly arrived in the form of the spearhead battalion (3rd Battalion, The Light Infantry), which had been placed on standby at 2300hrs on 14 August and deployed its soldiers onto the streets of Belfast from 0200hrs on 16 August (ministerial approval had been given at 1530hrs on 15 August), but it took several days for sentiment to change amongst the Catholics. In the first 24 hours in Belfast 800-900 petrol bombs were found and destroyed by the Army. By 17 August it was clear to most that the Army (and a lot more of it) would be staying for a very long time – although this was not what Stormont, or Westminster wanted.

[43] National Army Museum (hereafter 'NAM'), NAM 2013-01-31, Oral history interview: Squadron Commander, Londonderry August 1969.
[44] Londonderry's 1969 population of 55,000, was dwarfed by Belfast's 385,000.
[45] MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 1, II-29.

The troops were responsible to the MoD in London, not the Stormont regime. The military's job, according to the new GOC, Lieutenant General Sir Ian Freeland, was to 'hold the ring' in 'a completely impartial manner' while the government determined a 'new deal' for Northern Ireland.[46] Freeland had only assumed command on 9 July 1969 and led a force that was little more than that deployed in a small district on the mainland, with, as previously stated, a single brigade made up of two infantry battalions and one armoured car regiment – a role normally assigned to an officer of major general rank (the GOC's rank was designed to demonstrate the importance of the six counties for the MoD but was not accompanied by significant forces). Backwater was a common perception in military circles for the Northern Ireland garrison. Relations between the Army and RUC were described as 'distant' before July 1969, although some training assistance had been provided to the RUC following the July riots in Londonderry.[47] Headquarters Northern Ireland (HQNI) consisted of the GOC, a brigadier general staff and nine middle and junior ranking staff officers.

Reinforcement arrives

The resident brigade and the Army more generally (including the incoming troops from the spearhead battalion) had little understanding of the inter-sectarian frontiers of the cities they were deploying into until they started to receive briefings from the RUC on 15 August. Before the events of that week there appears to have been little consideration of a major threat developing, or that reinforcements might be needed in strength, perhaps explaining why the first intervention was too weak, too late and not as accurately inserted into the cities as it might have been. Doctrinally too the Army was breaking new ground as it was working under 'Counter-Revolutionary Operations' guidance on 'Internal Security' – not written with MAC-P deployments in the UK in mind.

While the military was initially welcomed by a besieged Catholic community, Callaghan was aware that 'the initial impact made by the arrival of British troops could not be expected to last, and it was essential to act urgently to lower the temperature'.[48] This view was also shared by Freeland who noted that: 'the honeymoon period cannot obviously continue forever…but

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[46] Imperial War Museum (hereafter 'IWM'), Freeland Papers, 79/34/3, 'Talk to Commanders at GOC's Study Day', 2 September 1969, quoted in Aaron Edwards, '"A Whipping Boy If Ever There was One"? The British Military and the Politics of Civil–Military Relations in Northern Ireland, 1969–79', *Contemporary British History* 28:2 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2014.923764, 168.
[47] MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 1, 1-16.
[48] TNA, CAB 128/46/6, 'Confidential Annex to CC (69), 41st Conclusions', 19 August 1969.

unless there is a solution or some hope for the future – and this is where the politicians have got to come in – the soldiers are not going to be welcomed on the streets forever.[49]

The British Cabinet agreed that in order to 'lower the temperature' it was important to keep the Stormont regime in place and use 'the Northern Ireland Government as agents'. Driving decision-making was a strong desire to avoid having to intervene politically in the province. This approach, argued Denis Healey, would give London 'more chance of being able to withdraw the troops'.[50] Moreover, it was feared that dissolving Stormont could push the Protestant majority into a civil war mindset, a concern that would overshadow military decision-making for years afterwards.

On 19 August, the British and Northern Ireland governments issued the Downing Street Declaration, which supported a programme of reform to ensure equality for all citizens. Reflecting London's lack of confidence in the RUC's competence and impartiality, the signed communiqué outlined that the GOC be given 'overall responsibility for security operations', and 'full control of the deployment and tasks' of the RUC. It also gave the GOC control over the B Specials and its arms and indicated that they would be 'rapidly relieved' of riot control duties.[51] The GOC reported to the CGS, the head of the Army, and through him to the defence secretary, meaning that Westminster had taken full control of security matters. After visiting Northern Ireland, a week later, Callaghan warned that '[t]he situation was [still] a grave and urgent one'. Harold Wilson was more optimistic about the situation and contended that the deployment of troops had been successful and 'bought time in which to work out a long-term solution'. He cautioned, however, that the 'solution' would not be imminent and, therefore, 'there should be no premature withdrawal of the troops'.[52] This assessment was not shared by Freeland who still thought that the deployment would be short-lived.[53]

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[49] Taylor Downing (ed.) *The Troubles: The Background to the Question of Northern Ireland* (London: Macdonald Press, 1989), 155 as cited in David Pearson, 'Low Intensity Operations in Northern Ireland', in Michael C. Desch (ed.) *Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 104-5.
[50] TNA, CAB 128/46, 'Confidential Annex to CC (69), 42nd Conclusions', 4 September 1969, quoted in Fanning, 78.
[51] HM Government, *Northern Ireland Text of a Communiqué and Declaration issued after a meeting held at 10 Downing Street on 19 August 1969*, Cmnd. 4154 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), 1969), https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/hmso/bni190869.htm
[52] TNA, CAB 128/46, 'Confidential Annex to CC (69), 42nd Conclusions', 4 September 1969, quoted in Fanning, 78.
[53] Edwards, 'Whipping Boy', 168.

Command Changes

The Army presence rapidly started to expand, doubling in size and assuming policing duties that had never been undertaken by it in the UK. By the end of August there were two brigades deployed in Northern Ireland (39 Brigade in Belfast covering the east, and 24 (later 8) Brigade covering the north and west including Londonderry) and command changes were urgently implemented as it was clear that the GOC had been overstretched during the previous weeks. These included an expanded HQNI and the appointment of two additional senior officers to support Freedland in controlling his growing force – a Major General as his chief of staff and a second Major General appointed as director of operations. The results were not ideal with the division of responsibilities between the two major generals 'flawed' and the quality of the staff 'insufficient'.[54] The problems with command and control arrangements took two years to settle down, although by August 1970 an important step was taken with the appointment of a single Major General (originally Anthony Farrar Hockley) to assume the role of Commander Land Forces (CLF), a post in operational command of the deployed brigades, with direct access to the GOC.

To coordinate military policy with political decision-making, a Joint Security Committee, chaired by the prime minister of Northern Ireland, was established on 18 August 1969. Other attendees included the GOC, ministers and the chief constable of the RUC. Operational policy was formulated at the Operational Policy Committee at Military Headquarters ('D Ops' meetings), chaired by the GOC and attended by the RUC chief constable, RUC assistant chief constable, the head of SB, the head of Army Intelligence, and the UK delegate to the Northern Ireland government. This style of decision-making body had been used in previous colonial campaigns.[55] The decision-making process, however, proved more complicated as Freeland was answerable to London, which was often at odds with the Stormont government over the direction of the operation.[56] This led Freeland to note that: '[t]he GOC is a whipping boy if ever there was one. He certainly has to serve several masters'.[57]

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[54] CGS, *Operation Banner*, 4-6, para 415.
[55] Christopher Tuck, 'Northern Ireland and the British Approach to Counter-Insurgency', *Defence & Security Analysis* 23:2 (2007), https://doi.org/10.1080/14751790701424721, 166.
[56] Edwards, 'Whipping Boy', 169.
[57] IWM, Freeland Papers, 79/34/4, 'Cross-Bench Peers - Talks on Topical Subjects by Lieutenant General Sir Ian Freeland: The Origins and development of the Army's Involvement in Northern Ireland', 3 February 1972, quoted in Edwards, 'Whipping Boy', 166.

The military's role was further increased when the Hunt Commission, established to investigate policing in the six counties, recommended that the B Specials be disbanded, and the RUC be disarmed and stripped of military style duties. It also recommended that a locally recruited part-time regiment be formed (which became the UDR, established in late 1969/early 1970).[58] Serious rioting by Protestants followed the publication of the Hunt Report in October 1969, with the Army and the RUC coming under sustained attack from shootings and petrol bombings near the Shankill Road, with one RUC member killed and four wounded, along with 16 soldiers wounded – the deployed battalion estimated that they were shot at over 1,000 times.[59]

The confidence of the Catholic community in the Army's ability to protect them was shaken by the riots of October and it was later judged that this may have been a turning point in support shifting to the paramilitaries, although the IRA's standing remained low.[60] The Loyalist community on the other hand appeared to have accepted the tough response of the Army and there was a reduction in violence from them. Joint patrolling of the Falls Road and later the Unity Flats and New Lodge Road by the RUC and Army began later in October and barricades came down in Londonderry. The Army though possessed poor intelligence and did little more than routine patrolling in this end of the honeymoon period.

The effect of both the Downing Street Declaration and Hunt Commission was to put the military in overall control of security policy and make it solely in charge of riot control in Northern Ireland. Freeland, however, was reluctant for the military to take on such a prominent role. He considered it vital for stability in the province to have a reformed and improved RUC back in charge; this would allow the military to return to its 'peace-time barracks'. Freeland was also cognisant that the MoD was unenthusiastic about dedicating extra resources to the operation.[61] In fact, in late January 1970, the government, judging violence had decreased sufficiently, withdrew three out of the eight Army units that had been sent to the province.[62]

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[58] The UDR was initially established as a new Regiment of the British Army with its establishment capped at 4,000 (later 6,000) officers and men in 7 battalions. It was proscribed from being used for riot control.
[59] MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 1, III-18-20
[60] Allegedly IRA stood for 'I Ran Away' in some parts of the Catholic community at that time.
[61] IWM, Freeland Papers, 79/34/4, 'GOC's Closing Remarks: Study Period', 5 December 1969, quoted in Edwards, 'Whipping Boy', 170.
[62] Peter Neumann, *Britain's Long War: British Strategy in the Northern Ireland Conflict 1969–98* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 52.

The decision to withdraw troops proved ill-fated as the military struggled to deal with the eruption of major violence in Belfast in March 1970. The move was compounded by the IRA's split several months previously into its 'Official' and 'Provisional' wings, with the latter stating its intention to launch an offensive campaign against the British.[63] Its potential threat was poorly understood due to continuing distrust between the SB and the Army, which thought the SB lacked 'effective machinery for processing and disseminating intelligence'.[64] With inadequate resources, Freeland restated his belief that the military would soon have to return to barracks, although he did warn that petrol bombers were 'liable to be shot'.[65] The GOC had estimated that to deal with the marching season the following year would take a force of 15,000 troops and 4,000 police officers – at the start of 1970, HQNI had nine battalions and two armoured car regiments.

The military was again placed under pressure as it struggled to contain widespread disturbances following Orange Order parades in June. Between 27 and 28 June, six people were killed and 113 were injured, including 52 troops and three RUC officers; several Royal Marines were fortunate to survive PIRA gun attacks.[66] The military concluded that the unrest was 'staged-managed by the [Provisional] IRA as part of a deliberate attempt to outstretch, and thereby discredit, the Security forces'.[67] Significantly, the military's handling of the disturbances caused dismay in Unionist circles; a charge the new Conservative Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, faced on a trip to the province. During a Northern Ireland Cabinet meeting, which Maudling attended, Chichester-Clark complained: 'that when the military were asked for help the reply tended to be: "We can't do that because we are neutral" or "Our task here is to protect the minority"…'. Chichester-Clark argued that it was 'essential that the Army should deal toughly, and be seen to deal toughly, with thugs and gunmen'.[68]

For months, Chichester-Clark, warning of a Republican attempt to overthrow Stormont, had placed pressure on both the GOC and previous (Labour) Home Secretary, James Callaghan,

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[63] Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 106, 125.
[64] MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 1, 1-14.
[65] Hamill, 32.
[66] TNA, WO 305/3783, 'HQ Northern Ireland: INTSUM', 2 July 1970, Annex A, para. 3a (1–2) and TNA, ADM 301/26, '45 Commando Royal Marines: Newsletter', 14, para. 6, quoted in Geoffrey Warner, 'The Falls Road Curfew Revisited', *Irish Studies Review* 14:3 (2006), https://doi.org/10.1080/09670880600802438, 329.
[67] TNA, FCO 33/1076, 'Burroughs: Telegram', 29 June 1970; TNA, WO 305/3783, 'HQ Northern Ireland: INTSUM', 2 July 1970, para. 7, quoted in Warner, 330.
[68] TNA, CJ 4/21, 'Home Secretary's discussion with Northern Ireland Cabinet on Tuesday 30 June', 9 July 1970.

for the military to take a tougher approach in restoring law and order, particularly increasing the number of arrests. Another concern for Stormont was the prospect that the PIRA was operating in Catholic 'no-go' areas with impunity. Not only did the PIRA use the 'no-go' areas to build their military strength, to the Loyalist community they represented the breakdown of the rule of law. In a meeting with Maudling, the GOC outlined that the Army 'alone' was in a position to adopt a tough line but asked how he should do so: '[h]e could either open fire on rioters or ask for sufficient soldiers on the ground to enable him to keep order by means of a massive military presence'. The GOC discarded the first option and instead lobbied for the government 'to face up to the necessity of sending as many men as were required to Northern Ireland in order to enable the peace to be kept'. Moreover, Freeland also requested that the military be given access to new weapons, such as rubber baton rounds and improved CS gas. The home secretary agreed to '"expedite decisions" on the use of the new weapons'.[69] By 1970 there were approximately 12,000 troops deployed, up from approximately 6,000 in 1969.[70]

The Balkan Street Search

It was not long, however, before events on the ground led the military to adopt a tougher approach. During a weapons search of the Lower Falls area of Belfast in July 1970, widespread rioting and disorder occurred, forcing the military to escalate its response, including using CS gas. A company of infantry had become encircled by rioters and a battalion operation was mounted to relieve them. The brigade commander, flying over the area in a helicopter, was forced to land after his pilot believed they had been hit by small arms fire. After consultation with the GOC and CLF he gave orders for an area search by four battalions of infantry.[71] Described by one account as 'one of the most violent nights even in Belfast's long history of violence',[72] the military conducted an extensive house search operation and imposed a 35-hour curfew on the Nationalist community (the operation is also known as the 'Falls Road Curfew'). During the operation, the military seized '29 rifles and carbines, three submachine guns, eight shotguns, thirty-two revolvers, nineteen automatic pistols, 24,973 rounds of ball ammunition and 621 shotgun cartridges'.[73] Approximately 3,000 soldiers participated in the operation, discharging nearly 1,500 rounds of ammunition in the process. The operation resulted in six

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[69] TNA, CJ 4/21, 'Hopkins Memorandum: Main points made by GOC Northern Ireland to the Home Secretary at Lisburn on 30 June 1970', 8 July 1970.
[70] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles*, 47.
[71] CGS, *Operation Banner,* 2–5. Republicans termed the events 'the Rape of the Falls'.
[72] TNA, WO 305/3783, 'HQ Northern Ireland: INTSUM', 9 July 1970, para. 3, quoted in Warner, 326.
[73] TNA, WO 305/3783, 'HQ Northern Ireland: INTSUM', 16 July 1970, Annex B, quoted in Warner, 326.

civilian deaths and 57 injuries; 18 soldiers were also wounded.[74] It is unclear how far the military's robust approach to the disorder was partly influenced by Unionist criticism the previous week, although Freeland stated that the operation was not pre-planned. [75] Nevertheless, the incident is considered the first in a series of missteps that damaged the military's relationship with the Nationalist community. A British soldier who participated in the search recounted that troops maltreated the locals. He noted: '[t]his is when I did feel like we'd invaded'.[76] According to the Army's own assessment of the operation:

> Tactically the Balkan Street Search was a limited success. However, it was a significant reverse at the operational level…The search also convinced most moderate catholics [sic] that the Army was pro-loyalist. The majority of the catholic population became effectively nationalist, if they were not already. The IRA gained significant support.[77]

Whilst the incident undoubtedly strained relations between the military and Nationalist community, its negative impact has been exaggerated. Several accounts point to the fact that after the Falls Road Curfew 'relations between the Catholic community and the British Army [were] generally good but quickly eroding'.[78] Relations between the British and Nationalist community deteriorated further as, at Chichester-Clark's request, Prime Minister Edward Heath authorised another curfew in the Lower Falls (and in the Bogside in Londonderry) in late July. Heath was determined 'not [to] allow [the continuation of 'no-go' areas] to develop any further'. As a counterbalance, Heath also insisted that sectarian marches were banned until January 1971.[79] Relations between the RUC and the Army remained 'undoubtably strained' at the top, satisfactory a little lower down and 'poor again' at 'soldier/constable level', while intelligence co-operation had seen no improvements.[80]

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[74] Warner, 326.

[75] TNA, DEFE 25/273, 'Freeland Message', 6 July 1970, quoted in Warner, 332.

[76] Nick Curtis, *Faith and Duty: The True Story of a Soldier's War in Northern Ireland* (London: André Deutsch, 1998), 35

[77] CGS, *Operation Banner,* 2–5, 6. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland*, points out that it was a particular blunder as the Lower Falls was a stronghold of the OIRA who were pursuing a policy of non-confrontation with the Army, providing PIRA with its first big influx of recruits, 92.

[78] Raymond J. Quinn, *A Rebel Voice: A History of Belfast Republicanism, 1925-1972* (Belfast: Belfast Cultural and Local History Group, 1999), 171, quoted in Warner, 336.

[79] Edward Heath, *The Course of My Life: My Autobiography* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998), 425.

[80] MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 1, IV–15-25.

Escalating Violence and Doctrine

Events in the summer and autumn of 1970 had a transformative effect on the Troubles. The PIRA moved from defensive to offensive operations,[81] and the nature of the disturbances changed from rioting to organised violence.[82] From 1969 to 1970, military injures increased from 54 to 620; the number of shootings increased from 73 to 213; and bombings increased from ten to 170.[83] In the face of rising violence, the military adopted a more aggressive posture, which, in turn, contributed to the cycle of violence. From the outset of the campaign, the military was largely unprepared to deal with widespread civil disturbances during a homeland mission. The context in which the military was operating in was widely different to the circumstances it had experienced in previous counterinsurgency campaigns; namely, Northern Ireland was part of the UK, not a colonial outpost. That said, in the early years of the campaign, the military relied heavily on its playbook from Aden, Cyprus, Kenya and Malaya.[84] In fact, the 1969 COIN manual, *Counter Revolutionary Warfare*, was shaped by the Malayan campaign and still 'smelled of the jungle'.[85] Aaron Edwards argues that 'the Army drew on its operational experience in colonial theatres of war for a quick-fix "one-size-fits-all" solution to the inter-communal violence'.[86] As John Bew notes, drawing on previous COIN experience was problematic as several of these campaigns were 'often brutal, occasionally indiscriminate, and sometimes counter-productive when it came to winning "hearts and minds"'.[87] A tendency to not regard the requirements of operating in the UK as uniquely demanding appeared to settle amongst some in command positions – at various levels, although this does not appear to have been the norm.

The reliance on inappropriate COIN techniques was compounded by the fact that pre-deployment training was based on colonial-era drills. Bob Stewart MP, then a young officer deployed to Northern Ireland in the early 1970s,

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[81] Seán MacStiofáin, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary* (Edinburgh: Cremonesi, 1975), 146-7; 150-161.
[82] CGS, *Operation Banner,* 2–6.
[83] Data from the PSNI quoted in Andrew Sanders, 'Principles of Minimum Force and the Parachute Regiment in Northern Ireland, 1969–1972', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 41:5 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1176917, 669.
[84] Bew, 'Mass, Methods, and Means', 159.
[85] British Army, *Field Manual,* CS4–4.
[86] Aaron Edwards, 'Misapplying lessons learned? Analysing the utility of British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland, 1971–76', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 21:2 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2010.481427, 306.
[87] Bew, 'Mass, Methods, and Means', 160.

We started our training immediately…We watched parts 1 and 2 of the film, 'Keeping the Peace,' which was made by my battalion in the 1950s. We were being trained to go into Northern Ireland as though we were going into somewhere like Singapore, Palestine or Amritsar. It was dreadful. We did not know what we were doing. We practised dealing with riots at Weeton camp in Lancashire using formations that the British Army had so often used in the past. In the formation, we had snipers, cameramen, diarists and banner-men, and the banner that I was issued said, on one side '[a]nyone crossing the white line is liable to be shot' and on the other, '[d]isperse or we fire'. We took that banner to Londonderry, but what was farcical was that the second language on it was Arabic.[88]

The use of a box formation approach for platoon movement in internal security operations was ill-suited to urban areas of the UK, as was the imposition of curfews. The lack of context-specific training had practical ramifications for the conduct of the campaign. For instance, a then Company Commander, Brigadier Peter Morton, noted that inadequate training had cost his men their lives and that they had 'little idea of what to expect' on arrival.[89] Once deployed, rules of engagement were conditioned by 'Yellow Card' guidance. The Yellow Card, first developed during the Aden campaign,[90] set forth guidance on the circumstances under which soldiers could open fire and implement the lawful application of lethal force and were first issued in the province on 25 September 1969.[91] The Yellow Card was amended for the first time in July 1970 to allow lethal force to be used against petrol bombers if warnings had been issued. In response to high levels of violence in 1970, Yellow Card guidance was amended again in January 1971.[92] Andrew Sanders argues the new cards 'opened up a number of scenarios where soldiers could open fire whilst on duty'. He further explains:

The elasticity of the rules of engagement emphasized the fact that previous directives had proven impracticable. These situations included someone carrying a firearm and believed to be about to use it, someone refusing to halt when ordered to do so, and petrol bombers, provided a clear warning was issued first. There was significant scope for diverse interpretations of these regulations…[93]

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[88] House of Commons, *Hansard*, 3 November 2010, Vol. 517, Col. 977, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2010-11-03/debates/10110358000005/BloodySundayInquiry(Report)
[89] Pearson, 116.
[90] Sanders, 'Principles of Minimum Force', 668. A Yellow card is reproduced in the appendices below.
[91] MoD Narrative Vol 1, III-13.
[92] Sanders, 'Principles of Minimum Force', 669.
[93] Sanders, 'Principles of Minimum Force', 669.

This 'elasticity', however, resulted in soldiers considering the Yellow Cards to lack clarity. According to Sanders, soldiers were given significant leeway to determine for themselves what the appropriate level of force was.[94] From the MoD's perspective, the idea was to provide a margin for judgement – so a soldier operating within the letter and spirit of the Card - in what were extremely demanding circumstances - could be assured that prosecution for using lethal force was unlikely. Given that every scenario where lethal force might be used could not be predicted, legal advice was against trying to define the precise limits of legal liability.[95] The Yellow Cards were revised in various ways during Operation Banner, not least as the weapons available to the Army developed, including the use of baton rounds (plastic bullets) and the Special Water Dispenser, with at least six iterations. All emphasised the use of minimum force and using firearms as a last resort. However, the Yellow Cards did not have legal standing and even in training these questions proved difficult to explain since:

> the yellow card [sic] is open to interpretation as many injunctions are hedged by phrases such as 'unless strictly necessary' or an equivalent phrase, begging the question of what such a necessity might be…The interpretation of the yellow card [sic] has always posed a problem for the Army authorities and legal experts; for the soldier these interpretations are supposed to be made in a matter of seconds on the streets of the province in very dangerous situations.[96]

More broadly, the military's actions were also guided by the principle of minimum force. In theory, the principle of minimum force underpinned the military's rules of engagement for the entirety of Operation Banner.[97] It was not, however, a fixed concept and depended on the context and those applying it. In particular, minimum force did not necessarily mean minimum numbers and doctrinally _shows_ of force could allow for less _use_ of force. A problem throughout the period of Operation Banner was that there rarely was sufficient force available, let alone disproportionate force to allow for escalation, due to political sensitivities and a recurring debate within the MoD about the extent to which Operation Banner was undermining the

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[94] Neumann, _Britain's Long War_, 56.
[95] Senior defence official.
[96] Paul Killworth, 'The British Army in Northern Ireland: internal security operations, training and the cease-fire', _The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology_ 20:3 (1998), https://www.jstor.org/stable/23818808, 8.
[97] TNA, DEFE 25/257, 'Military Assistance to the Northern Ireland Government', 20 November 1968, quoted in Edwards, 'Misapplying lessons learned?', footnote 14.

Army's ability to fulfil its other missions, most notably to NATO most importantly through the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR).

By early 1971, it was evident that the military's main threat was the PIRA. In February, the first solider of the conflict was killed and, soon after, the PIRA increased its bombing campaign.[98] At the same time, ministers in the MoD recognised that the violence was 'approaching armed conflict'.[99] The following month, the PIRA killed three young off-duty soldiers with shots to the backs of their heads, which was followed by 4,000 shipyard workers marching to demand the internment of PIRA volunteers.[100] As the situation worsened, Chichester-Clark petitioned Heath's government for stronger action. The Northern Ireland prime minister suggested to the Defence Secretary, Lord Peter Carrington, that the troops in the province be placed under Stormont's authority. This was a step too far for Heath, who agreed with Carrington, that there was no military justification for more troops; what was needed was 'better intelligence' to bring the situation under control. Nevertheless, Heath did concede to send an additional two battalions, numbering 1,300 troops to the province, 'to prevent Chichester-Clark losing too much face'.[101] The support, however, fell short of what Chichester-Clark considered appropriate to contain the mounting violence. Under pressure from the Unionist community, Chichester-Clark resigned as Northern Ireland prime minister in March 1971; he was replaced by Brian Faulkner.

Meanwhile RUC recruitment had continued to be slow, and its strength was still only around 3,900 against a target of 6,000, plus a reserve of 600. The UDR had reached 4,000, but on the ground the asymmetry was still stark – the Army was deploying 1,500 troops in the Shankill Road/Unity Flats area of Belfast, accompanied by just 21 policemen. Nonetheless, tour lengths were reviewed at this time with a proposal to reduce resident battalion tours from two years to 18 months agreed for 1972, but the roulement battalion tours were kept at four months. The CGS position was taken over by General Sir Michael Carver in April 1971 and the RUC had seen Sir Graham Shillington replace Sir Arthur Young, who had returned to the City of London Police the previous autumn.

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[98] CGS, *Operation Banner,* 2–6.
[99] Neumann, *Britain's Long War*, 54.
[100] Paul Bew, *Ireland: The Politics of Enmity 1789–2006* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 502. One of the soldiers was 17 and the government thereafter banned soldiers under 18 from service in Northern Ireland.
[101] Heath, 426.

3. The Rise and Fall of the Insurgency Phase, 1971-1974

Internment

Like his predecessor, Faulkner appealed to Westminster to introduce robust security measures, including sanctioning internment without trial for suspected PIRA members. Since the end of the Second World War, the British military had used internment in several of its colonial campaigns, including Malaya, Kenya, Brunei, and Aden. The Stormont regime had also previously implemented the measure in its fight against the IRA.[102] Whilst Chichester-Clark had considered its reintroduction throughout 1970, it was not until early summer 1971, that Faulkner's Cabinet agreed that internment might be required.[103] Faulkner hoped that the introduction of internment would stem the rising violence and thus save his precarious premiership. Although the power to introduce internment rested with the Stormont government under the Civil Authorities and (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922, it was agreed that Belfast would consult London before its introduction.

While the Army was not particularly in favour of internment and did not advocate its introduction, the discussions surrounding internment were accompanied by a debate about intelligence gathering and interrogation. This prompted the Head of SB, David Johnson, to request help from the MoD to establish an interrogation centre in Northern Ireland and to request training for 10 RUC officers as interrogators.[104] The MoD agreed to establish such a facility and sent an Intelligence Corps Lieutenant Colonel with experience in Aden from the Joint Services Interrogation Wing (JSIW), to help.[105] In April 1971, a number of RUC officers received interrogation training at JSIW headquarters at Ashford in Kent, including, at Johnson's request, training in 'five techniques' which had been developed by the Army to aid interrogation in a number of colonial contexts following the second world war.[106]

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[102] Stormont had introduced internment on several occasions: 1922–1924, 1938–1945 and 1956–1961.

[103] Brian Faulkner and John Houston (ed.) *Memoirs of a Statesman* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978), 117–19.

[104] TNA, DEFE 23/109, 'Background Note', c. November 1971, quoted in Samantha Newbery, 'Intelligence and Controversial British Interrogation Techniques: the Northern Ireland Case, 1971-2', *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 20 (2009), https://www.jstor.org/stable/25735153, 114.

[105] TNA, CAB 163/171, anon., 'Summary of events leading up to interrogation of August 12 and the results of the subsequent interrogation operation: Note on interrogation in Northern Ireland', undated, quoted in Samantha Newbery, *Interrogation, Intelligence and Security: Controversial British Techniques* (Manchester University Press, 2015),74.

[106] Although the military used in various contexts elements of the 'five techniques' after 1945, it was only during a 1963 interrogation operation in Brunei that all 'five techniques' were used together. Newbery, *Interrogation, Intelligence and Security*, 1. This is discussed in 'Deep Interrogation' below.

During the same month, as the debate over internment continued, Maudling noted that the security forces had now advised against the measure being introduced, arguing it would be 'counterproductive' to the security situation.[107] A PIRA bombing campaign in mid-July though convinced Faulkner of the need to introduce internment.[108] Despite this many were still not convinced of the arguments for internment. In July and August, Lord Carrington expressed his and the new GOC, Lieutenant General Sir Harry Tuzo's unease about internment.[109] A particular concern was that the intelligence needed to identify the right people to detain was hopelessly out of date and not in the control of the military, relying on SB material which was also poorly catalogued. The military commanders felt that it was a political decision that they would have to live with and expressed reluctance in various meetings. Detention facilities were also unsuitable, making the screening of those detained difficult and potentially counter-productive to the whole intended purpose.

On 5 August, Faulkner travelled to Westminster for a 'tense but decisive' meeting with Heath, Maudling, Carrington, Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, Tuzo, Shillington and Carver.[110] Faulkner, supported by Shillington, made his case for the introduction of internment.[111] Tuzo was initially cautious, arguing that it was not clear that 'internment could be militarily effective in the long run', although he acknowledged 'that there were compelling reasons for it'.[112] The MoD's senior leadership, including the CGS, argued against the proposal, noting 'that internment should not at present be recommended on military grounds'.[113] (In fact, the military assessed 'that the IRA could be defeated, within a certain timescale, without the introduction of internment'.)[114] MoD leaders did note, however, that the decision for internment ultimately rested with political, not military, leaders.[115] Heath approved the introduction of internment (along with a six month ban on marches), but accepted

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[107] House of Commons, *Hansard*, 6 April 1971, Vol. 815, Col. 268, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1971/apr/06/northern-ireland

[108] Faulkner, 119.

[109] Owen Bowcott, 'General fought plans to intern suspects', *The Guardian*, 1 January 2002, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/jan/01/uk.northernireland

[110] Heath, 428–429.

[111] Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI) CAB/9/B/83/6, 'Note of a Meeting at 10 Downing Street', 5 August 1971, quoted in Martin J. McCleery, 'Debunking the Myths of Operation Demetrius: The Introduction of Internment in Northern Ireland in 1971', *Irish Political Studies* 27:3 (2012), https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2011.636804, 414.

[112] Heath, 428.

[113] TNA, DEFE 70/214, 'R.J. Andrew to Graham Angel: Northern Ireland', 4 August 1971.

[114] PRONI, CAB/9/B/83/6, quoted in McCleery, 'Debunking the Myths', 415-16.

[115] TNA, DEFE 70/214

its introduction was not based on military grounds.[116] He also warned Faulkner that if the measure did not bring the security situation under control, Westminster would introduce direct rule.[117] The Army now had 14 battalions in Northern Ireland, with three reinforcing battalions due to arrive the following week.

On 9 August 1971, at 0400hrs, Operation Demetrius – picking up and interning suspects without trial – commenced. The Stormont government had previously used internment in its fight against the IRA, but its effectiveness, particularly during the 1956-1962 border campaign, was contingent on reciprocal internment measures being implemented in the Republic of Ireland; internment was not introduced south of the border in 1971.[118] The targets of arrest, which were based on SB intelligence, were exclusively from the Catholic community. In contrast, it took nearly two years before the first Loyalist was interned.[119] The Army was sceptical about the accuracy of the SB lists being up to date and believed that any intelligence gains might be counter-balanced by bad publicity – furthermore they suspected that the reluctance of SB to share information with them was to prevent them realising how poor their information was which might threaten the imposition of internment entirely.[120] Of 520 suspects on the initial arrest lists, only 342 were apprehended, with many PIRA members escaping before the start of Operation Demetrius. The arrest lists had been deliberately expanded to include political opponents of the Stormont regime, many of whom did not have PIRA connections.[121] Moreover, the Army was instructed that if they could not identify the suspect (many suspects faced with soldiers in their houses refused to say who they were or gave a first name only), they were to arrest any male over the age of 18 at the property.[122] In the event, a third of those arrested were released within 48 hours.[123]

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[116] Bowcott

[117] McCleery, 'Debunking the Myths', 414. PRONI, CAB/9/B/83/6, quoted in McCleery, 'Debunking the Myths', 415-16.

[118] Ibid.

[119] Whilst no Loyalists were arrested, a couple of Protestant civil rights marchers were arrested in the initial operation. McCleery, 'Debunking the Myths', 422-5.

[120] MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 1, VII-4.

[121] McCleery, 'Debunking the Myths', 411-430, 416 & 418.

[122] TNA, WO 296/71, 'Confidential Operation Instructions HQ 19', 8 August 1971, quoted in McCleery, 'Debunking the Myths', 416.

[123] McCleery, 'Debunking the Myths', 416. McCleery notes: 'among those arrested were retired republicans, trade unionists, civil rights campaigners, a drunken man picked up at a bus stop and several people held on mistaken identity (Diplock Report, 1972: para. 32). The inclusion of civil rights campaigners is perhaps not so surprising given that operational instructions circulated on 8 August stated that, 'Both factions of the IRA, NICRA and PD have contingency plans for a campaign of violence and civ [sic] disobedience if internment should take place' (confidential operation instructions from HQ 19, 8 August 1971, TNA: PRO WO 296/71).'

The initial internment operations led to violent confrontations with the Nationalist community, with soldiers and PIRA members engaging in firefights.[124] In Belfast, violence spiralled out of control: on 9 and 10 August, there were approximately 12 explosions, 59 shootings, 17 reported deaths, 25 reported injuries, 13 incidents of rioting and 18 reports of arson or other incidents.[125] This included what was later judged by a coroner to have been the killing of nine 'innocent' Catholics on the Ballymurphy estate, which occurred over three days when a battalion of the Parachute Regiment deployed to quell rioting. The coroner accepted that the Army faced a 'highly charged and difficult environment' with evidence that OIRA and PIRA were in the area and did open fire on 'certain occasions', but concluded that soldiers used 'disproportionate force' in the deaths of the nine civilians (a tenth innocent civilian was killed during the incident, but it could not be determined by whom).[126] Six weeks after internment began over 2,000 families abandoned their homes to escape the violence.[127] As a result of internment, violence also spread to towns which prior to that point had not experienced significant trouble.[128]

Deep Interrogation

Once detained, suspects were imprisoned in Crumlin Road prison, Long Kesh camp, and the Maidstone prison ship.[129] Many suspects complained of ill-treatment once interned. Fourteen internees (12 in August and two in October)[130] were selected to be subjected to 'interrogation in depth' (also referred to as 'deep interrogation') which included, what were termed, 'five techniques' – what could be extended periods of wall standing, hooding, subjection to white noise, sleep deprivation, and a basic diet of food and water – at the 'Special Interrogation Centre', (Hut 60) based at Ballykelly airfield in County Londonderry.[131] The 'Special Interrogation Centre', guided by the 1965 *Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas*, was headed by a centre controller, who was responsible to the head of SB. In August, the interrogations were conducted by 20 SB officers (who had been

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[124] Sanders, 'Principles of Minimum Force', 672.
[125] Colm Kelpie, 'Ballymurphy Inquest: Coroner finds 10 victims were innocent', *BBC News*, 11 May 2021, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-56986784
[126] Kelpie
[127] Edward Burke, 'Counter-Insurgency against "Kith and Kin"? The British Army in Northern Ireland, 1970–76', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 43:4 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2015.1083215, 662.
[128] Martin J. McCleery, *Operation Demetrius and its Aftermath: A New History of the Use of Internment without Trial in Northern Ireland, 1971–75* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 171-2.
[129] McCleery, *Operation Demetrius*, 416.
[130] Newbery, *Interrogation, Intelligence and Security*, 66.
[131] TNA, CAB 163/173, 'Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Nicholson (Senior Military Representative, Joint Services Interrogation Wing (JSIW)): Report on Operation CALABA – August 1971', 26 August 1971.

trained in sophisticated interrogation techniques at the JSIW in Britain earlier in 1971), with 12 JSIW personnel, under the supervision of an Intelligence Corps lieutenant colonel. The SB officers conducted the interrogations, while the JSIW personnel provided technical support and advice, although did not conduct the interrogations themselves.[132]

The Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington, and the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, Brian Faulkner, including possibly other senior politicians, may have known prior to the interrogation that the RUC would use a variety of methods, including the 'five techniques'. That said, it is unclear whether ministers were aware of the full ramifications of the techniques, or if any minister had formally approved the techniques.[133] The use of the 'five techniques' resulted in the Irish government taking the British government to the ECHR and later European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),[134] and led to two internal inquires: the 1971 Compton Report and the 1972 Parker Report.

The British Army's interrogation techniques had been developed during a number of colonial internal security operations following the Second World War, including Kenya, Cyprus, Malaya, British Cameroon, Swaziland, Brunei, Aden, British Guiana, Indonesia and Oman. In these operational contexts, it was believed, and codified in doctrine, that intelligence was a key requirement for success in counterinsurgency. Interrogation, military intelligence officials believed, could offer significant intelligence value, if information was quickly acquired, sometimes using deep interrogation techniques (with a 'sense of isolation' in the subjects leading them to be more cooperative), and thereafter acted upon swiftly.[135]

Northern Ireland was not the first time all 'five techniques' were used at the same time and in any case the Army did not see the techniques 'as an interlocking set of procedures which were

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[132] TNA, CAB 163/173, 'Standing Orders', draft, 1971; TNA, CAB 163/173, 'Report on Operation CALABA,'
[133] Newbery, *Interrogation, Intelligence and Security*, 75-6.
[134] In 1976, the European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR) reported that 'The Commission is of the opinion, by a unanimous vote, that the combined use of the five techniques in the case before it constituted a practice of inhuman treatment and torture in breach of Art. 3 of the Convention.' ECHR, *Ireland Against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Report of the Commission*, 5310/71, 25 January 1976, 490. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), to which the case was subsequently referred, came to a different conclusion to the Commission, instead finding that the use of the 'five techniques' amounted to 'inhuman and degrading treatment' rather than 'torture'. ECtHR, *Ireland v. the United Kingdom Judgment*, 5310/71, 18 January 1978, 59.
[135] Interrogation in the form of constant questioning may carried out for up to 20 hours each day with the subject standing most of the time, TNA, CAB 163/173, 'Interrogation Methods – A Brief Description', 26 Aug 1971.

either used all together or not at all'.[136] Ministers were later briefed that the use of interrogation, including the techniques had been 'successful' in previous operations. While such claims were open to dispute (and were questioned by some within the MoD), when the 'requirement for interrogation was recognised in Northern Ireland' the intelligence approach was to use what appeared to have worked before, without any particularly developed discussion of why this might not be appropriate in a part of the UK. Furthermore, it could be argued, that in the absence of actionable intelligence, interrogation was turned to as a means to acquire it with little consideration of the evidence for its actual utility.[137]

The period following the introduction of internment and the use of deep interrogation methods saw unprecedented levels of violence in the province. What is undeniable is that the use of these techniques during a three-month period in 1971 have become one of the most controversial aspects of Operation Banner. Following the publication of the Parker Report, the British government announced in March 1972 that the techniques would no longer be permitted as an aid to interrogation and the guidelines for interrogation in internal security operations were updated.[138] Notwithstanding the controversy over the 'five techniques', the Army and RUC argued that the policy of internment had resulted in considerable actionable intelligence; for instance, one report highlighted that the intelligence gathered had allowed the police to clear 40 outstanding major incidents.[139] Internment, according to the military, was also depleting the PIRA's ability to organise, especially in Belfast.[140] General Tuzo, who initially opposed the measure, later noted that 'internment had proved to be a considerable success and was their best available weapon in the fight against the IRA'.[141]

Behind the praise for the operation, military officers also recognised that internment drove up support for the PIRA. Even before internment was authorised, Tuzo accepted that 'half the Catholic population sympathises with the IRA, and up to a quarter – that is, about 120,000

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[136] Newbery, *Interrogation, Intelligence and Security*, 106-109.
[137] The 14 subjected to 'deep interrogation' included some suspected members of the OIRA, and the remaining were not significant figures in PIRA and few had any actionable intelligence to reveal.
[138] Newbery notes that prisoner handling is often included in the term 'interrogation techniques', although they are distinct. Newbery, *Interrogation, Intelligence and Security,* 108
[139] TNA, DEFE 13/958, 'Unsigned MoD: Intelligence Gained from Interrogations in Northern Ireland', November 1971, quoted in Tony Craig, '"You will be responsible to the GOC": Stovepiping and the problem of divergent intelligence gathering networks in Northern Ireland, 1969–1975', *Intelligence and National Security* 33:2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1349036, 217.
[140] Thomas Hennessey, *The Evolution of the Troubles, 1970–72* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 220–5.
[141] McCleery, *Operation Demetrius*, 422.

people – is ready to give the organisation active support'.[142] A PIRA member noted that: 'internment was the biggest recruiting tool for the Provos…they were queuing up to join the Provos'.[143] Moreover, internment had also led to an escalation of violence. Between February and early August 1971, five soldiers had been killed; in the four months after internment was introduced, 30 soldiers, 11 policemen and UDR personnel and 73 civilians were killed.[144] During the period of internment's operation from August 1971 to December 1975, the level of violence in the province reached new levels – almost 1,500 people died between August 1971 and the end of 1976. Reginald Maudling was later quoted as stating '[n]o-one could be certain what would be the consequences, yet the question was simply this: what other measures could be taken?'[145] The British Army's 2006 study of Operation Banner, conceded that 'on balance and with the benefit of hindsight, [internment] was a major mistake'.[146] As McKittrick, et. al. note, '[t]oday there is almost universal acknowledgement that the tactic was poorly conceived, badly executed and markedly counter-productive'.[147]

A New Security Policy

Prior to meeting his Northern Irish counterpart in October 1971, Prime Minister Heath commissioned the CGS, Sir Michael Carver, to write a report assessing the security context in Northern Ireland. In his appraisal, Carver noted that: 'the problem is essentially a politico-military one and the factors cannot be disentangled'. He went on to say: '[t]he history of all previous campaigns against terrorists – and few of them have been wholly successful – proves that a purely military solution is most unlikely to succeed'. However, 'the isolation of the terrorist from the population is a sine qua non of success'.[148] He outlined that the present military policy 'is one of maximum vigour in the elimination and apprehension of identifiable terrorists, tempered by a scrupulous care to avoid actions which are, or may be represented as being, indiscriminate as between the terrorists and the … minority community, or deliberately discriminate between Protestants and Roman Catholics'.[149]

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[142] Tuzo, quoted in 'A Fateful Decision', *The Economist*, 7 August 1971.
[143] Edwards, 'Misapplying lessons learned?' 308.
[144] Newsinger, 171.
[145] McKittrick, et. al, *Lost Lives*, 79.
[146] CGS, *Operation Banner,* 2-7.
[147] McKittrick, et. al., *Lost Lives*, 80.
[148] 'Northern Ireland – Appreciation of the Security Situation as at 4 October 1971', Document G14B in Mark Saville, William Hoyt and John Toohey (hereafter 'Saville'), *Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry* (London: HMSO, 2010), 86.8.
[149] Saville, Document G14B, 86.9.

He noted that the PIRA's offensive activities were resulting in more troops being dedicated to basic security duties, thereby decreasing the number of troops available to pursue the PIRA. The PIRA, according to Carver, had the 'initiative', which he predicted the group could 'maintain'. Carver felt that the PIRA's primary objective was to engineer the introduction of direct rule through a campaign of violence, which in turn, would influence British public opinion leading the British to depart Northern Ireland. [150] The CGS also noted that the deteriorating security situation meant that the level of minimum force employed had to be increased. [151]

During Heath's meeting with Faulkner, the latter warned that Stormont was on the verge of collapse. In response, both men agreed a new security approach that focused on three pillars: 'to intensify security operations in Belfast, making full use of the intelligence which has been gained as the result of internment'; assert greater control over the border area; and to resolve the 'unsatisfactory situation in certain parts of Londonderry'. [152] These priorities were codified in the new CLF, Major General Robert Ford's updated guidance: *Commander Land Forces Directive for Future Internal Security Operations.* The guidance asserted that the operation against the PIRA was 'making real progress' but it had 'only just begun to undermine the belief that the IRA is capable of winning'. Therefore, the Army was 'to demonstrate by military successes the certainty of defeat of the IRA'. This was to be done 'on three simultaneous and inter-related fronts: the intelligence front, the operational front, and the public information front'. [153]

The guidance outlined two priorities: first, 'defeat of the [P]IRA's campaign of violence' and, second, 'to overcome threats to law and order from all other directions, including in particular inter-sectarian strife'. [154] In order to achieve the first priority, the Army had to 'defeat [P]IRA armed attacks by resolute armed action within the terms of the current rules of engagement'; ensure that all other PIRA violence was met with 'vigorous follow-up action'; 'in conjunction with Special Branch, arrest [P]IRA suspects' as quickly as possible; defend important targets from PIRA attack; and enable quick and effective lines of communication to information staff

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[150] Saville, 10-11.
[151] Saville, 10.
[152] TNA, CAB 128/48/2, 'Annex to CM (71) 49', 12 October 1971, quoted in David A. Charters, *Whose Mission, Whose Orders?: British Civil-Military Command and Control in Northern Ireland, 1968-1974* (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2017), 124.
[153] Saville, 165.
[154] Saville, 165-6.

so they could report 'the truth about security force actions quickly and convincingly'.[155] Ford also emphasised that the Army had to be seen to be impartial. Despite some successes after the implementation of the new directive, Carver pointed out to Cabinet 'the virtual impossibility of halting the [P]IRA's activities by security measures alone'.[156] Maudling also drew a similar conclusion and abandoned the idea of defeating the PIRA as a prerequisite for political dialogue. Under these new circumstances he (controversially) concluded, the military's role was to ensure that violence remained at 'an acceptable level', in other words, at a level that allowed for a new political settlement between both communities to be reached.[157]

Bloody Sunday

Internment had caused widespread dismay within the Catholic community. On 22 January 1972, the NICRA converged at Magilligan Point, County Derry to protest the opening of a new internment camp.[158] Prior to the event, Brian Faulkner had notified the public that the existing ban on marches would be continued.[159] The 2nd Battalion of the Royal Green Jackets, supported by the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (1 PARA) brought in from Belfast, where it was the resident battalion, were responsible for security at the march. The Paras had a reputation as one of the toughest and most battle-hardened regiments in the Army and were already notorious in the Republican community for the shooting of unarmed civilians in Ballymurphy, Belfast during rioting associated with Operation Demetrius the previous August.[160] At the NICRA demonstration, the Paras were accused of using excessive force, including using CS gas and rubber bullets to disperse the crowd. Even a captain from the Royal Green Jackets complained that 'the Paras were called forward to stop [the protesters], and in my opinion did so in a manner far too aggressive for the situation, in a way perhaps more suited to Belfast'.[161]

Eight days later, on 30 January 1972, the NICRA organised another march against internment in the Bogside area of Londonderry. As all marches were still banned, the decision was taken to permit the demonstrators to reach Nationalist areas, but to prevent them from marching into

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[155] Saville, 166.

[156] Saville, 240.

[157] J. Chartres, 'Home Secretary says IRA may never be totally eliminated', *The Times*, 16 December 1971, cited in Neumann, *Britain's Long War*, 58.

[158] *Irish Times*, 20 January 1972, cited in Sanders, 'Principles of Minimum Force', 674.

[159] Saville, 183.

[160] 1 PARA had already served in the province as a roulement battalion in Belfast from October 1969 to February 1970.

[161] Max Arthur, *Northern Ireland Soldiers Talking: 1969 to Today* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson 1987), 70 cited in Sanders, 'Principles of Minimum Force', 674.

the city centre.[162] Prior to the march, CLF Major General Ford again arranged for an extra battalion to be deployed to Londonderry to conduct an arrest operation if rioting broke out. This would enable the Army to curtail the activities of the 'Derry Young Hooligans', who were accused of being responsible for much of the rioting in the city. There was also concern about the threat of gunmen using the march as an opportunity for a confrontation with the Army - in the two weeks before Bloody Sunday, 'there had been 80 confirmed shootings incidents in which 319 rounds had been fired at soldiers and police and 84 nail bombs had been thrown'.[163] Despite its aggressive conduct at Magilligan Point the previous week, 1 PARA were deployed to Londonderry to conduct the arrest operation – Ford chose them because they had been in Northern Ireland far longer than the other two battalions available to deploy and because of their reputation for toughness.[164] Brigadier Patrick MacLellan, the Commander of 8th Infantry Brigade, was in overall control of the operation, including 1 PARA's arrest operation.[165]

The Army highlighted that, given the intense media scrutiny of the march, it should adopt a 'low key' approach. The Army also expected that PIRA would use the march to attack the security forces, including using snipers. The HQNI operational summary for that week noted that 'intelligence reports indicate that the IRA are determined to produce a major confrontation by one means or another during the march'.[166] Furthermore, a Battalion Order Group Assessment noted that the 'threat from hooligans, gunmen, bombers and arsonists remains unchanged'.[167] However, it seems that these assessments were of a general nature and did not contain specific intelligence regarding an attack.

On the day of the march, thousands of demonstrators made their way from the Creggan area towards Free Derry Corner in the Bogside.[168] As marchers approached the junction of William Street and Rossville Street, a section of the crowd proceeded up William Street towards an Army Barrier (14), instead of turning right into the Bogside. Once the protesters reached Barrier 14, rioting broke out; soldiers fired rubber bullets and used water cannon to disperse the rioters. Rioting also broke out at other Army Barriers (12) and (13) at Little James Street and Sackville Street respectively - in response, soldiers fired rubber bullets and CS gas at the

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[162] Saville, 7-8.
[163] Hamill, 88.
[164] Hamill, 87.
[165] Saville, 8-9.
[166] Saville, 'HQNI Operational Summary for the Week Ending 28 January 1972', Document G83.526.
[167] Saville, 665.
[168] Sanders, 'Principles of Minimum Force', 675.

rioters.[169] Soldiers from a machine gun platoon, who were stationed in a derelict building on William Street, then fired shots at a teenager, wounding him and another bystander. An OIRA member then fired at soldiers who were stationed at a church. The Saville Inquiry concluded that soldiers opened fire first. The Inquiry also noted that the IRA did not return fire in response to the injured civilians, but had opened fired in an unrelated attack.[170]

In response to the rioting, MacLellan ordered the Officer Commanding 1 PARA (hereafter CO 1 PARA) to launch an arrest operation by sending his troops through Barrier 14. MacLellan was clear that soldiers were not to get involved in a running battle with people marching on Rossville Street. He had also delayed giving his order to ensure that the marchers had time to put distance between themselves and the rioters. As ordered, CO 1 PARA sent his soldiers through Barrier 14. However, he also, against instructions, deployed the battalion's Support Company through Barrier 12 leading them into the Bogside. The result was that the Support Company did engage in a running battle with people down Rossville Street and were unable to identify rioters from peaceful marchers.[171] As the Saville Inquiry stated, the CO 1 PARA 'either deliberately disobeyed Brigadier MacLellan's order or failed for no good reason to appreciate the clear limits on what he had been authorised to do'.[172]

After passing Barrier 12, two Armoured Personnel Carriers carrying soldiers of the Mortar Platoon entered the Bogside. Once in the Bogside, they conducted a limited arrest operation. Lieutenant N then fired three shots over the heads of the people who were throwing objects at the soldiers. No-one was hit by Lieutenant N's shots. In the words of the Saville Inquiry, Lieutenant N probably fired the shots as 'an effective way of frightening the people and moving them on'.[173] Soon after, soldiers of the Mortar Platoon at Rossville Flats opened fire hitting four civilians, one of whom was fatally wounded. Several more were injured by flying debris caused by the Army's fire. This was followed by two more platoons entering the Bogside. Shortly after, soldiers then killed another six civilians. In the space of 10 minutes from entering the Bogside, soldiers from the Support Company had killed 13 civilians and injured many more (a fourteenth civilian died later in hospital).[174]

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[169] Saville, 14. The numbering of the barriers was made by the Saville Inquiry.
[170] Saville, 15-16.
[171] Saville, 17.
[172] Saville, 18.
[173] Saville, 22.
[174] Saville, 18-31.

The Saville Inquiry concluded that '[n]one of the casualties shot by soldiers of Support Company was armed with a firearm or (with the probable exception of Gerald Donaghey) a bomb of any description. None was posing any threat of causing death or serious injury. In no case was any warning given before soldiers opened fire'. The inquiry further 'concluded that none of [the soldiers] fired in response to attacks or threatened attacks by nail or petrol bombers. No-one threw or threatened to throw a nail or petrol bomb at the soldiers on Bloody Sunday'.[175] These conclusions have been disputed by some military personnel present on the day. General Sir Michael Rose, who later commanded the United Nations mission to Bosnia, was present on Bloody Sunday while a junior officer in the Coldstream Guards, disputed Saville's conclusions and gave evidence to the inquiry saying that he heard Thompson sub-machine gun fire before 1 PARA deployed – he was astonished that the Paras moved into the Bogside, but had personally came under fire from balcony positions in the flats opposite.[176]

The inquiry also considered allegations about the activities of Martin McGuinness, then adjutant of the Derry Brigade of the PIRA, who was in the area - namely whether he had a Thompson sub-machine gun and fired on troops. It concluded that, '[b]efore the soldiers of Support Company went into the Bogside he was probably armed with a Thompson sub-machine gun, and though it is possible that he fired this weapon, there is insufficient evidence to make any finding on this, save that we are sure that he did not engage in any activity that provided any of the soldiers (in Support Company) with any justification for opening fire'.[177]

The Inquiry did accept that there 'was some firing by republican paramilitaries…but in our view none of this firing provided any justification for the shooting of the civilian casualties' and while (n)o soldier of Support Company was injured by gunfire on Bloody Sunday…(t)wo suffered slight injuries from acid or a similar corrosive substance thrown down on them in

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[175] Saville, 36-7.

[176] Michael Rose, 'It wasn't Blair who brought peace to Ulster but brave British soldiers about to be branded as criminals', *Daily Mail*, 15 June 2010. Rose wrote that he heard the 'unmistakable' sound of a Thompson as he looked down on the Bogside and asked his second-in-command to note down the time – it was 1600hrs. (The brigade commander ordered the arrest operation by 1 PARA at 1607hrs.) 'I told the inquiry…there is one thing of which I am absolutely certain…It was the IRA who started the firing with the Thompson machine gun…Brigade orders were that the Army should not enter the Bogside – for it was known through intelligence sources that the IRA intended to create a bloodbath by drawing the security forces into a firefight with their gunmen in the middle of the civil rights march. But when I and my second-in-command got down there, we were astonished to find that the barricades had been drawn aside and the paras were moving through into the Bogside, exchanging fire with the IRA gunmen who mostly seemed to be firing from the blocks of flats facing us… As I lay in the gutter, I could see bullets hitting the wall of the building above me.'

[177] Saville, 88.

bottles from the Rossville Flats'.[178] The throwing of acid was judged by the Inquiry to 'pose a threat of causing serious injury' although it believed that the soldier most likely to have shot one of the causalities fired indiscriminately at the flats from which the substances were being thrown.[179]

Contradicting generalised criticism of the Parachute Regiment since, the Saville Report also makes clear that apart from the actions of the Support Company, there was no other firing by soldiers of 1 PARA on Bloody Sunday, including the unit (C Company) that had gone into the Bogside on foot. Other Army units did return fire in response to paramilitary firing on that day, including one incident 600 yards from where the Support Company firing occurred, in which (justifiably the inquiry concluded) a soldier from another unit 'shot at and injured an armed member of the OIRA, "Red" Mickey Doherty, who had immediately before fired at soldiers.[180] The Saville Report concludes that 'there was a serious and widespread loss of fire discipline among the soldiers of Support Company' [181] and 'what happened on Bloody Sunday strengthened the Provisional IRA, increased nationalist resentment and hostility towards the Army and exacerbated the violent conflict of the years that followed'.[182]

Direct Rule

Bloody Sunday is one of, if not, the most controversial incident of the Troubles. Its aftereffects were felt immediately as violence escalated: 56 soldiers were killed in the two months between late January and late March 1972.[183] It also had political ramifications: it reignited the debate in Westminster over introducing direct rule. Since 1969, London had been deeply reluctant to impose direct rule, but Bloody Sunday demonstrated that action needed to be taken to regain control over the province.[184] At a Cabinet meeting on 3 March, Maudling argued that as the Army would likely be deployed in Northern Ireland for the long-term, Westminster should assume responsibility for both the Army and law and order; thus, enabling better coordination between both instruments of security policy. Maudling also contended that the Catholic

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[178] Saville, 79.
[179] Saville, 78.
[180] Saville, 88.
[181] Saville, 99.
[182] Saville, 100.
[183] David Charters, *Whose Mission, Whose Orders?,* 118. The INLA also bombed the HQ mess at the Parachute Regiment's Aldershot home base on 22 February, killing six civilians and an Army chaplain.
[184] Charters, *Whose Mission, Whose Orders?,* 144-5.

minority would never judge Stormont to be a neutral arbitrator of law and order.[185] Army strength was by now 17 battalions, six Armoured car squadrons and four Engineer Squadrons, up from 13 battalions, four Armoured car squadrons and three Engineer Squadrons in August 1971). The UDR had grown from 4,182 to 7,749 in the same period, while the RUC had increased by 75. This made it clear that the Army was likely to continue to bear the weight of operations for the foreseeable future. Many key infantry units had by now completed two tours in Northern Ireland and some were on their third.

Six days later, on 9 March, the Cabinet agreed that the government 'should seize the political initiative with four actions: a referendum on the border; the transfer of responsibility for law and order to Westminster; some modification of internment policy; and the appointment of a secretary of state for Northern Ireland (SSNI)'.[186] On 22 March, Heath, accompanied by Maudling and Carrington, informed Faulkner that Westminster intended to assume control of law and order in the province. Faulkner rejected the proposals and resigned the following day, forcing Heath to suspend Stormont, introduce direct rule, and appoint William Whitelaw as the first SSNI. On 23 March, the MoD issued new guidance to the GOC, Lieutenant General Tuzo, which highlighted his role under direct rule. The GOC was informed that he would remain in control of security operations, including 'coordinating the tasking of the RUC for security operations'. Tuzo reported to the CGS, who represented the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), and through to the defence secretary. He was also responsible for 'advising' the SSNI, William Whitelaw, on security issues. If the GOC and Whitelaw disagreed about the correct course of action, Tuzo would inform the CGS who would consult the CDS and defence secretary to mediate. Matters of intelligence would be taken up directly with the SSNI.[187]

The UK government considered direct rule as an opportunity 'to deprive the IRA of the support which it enjoyed among a substantial portion of the minority community in Northern Ireland'.[188] More importantly, London aimed to use the period to mend relations with the Catholic community and explore political proposals to end the conflict. To this end, the Army

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[185] TNA, CAB 129/162/1, 'Cabinet Paper CP (72) 26: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department', 3 March 1972.

[186] TNA, CAB 128/48/3, 'Confidential Annex to CM (72) 14', 9 March 1972, 1, quoted in Charters, *Whose Mission, Whose Orders?,* 146.

[187] TNA, DEFE 13/921, item 20, 'Directive for the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland as Director of Operations', 23 March 1972, quoted in Charters, *Whose Mission, Whose Orders?,* 152.

[188] TNA, CAB 128/48/3, 23 March 1972, quoted in M.L.R. Smith and Peter Neumann, 'Motorman's Long Journey: Changing the Strategic Setting in Northern Ireland', *Contemporary British History* 19:4 (2005), https://doi.org/10.1080/13619460500254356, 421.

was instructed to take a 'low profile' approach, and political measures – such as permitting special category status for internees, slowly freeing those in detention, and negotiating with the IRA leadership – were introduced.[189] The Yellow Card rules were again revised the week after Bloody Sunday making it clear that troops were not to open fire to prevent a barrier being taken down.

The government was concerned that removing the barricades, especially in IRA-dominated areas, would antagonise the Catholic community and potentially lead to significant civilian casualties.[190] However, as Smith and Neumann point out, there was 'a tension in the government's strategy'. On the one hand, London tried not to inflame the situation by adopting robust security measures, but, on the other hand, the government judged it 'completely intolerable that there should be "no-go" areas' in Londonderry.[191] In fact, the government acknowledged there would 'be no prospect of bringing violence to an end…unless the IRA could be deprived of its base in the minority community'.[192] The 'no-go' areas were also extremely damaging to the government's reputation amongst the Protestant community, and in the words of Whitelaw, were considered 'a symbol of weakness and failure in British rule'.[193] Carver proposed that government control be reasserted in Catholic areas through community relations with the Army backing up the RUC, which should reintroduce its presence in such areas. By the autumn troop numbers might be able to be reduced to 12 battalions, but less than this was unlikely. If the security situation improved and restrictions on families and single soldiers resident in the province could be lifted, tour lengths might be able to be extended to two years, if not they would need to be reduced to 18 months.[194]

The Army was growing increasingly concerned with the government's 'low profile' approach and the possibility of a Protestant backlash. In a memo to the defence secretary, Carver argued that the current policy made it 'difficult to define clearly the aim of the Army's presence in Northern Ireland'. As a result, he argued, 'this is already leading to confusion, doubt and

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[189] Paul Dixon, *Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace,* 2nd Ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), https://doi.org/10.1111%2F1467-856X.00063, 115-16.
[190] TNA, CAB 128/48/3, 'William Whitelaw: Confidential Annex, Northern Ireland Secretary', 13 April 1972, quoted in Smith and Neumann, 419.
[191] Smith and Neumann, 419-20.
[192] TNA, CAB 128/48/3, 'Edward Heath: Confidential Annex, Prime Minister', 14 March 1972, quoted in Smith and Neumann, 419.
[193] William Whitelaw, *The Whitelaw Memoirs* (London: Aurum Press, 1989), 102.
[194] TNA, WO305/6510, *MoD Narrative of Military Operations,* Vol. 2 (hereafter 'MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 2'), Appendix XI.2.

difficulty'.[195] Meanwhile, the 'low profile' approach allowed the IRA to consolidate militarily, which, according to Carver, meant that if the Army was to reengage the IRA it was in 'a position less favourable than that of August 71'. That said, the Army believed that a truce 'could be sprung on us at any time'.[196] On 26 June, the PIRA duly announced a cease-fire; the Army responded by abandoning offensive operations against the organisation and returned to a peacekeeping posture.[197] After talks between government ministers and the Republican leadership failed, the ceasefire ended on 9 July 1972.

Operation Motorman

In the three days after the ceasefire collapsed, the PIRA resumed its offensive campaign, killing nine members of the security services. This was followed by the group exploding 21 bombs in Belfast city centre, killing nine people and injuring 130, on 21 July 1972.[198] The atrocity, broadcast on television as it happened in some cases, came to be known as Bloody Friday, and forced the UK government to reset its military policy. As Whitelaw argued: '[t]he present climate of public opinion, while the events of Friday 21 July were still fresh, was opportune for the Government to take action, as was its duty, to show that it could no longer tolerate the existence of barricaded areas to which the security forces had only limited access'. By restoring law and order in 'no-go' areas, the government hoped to pave the way for political dialogue to end the violence.[199] Options for military operations to regain control of these areas had been discussed in government and the MoD for a number of months before the operation began. In July as the ceasefire ended, Carver had set out the three options he thought were open to the Army as lawlessness increased: 1) to only take retaliatory action against the IRA; 2) take offensive action against the IRA; and, 3) opt-out from the 'no-go' areas. Discussions for the imposition of order continued in the MoD – with the most demanding option - Operation Folklore - an option for imposing order on the whole of the province - requiring 47 major units charged with disarming the whole population.[200] Estimates of Republican strength was put at around 2,000, while the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) was thought to number 25,000

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[195] TNA, DEFE 13/907, 'Minute from CGS to Secretary of State for Defence', 30 May 1972.
[196] Ibid.
[197] TNA, DEFE 13/908 'Signal from CLF to commanders of 3, 8 and 39 Bdes, and HQ Ulster Defence Regiment', 22 June 1972, quoted in Huw Bennett, 'From Direct Rule to Motorman: Adjusting British Military Strategy for Northern Ireland in 1972', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33:6 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1080/10576101003752648, 515.
[198] Smith and Neumann, 422.
[199] TNA, CAB 128/48/3, 'William Whitelaw: Confidential Annex, Northern Ireland Secretary', 27 July 1972, quoted in Smith and Neumann, 425
[200] 'Major Units' were commonly, but not exclusively regarded as battalion in size in documents of the time.

(which the Army had limited intelligence on) - some argued that a civil war was possible if the Army did not take action. The Cabinet decided that Folklore should be kept in reserve and chose a lesser but still enormous operation to restore order.

The Cabinet agreed that the aim of the operation, codenamed Motorman, was to mount a military operation 'to re-occupy those areas from which either the IRA or the UDA sought to exclude the normal operation of the security forces'. In doing so, 'the operation should consist of rapid and simultaneous penetration into the several areas concerned, in order to inflict maximum damage upon the capability of the IRA to wage its campaign of terrorism while keeping to a minimum the risk of casualties' to civilians.[201] To ensure causalities were minimised, the government disseminated public warnings before the operation commenced, enabling IRA volunteers to escape.[202] Soldiers were told that 'Minimum Force' meant using more troops and less firepower rather than the other way around. The mission was the first time that the politico-military machinery had been tested since the imposition of direct rule. Requests by some senior officers for the military's powers to be extended for the operation were not authorised, although some heavier firepower was authorised for use if soldiers came under sustained fire, and under revised Yellow Card rules, warnings would not be required if there was no other way to protect life.[203]

On 31 July 1972, at 0400hrs, the first phase of the operation commenced with 27 major Army units deploying into Belfast, Londonderry, and rural locations. The removal of barricades in both Catholic and Protestant areas was completed without opposition.[204] The second phase, designed to achieve 'total domination' in 'hard Catholic areas', saw the Army continuously patrol locations, thus hampering the IRA's freedom of movement; this forced the IRA to shift its focus to suburban areas. The Army also made weapons seizures and arrested terrorist suspects during this phase. The third, and final, phase of the operation, launched in September, involved intelligence gathering and arresting terrorist suspects; of seven hundred arrested, three hundred were charged. This final phase was deemed effective at 'denting PIRA morale, hampering their ability to launch attacks and undermining its leadership by selective arrests'.[205]

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[201] TNA, DEFE 24/718, 'Commander Land Forces' Directive for Operation Motorman', 27 July 1972.
[202] TNA, CAB 128/48/3, 27 July 1972, quoted in Smith and Neumann, 425.
[203] MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 2, XII-12.
[204] Planning assumptions had estimated that thousands of rounds of fire would be exchanged between PIRA and security forces.
[205] TNA, DEFE 24/718, 'Directive for Operation Motorman'; Bennett, 521-2.

Over 30,000 military personnel – 21,000 regulars and 9,000 UDR personnel – participated in the four-month operation, making it the largest deployment of British troops since the end of the Second World War.[206] Motorman was successful in a several ways. First, it led to a reduction in violence: in the three weeks before and after the operation, explosions reduced from 180 to 73 and the number of shooting incidents decreased from 2,595 to 380. Over the same period, the number of soldiers killed decreased from 18 to 11.[207] Second, by establishing government control in the 'no-go' areas of Belfast and Londonderry, the operation disrupted the PIRA's ability to organise freely and weakened its 'operational capacity'. Third, it denied the PIRA ungoverned safe heavens from which to continue a high tempo of military operations, something that the organisation judged key to weakening British resolve and force it to withdraw.[208] According to Smith and Neumann, 'the overall military consequence of Operation Motorman was to deliver Northern Ireland into a two-decade-long period of stalemate. The security forces were not able to eliminate all PIRA violence. At the same time, PIRA violence was not able to attain the political objectives of forcing a British withdrawal'.[209] More importantly, however, was that 'Motorman permanently altered the strategic setting in Northern Ireland in which all parties to the conflict had to frame their long-term political judgements'.[210]

As such it is interesting to consider whether the Folklore option might have led to a different outcome - could it have delivered the GOC's desired end state of the restoration of law and order throughout Northern Ireland? The warnings before Motorman had avoided any direct confrontation with PIRA, but also led to limited attrition of its capacity to threaten law and order, since it chose not to fight the Army. Furthermore, there was no significant improvement in the intelligence picture - deemed Motorman's main failure - but would have required wider powers of arrest and probably interrogation. The Army concluded that troop numbers were the key determinant to dominating 'hard' areas (one company per 700 houses) which would require at least 22 battalions. Pressure from BAOR for forces to return quickly meant that only some hard areas could be dominated thereafter – '[a] highly skilful large-scale military operation that

[206] TNA, DEFE 24/718, item E54/3, 'HQ Northern Ireland: Operational Summary for the Week Ending 2 August 1972', Annex B: Operation Motorman, 2 August 1972, quoted in Charters, *Whose Mission, Whose Orders?,* 257, footnote 1.
[207] Peter Chippindale, 'Motorman's Slow Drive', *The Guardian*, 26 August 1972.
[208] Smith and Neumann, 426-7.
[209] Smith and Neumann, 427-8.
[210] Smith and Neumann, 414.

returned the freedom of movement in no-go areas left a sense of flatness in the minds of many at the time and beyond'.[211]

More immediately, Motorman had created the political space to explore whether direct rule could be ended. This prompted the UK government to establish the Northern Ireland Assembly, which Unionist and moderate Nationalist politicians eventually agreed to govern through a power-sharing arrangement. On 9 December 1973, UK, Irish and Northern Ireland politicians signed the Sunningdale Agreement, which created a tripartite Council of Ireland and confirmed a power-sharing executive.[212] Outraged by what they saw as an act of betrayal, the UWC, a Protestant group with links to paramilitaries, initiated a strike, bringing the province to a standstill and collapsing the power power-sharing executive in May 1974. The government tasked the MoD to consider anti-strike measures that could be taken by the security forces under MAC-P powers, but the GOC recommended that the Army be kept out of taking over any utilities. These discussions were leaked to the press and while the Cabinet did approve some possible interventions, the NIO later concluded that there were no conventional means to deal with a full-scale strike.[213]

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[211] MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 2, XIII-16.
[212] *The Tripartite Agreement on the Council of Ireland* (The Sunningdale Agreement) of December 1973 was the communique issued following the Sunningdale Conference, https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/sunningdale/agreement.htm.
[213] MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 3, XX-1.2.

4. IRA Terrorism and Police Primacy Over Security, 1974-1990

Criminalisation and Police Primacy

The mid-1970s marked a watershed as the conflict transitioned from a counter-insurgency campaign to a counter-terrorist campaign. The new Labour government, through a policy of criminalisation and police primacy (commonly known as Ulsterisation), set about reducing the military's presence in the province by placing the RUC, supported by the locally recruited UDR, in charge of security policy.[214] From spring 1974 onwards, the architect of Ulsterisation, SSNI Merlyn Rees, announced his intention to reinstate the principle of police primacy, increase the size of the RUC, and return the Army to its constitutional role of 'aiding the civil power'.[215] The package of reforms also contained the commitment – outlined in the Sunningdale Agreement – to phase out detention without trial, a measure seen as driving support for the PIRA.

Whilst Rees sought to limit the Army's role and curtail the use of emergency measures, he did acknowledge 'that if it were not for the British troops in the Province, there would be civil war'.[216] It is important to note that while the drive to reinstate police primacy is considered a defining moment in the UK's approach to the conflict, all British governments since 1969 – implicitly at least – had hoped to return the RUC to the forefront of security policy when conditions allowed.

Rees' plan to reduce the number of troops in the province found favour with the MoD. The Army's commitment in Northern Ireland had placed significant financial and manpower burdens on its ability to meet other security commitments.[217] During Operation Motorman, the peak of the Army's commitment to the conflict, 19 major additional units were deployed to Northern Ireland, equalling 21,000 troops.[218] Moreover, the fact that units served multiple tours in quick succession caused 'an adverse and cumulative effect, especially on the soldiers'

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[214] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles*, 46.

[215] 'How all can help—Rees', *Belfast Telegraph*, 4 September 1974, cited in Peter Neumann, 'The Myth of Ulsterization in British Security Policy in Northern Ireland', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26:5 (2003), https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100390227971, 369; House of Commons, *Hansard*, 4 April 1974, Vol. 871, Col. 1463-8, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1974/apr/04/northern-ireland-1.

[216] Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Cooper Papers, 1/1/10, 'Verbatim Transcript of Interview with Mr Merlyn Rees on BBC Television Panorama, 8.10pm, 11/1974', quoted in Edwards, 'Whipping Boy', 175.

[217] TNA, CAB 134/3778, 'IRN(74) Memo 5', 28 March 1974, quoted in S.C. Aveyard, *No Solution: The Labour Government and the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1974-79* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 23.

[218] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles*, 47.

families'. Force levels had been planned to fall to 12 major units by April 1974, but actually were only down to 16. Gaps between tours in Northern Ireland were only 10 months and if units could be reduced to 13 it would allow one four-month tour every two years. Additionally, it also impacted the Army's ability to maintain its training schedule for other deployments, most notably its NATO commitments.[219] In the words of Roland Moyle, a Northern Ireland Office (NIO) minister in the mid-1970s, the MoD took 'the view that the job of the British army [sic] was to defend the North German plain from the Red Army, not chasing around the backstreets of Belfast'.[220] As a result, several units were withdrawn in 1974, although the move was opposed by commanders at HQNI.[221] The Army also opposed Rees' move to end detention without trial, arguing that before the measure was abolished, violence should be brought to an end.[222]

The move towards police primacy was accompanied by attempts to engage the PIRA in political dialogue, a step that was seen as crucial in ending the violence and allowing the government to reduce its political and military presence in Northern Ireland. The subsequent talks resulted in the PIRA announcing a ceasefire between December 1974 and January 1975, which was then later extended indefinitely.[223] In response, the Army adopted a low-profile approach.[224] At the turn of the year, the Gardiner commission, established to review security legislation with a focus on civil liberties and human rights, concluded that emergency measures, such as internment without trial and special category status for paramilitary prisoners should be ended. It also recommended that criminal courts be given primacy for prosecuting terrorist violence.[225] The policy of criminalisation was designed to treat paramilitary violence as acts of criminality, thus delegitimising those perpetrating the acts.[226]

Despite the PIRA ceasefire officially lasting for much of 1975, levels of violence remained high. Rees concluded that the violence could be classified in four categories: 'sectarian violence emanating primarily from the UVF and UDA against Catholic civilians, gang warfare

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[219] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. TNA, CAB 134/3778, 'IRN(74) Memo 5', quoted in Aveyard, 23.
[220] Neumann, 'The Myth of Ulsterization', 369.
[221] TNA, PREM 16/145, 'Rees to Mason', 16 April 1974, quoted in Aveyard, 23.
[222] Aveyard, 24-5. TNA, FCO 87/335, 'GOC to Rees', 28 March 1974.
[223] Edwards, 'Whipping Boy', 175-6.
[224] TNA, DEFE 70/637, 'GOC to CGS', 30 December 1974, quoted in Aveyard, 60-2.
[225] Gerald Gardiner, *Report of a Committee to Consider, in the Context of Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Measures to Deal with Terrorism in Northern Ireland*, Cmnd. 5847 (London: HMSO, 1974–5)
[226] Graham Ellison and Jim Smyth, *The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 81.

between the two main loyalist paramilitary groups over the spoils of criminal activities, factional violence between the OIRA and the INLA and its political wing the Irish Republican Socialist Party, and selective acts by the PIRA "as an instrument of policy"'.[227] The continuing violence led General Sir Frank King, the GOC, to complain to Rees that the truce allowed the PIRA to gain strength and that 'the ceasefire itself was achieving nothing'. King opposed the speed at which internees were being released and argued for the reimplementation of detention without trial.[228] The Army was largely pushing for stronger measures because it considered the RUC too weak to properly deal with the ensuing violence. In July 1975, Major General David Young, the CLF, set forth his reservations about the RUC's capabilities to take the lead in security operations:

> As you know the RUC have not been able to return to any degree in certain areas and our opting out at this point will be seen by them as a gesture of our lack of will and our determination to withdraw. This could inevitably lead to a reduction in their efforts and we would then be faced with a deteriorating situation which may take us some time to restore.[229]

The NIO was unmoved by Young's complaints and continued to promote the policy of police primacy with the aim of undermining PIRA support among the Catholic populace.[230] Rees noted 'that the full processes of the law are a much more effective deterrent and are more acceptable to the community as a whole than any emergency procedures'.[231] Army chiefs, however, still had misgivings about ending detention without trial, and the RUC's ability to operate in PIRA strongholds. In a letter to Rees in December, Lieutenant General Sir David House, King's replacement as GOC, advised a 'cold, hard look' at the security situation. House admitted that the RUC had progressed recently but cautioned against crediting the police with recent successes in the courts. This, he argued, stimulated a 'state of euphoria that was positively dangerous'. He further reminded Rees that the PIRA was the main security threat and the RUC were incapable of combating them effectively; consequently detention or other measures should be implemented to bring those with PIRA memberships to justice.[232] In his

[227] Aveyard, 92-3 and TNA, CAB 134/3921, 'IRN(75) Memo 15', 16 May 1975, quoted in Aveyard, 92-3.
[228] Ibid.
[229] TNA, CJ 4/1291, 'Letter from Major-General D.T. Young to J.B. Bourn', 28 July 1975.
[230] TNA, CJ 4/1291, 'Frank Cooper: Notes from a Meeting with the GOC', 22 October 1975.
[231] House of Commons, *Hansard*, 4 November 1975, Vol. 899, Col. 237, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1975/nov/04/northern-ireland-emergency-provisions.
[232] TNA, CJ 4/1293, 'GOC to Rees,; 10 December 1975, quoted in Aveyard, 123.

response to House, Frank Cooper, NIO permanent secretary, agreed that improvements to the RUC were a work in progress. He stressed that *Loyalist* violence was also a significant threat, and that Rees' aim was to ensure that violence on both sides of the divide was treated equally.[233]

In early January 1976, a wave of Loyalist and Republican sectarian killings swept Northern Ireland,[234] prompting Prime Minister Harold Wilson to demand a robust military response, primarily to demonstrate that the government was taking action. After considering several proposals, Wilson decided to deploy additional troops (the spearhead battalion), openly deploy the Special Air Service (SAS) in Armagh, and partially closed the border.[235] Securing the border region became a high priority for the government as the PIRA was understood to plan its attacks in the Republic of Ireland, then often seek refuge there after committing them.[236] Throughout the spring of 1976 the main security burden fell on the South Armagh roulement battalion.

Special Forces and Covert Operations[237]

The MoD operates a policy of not confirming or denying covert activities and deployments by special forces and many documents relating to such activities and units remain closed. However, recent releases to TNA and information provided to various official inquiries and inquests have made public information about certain units that previously was only supported by secondary sources and press reports. Furthermore, political figures have on occasion referred to such units. Given the increasing importance of intelligence acquisition in the direction and delivery of Operation Banner from the mid-1970s, this primer summarises documented material and information that is in the public domain and commonly quoted, but this does not represent the views or opinions of the MoD.

The SAS, one of the most secretive units that saw service during Operation Banner, had twice been deployed to Northern Ireland in 1969 and 1970 to conduct covert surveillance on 'suspected gun-running activities and thefts of explosives from quarries, for which Protestants

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[233] TNA, CJ 4/1293, 'Cooper to GOC', 12 December 1975, quoted in Aveyard, 123-4.

[234] Aveyard, 125.

[235] TNA, CAB 130/908, 'MISC115(76) Meeting 1', 6 January 1976, quoted in Aveyard, 125. Bernard Donoughue, *Downing Street Diary: With Harold Wilson in No. 10* (London: Pimlico, 2006), 621–2.

[236] Henry Patterson, 'The Border Security Problem and Anglo-Irish Relations 1970–73', *Contemporary British History* 26:2 (2012), 231–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2012.673715.

[237] In the following section and Chapter 7 some secondary sources are referenced which cannot be properly checked for veracity or indeed accuracy, given the MoD's policy on not commenting on such activities.

paramilitaries were thought to be mainly responsible'. The regiment also became responsible for training the Special Reconnaissance Unit (SRU), the group tasked with conducting covert surveillance on 'terrorists, their haunts and contacts and their couriers within Northern Ireland' which was a successor organisation to the Military Reaction Force discussed in Chapter 7 below. Thirty individual SAS soldiers then joined the SRU for a four-month deployment in 1974 due to slow recruitment from the new training system for covert operatives (the attrition rate was 80-85%) that had been established on the mainland.[238] Somewhat ironically given its later reputation for clandestine activities, the regiment's 1969 deployment of a full squadron to County Antrim, in uniform and cap badged as the SAS, undertaking counter-arms smuggling operations against the Loyalist UVF[239] caused no comment in the press or indeed Republican circles (and ended with no weapon finds). While the earlier Military Reaction Force (MRF) period of 1971-72 did not involve the SAS in an operational deployment, members of the unit were sent to the province to the train MRF operatives.[240] Whatever the actuality of these claims, the SAS was from 1976 onwards to remain in Northern Ireland in some form or another, for the rest of Operation Banner.

The acknowledged deployment of the special forces unit in January 1976 - 'a political act'[241] - under direct pressure of the Prime Minister arose during an intense phase of an ongoing SAS operation in Dhofar, Oman.[242] The deployment was announced hurriedly by Downing Street, but was only a troop strength of around 11 initially, tasked with patrolling and surveillance and restricted to South Armagh, where a series of sectarian killings had shocked ministers. While a political decision had been taken, the 'Green' Army was not universally happy about this surprise deployment, seeing the province as its patch and did not open its intelligence secrets to the special forces unit for some time.[243] This was problematic as without the mass of conventional Army units already on the ground, special forces like the SAS needed intelligence and a concept of operations to guide their activities – neither was initially provided. Furthermore, the speed of the deployment had allowed no time for any preparatory training or intelligence briefings for a unit that in contrast to the rest of the Army had limited experience

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[238] TNA, CAB 134/3778, 'IRN(74) Memo 2', 28 March 1974, quoted in Aveyard, 125.
[239] Nick van der Bijl, *Operation Banner: The British Army in Northern Ireland* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2017), 106.
[240] See Chapter 7.
[241] Mark Urban, *Big Boys' Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA* (London: Faber & Faber, 1992), 7.
[242] The Oman commitment was so significant that during periods of handover between squadrons, half the regiment was in Dhofar, de la Billiere, General Sir Peter, *Looking for Trouble: SAS to Gulf Command*, (London: Harper Collins,1994), p.271.
[243] van de Bijl, 123-4.

of Northern Ireland and no understanding of the social terrain other than that gained by service in other units that had deployed to the province.

During the first year in Northern Ireland several high-profile accidental crossings of the long border with the Republic by armed covert units occurred, underlying the need for good intelligence and that there were genuine difficulties of negotiating an open border. When a group of British troops, armed but in plain clothes, crossed the border and were arrested by the Garda (police) south of the border, a back-up team sent to find them (again, armed and in plain clothes) also crossed the border - all were then detained and later appeared before the Dublin Central Court. Their claim of map-reading error was doubted by many but served as an example of the major policy issues over cross-border operations. Politically however, politicians such as Roy Mason, the new defence secretary, chose to avow the increasing size of the SAS deployment, stating in May 1977 that '[t]he number of special security forces such as the SAS had been substantially increased and this trend would continue', becoming an enthusiastic supporter of the need for further covert action.[244]

Only when arrangements were put in place for intelligence-led operational deployments by the SAS and the central organisation of covert activities did things change. As such, according to one author the SAS 'only really began to operate as the cutting edge of the intelligence effort almost two years later, in late 1977 and early 1978' by which time it had been granted leave to operate throughout the province and a Tasking and Co-ordination Group had been established.[245]

The Bourn Committee

To assess how best to implement the policy of police primacy, Rees convened a committee, under the stewardship of civil servant John Bourn, in January 1976.[246] The Committee's resultant recommendations, contained within a report titled *The Way Ahead*, included, among other things, increasing the size of the RUC and RUC Reserve, the creation of specialist RUC teams, and ensuring that the police establish themselves as a credible force in both communities.[247] As the death toll mounted in early 1976, senior Army officers, including GOC

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[244] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles*, 48-49.
[245] Urban, 238.
[246] Ellison and Smyth, *The Crowned Harp*, 82.
[247] TNA, CJ 4/1197, 'Interim Report of the Official Working Party on Law and Order in Northern Ireland', undated, quoted in Aveyard, 135-6.

House, again expressed their reluctance to accept that the Army's role was being limited to defensive tasks and that detention had ended. Nevertheless, House did, ostensibly at least, pledge his support for police primacy and seemed to accept that a return to the previous security policy was unlikely.[248]

To offset expected troop reductions, and to foster the Ulsterisation process, the size of the RUC was indeed increased; between 1974 and 1980, the RUC grew from approximately 4,500 to 7,000. Likewise, over the same period, the RUC Reserve increased from approximately 3,900 to 4,800.[249] There was also a significant upsurge in the number of full-time UDR members. In 1974, only 12.4% of UDR personnel were full-time; by 1980, over one-third of UDR members were full-time.[250] Notwithstanding its enlargement, the UDR was prevented from taking on civil disorder duties and excluded from operating in 'hard' Republican areas in Belfast and Londonderry, and was mainly confined to patrolling and searching and guard duties. The NIO was concerned that extending the mainly Protestant UDR's role would stoke tensions within the Catholic community.[251] The immediate reduction in regular troops was slower than anticipated. However, between 1974 and 1980, the number of regular British troops decreased from approximately 16,000 to 12,000.[252] One positive outcome for the Army was that tour intervals increased from 16 to 20 months for most infantry units.[253]

In September 1976, Roy Mason, Rees' replacement as Northern Ireland secretary, took over implementing *The Way Ahead* recommendations. 'Mason's strategy', according to Neumann, 'was similar to that of all his predecessors. It was to create a political framework that would restore peace and stability in the province, thus making it possible for the British government to scale down its political, physical and financial commitment to the province'. That said, Mason did not consider 'that an institutional accommodation between the two communities was necessary to achieve this'.[254] Consequently, Mason placed an aggressive stance on

[248] Aveyard, 136. TNA, CJ 4/1779, 'GOC to CLF', 7 April 1976.
[249] Neumann, *Britain's Long War*, 189-90.
[250] Neumann, 'The Myth of Ulsterization', 371.
[251] TNA, CJ 4/1783, 'Pritchard to Cubbon', 14 October 1977; TNA, CJ 4/1783, 'Security Forces' Capability: Ulster Defence Regiment', undated, quoted in Aveyard, 163.
[252] Neumann, *Britain's Long War,* 89-90.
[253] TNA, MoD, 'Narrative of Military Operations', Vol. 4 (hereafter, MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 4), XLII-28.
[254] Peter Neumann, 'Winning the "War on Terror"? Roy Mason's Contribution to Counter-Terrorism in Northern Ireland', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 14:3 (2003), https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310410001676907, 47.

paramilitary organisations, coupled with economic development opportunities, at the heart of his approach.[255]

On 12 January 1977, the policy of police primacy was formalised as Sir Kenneth Newman, head of the RUC, and General House signed a directive which placed the RUC at the forefront of security operations.[256] Under this rubric, the SSNI was 'responsible for deciding the security policy in Northern Ireland'[257] and the RUC 'was "to be fully concerned" with army [sic] operations, agreeing to the frequency and tasking of army [sic] patrols and vehicle check-points, and the army [sic] seeking authorisation from the police for house searches, identity checks and arrests'.[258] In June 1977, the MoD issued an instruction highlighting the GOC's reduced security role, amending his title from director of operations to director of military operations. Security policy was now firmly centred on separating terrorists from their communities and dealing with acts political violence through a criminal justice approach.[259] The 'Green' Army's role in confronting terrorism now reduced as intelligence-led operations increased; as intelligence gathering, and its exploitation, improved.

The Loyalist strike of April/May 1977 led to another series of discussions about how the military might maintain vital services, with the Army again unwilling to take on an additional operational role. MAC-P instructions at the time meant that any troops would have to be unarmed and therefore would need to be protected by the RUC. In the event it was decided that personal protection weapons would be carried, and 3,000 servicemen were sent from UK Land Forces (UKLF), moving at seven days' notice – many had just returned from service in Northern Ireland, and it coincided with Queen Elizabeth's Silver Jubilee celebrations. The strike ended on 13 May 1977 and the additional forces were quickly withdrawn.[260]

Over the course of 1977, the PIRA implemented its November 1976 decision to reorganise its structure and modus operandi. This involved creating a Northern Command which was responsible for all operations and transitioning the PIRA to a cell-based structure, with small

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[255] Neumann, 'Winning the "War on Terror"?', 47.
[256] TNA, CJ 4/1650, 'Joint Directive by General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland and Chief Constable Royal Ulster Constabulary', 12 January 1977, quoted in Aveyard, 146.
[257] TNA, DEFE 11/918, 'Directive for the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland Director of Military Operations', 28 July 1977.
[258] TNA, CJ 4/1650, quoted in Aveyard, 146.
[259] TNA, DEFE 24/1618, 'The Future Role and Organisation of the UDR', 22 September 1977.
[260] At this stage, 25% of BAOR was either deployed to Northern Ireland or training to go there.

Active Service Units (small mobile units) coming to the fore. In December 1977, Seamus Twomey, the PIRA's Chief of Staff, was arrested with a 'Staff Report'. The report highlighted the RUC's success in 'breaking volunteers' and that the PIRA were 'burdened with an inefficient structure of commands, brigades, battalions and companies'. Moving forward, the report argued, the PIRA should jettison the structures of an army, and instead 'gear ourselves towards long term armed struggle based on putting unknown men and new recruits into a new structure'. New four-man cells should specialise in sniping, execution, bombing or robberies and 'operate as often as possible outside of their own areas'.[261] 'This document', according to Aveyard, 'formed the basis for the PIRA's strategy, representing the republican equivalent to Bourn's proposals for police primacy'. [262]

By 1978, James Glover, Brigadier-General Staff (Intelligence) and soon to be CLF, reported that: '[t]he improved professionalism of the PIRA, both in organisation and in method, coupled with their improved security and revitalised motivation, persuades us that they can sustain at least the existing level of violence almost indefinitely. They are not being contained'.[263] Irish Joint Section (IJS) sources in the intelligence community reported that Glover's assessment was 'remarkably accurate' although less welcome was the view that Glover's (by then) leaked report 'had had a strong effect on morale throughout the movement'.[264] As the PIRA settled into its 'long war' strategy, it increased targeting of members of the UDR, often when they were off-duty and unarmed. By the late 1970s, the PIRA had killed 50 members of the UDR.[265]

The Hannigan Review

In July 1978, the NIO conducted a review, led by the Deputy Secretary for NIO Belfast, James Hannigan, to assess the implementation of the Bourn recommendations.[266] During the review process, the HQNI suggested the implementation of harsher measures, such as enforcing all government departments to commit to defeat terrorism, allowing more intrusive intelligence gathering practices, and the introduction of identity cards. Hannigan considered many of the

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[261] 'Staff Report', reproduced in Liam Clarke, *Broadening the Battlefield: The H-blocks and the Rise of Sinn Féin* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987), 251–3.
[262] Aveyard, 224.
[263] TNA, DEFE 23/200, 'Northern Ireland: Intelligence Summary', 27 January 1978, quoted in Aveyard, 224.
[264] Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5* (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 652.
[265] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles*, 51.
[266] Aveyard, 227.

proposals to conflict with 'the whole post-Bourn trend of normalisation'.[267] An MoD official on the committee agreed with the NIO office that the proposals contained within 'the HQNI document had an air of 1972 rather than 1978'.[268] Hannigan's report was finalised three months later. It revealed that deaths in the second half of 1977 and throughout 1978, with a couple of exceptions, had dropped significantly. The incidences of shootings, bombings and armed robberies had also declined. RUC and UDR recruitment continued to increase at an impressive rate and the number of regular troops deployed to Northern Ireland was reduced.[269]

Despite the report indicating that violence was decreasing, it acknowledged that the PIRA remained a threat and that communities turning away from the PIRA did not support the security services. The report concluded that the Bourn recommendations were the best way to proceed, but for several years the Army would still have to maintain its presence in 'hard' Republican areas in Belfast and Londonderry. There had also been little progress in separating the PIRA from the community in South Armagh; therefore, the county would likely 'remain chiefly a military problem'. As such, the Army would continue to be at the forefront of security operations in 'hard' Republican areas.[270] Tour lengths were extended to 18 weeks for roulement battalions and to two years for resident battalions, in part to support continuity in supporting the RUC and to enhance intelligence led operations, especially in border areas. Meanwhile the GOC argued for the Army to be released from point guarding duties stating that 15 out of 45 companies in the province were still guarding prisons, police stations, key points and permanent vehicle check points.

Fundamental differences still existed between HQNI, the RUC and NIO over the prosecution of security policy. HQNI considered its main task to be defeating the PIRA through military means, whereas the RUC and NIO viewed the fight against terrorism as a strand of the fight against criminality, which was to be defeated by taking a criminal justice approach. HQNI did not think the PIRA would be beaten 'within a discernible time frame'; consequently, the military campaign against them should be expanded. The NIO argued that HQNI were 'to some extent paying only lip service to [police primacy] in that they see themselves in the front line in the hard areas, de facto, if not de jure taking the lead'. Therefore, the Army was responsible

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[267] TNA, CJ 4/2291, 'Schulte to Hannigan', 16 August 1978, quoted in Aveyard, 227-8.
[268] TNA, CJ 4/2290, 'Innes to Hannigan', 8 August 1978.
[269] TNA, CJ 4/2294, 'Report of the Working Group to Consider Progress on Security', undated.
[270] Ibid.

for 'simply ignoring community sensitivities', choosing to 'take a calculated risk on the attitude of those who are uninvolved in terrorism but who will nevertheless be affected by such activities'. The RUC and NIO, by contrast, thought the security mission had progressed well and it should not be endangered by 'an ill-considered intensification'.[271]

It was reported the RUC and Army cooperated well at headquarters and division/battalion level, but the RUC 'still complained about the Army's turnover of personnel, claiming that its officers had "difficulty in coming to grips with the subtleties of security policy"'.[272] The NIO and RUC also raised concerns about the Army's covert missions, 'the RUC and NIO were throughout at pains to stress that such operations should not be conducted on the assumption that they should inevitably or even normally lead to terrorists being killed'.[273] It was emphasised that the mission was to apprehend terrorists and their deaths should happen 'only as an unavoidable use of force in accordance with the law'.[274] The Army was accused by some of operating a 'shoot-to-kill' policy in the province, with incidents involving covert members of the armed forces starting to all be ascribed to the SAS. It appeared at times that this may have suited both Republican critics and the Army itself. Whilst claims of a 'shoot-to-kill' policy have and continue to be vigorously contested, this issue only served to alienate parts of the minority community further and played into the hands of PIRA information operations, critics argued.[275]

Lieutenant General Timothy Creasey, David House's successor as GOC, met with Kenneth Newman and Brian Cubbon, NIO permanent secretary, to discuss the report's findings. Creasy, a veteran of several colonial campaigns, robustly endorsed HQNI's recommendations. He agreed that it was 'right that the army [sic] should be in support of the civil power' but 'the army [sic] did not see the defeat of PIRA as distinct from, or at odds with, the goal of bringing about a return to normality'. The recommendations, he contended, amounted to making the most of the resources available. Cubbon and Newman agreed that any possible short-term benefits of increasing security measures could hamper the long-term aim of successfully

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[271] TNA, CJ 4/2293, 'Stephens to PS/PUS', 6 October 1978, quoted in Aveyard, 232.
[272] TNA, CJ 4/2293, 'Stephens to PS/PUS', 6 October 1978, quoted in Aveyard, 232-3.
[273] TNA, CJ 4/2293, 'Stephens to PS/PUS', 6 October 1978, quoted in Aveyard, 232-3.
[274] TNA, CJ 4/2293, 'Stephens to PS/PUS', 6 October 1978, quoted in Aveyard, 232-3.
[275] Aveyard, 236-7.

defeating terrorism.[276] Despite the arguments put forth for stronger military action, the review concluded that the current policy be maintained.[277]

Police Primacy under the Conservative Government

In 1979, the Conservative Party, led by Margaret Thatcher, returned to government. The new SSNI, Humphrey Atkins, reaffirmed the security approach instituted by the previous Labour government. Speaking in the House of Commons, Atkins noted:

> The objective of all of us must be to bring about a state of affairs where the policing of the Province is done by policemen as opposed to soldiers, as in the rest of the United Kingdom. It will be my objective to do this. I am sorry that it is not possible at this stage to say that the presence of the Army is unnecessary.[278]

The continuation of Labour's approach was not well received by some senior Army officers, including Creasey. The MoD recommended that Thatcher appoint a director who could oversee and integrate security operations in the province. Sir John Hunt, the Cabinet Secretary, informed Thatcher that 'Some people in the MoD would also like to see the appointment of a Resident Minister in Belfast and a Director of Operations'. By contrast, the NIO argued that the proposal was from disgruntled soldiers who wanted to be 'let off the leash'. [279] Hunt highlighted that conceding to the Army's demands and appointing a director of operations 'would raise great difficulties vis-a-vis the RUC and would be a major reversal of the present policy of giving "primacy to the police"'.[280] Thatcher too saw the benefits of ensuring police primacy and refused to bend to the Army's demands. This though may have been to misunderstand the military's intent in calling for a director or 'supremo' which had long been a concern:

> Commanders…are likely to press for an effective, unitary campaign authority in order to coordinate the range of political, economic, social, legal, cultural, information operations

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[276] TNA, CJ 4/2295, 'Meeting between PUS, GOC & the Chief Constable', 10 October 1978, quoted in Aveyard, 233.
[277] TNA, PREM 16/1722, 'Mason to Callaghan', 1 December 1978 and TNA, PREM 16/1722, 'Hunt to Cartledge', 13 December 1978, quoted in Aveyard, 234-5.
[278] House of Commons, *Hansard*, 24 May 1979, Vol. 967, Col. 1206, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1979/may/24/security.
[279] TNA, PREM 19/80, 'Lord John Hunt: Secret Briefing to the Prime Minister OD(79)', 9 July 1979
[280] Ibid.

and security measures (security representing military, police and intelligence contributions) …The campaign authority – a supremo or viceroy – does not need to be military.[281]

The tenth anniversary of Operation Banner came around shortly after the 300th military casualty. The Army still had 13 major units and just over 13,000 troops in Northern Ireland, while the RUC had now reached 6,500, and planned to reach 7,500.

Calls to increase the Army's role in security operations intensified after PIRA assassinated Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Queen's cousin, in a bomb attack on his boat at Mullaghmore in the Republic of Ireland on 27 August 1979. The same day, the PIRA also launched an attack on members of the Parachute Regiment at Warrenpoint, County Down, killing 18 soldiers – the incident represented the highest number of Army fatalities in a single attack since the onset of the Troubles (and the largest number of paratroopers killed on one day since the Battle of Arnhem of September 1944). PIRA statements contrasted its 'success' in killing 18 soldiers (16 were Paras and two were from the Queen's Own Highlanders[282]) with Bloody Sunday's tally of 13 civilians. The sophistication of the attack, coupled with an increase in PIRA activities, convinced Army officers that the current security policy was ineffective at curbing PIRA violence. A report written (in 1981 evaluating previous policy), by Brooks Richards, the second Security Coordinator for Northern Ireland, indicated that: '[t]he Army saw itself as engaged in a low-intensity war, which it was not winning and could conceivably lose'. The 27 August attacks further compounded a feeling of 'gloom and professional frustration' and 'brought to a head feelings that security policy was either wrong or was at least being pursued in too doctrinaire a fashion'. This feeling was exacerbated by frequent 'differences in approach' between the Army and the RUC.[283]

Creasey used the attacks to petition for a re-evaluation of security policy, arguing that he was unsure that police primacy was being 'implemented properly to deal with the continuing threat

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[281] CGS, *Operation Banner*, 8-14.
[282] Including Lieutenant Colonel David Blair, one of the most senior officers to die from hostile action in Northern Ireland. Colonel Mark Coe was killed by PIRA while off-duty in Bielefeld, Germany in February 1980 and Lieutenant General Vernon Erskine-Crum died of a heart attack while serving as GOC in Northern Ireland in March 1971.
[283] TNA, PREM 16/958, 'Sir Brooks Richard: Co-ordination of the Security Effort in Northern Ireland – The Way Forward' (Report by the Security Co-ordinator to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland), March 1981, quoted in Bew, 'Mass, Methods, and Means', 166.

to security within Northern Ireland itself'. To free the Army from the restrictive rules of the NIO, Creasey suggested 'the appointment of a Director of Operations on the Malayan model' which 'reflected a well-defined strand of Army thinking about earlier internal security commitments'.[284] He also advocated for harsh security measures, including the reintroduction of internment and hot pursuit across the border.[285]

Thatcher, who had visited the units involved in the Warrenpoint bombings, was unmoved by Creasey's pleas and instead appointed Sir Maurice Oldfield, the former director of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), as a Security Coordinator to address the worsening violence and to improve civil-military relations, particularly in the intelligence field.[286] Summing up the context, Brooks Richards concluded:

> [t]he situation in the summer of 1979 called for a clamp and some glue of a rather special kind to prevent the RUC/Army/NIO tripod falling apart but the joints are now firmly sealed…A tripod must always have three sound, mutually supportive legs if it is to remain upright, particularly on uneven ground; it is then a most useful structure.[287]

Oldfield proved not to be the overall supremo that the Army had been hoping for – nor it seems was he intended to be.

Thatcher was equally determined not to concede to PIRA and INLA prisoners who were on hunger strike in the Maze prison. Ten strikers, protesting over the withdrawal of special category status, eventually died, including the recently elected MP Bobby Sands. The hunger strikes led to a wave of support for the PIRA among the Catholic community and widespread rioting requiring overt Army deployments once again. The support was also translated into political success for Sinn Féin, prompting the Republican movement to change to a twin-tracked approach of 'the Armalite and the ballot box'. In other words, Republicans simultaneously sought to purse both a violent campaign and constitutional politics to achieve their objectives. The hunger strikes, perhaps inevitably, also led to increased violence and an intensification of the PIRA's campaign to target members of the Security forces.[288]

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[284] TNA, PREM 16/958, quoted in Bew, 'Mass, Methods, and Means', 166.
[285] Newsinger, 188.
[286] Edwards, 'Whipping Boy',182.
[287] TNA, PREM 16/958, quoted in Bew, 'Mass, Methods, and Means', 166.
[288] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles,* 56.

An Intelligence-led Campaign

By the early 1980s, intelligence operations, particularly of a covert nature were considered one of the most important weapons against terrorist organisations. The Army continued to conduct framework operations, but there was a sense in Whitehall that 'a uniformed Army presence was not now contributing significantly to the defeat of terrorism' in Northern Ireland. In fact, it was actually 'providing a focus of community animosity'. Therefore, it was considered important to keep troop numbers to 'the minimum necessary to support the re-introduction of normal policing'.[289] (One of the three brigade headquarters (HQs) was closed down in September 1981, reflecting the reduced manpower and operational commitments.) Army operations were constrained by well-defined guidelines and its role limited to three tasks: '(a) anti-terrorist operations; (b) the containment of public disorder when the situation is beyond the capacity of the RUC; and (c) the provision of specialist support such as helicopters and bomb disposal teams'.[290]

Attacks on the security forces increased in this period and the response was to pressure the paramilitaries through intelligence led action. The SAS made the headlines in 1980 when a joint operation between specialist covert surveillance operators and special forces to capture a PIRA unit went wrong. The assault team entered the wrong house in Belfast and the targeted PIRA members who were next door opened fire on the unsuspecting soldiers and the team leader was killed.[291] Two years later the INLA bombed a pub - the Droppin Well – near Shackleton Barracks in Ballykelly on a Saturday disco night killing 11 off-duty soldiers and six civilians and injuring 39, in one of the worst bombings of the Troubles.

UDR soldiers were in a particularly difficult position. First, as a locally recruited force, many lived in rural, isolated communities rather than the fortified barracks which housed mainland personnel. This made them easy targets for Republican assassination attempts.[292] Of the 206 UDR members killed, the majority were off-duty at the time, often in their weekday occupations as school bus drivers and postal workers.[293] Moreover, the treatment levelled at

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[289] TNA, PREM 16/958, 7-8, quoted in Bew, 'Mass, Methods, and Means', 167.

[290] Ibid.

[291] The incident is currently under investigation by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).

[292] Joseph S. Robinson, '"We have long memories in this area": Ulster Defence Regiment place-memory along the Irish border', *Memory Studies* (2020), https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1750698020921455, 6.

[293] Robinson, '"We have long memories"', 6, and Robert M. Pockrass, 'Terroristic murder in Northern Ireland: Who is killed and why?', *Terrorism* 9:4 (1987), https://doi.org/10.1080/10576108708435637, 353.

Catholic UDR soldiers by Republican paramilitaries prompted their number to dwindle, further delegitimising the Regiment.[294] On the other hand, the wider UDR membership was also subjected to intimidation by Loyalist paramilitaries who sought corporate influence, intelligence on Republican groups, and military-grade weapons. This involved 'threatening letters and telephone calls, shots fired from a passing car, two abductions, the intimidation of a soldier's children and arson'.[295]

The Army was now focussed on two very different tasks – public order and counter-terrorism – the first requiring considerable manpower at certain times and the second continuous deployment of often covert forces in certain areas (but supported by the 'Green' Army). The activities were not in themselves going to lead to any resolution, however. As the decade progressed, the focus on covert intelligence operations, compared to overt military operations, increased significantly. The beginning of Operation Banner had been marred by poor intelligence sharing and cooperation amongst the Army, the RUC and the Security Service (MI5); the different intelligence units pursued their own agendas, often in competition with each other.[296] This intra- and inter-agency friction was largely resolved by the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Army further developed its intelligence gathering apparatus by establishing the Field (later Force) Research Unit (FRU) in 1982.[297] The unit was adept at recruiting informants from both Catholic and Protestant communities and infiltrating Republican and Loyalist groups with agents, commonly known as 'touts'. The British were so successful at recruiting 'touts' that one report indicates that as many as half of all senior PIRA members were working for the security services.[298] The true extent of how far the security forces infiltrated Republican (and Loyalist) organisations is unknown, but accounts indicate that the PIRA killed 70 suspected informants over the course of the conflict.[299]

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[294] Robinson, 6.

[295] John Potter, *A Testimony to Courage: The Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 – 1992* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2001), 93. Hypervigilance, fear and a mistrust of others – encapsulated by the title of a book commissioned by the Regimental Association, *A Lifetime Looking Over Your Shoulder* - continue to have a debilitating impact of the lives of UDR veterans today. See Robinson, 7; Stephen Herron, *A Lifetime Looking Over Your Shoulder: The Experiences of the Ulster Defence Regiment* (Belfast: Regimental Association of the Ulster Defence Regiment, 2017).

[296] B.W. Morgan and M.L.R. Smith, 'Northern Ireland and Minimum Force: The Refutation of a Concept?' *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 27:1 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1122907, 96.

[297] See Chapter 6 below on the FRU..

[298] Liam Clarke, 'Half of All Top IRA Men "Worked for Security Services"', *Belfast Telegraph*, 21 December 2011.

[299] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles*, 58.

According to the Army's paper on Operation Banner, the government's primary military goal in the 1980s was 'the destruction of [the] PIRA, rather than resolving the conflict'. This was achieved by a 'sophisticated mix of operations', including a willingness to use intelligence operations to 'catch terrorists undertaking serious and violent offences'. The Army noted that over the course of 13 or 14 such operations, over 40 terrorists were killed.[300] The most well-known of these operations was when soldiers shot dead eight PIRA members, armed with guns and a 91kg bomb, as they attacked an RUC station in Loughgall, County Armagh on 8 May 1987.[301] The following year, three PIRA members in Gibraltar, preparing to plant a bomb during the Governor's parade, were shot dead by the SAS. The funeral of the PIRA members was later attacked by a loyalist paramilitary, Michael Stone, who killed three people with a handgun and grenades. Less than two weeks later, two British Army corporals in civilian dress accidentally drove into a road in which the funeral procession of an IRA member killed by Stone was proceeding – the men were dragged from their car and later were murdered on waste ground, all in the sight of an Army helicopter. There is no evidence that the men were members of a covert unit despite claims to the contrary.

Operations such as Loughgall, according to the Army, caused the 'PIRA… to believe that there was no answer to Army covert operations, and that they would not win through violence'.[302] Some argue that the effect was even more profound. 'The witch-hunt for a mole destroyed them mentally,' suggests one former SB detective, adding that the entire PIRA brigade in East Tyrone – previously one of its most deadly units – was stood down after Loughgall, so consumed was it with self-debilitating paranoia.[303] Whatever the truth to these assertions, violence *was* trending downwards. For instance, in the 1980s, 96 British soldiers were killed, compared to 103 killed in 1972 alone.[304] Army force numbers had also fallen to below 11,000 and the government's plan was for a permanent garrison nearer 7,000 in the long term. The UDR had grown to 7,500 and were taking on more and more as the 'first line of support' for the RUC. The Army was now concentrated in the hardest Republican areas of West Belfast, Londonderry, and the border areas. The RUC had also grown with an increase of 500 and 300 reserves making a total of 8,000 regular police and 2,500 reservists.[305] An enormous change

[300] CGS, *Operation Banner,* 2-15.
[301] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles*, 59.
[302] CGS, *Operation Banner,* 2-15.
[303] Quoted in Matchett, 22
[304] Newsinger, 193.
[305] Hamill, 265-267.

from the 'defeated' force that the Army encountered in August 1969. While co-operation had improved between the Army and RUC, intelligence sharing remained a sticking point.

The new GOC, Lieutenant General Sir Robert Richardson, was the first to have been a battalion commander in Northern Ireland. Troops numbers were still 10,000, with eight infantry battalions (six of which were resident on long two-year tours).[306] John Bourne, who had led the Way Ahead Process in 1976 was asked to review it with the GOC and the chief constable, in early 1984. The report predicted that the current level of forces would be required for the coming five years and agreed that Army static commitments should be reduced, while all overt Army patrols would start to be accompanied by an RUC officer. The following year saw the lowest number of deaths from terrorism since 1970, but also the bombing by PIRA of the Grand Hotel in Brighton which almost killed the prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. Attacks on Army helicopters were also becoming a regular occurrence and RUC deaths exceeded Army causalities for only the second time since 1971.

As Operation Banner continued through the 1980s, PIRA expanded their list of 'legitimate' military targets. A PIRA statement which followed the 1988 bombing of a military housing complex, read: 'No longer can the IRA tolerate the ridiculous situation where British soldiers can come into nationalist areas, raid and systematically wreck homes, harass people, make arrests and then retire just a few miles away to the comfort of their families.'[307] PIRA also moved to attacking servicemen and women in European contexts, targeting them and their families in Germany, Belgium and Holland between 1988 and 1990. In an infamous incident, PIRA killed a six-month old baby daughter of an RAF corporal in 1989 - republican inmates at HMP Maze were said to have 'cheered' upon hearing of the double murder of baby Nivruti Ismalian and her father[308] even as the PIRA leadership officially regretted the child's death.[309] PIRA also murdered two Australian tourists mistaking them for off-duty British soldiers in May 1990 in Roermond, in the Netherlands. The blurring of the lines between front line personnel and the wider societal effort extended beyond military families. 'Collaborators' –

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[306] The outgoing CLF, Major General James Glover, had proposed ending all roulement battalions and moving to a resident-only force.
[307] Associated Press, 'IRA Bombs Soldiers' Married Quarters; Warns Families to Quit Province', AP News, 10 November 1988, https://apnews.com/article/d26de7f88c302d55626a866ba902fb2c.
[308] Her mother survived the attack.
[309] Editorial, 'Remember Nivruti - baby girl murdered by IRA 30 years ago today', Belfast News Letter, 26 October 2019, https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/crime/remember-nivruti-baby-girl-murdered-ira-30-years-ago-today-929020

those Catholics who supported Crown forces as, for example, working as kitchen hands in an Army mess – were forced to undertake suicide missions by driving bombs into military checkpoints, in part to overcome the Army's ability to jam radio signals for remote detonation. However, the use of such 'collaborators' in these operations was ultimately found to be counter-productive for the Republican movement and the tactic was dropped as the conflict entered the 1990s.[310]

Notwithstanding such grim atrocities, the period also saw the development of initiatives to build confidence between the Army and Nationalist communities. Londonderry had been the base of one of the most active groups in PIRA from the early 1970s, accounting for 17% of British military fatalities, compared to Belfast's 30% despite the capital having a potential pool of recruits 4 or 5 times higher according to one source. [311] All the more surprising perhaps then that it also was the location for the discussion and trialling of mutually de-escalatory measures in the late 1980s through the Peace and Reconciliation Group. Meetings were held with local people and the Army discussing issues and the initiative was endorsed by the GOC.[312]

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[310] C. J. M. Drake, 'The provisional IRA: A case study', Terrorism and Political Violence 3:2 (1991), 43-60, 50, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546559108427103
[311] Ed Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA* (London: Penguin, 2002), 363.-366.
[312] Ibid., 364-366.

5. The Road to Peace, 1990-2007

The PIRA's Mainland Campaign and Nascent Political Dialogue

By the early 1990s, a reformed and improved RUC was at the forefront of security operations. Improvements in the RUC's operational capacity, coupled with the success of intelligence operations against the PIRA, put the Republicans under significant strain. So much so, 'the RUC estimated that… 70 per cent of all planned IRA operations in the province needed to be aborted for fear of detection, whilst of the remaining 30 per cent, another 80 per cent were prevented or interdicted by the security forces'.[313] With the conflict at a military stalemate in Northern Ireland, the PIRA shifted its focus by launching a series of spectacular terrorist attacks on political and financial targets on the British mainland.[314] In July 1990, the PIRA bombed the London Stock Exchange, creating a 10-foot hole in the building. The following February, the PIRA fired several mortar rounds at Number 10 Downing Street, narrowly missing a (War) Cabinet meeting, chaired by the Prime Minister, John Major. In 1992, the PIRA launched another attack in the City of London, killing three and injuring 91 civilians. This was followed by PIRA exploding a car bomb in London hours later, although no-one was killed in the second attack. As Robert McCartney, a Unionist politician, noted: 'a bomb in London is worth 100 in Belfast'. [315]

Notwithstanding McCartney's comments, there was a sense in the NIO that the PIRA's mainland campaign did not demonstrate the organisation's military strength, but instead revealed its weakness. In fact, politicians at Westminster judged the PIRA's high-profile attacks as an indication of its desire to enter serious political negotiations. [316] As John Major argued, for the PIRA 'an offer of peace needed to be accompanied by violence, to show their volunteers that they were not surrendering'.[317] As such, the UK government rebuffed calls to escalate its military response, including deploying more troops to the province and reintroducing internment, which remained on the statute book.[318]

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[313] Neumann, *Britain's Long War,* 157.
[314] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles*, 61.
[315] Ibid., 62.
[316] Neumann, *Britain's Long War*, 157.
[317] John Major, *John Major: The Autobiography* (London: Harper Collins, 1999), 433.
[318] Neumann, *Britain's Long War*, 157.

From the outset of the Troubles, the UK government had held talks with IRA leaders to bring the conflict to a peaceful resolution. As previously discussed, negotiations with UK representatives resulted in PIRA enacting several temporary ceasefires in the 1970s. By the early 1990s, several of these behind-the-scenes talks were beginning to yield results. One of the most important, although by no means the only one, was the dialogue established between Gerry Adams, Sinn Féin's president, and John Hulme, the leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), in the late-1980s. The SDLP leader attempted to convince Adams that the most likely way to achieve a united Ireland was by abandoning the PIRA's violent campaign in favour of a political process.[319] Fundamental to Hulme's argument was that the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement – that gave the Republic of Ireland an official role in Northern Ireland's affairs – demonstrated that the UK government was neutral on the question of a united Ireland. Adams disagreed with Hulme's assessment and the talks collapsed without agreement.

Hulme, however, remained undeterred by Adams' recalcitrance and held talks with the UK government.[320] This engagement led to the SSNI, Peter Brooke, declaring in 1990 that: '[t]he British government has no selfish strategic or economic interests in Northern Ireland'.[321] This process paved the way for John Major and Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, to sign the 1993 Downing Street Declaration; the declaration was the springboard for all-party peace talks.[322] John Major stated that: '[t]here is an opportunity to end violence for good in Northern Ireland'. Laying the onus on the paramilitaries to renounce violence, Major noted: '[w]e believe that it's now up to those who have used or supported violence to take that opportunity. The door is open to them'.[323]

Loyalist Paramilitaries and the Security Forces

Despite moves towards peace negotiations, Loyalist paramilitary activity, especially nakedly sectarian violence against innocent Catholics, increased in this period. In March 1993, UDA gunmen shot dead four Catholic workmen, then seven months later, viciously attacked a bar in

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[319] John Manley, 'Hume-Adams talks laid the foundations of the peace process', *The Irish News*, 4 August 2020, https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2020/08/04/news/hume-adams-talks-laid-the-foundations-of-the-peace-process-2025157/.

[320] Peter J. McLoughlin, '"Humespeak": The SDLP, Political Discourse, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process', *Peace and Conflict Studies* 15:1 (2008), https://doi.org/10.46743/1082-7307/2008.1090, 106-107

[321] *Irish Times*, 10 November 1990, cited in McLoughlin, 107.

[322] McLoughlin, 107-08

[323] Vincent Kearney, '"It's Over": Reporting the IRA ceasefire 20 years ago', *BBC News*, 27 August 2014, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-28957532.

Greysteel, County Londonderry, killing eight people. The attack was launched in response to the PIRA's bombing of a fish and chip shop on the Shankill Road, which killed nine people. After the attack, the PIRA asserted that the bomb was designed to kill Loyalist paramilitaries meeting in an office upstairs.[324] The incident was one of many tit-for-tat sectarian revenge attacks over the course of the Troubles. The following year, both the PIRA and Loyalist paramilitaries continued their violent campaigns, with the latter responsible for shooting dead six people in a bar in Loughinisland, County Down. The attack, like others before it, resulted in claims of collusion between Loyalist volunteers and state forces. Although collusion in this instance has been disputed, a 2016 Northern Ireland Public Services Ombudsman report concluded that collusion 'was a significant feature of the Loughinisland murders'.[325]

Republicans had long claimed that members of the security forces colluded with the Loyalist paramilitaries to carry out sectarian killings. One of the most notorious cases was the 1989 murder of Pat Finucane, a solicitor who represented PIRA members, at the hands of the UDA. Shortly after Finucane's death, Loughlin Maginn, a suspected PIRA member, was shot dead by Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) members. However, after Maginn's family refuted that he was a PIRA volunteer, UFF members distributed intelligence reports, which they received from the security forces, to indicate that Maginn was in the PIRA.[326] In response to these claims, the UK government appointed Sir John Stevens, the former Metropolitan Police commissioner, to investigate accusations that the police colluded with Loyalist paramilitaries over the murders of Finucane and a Protestant, Brian Adam Lambert.[327] In his third, and final, report published in 2003, Stevens outlined that:

> …there was collusion in both murders and the circumstances surrounding them. Collusion is evidenced in many ways. This ranges from the wilful failure to keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence, through to the extreme of agents being involved in murder. [328]

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[324] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles,* 62.

[325] BBC News, 'Loughinisland murders: Families "relieved" that report will stand', *BBC News*, 18 June 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-53093852.

[326] BBC News, 'The Stevens Inquiry Chronology', *BBC News*, 17 April 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/2954383.stm.

[327] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles*, 60.

[328] 'Collusion, murder and cover-up', *The Guardian*, 18 April 2003, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/apr/18/uk.northernireland1.

Stevens' investigation also revealed that Brian Nelson, the UDA's intelligence chief and an active FRU agent, was involved in Finucane's murder. Nelson's role in the murder led to broader concerns about the FRU's agent handling operation in Northern Ireland. Nelson, a convicted kidnapper and torturer, was originally recruited by the FRU in 1984 and was its only Loyalist agent.[329] During this period, Nelson was involved in committing acts of terrorism, including the attempted murder of a Sinn Féin councillor. After a break as an agent, the FRU recruited Nelson again in 1987; over the next four years, Nelson participated in at least four killings and 10 attempted murders.[330] His re-recruitment was subjected to intense competition between the Army and MI5, which wanted to take over the running of this agent, and these discussions went all the way up the chain of command to the then CLF and the director general of MI5.[331]

Nelson's main task as an agent was to focus the UDA's efforts on targeting PIRA members. The somewhat questionable argument for this, according to a former FRU commander, was that as PIRA targets would be challenging for the UDA to find, the security forces would have ample opportunity to intervene before the attacks occurred. A further review into Pat Finucane's murder, led by Sir Desmond de Silva, criticised the FRU's knowledge of Nelson's activities, including targeting PIRA members. De Silva argued that: 'I am also satisfied that, with the knowledge and acquiescence of his FRU handlers, Nelson extensively updated and disseminated targeting material to other loyalist paramilitaries which they subsequently used in their efforts to carry out terrorist attacks'. He further noted that: 'I was particularly concerned by the fact that, on occasions, Nelson's FRU handlers provided him with information that was subsequently used for targeting purposes. These actions are, in my view, indicative of handlers in some instances deliberately facilitating Nelson's targeting of PIRA members'.[332] De Silva was also critical of the fact that Nelson discussed his involvement in several murders with his handlers, but the FRU continued to use him as an agent.[333] To this day there is uncertainty about who knew what surrounding this affair – itself an unsatisfactory situation. De Silva's overall conclusion was that 'the Government was fully aware of the entirely unacceptable fact

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[329] de Silva, Vol. 1, 6-7.
[330] Ibid., 1, 7-8.
[331] Ibid., 117.
[332] Ibid., 7-8.
[333] Ibid., 8-9.

that there was no adequate framework in place for agent-handling in Northern Ireland in the late 1980s'.[334]

The Peace Process 1994-1998

On 31 August 1994, after 25 years of conflict, the PIRA announced a ceasefire. Declaring the truce, the PIRA's ruling Army Council stated:

> Recognising the potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the democratic process and underlying our definitive commitment to its success, the leadership of the IRA have decided that as of midnight, August 31, there will be a complete cessation of military operations. All our units have been instructed accordingly.[335]

The PIRA's ceasefire was met with cautious optimism from the UK government, although Loyalists were less convinced of the PIRA's intentions to sustain the truce.[336] Nevertheless, Loyalist paramilitaries had often claimed that they would end their own violent campaign if the PIRA put down its guns. Several weeks after the PIRA's ceasefire, the Combined Loyalist Military Command, a collection of the main Loyalist organisations, called a truce. Announcing the ceasefire, Gusty Spence, the former UVF leader, offered:

> …to the loved ones of all innocent victims over the past 25 years abject and true remorse - Let us firmly resolve to respect our differing views of freedom, culture and aspiration and never again permit our political circumstances to degenerate into bloody warfare.[337]

With both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries announcing a ceasefire, tentative moves were made to begin peace talks. The process was not without setbacks as sections of both communities expressed dissatisfaction with the ceasefire. The Republicans, for their part, opposed the UK government's demand that they decommission their arms before Sinn Féin was allowed to enter the talks. Loyalist politicians at Westminster, who were against Sinn Féin entering discussions, placed John Major's minority government under pressure to

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[334] de Silva, Vol. 1, 25, 31.
[335] Ciaran Mullan, 'Irish Republican Army (IRA) Ceasefire Statement, 31 August 1994', *CAIN Web Service*, https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira31894.htm.
[336] BBC News, 'On This Day: 31 August 1994: IRA declares "complete" ceasefire', *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/31/newsid_3605000/3605348.stm.
[337] BBC News, 'The Search for Peace: Loyalist Ceasefire, October 1994', *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/northern_ireland/understanding/events/loyalist_ceasefire.stm.

ensure the PIRA recanted violence before the organisation was allowed to participate in discussions.[338] At the political level, cautious progress was made as Patrick Mayhew, SSNI, held a series of informal and official meetings with Sinn Féin representatives over the course of 1995. At the military level, however, much of the PIRA's military structures remained intact and some of its members supported a return to violence. Smith argues that PIRA's 'overall military position was one of relative decline' by this time, with an 'inability to attain designated ends with chosen means' or, to put it another way, its military campaign wasn't working.[339] The ceasefire was broken in early 1996 when the PIRA exploded a bomb in the Docklands, London, killing two and resulting in millions of pounds worth of damage. On 15 June 1996, five days after the start of all-party peace talks, the PIRA bombed Manchester city centre, injuring 200 people. In October of the same year, the PIRA, for the first time since 1994, attacked British forces, planting two bombs at Thiepval Barracks, killing one.[340]

The peace process was rejuvenated after the Labour Party under Tony Blair's leadership, returned to government in 1997. According to Mo Mowlam, the SSNI, 'the new government's approach was almost identical to that of the previous administration, except for the fact that London was now at liberty to generate the momentum which the peace process had lacked in previous years'.[341] The UK government used the momentum to announce a date to resume all-party talks, which eventually led to the PIRA declaring another ceasefire in July 1997.[342] The resultant talks culminated in the signing of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, which outlined a power-sharing deal between the Nationalist and Unionist communities. The accord, which was signed by the British and Irish governments, along with the main political parties in the province (except for the Democratic Unionist Party), agreed that Northern Ireland would remain part of the UK, until such time that there was a majority in favour of a united Ireland.[343]

[338] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles*, 80.
[339] Smith, *Fighting for Ireland*, 215.
[340] Martin Melaugh, 'Key Dates in the Irish Peace Process', *CAIN Web Service*, https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/keydate.htm
[341] Neumann, *Britain's Long War*, 172.
[342] BBC News, 'On This Day: 19 July 1997: IRA declares ceasefire', *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/19/newsid_2450000/2450845.stm.
[343] Charles Landow and James McBride, 'Moving Past the Troubles: The Future of Northern Ireland Peace', *Council on Foreign Relations*, 23 April 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/moving-past-troubles-future-northern-ireland-peace.

The peace process did not signal a complete end to violence or sectarian dispute. Disenchanted PIRA members splintered into dissident groups, most notably the Real IRA and Continuity IRA. In 1998, the Real IRA detonated a bomb in Omagh, County Tyrone, killing 29 and injuring over 200 people. The attack was the worst atrocity of the Troubles.[344] The Army was also still called upon to police sectarian flashpoints, especially Orange Order parades determined to march through Nationalist areas. Over the course of 1998, 19 battalions were deployed in public order operations.[345] For the troops on the ground even in the 2000s, the mission remained a demanding one: '[w]e were …supporting the RUC…every Friday and Saturday night on patrol, we used to get bricked… if you go into the sort of, harder-core, Nationalist areas of Belfast…People walk past you and spit in your face. "F-off you Brits" and stuff like that'. The peace process meant that some soldiers ignored rules to not go into out-of-bounds areas: 'someone …went into an out-of-bounds area. Got a bit of a kicking, got a pistol put to his head and told if it wasn't for the peace process, he would have been killed…People at the time were probably not treating it with the seriousness it deserved'.[346]

After the conclusion of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, the military began slowly drawing down its capabilities in the province. Between 1999 and 2007, the year Operation Banner ended, the Army departed from 18 bases that it occupied with the RUC. Likewise, the Army also proceeded with a staged withdrawal from its observation and communication posts between 1999 and 2007. At the close of the operation, all military observation posts had been shut. In the two years prior to 2007, the Army reduced its installations from 24 locations to 13.[347] In July 2005, the PIRA finally called an end to its armed struggle; two years later, on 31 July 2007, Operation Banner was concluded. [348]

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[344] Colleen Sullivan, 'Omagh bombing terrorist attack, Omagh, County Tyrone, Northern Ireland', *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 8 August 2021, https://www.britannica.com/event/Omagh-bombing
[345] CGS, *Operation Banner,* 2-16.
[346] NAM, NAM 2012-11-36, Oral history interview: Infantryman, 1 Royal Anglian
[347] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles*, 81.
[348] Ibid.

6. Intelligence Co-ordination

The evolution of intelligence co-ordination during Operation Banner saw improvisation and institutional rivalry, but also an evolution from initial fragmentary and fractious approaches into a growing professionalisation. From a supporting role gaining experience in the first decade, MI5 gradually took over control of the combined efforts both in the six counties and on the mainland.[349] Ultimately the intelligence dimension proved to be central to the peaceful resolution of the Troubles.

Supporting Intelligence

That over the duration of Operation Banner some 20 units were created to deliver intelligence co-ordination attests to the abiding volatility.[350] Yet however inefficient, duplicative, and internecine the result may have been at times,[351] by the late 1980s, intelligence – what a defence secretary considered 'the single most potent force'[352] – would thwart 85% of paramilitary operations,[353] equipping the British Army and security forces more widely with crucial lessons for subsequent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. While much of the intelligence story remains classified and the MoD (as explained earlier in the primer) does not confirm or deny details relating to covert intelligence activities, contemporaneous accounts and recently released primary material are sufficient to undertake a preliminary consideration of this crucial aspect of Operation Banner.

The outbreak of sectarian violence in the spring of 1969 quickly saw an understaffed and antiquated SB 'overwhelmed';[354] its intelligence gathering capacities ill-configured to the modern communications and transport which had emerged since the last Republican campaign a decade earlier.[355] By April, both MI5 and the Army had dispatched liaison officers to the province to fulfil a Cabinet Office request for 'information other than through

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[349] Former senior intelligence officer.

[350] Urban, 255

[351] Rory Finegan, 'Shadowboxing in the Dark: Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism in Northern Ireland', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 28:3 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1155933, 501

[352] King, Thomas, 'Letter from Secretary of State for Defence to the Attorney General', 19 March 1991, in Desmond de Silva, *The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review*, Vol. 2, HC 802-II (London: The Stationery Office, 2012) (hereafter 'de Silva, Vol. 2'), 257-265

[353] Peter Neumann, 'The Bullet and the Ballot Box: The Case of the IRA', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28:6 (2009), https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390500441081, 969

[354] David Charters, '"Have A Go": British Army/MI5 Agent-running Operations in Northern Ireland, 1970–72', *Intelligence and National Security* 28:2 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.708217, 207

[355] Michael Kirk-Smith and James Dingley, 'Countering terrorism in Northern Ireland: the role of intelligence', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 20:3-4 (2009), https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310903027132, 553

the Northern Ireland official sources,'[356] although these officers were soon forced from their SB base for causing 'an ardent amount of friction'[357] with their hosts.[358] This ill-feeling would only sour further with the deployment of British soldiers onto the streets in August that year.

MI5 initially had only a supporting role within the UK against the IRA, with the lead agency on the mainland being the Metropolitan Police's Special Branch (MPSB) (originally Special Irish Branch)[359] and in Northern Ireland, the SB.[360] When asked by the home secretary for an appreciation of the prospect of violence in Northern Ireland by the IRA in November 1968, the Service admitted that it had 'no independent coverage' and relied on SB for information. F Branch, the MI5 unit tasked with counter-subversion operations, at the time had one desk officer working on Northern Ireland. A gloomy paper advised the home secretary to look beyond the IRA for potential sources of violence, citing deep seated antagonisms between the Catholic and Protestant communities.[361] MI5 was also unaware at the time that Seamus Costello, a member of the IRA Council, had requested arms supplies from the Soviet Union in late 1969, but had been rebuffed. Nor did it realise until much later that a second request for weapons from Cathal Goulding, IRA chief of staff, delivered through the general secretary of the Irish Communist Party, eventually did result in a weapons drop by a Soviet vessel 55 miles off the coast of Northern Ireland in 1972, undetected by British intelligence.[362]

Historically, the British Army had conducted its colonial campaigns in cooperation with the local police, on whom intelligence concerning the indigenous community often relied. This mix of military muscle and local expertise, together with the carrot of independence, had been relatively successful in stemming post-war unrest in Britain's various colonies. The situation in Northern Ireland differed on two counts. First, the RUC considered itself composed of loyal Ulstermen who resented an Army seeking quick wins in support of

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[356] TNA, CAB 130/422, 'Cabinet Office Committee Misc. 244: 1st Meeting at Home Office, Sir Phillip Allen (Home Office PUS & Chair)', 21 April 1969, Section G. The Joint Intelligence Committee had also set up a Current Intelligence Group on Northern Ireland in April 1969.
[357] TNA, CJ 3/55, 'Home Office Memo to Sir Philip Allen, Permanent Secretary', 31 July 1969.
[358] Charters, 'Have A Go', 207.
[359] Formed in 1883 during the Fenian's bombing campaign in London.
[360] Andrew, 600.
[361] Andrew, 603.
[362] Andrew, 605-606. The weapons may well have gone to the OIRA rather than PIRA, given their Marxist credentials.

'mainland interests';[363] the RUC in turn was found by the Army 'to be secretive, and mistrustful of outsiders'.[364] Not only did this mean that the Army entered Northern Ireland with 'a limited understanding' of the theatre, but there was not even the opportunity to break down cultural barriers at this early stage: 'Ulster humour and rough cop banter was lost on soldiers. SB's approach was different to the Army's which unsettled many well-mannered young men just out of Sandhurst and seasoned officers alike'.[365] Second, the campaign sought to *preserve* the status quo of Northern Ireland as a constituent nation of the UK, as per the wishes of the Unionist majority.

Against this backdrop, early efforts to establish a centralised, pan-Province intelligence structure – which the Army evaluated as 'undoubtedly the best'[366] approach to intelligence gathering – stalled when Stormont insisted that the RUC remain independent of Army jurisdiction, pressures which would persist until the imposition of direct rule by Westminster in 1972.[367] Mindful of these tensions, the GOC at HQNI appointed a senior MI5 officer as his Director of Intelligence (D/Int) who, despite the title, would *coordinate* rather than *direct* the intelligence effort. In parallel, an Intelligence Sub-Committee comprising SB, MI5 and Army representatives, that Stormont had assembled to advise it, succumbed to the strained relationship between its members but was soon replaced with a committee chaired directly by D/Int.[368] The result of these developments was, contrary to the intentions of the Northern Ireland government, to further harm the morale of SB.[369]

Developing Human Intelligence

Simultaneously, Stormont and Westminster reformed law enforcement in recognition of what London saw as legitimate grievances on the part of the Catholic population. The Hunt Report of August 1969 led to the USC being disbanded in favour of a local volunteer force stood up as a regiment of the British Army, under the command of the GOC (discussed above). The new UDR quickly saw its ranks fill with ex-USC recruits, immediately discrediting the former in many Catholic eyes (although initially 15% of so of recruits were

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[363] Kirk-Smith and Dingley, 555, 570; Leahy, *Informers, Agents,* 130.
[364] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para 308.
[365] Matchett, 141.
[366] Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), 74.
[367] Charters, 'Have a Go', 132.
[368] Charters, 'Have a Go', 208.
[369] Craig, 215.

still Catholic).[370] Moreover, the USC's dissolution exacerbated the intelligence vacuum since its responsibility as the province's primary source of human intelligence (HUMINT) was not transferred to the UDR.[371] The under-resourced SB thus emerged as a single point of failure in the intelligence architecture, providing up to 90% of the aggregate intelligence intake.[372]

Nevertheless, at this stage of the campaign the Army envisaged its presence to be temporary so military commanders were reluctant to expend further political capital on intelligence, particularly while they enjoyed a 'honeymoon' period of relatively good relations with both sides of the conflict and the Catholics especially.[373] That all began to change with the twin antagonisms of the Falls Road Curfew (1970) and the subsequent policy of internment (1971). The latter had a catalytic impact on the development of the intelligence landscape. Though the Army warned against internment and in hindsight affirmed it 'was a major mistake,'[374] Westminster yielded to the appeals of Stormont's prime minister in approving the mass arrest and internment of IRA suspects. As noted previously, the intelligence provided by the SB was woefully outdated, however. During Operation Demetrius, soldiers rounded up dozens of inactive IRA members, sought long-deceased suspects, and attempted to raid houses which were demolished. IRA ringleaders, more to the point, had already fled to the Republic sensing that internment was imminent.[375] That some internees were subjected to the colonial practices of 'deep interrogation' only inflamed the aggrieved communities.

This treatment was in effect sanctioned by Whitehall's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which had approved a revision of counter-insurgency doctrine under which these techniques were used.[376] The techniques had been explained as similar to the escape and evasion training undertaken by pilots and members of special forces.[377] The furore and Parker

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[370] Andrew Sanders, 'Northern Ireland: The Intelligence War 1969–75', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 13:2 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-856X.2010.00416.x, 234.
[371] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para 502.
[372] TNA, DEFE 25/304, 'Dick White: File 7A: Report by the Intelligence Co-ordinator on the State of Intelligence in Northern Ireland', March 1971.
[373] Charters, 'Have a Go', 209.
[374] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para.220; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, *The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1997), 55.
[375] Thornton, 93; Kennedy-Pipe, 55.
[376] Thornton, 94.
[377] Matchett, 129. See also Newbery, 'Intelligence and Controversial British Interrogation Techniques', 114.

Inquiry which followed forced the Heath government to ban the 'five techniques' associated with deep interrogation, although members of the JIC continued to advocate their use and the psychological approach to interrogation was not abandoned.[378] Through their use of the Army's interrogation techniques, allegations of brutality were extended to SB, prompting several of its officers to withdraw from internee interrogations to save their reputations.[379] In sum, while internment did contribute to situational awareness, and by some measures to a large degree,[380] the disconnect between various organs of the intelligence machine had handed the IRA (OIRA and PIRA) a propaganda victory and further deteriorated fragile inter-agency relationships.

One significant outcome of Operation Demetrius was the Army's increased focus on building its own intelligence apparatus in the province. Military intelligence officers were the primary collectors of intelligence and had been working on various types of collection before internment in the absence of specialist units, often working directly with SB. The Army had in fact been active in intelligence gathering from early on in Operation Banner, running plain clothes surveillance patrols[381] and later handling and recruiting human sources, from early 1970.[382] The following spring, it had also begun - at a small scale - to run joint covert intelligence gathering operations with the SB, known as the 'Bomb Squads'.[383] However, these joint teams, responsible for intelligence collection of admissible evidence about terrorist plots to be used in court,[384] 'were unsuccessful, largely owing to difficulties over sharing intelligence' and were not popular with all parts of the Army, (although interestingly much later in Operation Banner, intelligence co-operation between the Army and the RUC involved similar joint-working practices).

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[378] Newbery, 'Intelligence and Controversial British Interrogation Techniques', 103-119, 118.
[379] Bennett, 523.
[380] Interrogation may have produced 90% of new intelligence in the aftermath of internment. Andrew Sanders, 'Operation Motorman and the search for a coherent British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 24:3 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.802609, 471.
[381] "Use of Plain Clothes Patrols," TNA DEFE 13/992, quoted in Charters 'Professionalising clandestine military intelligence', p132.
[382] Charters, 'Have a Go', 202-229.
[383] TNA, CAB 134/3778. 'Ministerial Committee on Northern Ireland: Army Plain clothes patrols in Northern Ireland', 28 Mar 1974, 2. See also Peter Taylor, *Brits: The War Against the IRA* (Bloomsbury: London, 2001), 128.,
[384] Sanders, 'Northern Ireland,' 236.

Early Steps and experimentation

After the RUC withdrew from the joint teams following the introduction of internment in August 1971, the Army created the MRF 'to carry out covert operations, including surveillance, protection, counter-hijacking and arrests'.[385] The MRF, said to be the creation of the Commander of 39 Brigade, the then Brigadier Frank Kitson, mirrored his anti-Mau Mau squads in Kenya,[386] although he himself downplays this.[387] One problem, according to the noted journalist Peter Taylor, was:

> What undercover soldiers might have got away with in the dense jungles of Kenya, the barren wastes of Oman or the dusty alleyways of Aden, was not 'acceptable' on the streets of Belfast when the 'natives' were British citizens.[388]

The experiment proved to be highly controversial and of questionable value. MRF recruitment eschewed formal training and its members were borrowed ad hoc from various Army units to the detriment of its institutional memory.[389] Indeed early recruits were selected from roulement units on very short tours of service in the province and were provided with little more induction than learning from the hands-on experience of those who preceded them. This led to high turnover rates with resultant effects on efficiency and security. Draft guidance on plain clothes operations advised that: '[n]o training is required before arrival in Northern Ireland, but commanding officers should be prepared to earmark suitable personnel of above average intelligence who are steady, unexcitable individuals of known reliability and good pistol shots'.[390]

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[385] TNA, DEFE 25/282, 'Carrington to Heath: Northern Ireland – Special Reconnaissance Unit', 21 November 1972. The covert nature of such units means that even in official documents, correct titles are not always used – the MRF was regularly (and incorrectly) referred to as the Mobile Reconnaissance Force.

[386] Jon Moran, *From Northern Ireland to Afghanistan: British Military Intelligence Operations, Ethics and Human Rights* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 37. Kitson was also author of *Low intensity Operations* which was originally published in 1971. See also Thomas Leahy, *The Intelligence War Against the IRA* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 29-33, which suggests that the GOC was also instrumental in the creation of the MRF.

[387] Matchett, 34

[388] Taylor, *Brits*, 127.

[389] Geraint Hughes, 'The Use of Undercover Military Units in Counter-Terrorist Operations: A Historical Analysis with Reference to Contemporary Anti-Terrorism', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 21:4 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2010.518857, 572.

[390] TNA, WO 32/21732, 'Draft for DMO's Monthly Report for June 1972', 22 June 1972.

Shortly after the MRF was established another experiment by the Army was begun to co-ordinate certain source handling, by trying to turn (mostly low level) members of the IRA or those familiar with paramilitaries, into informers (whom the Army called 'Freds'). Although the short-lived, Fred Force, which began in late 1971, was a separate unit, although both it and the MRF were initially based at Palace Barracks in Belfast.[391] Palace Barracks was at the time also being used as a police holding centre for internees – an obvious security vulnerability for the covert units. The MRF numbered between 30 and 40 operatives [392] in 1972 and used unmarked cars to conduct covert surveillance where uniformed units would find it difficult to operate.[393]

While initially only in 39 Brigade, one MRF was eventually assigned to each brigade but with overall command vested in the CLF.[394] The MRF was subject to limited supervision and was associated with a number of intelligence breeches and lapses in security, as well as a tendency to not coordinate its activities with the 'Green' Army, which dismissed them as 'the Funnies'. The October 1972 case of the Four Square Laundry and Gemini massage parlour operation[395] in which a covert Army surveillance unit offering discounted laundry services in Republican areas was ambushed by the IRA and an MRF soldier (on loan to the unit) was killed, probably following a security breach by a 'Fred' who may have seen the Four Square Laundry van at Palace Barracks, revealed the activities of the unit.[396] After interrogation by a PIRA counter-intelligence unit, the Fred and another he identified were both later killed by PIRA.[397] The basing of the Fred Force, alongside a different covert unit, both within a busy military base with comings and goings was used by critics to suggest that these units were amateurish and in need of urgent reform. The intense publicity around the Four Square Laundry operation also revealed that the MRF and the informer running Fred

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[391] Taylor, *Brits*, 128.

[392] Recently declassified papers at TNA give the establishment of each brigade MRF as 43 (two officers, two NCOs and three soldiers at HQ, and three sections each with three NCOs and nine soldiers who would deploy in units of four), MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 2, XIII-10.

[393] See also Martin Dillon, *The Dirty War* (London: Arrow, 1991), 27-51.

[394] Charters, 'Have a Go', 215.

[395] Moloney, 119.

[396] The PIRA learned that a shadowy unit was based in married quarters in Palace Barracks and targeted the Four Square Laundry van, killing Sapper Edward Stuart. His fellow operative (a Women's Royal Army Corps member attached to the Royal Military Police) who was outside the vehicle survived and was able to warn a third member of the team that their offices might be targeted who evacuated shortly before it was attacked. van der Bijl, 73-75. The female operative was later awarded the Military Medal. McKittrick, et. al., *Lost Lives*, 274.

[397] McKittrick, et. al., *Lost Lives*, 275..

Team were working separately from the SB (which was running its own sources) and ultimately led to the disbandment of both units.

Professionalising Intelligence Capabilities

The MRF's replacement was a more professional organisation - the SRU)[398] - and was different in a number of ways, most significantly that membership was based on a rigorous selection outside of Northern Ireland (run at camps at Lydd and Pontrilas), and the establishment of a covert surveillance training system for successful recruits.[399] Its main task was to provide the Army across the province with a covert surveillance capability for special intelligence tasks. The standards were so rigorous that the unit struggled to fill its established strength for a long time, which led to it being backfilled by personnel from other units, including the SAS.[400] The Unit was known as the 14th Intelligence Company in early 1973, and later as the Intelligence and Security Group (ISG), sometimes Company.[401]

Arguably the Army's most important intelligence gathering tool at the time was still foot patrols, which were used to compile knowledge about an area and its residents. Soldiers did this through stopping and questioning citizens, vehicle checks and house searches. It is reported that between 1971 and 1973, house searches increased from 17,000 to 75,000 and that most days would see 5,000 cars stopped and searched.[402] The Army considered intelligence such an effective weapon against the PIRA that, Robin Evelegh, a former officer in Belfast, complained that 'during his tours in Northern Ireland he was not allowed to put more than 20 per cent of his battalion into plain clothes and argues that 50 soldiers in civilian dress were more effective than 400 in battledress'.[403] However, it was still a best effort for many years as one senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) noted: 'I had been working in Northern Ireland as the intelligence sergeant for my infantry battalion. Although what I

[398] David Charters, 'Professionalizing Clandestine Military Intelligence in Northern Ireland: Creating the Special Reconnaissance Unit', *Intelligence and National Security* 33:1 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1373443, 133.

[399] The selection process and training of volunteers to the 14th Intelligence Company is described in depth by an avowed former member of the organisation (and later also the FRU), in Robert Lewis, *Fishers of Men* (London; John Blake Publishing, 2017), Ch.3. See also van der Bijl, 75.

[400] TNA, FCO 87/583, 'Memo to the Prime Minister from Roy Mason: The SAS and the Special Reconnaissance Unit in Northern Ireland', 8 September 1976.

[401] These units were never avowed by the MoD. McKittrick, et. al., *Lost Lives*, 438-439 lists at least four soldiers who are believed to have been killed while undertaking covert duties in 14 Intelligence Company. (Not including the MRF's Edward Stuart). See also Urban, Ch. 4, 35-49.

[402] Newsinger, 174.

[403] Newsinger, 175.

knew about intelligence at the time wouldn't have covered half the back of a postage stamp!'[404]

The SRU, which initially numbered 120 rising to 130, was altogether more disciplined and professional than its predecessor.[405] Whereas the MRFs were subordinate to the brigades, the CLF exercised operational control of the SRU as part of an effort to centralise and formalise its activities. Eligibility extended to all three Services but selection was no less competitive: its members had eight weeks' training. The Intelligence Corps increasingly got involved in training covert Army intelligence units and they became highly professional. The Army's equipment requirements staff in the MoD also set up a special team supporting the needs of covert surveillance.[406] The association with the Special Air Service would pose an increasingly complicated quandary for ministers over the decade who, 'in order all the more readily to refute hostile propaganda about SAS involvement in Northern Ireland,' enforced a three-year ban between SAS and SRU service. Given the utility of SAS training in plain-clothes operations, this restriction became increasingly relaxed over the years to the extent that SAS soldiers were temporarily 're-capbadged' during their service with SRU.[407] Ultimately, Harold Wilson would publicly despatch the SAS to Northern Ireland in 1976, as discussed above.

At the time of the SRU's establishment, however, SAS involvement was minimal. Direct Rule had been imposed in 1972 and with it, the D/Int was replaced with a Director and Coordinator of Intelligence (DCI) reporting directly to the SSNI, William Whitelaw, unlike D/Int who answered to the GOC. The DCI's relationship reflected Whitehall's desire for greater civilian oversight, and as such, he was tasked with 'keep[ing] a professional eye on the…operations of the [SRU]'.[408] In 'conduct[ing] surveillance of terrorists as a preliminary to an arrest carried out by security forces in uniform…[and] contact[ing] and hand[ling] agents or informers,' the task of the Unit could be said to continue that of the MRF but crucially 'without upsetting the communities'.[409] Yet while the SRU continued to rely heavily on SB for intelligence steers, efforts between the security forces to deconflict covert

[404] NAM, NAM 2017-01-4-1, Oral history interview: Intelligence Corps SNCO
[405] TNA, CAB 134/3778, 3.
[406] Senior security official.
[407] TNA, FCO 87/583; TNA, DEFE 13/916, 'Note for the Record: Northern Ireland Policy Group', 3 December 1973.
[408] TNA, DEFE 25/282, 'Carver to Carrington', 17 November 1972.
[409] TNA, CAB 134/3778, 4.

operations were not always successful, with the less than transparent operations of the unit resulting in two instances of fratricide in 1974. Concerningly, neither event prompted the Army to address the deficiencies in intelligence coordination.[410]

The Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence

Another outcome from Direct Rule had been the creation of the first joint MI6-MI5 unit on Northern Ireland, the IJS. Intended 'for the control of both Services' agent-running operations and for the distribution of the resulting intelligence'[411] with staff based in Belfast and London, the IJS possessed 'a combination of human and technical sources…which sometimes provided important insights into PIRA policy and operations'.[412] Initially the lead was taken by the SIS, reflecting the MI5's 'own lack of a readiness for a major role in Northern Ireland' (one MI5 officer posted to Northern Ireland recalled that Ulster seemed further away than outposts of Empire).[413] The core problem was that many intelligence operations remained fundamentally fractured for much of Operation Banner, with multiple units and multiple agencies running their own agents at times, all characterised by poor levels of co-ordination and a recurring unwillingness to share information. Inter-agency bickering and rivalries, a suspicion of outsiders, and outdated methods of data handling all characterised the early years. PIRA attempts to smuggle weapons from Europe at this time saw little success, but when Colonel Qaddafi of Libya got involved, things changed. A planned major shipment of weapons from Libya aboard a freighter - the Elbstand (later Claudia) was uncovered by MPSB in March 1973. In an extraordinary error, MI5 was not informed about the surveillance operation, or the plan to have the Irish Republic intercept the ship.[414]

Multiple attempts to rationalise such activities occurred during Operation Banner, but each group of actors always believed it had valid reasons to retain their own sources. As discussed in Chapter 2, various attempts were made to bring the effort together with co-ordinator roles established – for example, the D/Int post created at HQNI at the start of Operation Banner, but the relationship with SB was unclear. The role was later reformed into the DCI position.

[410] Charters, 'Professionalizing Clandestine Military Intelligence', 135.
[411] de Silva, Vol. 1, para 3.23.
[412] Andrew, 684.
[413] Andrew, 621.
[414] Andrew, 622-623. Andrew believes that if the Claudia had got through, Libyan arm shipments to the PIRA would have quickly risen. As it was, it was not until 1985 that large shipments from Qaddafi began to transform PIRA capabilities.

Designed to be William Whitelaw's security adviser and his main link with the GOC and RUC's chief constable, it initially attracted no applications from suitably senior MI5 officers and was filled by an SIS officer at the end of October 1972.[415] A year later, his successor came from MI5 and the role stayed within the Security Service thereafter. The DCI post however never really was designed to direct intelligence.

Internment operations had demonstrated how badly the absence of co-ordination was impacting on the effective use of intelligence. Tensions between the Army and SB continued in part because the relationship was still so imbalanced: SB numbered well under 200 officers while the Army was able to draw on resources from a huge force of military personnel, especially in the latter stages of Operation Motorman, when 27 major units were deployed (see above). Most resources were still focussed on brigade-level activities, while the co-ordinating functions were based at HQNI. The SRU though was proving to be much more successful than its predecessor units, using stand-off surveillance techniques and crucially began to be valued by SB, with which relations had become 'very close' by the mid-1970s. The RUC and Army also began to automate elements of their intelligence information, notably on vehicle movements.

HQNI's role hitherto as lead agency had alienated the civilian authorities. Of course, government records testify to the mutual distrust between the RUC and Northern Ireland Civil Service on the one hand, and the MoD on the other, notably over the introduction of security classifications for 'mainland eyes only' or UK Eyes A.[416] But so too was a nascent, ideological tension within Whitehall itself over the type of response necessitated by the terrorist threat: counter-insurgency versus law enforcement.[417] It was acknowledged that the Army had been a stabilising force[418] in the early years of the Troubles in support of an 'overwhelmed' Constabulary, but the NIO felt now was the time to 'Ulsterise' the situation. As mentioned previously, *The Way Ahead* was the internal and confidential product of an NIO review which outlined the implementation of this process. It recommended relegating the Army to a role subordinate to the RUC: a policy of 'police primacy' which accompanied

[415] Andrew, 621.
[416] Sanders, 11. Charters, Professionalising clandestine military intelligence, p.
[417] Edwards, 'Whipping Boy', 174; John D. Brewer, Adrian Guelke, Ian Hume, Edward Moxon-Browne and Rick Wilford, *The Police, Public Order and the State: Policing in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic, the USA, Israel, South Africa and China* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 64.
[418] Matchett, 137, 143

the 'criminalisation' of political violence. Treating paramilitaries as ordinary criminals and minimising non-Ulster (i.e. British Army) casualties was expected to undermine Republican propaganda, but however well-intentioned, 'police primacy' overlooked the inability of the RUC at this stage to reassert itself.[419] 'While the army [sic] agreed in principle with police primacy, it was difficult for them to accept in practice,' reflected the then SSNI in his memoirs.[420]

Backchannels

In the context of these developments the emergence of a backchannel to PIRA from 1972 onwards (involving both MI5 and MI6, as well as a number of intermediaries), demonstrated another aspect to intelligence operations in counter-terrorist campaigns. A meeting between the British and the IRA chief of staff was held in a house near the border with Donegal in June. In return for a 10-day ceasefire, a July meeting with Whitelaw in London was arranged, but collapsed following a demand by the OIRA that British leave the province by 1975. When the meeting was revealed by the IRA, Whitelaw was deeply embarrassed, and Loyalists were outraged. One of the most violent periods in Operation Banner followed.

Within two months of the failure of the ceasefire, however, the backchannel was reopened by among others a businessman from Londonderry, Brendan Duddy, who approached Frank Steele (the organiser of the June meeting) with a message from the IRA seeking contact with the government. Steele's successor was an MI6 officer, Michael Oatley, who took enormous risks: to start with, acting without clearance from ministers despite a ban on contact with the IRA. The new SSNI at the time, Mervyn Rees, did not even know about the backchannel; Oatley instead worked through Sir Frank Cooper, the NIO's Permanent Secretary, and a key advisor to Rees. This led in 1975 to talks between NIO officials and PIRA representatives which, along with several other initiatives, eventually saw a PIRA ceasefire, during which time Mervyn Rees ended internment. Roy Mason, Rees' successor, had ordered all contact to cease, and it became clear that political progress had to be preceded by PIRA halting its terrorist attacks. Oatley, once again going against policy, agreed with Duddy that he could contact him anytime, anywhere in the world. In 1980 during the hunger strikes, PIRA reopened the backchannel to find a way out of the impasse,

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[419] Hughes, 574.
[420] Quoted in Edwards, 'Whipping Boy', 177.

but this collapsed once the first hunger striker died. Ten years later it was reopened again and eventually led to the ceasefire of 1994 under John Major.[421]

The role of DCI had become settled in this time and while it was still not to actually direct intelligence, the postholder became an influential figure. Interestingly the confusion and suspicion around intelligence was not confined to the province, with Harold Wilson ordering intelligence officials to only brief himself and the SSNI on the backchannel talks and not the home secretary.[422] When the previous Home Secretary, James Callaghan became prime minister in April 1976, he was briefed on the talks having been completely in the dark. Rees told him 'we now have a well-established, single machine for processing intelligence and covert work in Northern Ireland'. When the director general of MI5 visited the province in May 1976, he concluded that it was time to shift support from the Army to the RUC now that it appeared to be more reliable: 'I have followed a policy of helping the Army first. Of course we must still help the Army, but henceforth our priority must be the RUC…'.[423] By 1980 the IJS was fully funded by MI5 and it was ready to take sole responsibility for its operations, although it was not wound up until 1984.[424]

Tasking and Coordination Groups

With the shift in security policy and the fact that PIRA reorganised itself in the late 1970s, intelligence structures needed to adapt in response. Until then, '[t]he arrangements for the co-ordinating units worked mainly as a result of the determination on the part of those involved, with no one group either receiving or processing all the intelligence, on which operations should have been based'.[425] A partial solution was found in the establishment of three Tasking and Coordination Groups (TCGs) in 1978, each led by a regional SB superintendent, but comprising representatives of the intelligence agencies operating in the province: MI5, SRU, SAS, COPs,[426] 14th Intelligence Company and units of SB itself.[427] The TCGs were empowered to task the agencies based on an integrated intelligence picture

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[421] Jonathan Powell, *Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts* (London: Bodley Head, 2014), 78-82.
[422] Andrew, 626. This despite MI5 being directly responsible to the home secretary under the 1952 Maxwell Fyfe Directive.
[423] Andrew, 644-645.
[424] Andrew, 685.
[425] Quoted in Matchett, 179.
[426] Close Observation Platoons were raised by the Army in 1977. They were recruited from the resident infantry battalions and used to conduct uniformed covert surveillance to provide basic intelligence. CGS, *Operation Banner*, para.503; Finegan, 504.
[427] Leahy, *The Intelligence War*, 141.

to which all contributed. This mechanism would in hindsight be regarded as 'probably the most important step' in harmonising the intelligence fight, but at the time its fruits were still to be borne.

The military covert units were now grouped under the heading of the ISG (Northern Ireland) but the units retained their separate identities.[428] The ISG was supported by a specialist flight of Gazelle helicopters with sophisticated surveillance capabilities. The Army too began to directly support these activities not only with the creation of COPs in the resident battalions, but even in the roulement battalions, whose members tended to be experienced NCOs focussed on surveillance rather than ambushes. Once more the focus was on developing an intelligence picture that could be shared effectively. The end of the 1970s saw, by the Army's own estimate, one in eight regular soldiers deployed under Banner directly contributing to intelligence.[429]

Whereas the RUC and NIO regarded the decline in PIRA activity over the 1977-78 period as vindicating police primacy, the Army feared it rather was evidence of the paramilitaries being driven underground. In as much as the PIRA shifted towards a 'long war' mentality underpinned by a new cell structure and greater discipline,[430] this was true, and it convinced the CGS and the GOC by summer 1979 of the need for a 'Director of Operations' senior to both the GOC and RUC's chief constable. The double tragedy at Mullaghmore and Warrenpoint gave this thought renewed urgency and (as discussed above) Sir Maurice Oldfield was dispatched in October to 'improve the coordination and effectiveness of the fight against terrorism in Northern Ireland'.[431] As (a temporary) Security Coordinator, Oldfield and his joint RUC-Army-Civil Service staff worked towards achieving inter-agency intelligence sharing including through hardware (e.g. compatible computer databases) and coordinating committees.[432] But it was the December appointment of a new GOC fully subscribed to police primacy which resolved much of the tension.

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[428] van der Bijl, 151-152.
[429] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para.503
[430] Edwards, 'Whipping Boy', 181; Finegan, 502.
[431] TNA, PREM 19/82, f88 'FCO to UK Missions and Embassies: Security Coordinator in Northern Ireland', 2 October 1979.
[432] Kirk-Smith and Dingley, 555.

The Force Research Unit (FRU) and Beyond

In January 1982 HQNI established the FRU to centralise the Army's agent recruitment and handling in the Province, with sole responsibility for these activities in the military.[433] With HUMINT now being 'the most important source of information…about the policy, plans and psychology'[434] of the paramilitaries, the MoD was reluctant to depend on the SB-MI5 duopoly for this vital capability, although the Army did have some experience of this at the brigade level[435] where Brigade Research Officers led units running their own agents. The FRU consisted of an HQ and four regional units (or DETs): North Detachment, West Detachment, East Detachment and South Detachment. Each DET employed agent-handlers commanded by a captain, who reported to the FRU's commanding officer who in turn reported to the CLF and the GOC. The chief of the G2 Intelligence Section was responsible for the Field Intelligence Fund which financed FRU operations.[436]

Despite the evolution of a more professional approach, even at this advanced stage in Operation Banner, the units were operating without guidance on agent handling or a legislative framework which is discussed in detail by the de Silva report, which notes that: 'Throughout the Troubles the management of agents was not governed by statute but by non-statutory guidance and direction'.[437] Furthermore, what did exist was not relevant to the context of a counter-terrorism campaign facing the Army.

> It is absolutely clear that there was no adequate agent-handling guidance or direction whatsoever in the late 1980s. The 1969 Home Office Guidelines had not been designed for a counter-terrorism situation and had, rightly, been discarded. The FRU Directives and Instructions were manifestly unsatisfactory and the Security Service similarly lacked any external framework for assessing the extent to which agents could become involved in criminality. Successive reports and representations from senior RUC, Security Service

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[433] de Silva, Vol.1, para. 3.15

[434] King, Thomas, 'Letter from Secretary of State for Defence to the Attorney General', 3 October 1990, in de Silva, Vol. 2, 229-232.

[435] Leahy, 'Informers, Agents', 128; Charters, 'Professionalizing Clandestine Military Intelligence', 135.

[436] de Silva, Vol. 1, 6.7, para 3.17, 61.

[437] De Silva, Vol 1, para 4.8. The only guidance in place relating to the use of informants by the police …was contained in a Home Office Circular, the 'Consolidated Circular to the Police on Crime and Kindred Matters'…although the Guidelines were issued in 1986, they were essentially unchanged from previous guidance first issued in 1969. De Silva adds that 'The starting point for the way in which the Army conducted agent-handling operations in Northern Ireland, therefore, is the 'Directive for the Force Research Unit (Northern Ireland)' promulgated by Major General A S Jeapes, Commander Land Forces, on 26 July 1986, para 4.20-4.22.

and (latterly) Army officers had highlighted the fact that this situation was unacceptable.[438]

Nevertheless, compared with the SB, the FRU also provided an alternative to those who viewed the RUC as having a sectarian bias.[439] This further aggravated the Constabulary who saw penetration of terrorist groups as within its purview. As the 'one element of the military' which did not engage actively with its police counterpart, the FRU's relationship with SB was especially frosty. There was a prevailing cynicism amongst SB that 'other than appeasing Army commanders and helping the Army devise a new unit for future conflicts, it is difficult to see what practical benefits the FRU brought. They see it as having caused tension and confusion when there should have been harmony and clarity'.[440] FRU operative Lewis noted, 'I had very little time for (SB), even though we tried to establish a rapport with them on many occasions and fulfil our obligations. My personal opinion was that the Special Branch did not always play ball with us as much as they could have done.'[441]

In 1988 the FRU sought to establish itself as an 'independent unit' within Army intelligence structures, with its agent case files being moved from the offices of MI5's Assistant Secretary Political to the FRU HQ.[442] Contrary to the view of some SB officers, described above, the combined efforts of the FRU and other intelligence units did yield dividends. As has been argued,[443] the cell system adopted by the PIRA at this time paradoxically exposed its membership to greater scrutiny by the security forces.

Intelligence Sharing

PIRA had continued to receive support from Libya and between 1985 and 1986, four large arms shipments were landed on the coast of County Wickford, south of Dublin. A fifth and even larger shipment, which included SAM-7 missiles that could threaten British helicopters operating in the province, was heading to Ireland on the Eksund, a Panamanian freighter being pursued by covert forces and eventually detained by French customs officials. The crew

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[438] De Silva, Vol.1, para. 4.76-4.84.
[439] de Silva, Vol.1, para. 3.40.
[440] Matchett, 188.
[441] Lewis, pp140-141.
[442] de Silva, Vol. 1, para. 3.19.
[443] Finegan, 503.

revealed that they had brought over 120 tons of weapons to PIRA over the preceding two years. MI5 concluded 'PIRA has acquired from Libya more weapons etc than it can use'.[444]

The distrust engendered by institutional rivalry would pervade much of the 1980s,[445] even while Loughgall (1987) and Gibraltar (1988) were among successful examples of inter-agency cooperation.[446] Towards the end of the decade, a common database was sorely lacking as but one aspect of a 'very badly organised'[447] intelligence system, this despite the Army's data management having improved considerably from the start of Banner. Even as late as the mid-1970s, the Army had years of intelligence material which had not been collated or cross-referenced. 'Much useful material…[had] been lost through bad office management' with one officer spending three months to re-file the records into a working and simple machine.[448]

As the years progressed, this analogue approach of card files and photographs gave way to computerised databases. Soldiers on patrol by the 1980s could radio the intelligence officer manning a terminal at the local Army base to retrieve tactical intelligence from the system. This could include details on suspects sighted or the likelihood of an IRA ambush in the patrol's vicinity[449] – tangible benefits which motivated soldiers to reciprocate with their own detailed reports in the computer. At this time there were at least two computerised databases in use: 3702, an Army Intelligence Computer which retrieved files on personalities, vehicles, and houses; and Vengeful which catalogued reports from check points and sightings on suspicious vehicles (by 1997, this was linked to England's automatic number plate recognition network). But these systems remained separate from the RUC until May 1992 when CAISTER was introduced. Reflecting the cautious yet collaborative approach, CAISTER held three storage areas with two having single-service privileges, and the third providing joint RUC-Army access. This allowed intelligence to be sanitised by each force before uploading to the joint area, thus enhancing intelligence sharing while respecting the concerns for agent anonymity which had precluded such openness in the past. As Newbery argues, CAISTER marked an era

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[444] Andrew, 738.
[445] de Silva, Vol. 1, para. 3.38.
[446] Bradley W.C. Bamford, 'The role and effectiveness of intelligence in Northern Ireland', *Intelligence and National Security* 20:4 (2005), https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520500425273, 597.
[447] de Silva, Vol. 1 para. 3.41.
[448] TNA, WO 305/6960/2, 'Intelligence Officer's Post-Tour Report', Annex A to 2 PARA NI/OPS/12, 9 October 1975.
[449] Brian Jackson, 'Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a "Long War": The British Experience in Northern Ireland', *Military Review* 87:1 (2007), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20070228_art011.pdf, 81-82.

of more pragmatic attitudes towards intelligence co-ordination in Northern Ireland, just as the political effort intensified.[450]

The rivalries between agencies continued though. With 'the Army, the police and NIO locked in interagency rivalry in Northern Ireland, MI5 continued to lobby the Cabinet Office in its bid to take over responsibility for combatting the IRA in Great Britain from the Metropolitan Police Special Branch'.[451] MI5 was given the lead role in May 1992, while the tensions between the FRU (and 14th Intelligence Company) and the SB may have continued, MI5 was now a leading actor in all aspects of the intelligence campaign. The importance of HUMINT not only as a source of information, but also as a leitmotiv of the intelligence campaign in general cannot be overstated since inserting agents into a terrorist group inevitably involved them in criminal activity requiring a detailed legal and policy framework.[452] This was clearly missing during much of Operation Banner according to the de Silva report.

Writing about the late 1980s/early1990s and accepting that 'the structure of the intelligence effort in Northern Ireland was highly complex and involved a variety of organisations, sections and committees that had evolved piecemeal over a number of years', de Silva concludes that 'there was a lack of clarity about the respective roles and relationships of each of the main organisations involved in the intelligence sphere'. As if this was not bad enough after more than 20 years of organisational reform and experimentation, this confusion was then 'exacerbated by institutional rivalry between different organisations and parts of the intelligence community…most apparent in the strained relationship between the SB and Army intelligence' he reports. In what might be described as somewhat understating the essential problem of intelligence during Operation Banner, de Silva notes that 'Structural complexity, inter-agency rivalry and the (perhaps inevitable) culture of secrecy meant that the sharing of information and effective pooling of resources proved extremely difficult'.[453] Nonetheless, the intelligence picture in the second half of Operation Banner did improve in key areas and ultimately supported the steps to what became the peace process.

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[450] Samantha Newbery, 'Inter- and intra-agency intelligence liaison during "the Troubles"', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 32:4-5 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1853998, passim but especially 694-5.
[451] Edwards, *Agents of Influence*, 202-203.
[452] de Silva, Vol. 1, para 4.5, 4.7.
[453] de Silva, Vol. 1, para 3.47-48.

7. Training and Doctrine

The British Army of the 1960s, configured though it was to conventional warfighting against the Warsaw Pact, could not ignore the reality that colonial campaigns had been the primary source of contemporary combat experience. The first soldiers deployed under Operation Banner saw the 'pleasant backwater'[454] of Northern Ireland not only as a distraction from 'proper soldiering'[455] but a theatre in which they would instinctively apply the colonial policing techniques developed in these campaigns once the carnage of the Troubles was fully unleashed. With bitter experience came an increasingly sophisticated training regime; soldiers would ultimately see a Banner tour as a rite of passage: 'part of the process of becoming trained soldiers'.[456] But the shift to a COIN-proficient force was not without hindrance. Structural impediments included a regimental tradition which inhibited organisational learning across units; a conflicting requirement for troops trained in high-intensity warfare for the Continent; roulement tours of short duration leading to high turnover; and, in the decade following the 1957 Defence White Paper, a halving of the British Army's strength.[457] Compounded by inadequate intelligence in the early years and insufficient appreciation of the propaganda war, these factors conspired against optimal performance by the British Army in Northern Ireland.

Colonial-Era Internal Security

In the early years training was 'haphazard' and few were certain what to train for.[458] It was just over 24 hours when the initial reinforcements under Operation Banner arrived in the province. The 3rd Battalion, The Light Infantry began the first of what would be five Northern Ireland tours without specific training or maps – since 'none were available'[459] – but instead had recent experience of Malaya, a deployment which had concluded four months before. It would be joined and replaced over the ensuing months by units that shared this colonial heritage, from Kenya and Aden to the United Nations peacekeeping effort in Cyprus. Experience of 'apparently successful colonial soldiering' would colour these units' behaviour in Northern

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[454] MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 1, I-15.
[455] Kitson, 200.
[456] Killworth, 4.
[457] Douglas Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 288; MoD, 'An annual time series for the size of the armed forces (Army, Navy and RAF) since 1700', FOI 2017/0444028, April 2017, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/628180/2017-04440.pdf.
[458] Michael Dewar, *The British Army in Northern Ireland* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1997), 181.
[459] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para. 724.

Ireland. Reflecting in later life on his experience as a platoon commander in the Troubles, Lieutenant General Sir Alistair Irwin, later GOC, remarked: '[w]hat we encountered in Northern Ireland in those very early days was, as we saw it, a bunch of people misbehaving and that what we needed to do was to be tough with them and say "get back in order" and that is exactly what we expected would happen'.[460]

General Irwin was not alone in finding expectation and reality diverging. '[T]he British Army was struggling to adapt ideas gained in the colonies to the circumstances prevailing in…Northern Ireland,' observed General Sir Frank Kitson, one-time commander of 39 Brigade, adding '[p]rogress was only made after an extended period of trial and error'.[461] As discussed above, some of these errors were elementary. One officer recalled using 'the old drill' in Northern Ireland: 1. deploy Dannert wire, 2. magistrate reads out the Riot Act, 3. baton men mark the road with white tape, 4. unfurl banners reading '[h]alt or we will fire': '[t]he first time we did it the order was written in Arabic'.[462] Other practices, such as deep interrogation, which met with little criticism in Aden had to be abandoned when used in Northern Ireland.[463]

Without overstating the Army's colonial mindset,[464] its inability to simply transpose imperial policing was nevertheless aggravated by soldiers' dissatisfaction with such duties in principle.[465] Several commanders criticised the Army's role as 'policemen' in the province with one lamenting that 'the long-term effect on the army [sic] would be to turn it into a "gendarmerie."'[466] Exercising restraint was seen as abnormal even illogical: '[a] few broken heads early on, even a few deaths would have been a small price to pay for a quick and ruthless victory,'[467] suggested one commander. Though by no means representative of all units, this belligerence reinforces criticisms that the Army was a 'blunt instrument'[468] whose soldiers

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[460] Sanders, 'Northern Ireland', 244.
[461] Kitson, x. Kitson also noted that 'neutralising insurgents could usually be achieved if the security forces could find them' but because soldiers could only open fire in restricted circumstances and court convictions were difficult to due to the absence of evidence, 'Northern Ireland has…produced a new problem', Kitson, xi.
[462] Hamill, 23-24.
[463] Andrew Sanders, 'Aid to the Civil Power? The politics of the British Army's Operation Banner in Northern Ireland 1969-2007', APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, New Orleans, LA, 30 August – 2 September 2012, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2106722, 17
[464] Edwards, 'Whipping Boy', 167.
[465] Hennessey, 343.
[466] TNA, DEFE 48/256, D.G. Smith, Lt. Col. J.D. Watson R.E., & E.P.J. Harrison, 'A Survey of Military Opinion on Current Internal Security Doctrine and Methods based on Experience in Northern Ireland', Defence Operational Analysis Establishment Memorandum 7221, October 1972, 50, para. 12.8.
[467] Ibid., 49, para 12.4.
[468] Cardinal Conway quoted in Hennessey, 343.

wanted to be 'let off the leash'.[469] Some ascribed this pent-up aggression to their training[470] which reflected a military philosophy emphasising high-intensity warfare and tweaking that skillset for low-intensity operations.[471] But as the CLF wrote in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, 'I am aware of no directive issued to an Army which has asked officers and men to display so much self-control over such a prolonged period'.[472]

In many ways, the Army's behaviour post-Bloody Sunday was in marked contrast to the early years of the Troubles. By the Army's own admission, command and control at the beginning of Operation Banner was 'laissez-faire' with many units simply being told to 'get on with it'.[473] Officers and IRA leaders negotiated 'back-of-the-envelope' treaties for their areas of responsibility (AOR),[474] much to the anger of Protestants, while soldiers socialising with young IRA volunteers at the pub would happily give the run down on their weapons.[475] This conviviality became increasingly difficult to sustain amid worsening sectarian tensions but the ethos found continued support at the highest levels. Even in 1971, GOC General Harry Tuzo was encouraging 'all ranks to try out new tactics and methods'[476] to stem the violence. This carte blanche was issued in part because so few had been trained for a Northern Ireland-type contingency. At the military training establishments, 'teaching tend[ed] to be polarised towards the extremes,' explained Kitson. '[T]hat is to say the handling of riots on the one hand and encountering of major guerrilla forces on the other. As a result the countering of small terrorist groups especially in urban areas g[ot] less than its fair share of attention'.[477] The Sandhurst syllabus of the 1960s and 1970s neglected counterinsurgency warfare bar a limited discussion of tactics[478] and NCOs were only mandated to attend tactics courses from the 1980s.[479] In the absence of a centralised doctrinal process to improve training with lessons learned, there arose

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[469] TNA, PREM 19/80.

[470] Michael Asher, *Shoot to Kill: A Soldier's Journey through Violence* (London: Penguin 1990), 65.

[471] Sanders, 'Principles of Minimum Force', 662.

[472] TNA, WO 32/21732, 'Maj. Gen. Robert Ford: Commander Land Forces' Directive for Future Internal Security Operations', 24 June 1972.

[473] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para.419.

[474] Thornton, 78

[475] Hennessey, 9.

[476] Hennessey, 95.

[477] Kitson, 173.

[478] Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Colin McInnes, 'The British Army in Northern Ireland 1969–1972: From Policing to Counter-Terror', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 20:2 (1997), https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399708437676, 3.

[479] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para.301.

inter-unit variations in performance which, reinforced through the regimental system, led to unpredictable outcomes on the streets of Belfast.[480]

Doctrine of the time – 'heavily Aden-orientated'[481] as it was – swiftly became outdated for these reasons. Writing of *Land Operations* (*Vol.3: Counter Revolutionary Operations*), 'the events of August 1969,' conceded the Army, 'illustrate…the extent to which sound military principles so often have to be inhibited, or even set aside, because political restraints dictate that which is practicable'. [482] Until 1989, when Northern Ireland Standard Operating Procedures (NISOPs) were promulgated, there was no formal tactical doctrine akin to the British Army's training pamphlets for Southeast Asia (the *Jungle Book* and *Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya*) governing Operation Banner.[483] Rather, it was a series of Cabinet-approved coloured cards, issued to all soldiers, which provided some guidance: the Yellow Card (outlining the rules of engagement), the Blue Card (instructions for making arrests), and the White Card (to be left at the residence of an arrested person) – the text of each is appended to this primer.[484]

Across all there was an inherent tension between obfuscating legalese and clear instructions which soldiers could consult in fluid and dangerous situations.[485] The legal ambiguity arising from an imperfect compromise made soldiers overly cautious, to the tactical advantage of the IRA.[486] Often, survival instincts and basic drill would suffice, but when confronted with more complex circumstances, such as taking a tactical shot, soldiers froze: '[a]m I really right to be doing this between WH Smith and Marks and Spencers?' questioned one Argyll officer.[487] Their uncertainty was not helped by the frequent revisions of the Yellow Card; the Army falling foul of its own maxim: 'Order. Counter Order. Disorder'. For practical advice on the Yellow Card, soldiers came to rely on junior NCOs or older privates with prior experience of Banner.

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[480] Kennedy-Pipe and McInnes

[481] TNA, DEFE 48/256, 15.

[482] MoD, *Narrative*, Vol. 1, II-23. There was a struggle over the rewrite and updating of *Land Operations*, Vol. 3. In the MoD, Northern Ireland was delegated by CDS to CGS, so the Military Operations staff took the lead, recalls a former senior civil servant.

[483] Richard Iron, 'Case studies of adaptation in the British Army: Northern Ireland and Southern Iraq', in Peter Dennis (ed.) *2017 Chief of Army History Conference: The Skill of Adaptability: The Learning Curve in Combat* (Canberra: Army History Unit/Big Sky Publishing, 2018), 237-8.

[484] TNA, WO 32/21732, 'Draft for DMO.'

[485] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para. 431.

[486] TNA, DEFE 48/256, 46.

[487] Burke, 'Counter-Insurgency', 666.

Invariably this training occurred informally, in small discussion groups, and 'distant from higher authority'.[488]

Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Team

Efforts to institutionalise training for Operation Banner resulted in the 1972 formation of the Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Team (NITAT) on the mainland (subordinate to UKLF) and in Germany (under BAOR auspices), supplemented by an in-theatre Reinforcement Team for trickle postings.[489] The NITAT training package of roughly three weeks included briefings on the history of Ulster, the structure of the paramilitaries and their modus operandi, and the Army's role and operations.[490] From at least 1974, there was a recognition within the adjutant-general's staff that this training should stress to soldiers the need 'to look beyond the purely military campaign towards the long term and appreciate that good and effective civil administration is essential to the defeat of the terrorist'.[491] Certainly by the 1990s, when the political effort intensified, NITAT lectures quizzed soldiers frequently on their ability to repeat the battalion's mission in supporting the civil authorities, lest personnel resort to the 'shooting war' of years prior.[492]

Outside the classroom, instructors sought to go beyond basic infantry skills to the more Banner-specific competencies of patrol (both urban and rural), search, and riot control,[493] although non-infantry sub-units each had an infantry sergeant attached during training.[494] Bespoke NITAT facilities were constructed at both the Hythe and Lydd camps in England, and in Germany at Sennelager, to replicate the street conditions of Northern Ireland. Boasting mock houses, shop fronts, RUC stations and pubs, each of these 'Tin Cities' had at its edge an enclosure substituting for the Army barracks where units would begin their exercise, all illuminated by streetlight for after-dark training. Such facilities supported patrol techniques orientated around the sniper and explosive threat, such as four-man formations, or 'bricks',[495] and by equipping soldiers from rival units with stones and firebombs to act as the 'village's'

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[488] Killworth, 7-8.
[489] Bennett, 519.
[490] Ibid., 518.
[491] Peter Graham, 'Low-level Civil-Military Coordination, Belfast, 1970–73', *RUSI Journal* 119:3 (1974), https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847409430992, 83.
[492] Killworth, 6.
[493] David Stone, *Cold War Warriors: The Story of the Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regiment, 1959-1994* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 1998), 359.
[494] TNA, WO 32/21732, 'Baskervyle-Clegg to HQ INF: Progress Report', 30 May 1972, 3.
[495] Killworth, 5; Bennett, 525.

inhabitants, instructors found they could simulate realistic riots.[496] Dealing with these incidents in adherence to the spirit and letter of the Yellow Card was central to NITAT training; soldiers were expected to be cognizant of their legal powers. 'Wooden targets would appear in windows and doorways [of the 'village'],' recalls Alastair MacKenzie, 'but not all of them were hostile and they could include women and children. This was to reinforce the strict rules of engagement…'[497]

Most of this mandatory training catered towards the platoon and section levels: Banner was, after all, 'not so much a "corporal's war" as a "lance corporal's war"'[498]. While special provisions were made for the battalions' leadership, such as map-based exercises and a dedicated Commanders' Cadre course in advance of the NITAT training for the enlisted,[499] several company and battalion commanders felt the emphasis on tactical drills had meant they were insufficiently prepared for the management of an AOR.[500] That said, the success of NITAT was built on the 'personality, knowledge and credibility' of its captains and colour sergeants to the extent that they could 'clear' their superiors for deployment.[501] This mutual trust only grew with the increasing reliance on non-infantry forces for Banner deployments: as early as 1973, for instance, complete cavalry regiments were being unhorsed for Banner tours.[502] Moreover, for new recruits the province was still 'a totally different structure to the units you're [usually] working in: you're still working in platoons, [but also] in, sort of, [a] half a platoon, called a multiple, and in small four-man teams…the equipment you're using: electronic countermeasures, the roadside bombs, that sort of thing, they're all completely new to you. Bit of a steep learning curve for a new private soldier'.[503]

In addition to the organised training, NITAT fostered informal exchanges of tactical knowledge. The instructors, who prided themselves on recent operational experience, issued their students A4 'aide memoires' summarising the key takeaways on such tactics as patrols, surveillance, base protection, and defence against mortars, thus meeting a frontline demand for

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[496] Alastair MacKenzie, *Pilgrim Days: A Lifetime of Soldiering from Vietnam to the SAS* (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), 86.
[497] MacKenzie, 86.
[498] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para. 418.
[499] Stone, 359.
[500] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para. 417.
[501] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para. 725; MacKenzie, 86
[502] Robin Rhoderick-Jones, *In Peace & War: The Story of the Queen's Royal Hussars* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2018), ch.7; Bennett, 518.
[503] NAM 2012-11-36

actionable guidance covering the 'literally thousands of rules and regulations affecting a soldier's conduct in [Northern Ireland]'.[504] As Richard Iron points out:

> they were easy to keep up to date: new aide memoires were inserted into officers' plastic folders and old ones discarded. Costs were minimal; there were no bound books or expensive print runs. It was almost a perfect system for easy and rapid adaptation in the pre-digital age.[505]

NITAT thus became 'a major contributor to the speed at which tactical and equipment developments were brought into practice,' notes the Army.[506] Given how ephemeral these memoranda were, however, it is difficult to trace their evolution. What does become clear is that adaptability on the ground suffered when efforts were made to formalise doctrine from 1989.[507] Staff officers at HQNI promulgating the NISOPs were not informed by the same coalface insights as NITAT instructors, and accumulating several changes before printing an update only dragged out a process which hitherto had involved photocopies and roneos.[508] Moreover, some senior officers felt that over time battalions let their soldiers take the training without the attention it needed especially if it was refresher training.[509]

In more specialist areas, there was benefit in standardising best practice and ensuring this was adhered to. Systematic house searches; sharpshooting; sniffer dog; intelligence photography; mine detection; booby traps; media relations; and even witness training for court appearances were amongst the burgeoning number of courses offered by the Army as the campaign progressed.[510] Arguably, more than any other aspect, it was intelligence training which evolved most over Banner, reflecting both changes in the political and inter-agency context, and the paramilitaries' adaptation to Army tactics. Internment, detention, the searching of occupied houses, and pub checks which marked the Army's early attempts at intelligence gathering – and which were perceived as invasions of personal liberty – had given way to 'less intrusive

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[504] TNA, DEFE 48/256, 13.
[505] Iron, 238.
[506] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para. 727.
[507] There was an abortive effort to publish a training pamphlet in 1972 titled 'Lessons Learned from Operations in Northern Ireland.' TNA, WO 32/21732, 'Chiswell to School of Service Intelligence', 26 June 1972.
[508] Iron, 240.
[509] Antony Beevor, *Inside the British Army* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1990), 194.
[510] Bennett, 519, 523; British Army, 517; TNA, WO 32/21732, 'Director of Personal Services (Army) to HQNI: Preparation for Military Witnesses for Court Appearances in Northern Ireland', 26 June 1972.

methods' by the mid-1970s.[511] At the section level, this involved 'chat-ups' with the locals and enhanced training in suspect recognition. Soldiers were issued with the names and photos of persons of interest with the responsibility of monitoring these individuals when on patrol.[512] On their return to the garrison, rather than dispersing, the '[soldiers] would get a quick cup of tea, have a cigarette and in a relaxed atmosphere the patrol would be discussed, and every piece of relevant information written down and passed on to the company intelligence section'.[513]

By 1977, COPs were recruited from the resident infantry battalions.[514] Tasked with uniformed covert surveillance, COPs surveyed terrorist suspects allowing them to be apprehended by the RUC which, as Finegan argues, meant they acted as the reconnaissance platoons which had long-existed in the British Army, but adapted to the counterinsurgency context.[515] An additional layer in the intelligence hierarchy which required yet further training were static observation teams monitoring arms caches or the movements of specific individuals. Given the risk of strangers being readily identified in the vicinity of these close-knit, Republican strongholds, such teams required specialist training to avoid detection.[516]

Specialist Training

It was the use of these training instructors and, ultimately, personnel from elite units which ministers agitated over in Banner's first decade. Bar two covert deployments to Northern Ireland of up to half an SAS squadron in 1969 and 1970 (described elsewhere in this primer),[517] the British government initially forbade the SAS from visiting the Province, such was the perceived risk that the IRA would use special forces deployments to advance their propaganda campaign. This was despite the understanding that '[t]he training which soldiers who volunteered for service with the SAS received would be particularly valuable in any plain clothes operation.'[518] Following the dissolution of the MRF in part because it lacked professional training, its successor, the SRU, from January 1973 onwards benefitted from a selection process administered by 22 SAS, ministers regarding this as 'the key to the success

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[511] CGS, *Operation Banner*, paras. 502-504.
[512] Killworth, 13.
[513] David Barzilay, *The British Army in Ulster,* Vol. 2 (Belfast: Century Books, 1978), 218.
[514] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para. 503.
[515] Finegan, 504; Hughes, 568.
[516] Michael Kirk-Smith & James Dingley, 561; Jackson, 80.
[517] See also TNA, CAB 134/3778 ,IRN(74)2 Army Plain Clothes Patrols in Northern Ireland, 28 March 1974, 4.
[518] PREM 16/154: Defensive Brief D - Meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, 5 April 1974 "Army Plain Clothes Patrols in Northern Ireland.

of the whole project'.[519] This programme, initially 8 and later 11 weeks long, was conducted on the mainland rather than in-theatre due to the SAS embargo, encompassing its instructors as well as operators. Moreover, while selection and training occurred for security reasons away from their base, the SAS's existing facilities in Britain were 'well-proven' and its personnel 'were unmatched in the necessary experience and skills'.[520]

Within the year, the mental and physical rigour against which prospective candidates were judged meant that the SRU was under-recruiting: the Unit expected to be 30 operators short by May 1974. To bridge this yawning deficit, ministers had already reduced the duration of the ban between SAS and SRU service from three years to two,[521] but in November 1973 the Cabinet acceded to a GOC request to temporarily waive the embargo. One SAS officer and 30 NCOs were permitted to 're-capbadge' under their parent regiment and support the SRU as individual reinforcements from January 1974.[522] The official announcement that the SAS would be despatched to County Armagh in early 1976 did go some way in easing this political tiptoeing. The then Secretary of Defence, Roy Mason, just before the Cabinet Reshuffle in September 1976 - which saw him take over the Northern Ireland portfolio - reported to Prime Minister James Callaghan on the outcome of a review he had conducted into the SRU and SAS. Mason concluded that the new policy of SAS openness was an opportunity to 'strengthen the link between operations and training.'[523] Candidates with recent SAS experience would no longer be debarred from SRU service and while the Unit's operators would continue to be trained and selected by the special forces in Britain, SAS instructors could 'attach temporarily to the [SRU] in Northern Ireland' to 'participate in operations' and thereby inform the training regime.[524] Eventually SAS units that deployed to Northern Ireland also trained Close Observation Platoons.[525]

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[519] "Army Plain Clothes Patrols," TNA CAB 134/3778, IRN(74)2, 3.
[520] CAB 134/3778 IRN(74)2, 4.
[521] TNA, PREM 16/154.
[522] "Minutes," Northern Ireland Policy Group, MOD, 3 December1973, TNA DEFE13/916. See also "Note" accompanying E10, "Northern Ireland – Special Reconnaissance Unit," TNA DEFE 25/282; and "Army Plain Clothes Patrols," TNA, CAB 134/3778, 5, quoted in Charters, 'Professionalizing Clandestine Military Intelligence',134.
[523] TNA, FCO 87/583.
[524] TNA, FCO 87/583
[525] Charters, 'Professionalizing Clandestine Military Intelligence',134.

The Return of the Fulda Gap

For all the improvements in pre-Northern Ireland training, non-infantry units operating under Banner could rapidly degrade the mechanised skills they so required for a conventional war with the Soviet Union. A four-month roulement tour undertaken by non-infantry units, the British Army calculated, could render them unavailable in the BAOR Order of Battle for up to a year.[526] As one recalled:

> I joined as a vehicle mechanic, and I thought, yeah it will be no problem, I'll be in the workshop … spannering away. I got to [X] Regiment, and they goes, 'ah we are going to Northern Ireland'. And said, 'you'll be going out on the streets, we are short of bodies'. They always say you are a soldier first, a mechanic second in the army [sic]. So there I am, trained as a vehicle mechanic, patrolling the streets with a brick [four-man group], attending riots, stopping cars and checking their identities.[527]

It is true that in the absence of high-intensity warfighting, 'operational experience, vitality and junior leadership'[528] were key attributes that a Banner tour could provide, but this was not always appreciated throughout Banner. The twin drivers of police primacy and a deterioration of the East-West relationship in the 1980s saw the emphasis in defence circles shift back towards the Fulda Gap[529] with concomitant strains on Northern Ireland training.

And yet, throughout this period, training involved catching-up with the paramilitaries' tactics as they themselves adapted to the Army's methods. Patrolling units in rural areas who sought out derelict buildings to shelter from the rain soon found many of these structures booby-trapped by the PIRA,[530] while the symbols of territorial demarcation – which soldiers relied on their ability to read for safety – could vary from deployment to deployment.[531] Whereas in the early days soldiers would be deployed en masse, partially random, self-supporting formations like the 'brick' developed so Republican paramilitaries would have greater difficulty

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[526] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para.703.
[527] Quoted in K. Neil Jenkings and Rachel Woodward, 'Serving in troubled times: British military personnel's memories and accounts of service in Northern Ireland', in Graham Dawson, Jo Dover and Stephen Hopkins (eds.) *The Northern Ireland Troubles in Britain: Impacts, Engagements, Legacies and Memories* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 97-98.
[528] Colin McInnes and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, 'The Dog That Did Not Bark: The British Army in Northern Ireland, 1990-94', *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 8 (1997), https://www.jstor.org/stable/30002048, 147.
[529] Ibid.
[530] CGS, *Operation Banner*, para.515.
[531] Jenkings and Woodward, 98.

identifying the location of sub-units which could intercept their escape from an ambush. These smaller formations increased yet further the Army's reliance on NCOs and junior officers. Combined with the PIRA's targeting of RUC personnel (who sustained institutional memory on an AOR),[532] Banner was rendered a testing experience for all on the front-line, many of whom were scarcely older than eighteen.[533] That the paramilitaries would assess the drills of incoming units to identify those they expected to perform weakest in a firefight made the experience altogether more harrowing.[534]

Strategic Communications and Operation Banner

During Operation Banner, the British government's approach to communications relied on 'routine official public relations'[535] for damage limitation and image-building through press office statements from Whitehall. Consistent reporting of the 'official view' often lacked narrative framing within the strategic aim for peace. In fact, '[i]nformation [o]perations were probably the most disappointing aspect of the campaign', concludes the British Army's assessment of Banner, adding that this ineffectiveness arose from the 'lack of a single unitary authority for the campaign'.[536]

Press reports about the initial deployment on 14 August 1969 quoted the government's description of 'a "limited operation" to restore law and order'.[537] Richard McAuley, a Republican political strategist, points to the government's failure to 'frame' the conflict as sectarian strife with the British military offering a peace-keeping role.[538] Without applying policy and legislation in line with the strategic aim for peace – particularly in the case of internment and the Diplock courts – the government lacked strategic communications and grand strategy because it '[did] not appear to have made a conscious effort to "sell" the British case either to the people of the province or to the rest of the United Kingdom'.[539] As has been argued, successive governments had neglected Northern Ireland and saw the deployment of the

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[532] Killworth, 18.

[533] Jenkings and Woodward, 95.

[534] Killworth, 19.

[535] David Miller, 'The media and Northern Ireland: censorship, information management and the broadcasting ban,' in Greg Philo (ed.) *Glasgow Media Group Reader,* Vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 1995), 47

[536] CGS, *Operation Banner*, 7-6

[537] BBC News, 'On This Day: 14 August 1969',

[538] Ian Somerville and Andy Purcell. 'A history of Republican public relations in Northern Ireland from "Bloody Sunday" to the "Good Friday Agreement"', *Journal of Communication Management* 15:3 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1108/13632541111150970, 7.

[539] David A. Charters, 'Intelligence and Psychological Warfare Operations in Northern Ireland', *RUSI Journal* 122:3 (1977), https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847709428732, 26.

Army as a civil order challenge rather than a situation that required a political solution. As such it is perhaps unsurprising that neither the government nor the Army entered the Province with a 'frame' for its actions, or indeed a developed strategic communications plan. That they struggled to find either for many years after the initial deployment is due to a number of factors.

Short-term operational tactics posed threats to the long-term discourse around British peacebuilding efforts in the Province. During Operation Banner, key politico-military decisions were taken in Whitehall, without a unitary campaign authority in Northern Ireland to oversee coherent understanding of policy from the top down.[540] The disconnect between policymakers and troops may also have contributed to 'early British government policy and [public relations] disasters'[541] such as internment and Bloody Sunday, which in turn contributed to the defining narrative of violence surrounding Britain's approach to peace and conflict management in the Province. Similarly, when the ECHR ruled against Britain's use of unsanctioned 'deep interrogation',[542] public condemnation by a powerful global actor became a defining moment in the historiological narrative of the Troubles both in the public domain, and in public consciousness. In addition, 'this criticism proved to be valuable information operations fodder for the PIRA who used it to reinforce their portrayal of British forces as repressive occupiers'.[543] Due to this misalignment of sometimes violent operational tactics with the general aim for peace, Operation Banner was gaining a reputation as 'a rather coercive counter-terrorism strategy, [where] Britain was losing the battle for hearts and minds'.[544]

A Battle for the Narrative

During Operation Banner, violent acts and non-violent acts became means of communicating political values. PIRA used bomb attacks, such as that on the Grand Hotel in Brighton on 12[t] October 1984, as communicative acts of terror, commonly known as 'Propaganda of the Deed'.[545] Violence became a means of 'radical communication, both in terms of terrorising its

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[540] CGS, *Operation Banner*, 8-14.

[541] Somerville and Purcell, 7.

[542] ECHR*, Ireland Against the United Kingdom,* 490

[543] Terrence L. Soule, *Tiocfaidh Ar La: A Critical Examination of British Counterinsurgency Operations in Northern Ireland 1969-1998* (Monograph for the School of Advanced Military Studies: Army Command and General Staff College*,* Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2012).

[544] Rory Cormac, 'The Information Research Department, Unattributable Propaganda, and Northern Ireland, 1971–1973: Promising Salvation but Ending in Failure?' *The English Historical Review* 131:552 (2016), 1074-1104, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cew342.

[545] Sean McCafferty and Iain Overton*, Report by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV): The Improvised Explosive Device and the 'Propaganda of the Deed'* (London: AOAV, 2021), 8.

intended audience and in inspiring followers'.[546] By contrast, Bennett argues that violent communications painted the British government's evolving 'low profile' military strategy associated with police primacy in a positive light 'because it contrasted with Republican violence and was contextualized within the government's willingness to negotiate and compromise when necessary'.[547] Indeed, in Margaret Thatcher's response to the hunger strikes she insisted on 'find[ing] ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend'.[548] In so doing, she used publicity to define the parameters of the debate, furthering the British perspective of a battle between peace and terrorism.

The success of a collaborative peace process fluctuated depending on levels of trust and mistrust between Republicans, Loyalists, and governments. Under John Major's government, the 'glittering prize' of a ceasefire agreement in 1994 'was seen to have slipped from his grasp' in 1996.[549] Unfortunately, Major's call for elections to a peace forum before establishing a date for all-party negotiations had reignited Irish Nationalists' mistrust of the British government. PIRA felt that the British government was using delaying tactics to strengthen its position in upcoming negotiations, which resulted in the ceasefire boycott.[550] In the following years of Major's government, the British refashioned their position into one of 'an honest broker' between unionism and nationalism … [whose] impartiality did not mean indifference'.[551] In so doing, the government attempted to support the Unionist cause whilst appearing open to negotiations with Republicans.

Under Tony Blair, the British rebuilt trust between the government and Republicans who at times felt left out 'in the cold' and excluded from negotiations by former British Conservative governments.[552] By quickly setting a date for all-party talks, Blair recognised a Republican political grievance which he rectified through action: he gave them a place at the negotiating

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[546] McCafferty and Overton, 8.

[547] Bennett, 511.

[548] Gary Edgerton, 'Quelling the "Oxygen of Publicity": British Broadcasting and "The Troubles" During the Thatcher Years,' *Journal of Popular Culture* 30:1 (1996), https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/quelling-oxygen-publicity-british-broadcasting/docview/195360133/se-2?accountid=11862, 115.

[549] Christopher Norton, 'Renewed Hope for Peace? John Major and Northern Ireland', in Peter Dorey (ed.) *The Major Premiership* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 108.

[550] Geoffrey Evans and Brendan O'Leary, 'Frameworked futures: Intransigence and flexibility in the Northern Ireland elections of May 30 1996,' *Irish Political Studies* 12:1 (1997), https://doi.org/10.1080/07907189708406572, 23.

[551] Major, 435 – 436.

[552] Paul Dixon, 'British policy towards Northern Ireland 1969–2000: continuity, tactical adjustment and consistent "inconsistencies"', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 3:3 (2001), 341.

table. In turn, meaningful dialogue began: the PIRA responded with the 1997 ceasefire agreement. Later, the signing of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday power-sharing deal followed. Indeed, '[w]orking together, once dirty words, [became] now the basis of a new future that offers hope in place of war [in Northern Ireland]'.[553]

Overall, the British found it challenging to 'frame' a unified approach during Operation Banner due to early ambiguity around the purpose of the initial deployment and political ambivalence about finding a solution to the problem of Northern Ireland. Consequently, the overarching strategic communications changed according to British government policy and objectives in the Province. Changing the approach from referring to the PIRA as 'terrorists'[554] (and 'Beelzebub')[555] to one of quasi-neutrality enabled the British to effectively extend the arm of diplomacy to the Republicans and eventually restore 'law and order'.

[553] Tony Blair, 'Speech to Global Ethics Foundation: Values and the Power of Community', Tübingen University, 30 June 2000.
[554] Edgerton, 115.
[555] Dixon, 'British policy', 361.

8. Army Structures and the Northern Ireland Experience

Northern Ireland Command Structures and Indicative Strengths

Command and leadership in Northern Ireland was not organised in the normal manner of the BAOR or a mainland unit. The GOC (Northern Ireland) was a 3* post (lieutenant general rank in Army nomenclature) in 1969 even though the forces under his command were not equivalent to a corps (usually three divisions). The GOC acted as the Commander-in-Chief with responsibility to the MoD through the CGS and defence secretary, but would also have frequent contact with the prime minister of Northern Ireland (and after direct rule was established, the SSNI) and often No. 10 Downing Street. The GOC commanded all service personnel in the province - Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force (RAF) - and at times was responsible for province-wide security policy, including deployments of the RUC on security operations, until police primacy was increasingly introduced in the late 1970s. The chief constable of the RUC was however independent of the GOC and reported to the Stormont government and after the introduction of direct rule, the SSNI.

The GOC was initially supported by two major general rank officers as discussed above, but this system failed due to unclear lines of command and authority. The solution was the creation of a CLF from 1970 which was a 2* post (major general-ranked officer) responsible for the day to day running of military forces in Northern Ireland, but unlike his counterparts in other commands, did not actually command the scale of forces in the way they would, being far more involved in policy (although on occasions it appears to have necessitated the postholders getting involved operationally according to some accounts).

In the 1970s, a British Army division normally consisted of three brigades, but the garrison in Northern Ireland was not referred to as a division. In Northern Ireland, brigade structures were established in two and later three districts, each led by a brigade commander (a brigadier or 1*) with a HQ function and units from the mainland and Germany posted to Northern Ireland to supply battalions to each brigade district. As such the battalions rarely operated as a formed brigade structure, but rather were each allocated AORs. As a result, the brigade function tended to be one of co-ordination and policy guidance of a number of independent commands in a particular area. (In deployments such as to Helmand in Afghanistan, the initial unit sent – 16th Air Assault Brigade – deployed under the command of a brigadier as a formed unit.) The unique circumstances of Northern Ireland meant that the brigade leadership sat on committees at local

and regional levels alongside senior police officers and even sometimes at HQNI, especially where operations were undertaken based on intelligence information.

A brigade normally consisted of three, sometimes four battalions (or regiments in some cases depending on the arm - infantry, armoured, artillery etc). Infantry battalions under a lieutenant colonel (typically 500-700 soldiers) were made up of four to six companies of 85-120 (although this number could vary significantly) each under a major, which in turn were made up of four to five platoons of up to 30 soldiers each under a lieutenant. These in turn were divided into three or four sections of up to eight, each under a corporal. In Northern Ireland, however, sections were in turn often divided into 'bricks' (or fire teams) of four, each under the command of a corporal or lance corporal, who were often called upon to make challenging decisions. Three 'bricks' in Northern Ireland could be deployed as a 'multiple' under a senior NCO or junior officer.

These numbers are indicative and varied wildly. Battalions were routinely reinforced by additional companies when required and rural-based units tended to have fewer men than urban ones at certain times. The above numbers also do not necessarily include HQ elements for any of the units, which could also vary significantly.

Minimum Manning Strengths
The Army introduced a system of Minimum Manning Strength (MMS) for deployments to Northern Ireland, which sometimes were not reached and sometimes were breeched in the wrong direction (for the MoD), with units taking more soldiers to Northern Ireland than the planning assumption. In 1970, the MMS for an infantry battalion was generally 650 but could run at over 700. In the late 1970s, roulement battalions would number between 490-550 (with a MMS of 450), while accompanied battalions on a resident tour would number 600. Units deploying as province reserves were told to ideally deploy with 450, with 420 stated as an acceptable minimum and 390 the absolute minimum.

Data for the number of units and the number of troops in the province was also listed in various ways. There is a figure of established strength, meaning the number of troops a unit was supposed to have, and figures for the actual number of people in a unit, who were fully trained and actually deployable. Resident battalions (those on 18–24-month tours in the province) would generally have most of their actual strength deployed, while roulement battalions on

four-to-six-month tours would leave elements of their units behind in their home base (UKLF, or BAOR in Germany). This also applied to spearhead battalions and other battalions on short-term reinforcement, which were regularly deployed at times of greatest need such as during unexpected rioting and during the traditional marching seasons. As such, it is difficult to calculate how many troops were deployable on the ground at any one time.

Thus, on the first night of the deployment of the Army onto the streets in Londonderry on 14 August 1969, the 1st Battalion, PWO had been reinforced with an additional company from another battalion and put five infantry companies on the ground (which was half the infantry strength in Northern Ireland at the time) - listed as 300. On Bloody Sunday in January 1972, by contrast, according to the Saville Inquiry, 1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment was sent as a reinforcement battalion from Belfast (where it was a resident battalion on a two-year deployment) to Londonderry and deployed four companies: A COY (73), C COY (73), D COY (74) and Support COY, which had four platoons (97). There was also B COY which was the command company, some of whose members were deployed in Support Company, and an administrative company or HQ company which also attached some of its soldiers to Support Company. Thus, during the events of that day, the battalion actually had around 320 soldiers, excluding command elements, on the ground – in a four-company force.[556]

Following the 1974 Defence Review which resulted in significant manpower reductions, Northern Ireland deployments saw units restructured and reductions in the HQ element in the province of over 200 personnel. The restructuring plan led to a reduction in the size of infantry battalions from an establishment of 720 to 650 and there was concern that units would no longer be able to meet the MMS targets. Consequently, it was agreed that some units in Belfast would be able to reduce their MMS from 450 to 420 from October 1977, and the Royal Armoured Corps commitment to Londonderry was allowed to go down from 355 to 250. The results of these changes meant a reduction of 600-850 troops in Northern Ireland – but not a change in the number of units.

The UDR battalions of which there were up to 11, deployed under the command of each of the three brigades. UDR battalions varied in size and in the number of companies under command,

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[556] Saville, Vol. 2, para. 12.52.

but all had at least one 'full-time' company, where the soldiers were available on a permanent basis and not on a part-time basis.

In the 1980s a roulement battalion might deploy all its companies (usually four, including the support company reorganised as a rifle company) on the ground for framework operations, unlike the resident battalions, which would normally only have one company on the ground, with the others at varying degrees of notice to deploy. For example, in a 1982 roulement tour, one visiting battalion had four companies deployed on the ground in 18 different locations with the minimum deployment in any location being eight men (one section) and each company had its own Tactical Area of Responsibility (or TAOR).[557] A spearhead battalion deployment could last from several weeks to several months with numbers approaching 600. Instead of having its our own AOR, each company was under command of other units, including UDR battalions. In such circumstances where command and administration functions at battalion level were not needed, a fifth rifle company from HQ Company might be formed.[558]

Deployment

Each of the three brigades would also have a AOR and by the 1980s generally operated with two resident battalions augmented by roulement battalions, plus short-term reinforcements from the spearhead battalion from the mainland or, on occasions, larger reinforcement. In turn, battalions were given their own AORs and decided how to cover their responsibilities. In Belfast in the 1980s, a resident battalion might have an HQ company acting as a reserve and four companies each able to deploy 72 soldiers in 'bricks' or 'multiples'. The companies would rotate in five- or six-week periods, the first company would be attached to an RUC station in a security force base under the operational control of a roulement battalion, then a period in barracks as the brigade reserve at two hours' notice to move; while the second company acted as a second reserve company; meanwhile the third company was at six hours' notice to move as a reserve, allowing for some training to take place, and finally the fourth company was only called on in exceptional circumstances with many members either on training courses, leave or adventure training.[559] In Belfast a company could be responsible for an area with 25,000 inhabitants which they were expected to understand and secure in 18 weeks.

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[557] Under the leave system every soldier was given a three-day home leave during a tour, which had to be taken into consideration when manning framework operations and planning surge operations.

[558] Senior military officer.

[559] Beevor, 195.

The Soldier Experience

With hundreds of thousands of deployments over the course of Operation Banner, there are countless accounts from many of the participants about what it was like to serve in Northern Ireland. Ken Wharton has collated a range of oral histories bringing together the impressions from a range of security force personnel in a number of books including, *Bloody Belfast* and *The Bloodiest Year 1972*.[560] In the early years 'battalions were rushed out at little or no notice as both the Government and the military merely reacted to events'.[561] Advance parties of the battalion, company and platoons, plus section leads would arrive several weeks before the whole unit arrived, going out to patrol with the departing unit and doing a handover. The battalion intelligence officers would have come out several weeks before the advance party to work with their predecessors. The system took some years to develop. Patrolling was a key activity in the province undertaken for 'domination of the ground' – denying the enemy freedom of movement; and to get to know the area to build up knowledge and intelligence, but for the soldiers, every patrol was dangerous as they knew they were targets every time they stepped out of their bases. From 1969-71, it was described by one commentator as reactive rather than preventative, as battalions had trouble just keeping up with events.[562] While 1972 was the year of the greatest number of casualties, the pressures on those serving hardly changed over the almost four decades of Operation Banner.

Some officers tended to have an idealised image of their soldiers as the 'irrepressible squaddy' when the reality was rather different. Officers, while in command, were rarely present at most activities conducted by bricks. Above them, responsibility probably fell most on the shoulders of company (major) rather than battalion commanders (lieutenant colonel).[563] The pressure fell on the junior NCOs all the time, usually 23-year-olds with one tour behind them. The training these junior NCOs received was still all based on the key demand for the Army of warfare in Northwest Europe, not Northern Ireland, and despite the development of NITAT, only engaged with the programme in the weeks before the actual deployment. Until the mid-1990s, soldiers with nine years of service in the Army could have expected to have completed between three

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[560] Ken Wharton, *Bloody Belfast: An Oral History of the British Army's War Against the IRA* (Cheltenham: The History Press, 2018); Ken Wharton, *The Bloodiest Year 1972: British Soldiers in Northern Ireland, in Their Own Words* (Cheltenham: The History Press, 2017).
[561] Dewar, 186.
[562] Ibid.
[563] Personally debriefing each of the brick patrols was an essential part of keeping the intelligence picture up to date for a company commander. Dewar, 182-183.

and six tours in Northern Ireland – standard periods of enlistment during Banner were three, six and nine years, after which they could opt to serve for a maximum of 22 years. [564]

The conditions that soldiers had to live in were particularly bad for units sent to security force bases. Beevor writing in 1990, reported that soldiers lived in windowless damp portacabins with four men to a nine-by-six-feet space, with two double bunks and a single light bulb; sharing one ablutions portacabin for up to 100 men. On return to barracks there were repeated problems of de-compression for the men returning to their family quarters in resident battalions – between 10-30% of wives preferred to stay in the UK rather than deploy with their husbands to the province; many of those that did go, spent the two years rarely if ever leaving the base. Local girls were a distraction for single soldiers, and it was claimed each resident battalion 'usually leaves with between fifteen and sixty new wives'.[565] The danger of the 'honey trap' where young soldiers were lured out of barracks by women working for paramilitaries remained a deep cause for concern into the 1990s – the March 1971 killing of three young Scottish soldiers (one only 17) still evoked memories 20 years later.

Compared with 1.5% a century earlier, a third of male British soldiers in 1971 were married and/or had children, with that figure rising to two-thirds by the end of that decade.[566] These military wives, along with their in-laws, had a significant influence on soldiers' continued service in the Army, and in their children's decision to enlist. When a married infantryman might only 'see his wife on about half the days in the year',[567] it was not only the soldiers who grew war weary. Petitioners in the 'Bring Back the Boys from Ulster Campaign' from 1973-74, most of whom had relatives serving in the Province, secured 119,939 signatures in 1974, despite pressures from some government quarters to suppress the movement.[568] Republican paramilitaries recognised this was a centre-of-gravity for the British Army, and believed a bombing campaign on the mainland – if they could avoid civilian losses – would sway public opinion further in favour of military withdrawal.[569] Simultaneously, parents discouraging their

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[564] Dewar, 184-185.
[565] Beevor, 201.
[566] Paul Dixon, '"A real stirring in the nation": military families, British public opinion and withdrawal from Northern Ireland', in Dawson, et. al., 47.
[567] Ibid., 46
[568] 'By 21 June [1973]…42,535 signatures had been collected, largely by the relatives of serving soldiers. The second petition, in October 1973, raised a total of 99,711 signatures. The third petition, containing the grand total of 119,939 signatures, was handed in to 10 Downing Street in May 1974'. Dixon, in Dawson, et. al. 47.
[569] See also Gary McGladdery, 'Reflections on the historical significance, impact and consequences of the Provisional IRA's attack on the British Government in Brighton, 1984', in Sacha van Leeuwen and Graham

sons from joining the Army, according to Lord Carrington, was contributing to the Army's recruitment shortfall in the mid-1970s.[570]

Life in the countryside was much more demanding and was generally taken on by roulement battalions on short-tour lengths. With 51 border crossings and only four officially recognised crossings, the smuggling challenge was acute and the guerrilla warfare undertaken by local ASUs was particularly ruthless. Bessbrook Mill was the security base for operations in South Armagh or 'bandit country' where vehicles could not be risked on the roads so most movements were conducted by air: RAF Wessex and Puma helicopters and Army Air Corps Gazelle and Lynxes, with the outlying areas manned from security bases supported from 1985 by a network of watchtowers.

The worst place for soldiers to be sent to was Crossmaglen (or XMG), a border town where living conditions in the operating base were even worse than in Belfast. Apart from a week's leave on the mainland they had no privacy for six months. The multiples (three bricks) in the company rotated between observation towers, patrolling and base guarding (who also act as a quick reaction reserve at no notice to deploy). The observation towers were isolated and boring; the patrolling could involve four days of demanding movement and covert observation: the countryside was a 'war of patience and caution'. [571]

Clarke's *Contact* is a harrowing account of a young Parachute Regiment officer based in Belfast and then South Armagh in 1976 at XMG: 'South Armagh, still light years away from civilisation, still living in the dark ages, where barbarity and cruelty are the prime factors of a successful life. Where stealing and killing are as natural a part of living as breathing is to most of us'.[572] Clarke provides a no-holds-barred account of life in a forward operating base in the then most dangerous place in the province.

> The base here in Crossmaglen just has to be the biggest tactical farce of the whole
> Northern Ireland thing. It is situated in a pocket of the North surrounded on three sides
> by the border with the Republic…then there is the Army base, sitting near the centre of

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Dawson (eds.) *The Brighton 'Grand Hotel' Bombing: History, memory and political theatre* (Brighton: Centre for Research in Memory, Narrative and Histories, 2017), 19
[570] Quoted in Dixon, 'A real stirring in the nation', 51.
[571] Beevor, 202-204.
[572] A.F.N. Clarke, *Contact* (Sydney, NSW: Clarke Books, 2014), 143.

town just asking for trouble. I would like to meet the lunatic who decided to set up a base here.[573]

He details the boredom, the stress of potential booby traps, and the uncertainty of the deployment on a day-to-day basis as the troops count the days down until they can leave XMG. Writing at the end of the 1980s, Beevor observed that '[a]s for the future they just feel resigned. The older sergeants and warrant officers have served about 10 tours over the last 20 years, and they expect the cycle to continue for another twenty. (Of course, they were not wrong).[574] Young soldiers expressed shock at the abuse women shouted at them in the towns and the spitting and howling. Describing a search in the Old Park district of Belfast in 1973, Clarke recalled a night search: '[t]he abuse is never ending, the quality never-changing. Now it just rolls off my back and I concentrate on the job. A week ago, one of our section commanders was hit in the stomach by a sniper's bullet, just thirty yards from this house…the locals cheered at the time'.[575] One former SB officer sympathises with the 'restraint and professionalism' of the Army despite these challenges:

> Every day they met people who wanted them dead…A burning building could be an ambush or a 'civil rights' protest a chance to riot, with snipers secreted in the crowd. A car oddly parked or curtains fluttering at an open window raised suspicion. No kids playing in the street or disturbed ground on a roadside verge were signs of danger. Some young soldiers were physically sick with fear as they put on their kit before leaving base. There was a chance they would not return in one piece, or at all.[576]

Most accounts speak of it as a war for those on the ground, facing the risks of snipers and bombs once the acute phase of civil disorder had passed and a sense of being separate from the community they had been sent in to protect. This isolation was exacerbated in some who felt their efforts were being exploited for self-interested objectives. Beevor reported in 1990 how a number of officers were cynical about the security 'industry' that had grown up in the province by the late 1980s with subsidies, and how Loyalists and Republicans were careful not to disrupt each other's sources of revenue.[577]

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[573] Clarke, 118.
[574] Beevor, 205.
[575] Clarke, 17.
[576] Matchett, 136-7.
[577] Beevor, 205.

Technology and Operation Banner

321 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Royal Army Ordnance Corps

On September 1971 Captain David Stewardson became the first bomb-disposal officer to die during Operation Banner. In all, 20 EOD members died in Northern Ireland and another three on the mainland between 1971 and 1988. The first bomb-disposal unit was deployed in 1970 and reinforced in 1971. In 1972, six of its 30 members were killed and by 1980 almost 550 had served with the unit. During Operation Banner it dealt with more than 47,000 emergency calls and 5,500 actual bombs. The squadron is the most decorated unit to have served in Operation Banner with almost 300 awards for gallantry.[578]

On-going technical support was provided by the Defence Research Establishments such as the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment. Of the numerous technical projects undertaken to support the security services in Northern Ireland, the development of the 'Wheelbarrow' remotely controlled robot was a notable and dramatic breakthrough in dealing with improvised explosive devices. From an initial prototype modified from a garden centre purchase, within a year, the fifth iteration had 'interchangeable parts such as a grappling hook, a hammer to break car windows, a claw to grab door handles or release charges, integrated CCTV capability and a clamp'.[579] It should be noted that some criticise the Army's use of Northern Ireland as an 'always-available laboratory' in which the built environment was exposed to the risks of an experimental machine.[580] However, the reality was that in the early digital age, the Wheelbarrow – if not always successful – saved the lives of bomb disposal officers and locals alike, and the forensic evidence needed to prosecute the perpetrators. Moreover, by safely defusing bombs, EOD members were able to study the device and improve their response to the terrorist threat.[581] Within eighteen months of its introduction in March 1972, the Wheelbarrow had been deployed operationally 100 times.[582] While initially hidden from prying eyes, the Army ultimately saw the utility of this life-saving device in the 'hearts and minds' campaign and permitted photo essays on the robot to be published in local

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[578] McKittrick, et. al., *Lost Lives*, 98.

[579] Debbie Lisle, 'Making safe: The dirty history of a bomb disposal robot', *Security Dialogue* 51:2-3 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010619887849, 178.

[580] Lisle, 180

[581] Alistair Irwin and Mike Mahoney, 'The military response', in James Dingley (ed.) *Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 206

[582] The Times, 'Lieutenant Colonel "Peter" Miller', *The Times*, 6 September 2006, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/lieutenant-colonel-peter-miller-t8t6hr3zxlm

newspapers.[583] The Wheelbarrow was deployed on the mainland as well as in Northern Ireland and later also in Iraq, with later versions seeing deployment with the Metropolitan Police Service.

Separately, PIRA's transition to remote detonation of improvised explosive devices, which accompanied its use of proxy bombs on military checkpoints, was impeded by the Army's development of radio jamming, an early type of electronic countermeasure. Furthermore, once a radio-controlled bomb 'had failed to detonate, the army could retrieve the weapon and [thereafter] identify the radio code on the receiver, thus neutralizing all bombs using the same signal'.[584] The Defence Research Establishments provided ongoing technical support to such innovations and in other areas of equipment requirements for Operation Banner. For example, the urgent requirement for non-lethal weapons for use in civil disorder contexts saw the Chemical Defence Establishment lead in the development of rubber, and then plastic, baton rounds to replace the wooden ones previously used in colonial contexts such as Hong Kong. While their efficacy is disputed, it was the need to 'impose order during violent conflict while simultaneously limiting the use of force'[585] which motivated the Army's pursuit of these technical solutions. Elsewhere, bomb and mortar-proof bases, armour, and surveillance equipment were among the other key innovations successfully used to outmanoeuvre the increasingly sophisticated paramilitaries. As one former GOC noted in a co-written piece, '[e]very terrorist innovation was trumped by a rapidly developed technical countermeasure the details of which were, and remain, secret'.[586]

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[583] Lisle, 186

[584] Quoted in Mia Bloom and John Horgan, 'Missing Their Mark: The IRA's Proxy Bomb Campaign', *Social Research* 75:2 (2008), 597

[585] Brian Drohan, 'Unintended Consequences: Baton Rounds, Riots, and Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, 1970-1981', *Journal of Military History* 82:2 (2018), https://www.academia.edu/43012392/_Unintended_Consequences_Baton_Rounds_Riots_and_Counterinsurgency_in_Northern_Ireland_1970_1981_Journal_of_Military_History_82_2_April_2018_491_514, 513.

[586] Irwin and Mahoney, 205-206

9. Concluding Reflections

The human cost of the years of Operation Banner is stark and of course does not reflect the long (and continuing) toll from the Northern Ireland Troubles. The total casualty figure for the period of Operation Banner is over 3,600, the vast majority civilian at 2,034.[587] Most of these deaths were caused by Republican paramilitaries who killed 2,139 people, followed by Loyalist paramilitaries who killed 1,050. The security forces were responsible for 367 deaths, of which 301 were attributed to the Army.[588]

From the first military casualty in February 1971 to the last in February 1997 (both killed by IRA snipers) the British Armed Forces probably lost just over 700 to hostile action.[589] In addition, more than 6,000 service personnel were wounded, many with life changing injuries. *Lost Lives* puts the figure at 709 deaths including the UDR and Royal Irish Regiment (RIR) (but this may be including negligent discharges). The Sutton-Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) database lists 502 British Army; 196 UDR; seven RIR; two Royal Navy; four RAF; and seven Territorial Army, equalling 718 plus five ex-Army; and 40 ex-UDR, making 763.[590] A 2015 FOI release from the MoD[591] lists a toll of 1,436 deaths, from off-duty Hugh McCabe in August 1969 to Kai Jennings in March 2007, of which 646 are listed as killed by hostile action.[592]

Taking the *Lost Lives* database as the median, these figures are sobering when one includes 200 RUC and 103 RUC Reserves making 1,012 security forces personnel killed. By comparison 179 British Armed Forces personnel or MoD civilians died serving on Operation Telic in Iraq, of which 136 were killed as a result of hostile action.[593] In Afghanistan, from October 2001 to July 2015, a total of 454 British forces personnel or MoD civilians died while serving in Afghanistan, of which 405 were killed as a result of hostile action. Simply put therefore, it is clear that, '[t]he United Kingdom owes an immense debt of gratitude to all those

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[587] McKittrick, et. al., *Lost Lives*, 1474.

[588] McKittrick, et. al., *Lost Lives*, 1475. It attributes 62 of these deaths to the SAS.

[589] Depending on the counting rules.

[590] Malcolm Sutton, 'An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland', *CAIN Web Service*, available at: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/cgi-bin/tab2.pl. As such the UDR/RIR suffered higher causalities than any other Army regiment.

[591] See MoD, 'Freedom of Information: Army Sec/06/06/09633/75948'.

[592] A significant number of these deaths may be road traffic accidents, but also several who took their own lives. Wharton, *Bloody Belfast*, puts the number at 1,301.

[593] MoD, 'British Fatalities: Operations in Iraq', *UK Government*, accessed February 2022 at https://www.gov.uk/government/fields-of-operation/iraq, accessed February 2022.

who have served in Northern Ireland, to the Army, to the RIR and to the RUC'.[594] Aaron Edwards considers the costs on the whole community of the province and beyond has been immense: '[t]he Troubles have left behind a terrible legacy, of dead and wounded on all sides, scarring people it affected both directly and indirectly, not only in Northern Ireland but across the British Isles, in a way that may take generations to heal'.[595]

The British Army was deployed to the province because political discourse had broken down and civil order was threatened in a way that had not been seen before. It did not ask for or seek the mission, indeed many soldiers were against a long-term commitment. In undertaking the mission that faced it, the Army took on a burden that no other authority could or would do: '[f]rom 1921 to 1969, Britain washed its hands of Ulster. Since then, using the Army as a shield, it has been able to keep the worst of the problem at arm's length'.[596] Aaron Edwards writing in 2011 noted that '[a]s an institution the British Army actively sought to capture its own lessons from its deployment in Northern Ireland…there is a suggestion that the campaign was – on balance – a success'.[597] Of the lessons, the 2006 Army Study identified the lack of a single overall campaign authority which made decision making occasionally chaotic and resulted in intelligence agencies working to different agendas at times, a point made by Urban and Hamill.

On the fractious relationship between the Army and the RUC, Beevor summed up the view of many: '[c]oloured by the frustrations of liaison, above all in the intelligence field, the Army's opinion of the RUC, and the RUC's opinions of the Army, are very mixed'.[598] The RUC was often frustrated by the short-termism of officers on four-to-six-month roulement tours and the Army bemoaned a fixed shift culture amongst the police. There were also recurring tensions between the NIO and successive GOCs - the Army resented being in support of a civil power they regarded as inadequate and unwilling to face up to the threat as seen by the Army.

Writing in 1990 about the various controversies surrounding Operation Banner and the 'Green' Army, Anthony Beevor (the noted historian and himself a former soldier) reflected that 'although there may have been lapses in the early days…it is hard to imagine other armies

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[594] Dewar, 238.
[595] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles*, 89.
[596] Beevor, 207.
[597] Edwards, *The Northern Ireland Troubles*, 82.
[598] Beevor, 191.

maintaining a similar degree of discipline and restraint'.[599] By contrast, Edward Burke's careful analysis of two contrasting battalions in the early 1970s makes for difficult reading for those who dismiss such lapses as simply reflective of bad apples, noting as he does that 'small units of infantry soldiers enjoyed considerable autonomy during the early years of Operation Banner and could behave in a vengeful manner towards the local population'.[600] He argues that operational conduct was influenced more by company commanders than battalion commanding officers and HQNI and respective brigade headquarters 'failed to ensure operational consistency among its rotating battalions in Ulster'.[601] 'Handovers between battalions remained inadequate: 'mistakes were repeated and command oversight was often absent'.[602] Soldiers could and did become too exclusively loyal 'to the immediate group rather than the institution that employed them...excessive and ultimately deviant loyalty to the regiment or its sub-units could seriously damage government policy and the reputation of the British Army in Northern Ireland'. Burke nevertheless concludes that 'British Army operational leadership and combat training worked...Under fire, soldiers generally responded well, using drills to supress fire, move out of the 'kill zone' and work as teams to advance towards firing points [and d]espite the occasional instances of abuse...many mid-ranking and junior officers distinguished themselves in Northern Ireland'.[603]

Hamill writing before the end of Banner reflected that it: 'was a campaign which had totally changed the Army's anti-riot and counter-insurgency tactics, from the time when they had been put in to tackle the symptoms and 'be seen to be there', to understanding and tackling the fundamental nature of the problem, which was the terrorist embedded in the local population'.[604] The fact that the two most important organs of security in Northern Ireland – the RUC and the Army – needed the best part of thirty years to find a way of co-operating successfully together is testimony to engrained cultures that each found impossible to free themselves from for too long.

The 'lesson' with the benefit of hindsight may be that an Army that had spent the previous decades in post-colonial internal security operations struggled to conceptualise how to deliver

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[599] Beevor, 183.
[600] Edward Burke, *An Army of Tribes: British Army Cohesion, Deviancy and Murder in Northern Ireland* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2018), 334-335.
[601] Ibid., 334-335.
[602] Ibid., 335.
[603] Ibid., 340.
[604] Hamill, 281.

MAC-P over a 38-year operation, when it had a warfighting ethos and a need to be ready for high-intensity warfare contingencies, which loomed rather larger for the first two decades of Operation Banner than internal security. Why this conceptual and operational challenge did not get addressed more successfully in the second two decades goes some way to explaining why the Army was so reluctant to embrace MAC-P missions to support home security and defence during the engagements in Afghanistan, Iraq and again in Afghanistan from 2001.

In many ways, it took too long for the civil power (the Home Office and then NIO staff with many former Home Office officials) to acquire a sharp operational edge. The Army never wanted a home mission and always saw it as a distraction – albeit a deadly and an extraordinarily demanding one at times. This fundamental reluctance to embrace home defence and security missions characterised the MoD's approach to countering international terrorism even as Operation Banner wound down. After 9/11, the UK counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST that emerged from the Cabinet Office was regarded as a model for civil/police/military collaboration harnessed to a common strategic aim. However, only with the doctrinal acceptance of such missions under Operation Temperer in 2017 did the Army and MoD affect significant change in its doctrinal approach. [605] How far this represents a fundamental acceptance that a warfighting ethos is not necessarily the best way to prepare for the other missions, whether at home or away, that may face Britain's armed forces in the future will indicate how successful Operation Banner has proven to be as a learning experience.

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[605] Gearson, John and Philip A. Berry, 'British Troops on British Streets: Defence's Counter-Terrorism Journey from 9/11 to Operation Temperer', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (2021), 1-27, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1902604

Appendices

Political Figures

THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC ORDER OPERATIONS, 1969-1971

UK PRIME MINISTERS	HOME SECRETARY	DEFENCE SECRETARY
PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON LABOUR PARTY GOVERNMENT 1964-1970	JAMES CALLAGHAN, 1967-1970	DENIS HEALEY, 1964-1970
PRIME MINISTER EDWARD HEATH CONSERVATIVE PARTY GOVERNMENT 1970-1974	REGINALD MAUDLING, 1970-1972	PETER CARRINGTON, 1970-1974

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE INSURGENCY PHASE, 1971-1974

UK PRIME MINISTER	HOME SECRETARY	DEFENCE SECRETARY	SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NI
PRIME MINISTER EDWARD HEATH CONSERVATIVE PARTY GOVERNMENT 1970-1974	ROBERT CARR 1972-1974	PETER CARRINGTON 1970-1974 IAN GILMOUR, JAN 1974-MARCH 1974	WILLIAM WHITELAW, 1972-1973 FRANCIS PYM, 1973-1974

IRA TERRORISM AND POLICE PRIMACY OVER SECURITY, 1974-1990

UK PRIME MINISTERS	HOME SECRETARY	DEFENCE SECRETARY	SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NI
PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON LABOUR PARTY GOVERNMENT MARCH 1974- APRIL 1976	ROY JENKINS 1974- 1976	ROY MASON 1974-1976	MERLYN REES 1974-1976
PRIME MINISTER JAMES CALLAGHAN LABOUR PARTY GOVERNMENT 1976- 1979	MERLYN REES 1976- 1979	FRED MULLEY 1976-1979	ROY MASON 1976-1979
PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER CONSERVATIVE PARTY GOVERNMENT 1979–1990	WILLIAM WHITELAW, 1979–1983 LEON BRITTAN, 1983-1985 DOUGLAS HURD, 1985-1989 DAVID WADDINGTON, 1989-1990	FRANCIS PYM, 1979-1981 JOHN NOTT, 1981-1983 MICHAEL HESELTINE, 1983-1986 GEORGE YOUNGER, 1986-1989	HUMPHREY ATKINS, 1979-1981 JIM PRIOR, 1981-1984 DOUGLAS HURD, 1984- 985 TOM KING, 1985-1989

THE ROAD TO PEACE, 1990-2007

UK PRIME MINISTER	HOME SECRETARY	DEFENCE SECRETARY	SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NI
PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR CONSERVATIVE PARTY GOVERNMENT 1990-1997	KENNETH BAKER, 1990-1992 KENNETH CLARKE, 1992-1993 MICHAEL HOWARD, 1993-1997	TOM KING, 1989-1992 MALCOLM RIFKIND, 1992-1995 MICHAEL PORTILLO, 1995-1997	PETER BROOKE, 1989-1992 SIR PATRICK MAYHEW, 1992-1997
PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR LABOUR PARTY GOVERNMENT 1997-2007	JACK STRAW, 1997-2001 DAVID BLUNKETT, 2001-2004 CHARLES CLARKE, 2004-2006	GEORGE ROBERTSON, 1997-1999 GEOFF HOON, 1999-2005 JOHN REID, 2005-2006	MO MOWLAM, 1997-1999 PETER MANDELSON, 1999-2001 JOHN REID, 2001-2002 PAUL MURPHY, 2002-2005 PETER HAIN, 2005-2007

General Officers Commanding - Northern Ireland 1969-2007

(Commanders Land Forces, 1970-1996)

THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC ORDER OPERATIONS 1969-1971

GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING	COMMANDERS LAND FORCES
LIEUTENANT GENERAL IAN HARRIS 1966-1969	
OP. BANNER BEGINS	
LIEUTENANT GENERAL IAN FREEDLAND 1969-1971	GENERAL ANTHONY FARRAR-HOCKLEY AUG 1970-JULY 1971

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE INSURGENCY PHASE, 1971-1974

GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING	COMMANDERS LAND FORCES
LIEUTENANT GENERAL VERNON ERSKINE-CRUM FEB-MAR 1971	
LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY TUZO MAR 1971-FEB 1973	MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT FORD JULY 1971-APR 1973

IRA TERRORISM AND POLICE PRIMACY OVER SECURITY, 1974-1990

GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING	COMMANDERS LAND FORCES
GENERAL SIR FRANK KING FEB 1973-AUG 1975	MAJOR GENERAL PETER LENG APRIL 1973-APRIL 1975
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR DAVID HOUSE AUG 1975-NOV 1977	MAJOR GENERAL DAVID YOUNG APR 1975-APR 1977
LIEUTENANT GENERAL TIMOTHY CREASEY NOV 1977-DEC 1979	MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD TRANT APR 1977-FEB 1979
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR RICHARD LAWSON DEC 1979-JUNE 1982	MAJOR GENERAL JAMES GLOVER FEB 1979-OCT 1980
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR ROBERT RICHARDSON JUNE 1982-JUNE 1985	MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES HUXTABLE OCT 1980-JAN 1982
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR ROBERT PASCOE JUNE 1985-JUNE 1988	MAJOR GENERAL PETER CHISWELL 1982-1983 MAJOR GENERAL DAVID PANK SEP 1983-SEP 1985
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR CHARLES WATERS JUNE 1988-JUNE 1990	MAJOR GENERAL TONY JEAPES, SEPT 1985-APR 1987
	MAJOR GENERAL R HODGES APR 1987-DEC 1989

THE ROAD TO PEACE, 1990-2007

GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING	COMMANDERS LAND FORCES
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR JOHN WILSEY JUNE 1990-JUNE 1993	MAJOR GENERAL DAVID THOMSON DEC 1989-1991
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR RUPERT SMITH 1996-1998 LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR HEW PIKE OCTOBER 1998-JUNE 2000	MAJOR GENERAL ANTHONY DE C.L. LEASK FEB 1994-1996
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR ALISTAIR IRWIN DEC 2000-JAN 2003	
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR PHILIP TROUSDELL JAN 2003-AUG 2005	
LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR REDMOND WATT 2005-2006	
LIEUTENANT GENERAL NICK PARKER JULY 2006-OCT 2007	
END OF OP. BANNER JULY 2007	
MAJOR GENERAL CHRIS BROWN 2008-JAN 2009 = THE LAST GOC.	

Army Structures in Northern Ireland

ARMY STRUCTURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969-2007

Command was not organised in the same way as the British Army of the Rhine and UK Land Force Units.

GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING (GOC)

- In 1969, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) was a Lt. General (3*) who acted as the Commander in Chief responsible for all regional service personnel: Army, Royal Navy and Air Forces, but not at normal scale of a Corps that a LT. General would command.
- The General Officer Commanding had regular contact with MoD, CGS, SoS and the PM to Northern Ireland. After direct rule was established, the post had frequent contact with the Secretary of State of Northern Ireland, and No. 10 Downing Street
- At times, the GOC was responsible for province-wide security policy - including deployments of the RUC on security operations, until Police Primacy in the late 1970s.

COMMANDER LAND FORCES (CLF)

- In 1970, the CLF was created as a Major General officer (2*) responsible for the day to day running of military forces in Northern Ireland
- The CLF role focused on policy
- On occasions some CLFs appear to have been involved in some operations, but should have devolved to Brigade Commander.

Northern Ireland Brigade Structures in 1970s

In the 1970s 3 Brigades would normally have made up a division but in Northern Ireland the three Brigades were given more independence in each of their areas of responsibility.

Unique to Northern Ireland, Brigadiers sat on local and regional committees alongside police officers at HQNI, specifically during operations based on intelligence information.

Battalions posted to NI from Germany and the mainland came as individual units and not part of their Brigade structures. Once in the province they operated quite independently within their Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAORs).

NORTHERN IRELAND COMMAND STRUCTURES

GOC (3*) HQNI

CLF (2*) HQNI

39 BRIGADE (1*)	8 BRIGADE (1*)	3 BRIGADE (1*)
3-4 X BN (LT.COL)	3-4 X BN(LT.COL)	3-4 X BN(LT.COL)
12-16 X COY (MAJOR)	12-16 X COY (MAJOR)	12-16 X COY (MAJOR)
48-64 PLT (LT)	48-64 PLT (LT)	48-64 PLT (LT)
144-192 SEC (CPL)	144-192 SEC (CPL)	144-192 SEC (CPL)
288-384 BRICKS (L/CPL)	288-384 BRICKS (L/CPL)	288-384 BRICKS (L/CPL)

3 BRICKS WERE ROUTINELY PUT TOGETHER AS 'A MULTIPLE' UNDER THE COMMAND OF A SENIOR NCO OR JUNIOR OFFICER.

Army Ranks in use during Operation Banner

Officers	
General	Gen
Lieutenant General	Lt Gen
Major General	Maj Gen
Brigadier	Brig
Colonel	Col
Lieutenant Colonel	Lt Col
Major	Maj
Captain	Capt
Lieutenant	Lt
Second Lieutenant	2 Lt
Warrant Officers	
Warrant Officer Class I	WO1
Warrant Officer Class II	WO2
Senior non-commissioned officers		*Equivalent ranks*
Colour Sergeant	C/Sgt	Staff Sergeant S/Sgt
Sergeant	Sgt	
Junior non-commissioned officers		*Equivalent ranks*
Corporal	Cpl	Lance Sergeant L/Sgt
		Bombardier Bdr
Lance Corporal	L/Cpl	Lance Bombardier L/Bdr
Soldiers		*Equivalent ranks*
Private	Pte	Guardsman Gdsm
		Gunner Gnr
		Rifleman Rfn

The Yellow Card (1971) [606]

Instructions by the Director of Operations for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland

1. These instructions are for the guidance of Commanders and troops operating collectively or individually. When troops are operating collectively soldiers will only open fire when ordered to do so by the Commander on the spot.

General Rules
2. Never use more force than the minimum necessary to enable you to carry out your duties.

3. Always first try to handle the situation by other means than opening fire. If you have to fire:
a. Fire only aimed shots.
b. Do not fire more rounds than are absolutely necessary to achieve your aim.

4. Your magazine/belt must always be loaded with live ammunition and be fitted to the weapon. Unless you are about to open fire no live round is to be carried in the breech, and the working parts must be forward. Company Commanders and above may, when circumstances in their opinion warrant such action, order weapons to be cocked, with a round in the breech where appropriate, and the safety catch at safe.

5. Automatic fire may be used against identified targets in the same circumstances as single shots if, in the opinion of the Commander on the spot, it is the minimum force required and no other weapon can be employed as effectively. Because automatic fire scatters it is not to be used where persons not using firearms are in, or may be close to, the line of fire.

Warning before firing
6. A warning should be given before you open fire. The only circumstances in which you may open fire without giving warning are described in paras 13 and 14 below.

7. A warning should be as loud as possible, preferably by loud-hailer. It must:
a. Give clear orders to stop attacking or to halt, as appropriate.
b. State that fire will be opened if the orders are not obeyed.

You may fire after due warning
8. Against a person carrying what you can positively identify as a firearm,* but only if you have reason to think that he is about to use it for offensive purposes and, he refuses to halt when called upon to do so, and there is no other way of stopping him.

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[606] The Yellow Card provided guidelines for soldiers but did not have legal force, in the sense that they 'did not define the legal rights and obligations of the forces under statute or common law. (R v McLaughton (1975) NI 203 at 206 per Sir Robert Lowry L.C.J.). This meant that a soldier firing contrary to the Yellow Card would not necessarily be breaking the law. It was issued to every soldier serving in Northern Ireland and contained instructions as to when a soldier could use lethal force. The Yellow Card was first issued in September 1969. It was periodically revised, and the GEN 47 Committee approved this version on 11th November 1971. Edward Heath told us that the main changes were to allow soldiers, when authorised by Company Commanders or officers of higher rank, to have their weapons loaded, cocked and with a bullet in the breech, though with the safety catch on; to allow fire to be opened at terrorists in vehicles; and to allow, in the circumstances stipulated, the use of automatic fire against identified targets'. Saville, Vol. 1, 186-7.

9. Against a person throwing a petrol bomb if petrol bomb attacks continue in your area against troops and civilians or against property, if his action is likely to endanger life.

10. Against a person attacking or destroying property or stealing firearms or explosives, if his action is likely to endanger life.

11. Against a person who, though he is not at present attacking has:
a. in your sight killed or seriously injured a member of the security forces or a person whom it is your duty to protect, and
b. not halted when called upon to do so and cannot be arrested by any other means.

12. If there is no other way to protect yourself or those whom it is your duty to protect from the danger of being killed or seriously injured.

You may fire without warning
13. Either when hostile firing is taking place in your area, and a warning is impracticable, or when any delay could lead to death or serious injury to people whom it is your duty to protect or to yourself; and then only:
a. against a person using a firearm* against members of the security forces or people whom it is your duty to protect, or
b. against a person carrying a firearm* if you have reason to think he is about to use it for offensive purposes.

14. At a vehicle if the occupants open fire or throw a bomb at you or others whom it is your duty to protect, or are clearly about to do so.

Action by guards and at road blocks/checks
15. Where warnings are called for they should be in the form of specific challenges, as set out in paragraphs 16 and 17.

16. If you have to challenge a person who is acting suspiciously you must do so in a firm, distinct, voice saying 'HALT – HANDS UP'. Then:
a. If he halts you are to say 'STAND STILL AND KEEP YOUR HANDS UP'.
b. Ask him why he is there, and if not satisfied call your Commander immediately and hand the person over to him.

17. If the person does not halt at once, you are to challenge again saying 'HALT – HANDS UP' and, if the person does not halt on your second challenge, you are to cock your weapon, apply the safety catch and shout: 'STAND STILL I AM READY TO FIRE'.

18. The rules covering the circumstances for opening fire are described in paragraphs 8–14. If the circumstances do not justify opening fire, you will do all you can to stop and detain the person without opening fire.

19. At a road block/check, you will NOT fire on a vehicle simply because it refused to stop. If a vehicle does not halt at a road block/check, note its description, make, registration number and direction of travel.

20. In all circumstances where you have challenged and the response is not satisfactory, you will summon your Commander at the first opportunity.

Revised November 1971
*NOTE: 'Firearm' Includes a grenade, nail bomb or gelignite type bomb.

The Blue Card (1972)[607]

<div align="center">

RESTRICTED

Instructions by the Director of Operations for making Arrests under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922

</div>

1. These instructions are for the guidance of Commanders and troops when making arrests under Regulation 10 or Regulation 11 of the Regulations for Peace and Order in Northern Ireland made under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922. The requirements explained below do NOT apply to arrests made under the common law or other Acts of Parliament under which arrests may be made.

2. When a person is arrested under a Regulation made under the Special Powers Act he must be told under which Regulation and why he is being arrested.

Arrests under Regulation 10

3. A soldier may arrest specified persons under Regulation 10 only when authorised to do so by an Officer of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

4. The soldier making the arrest must say:-
    "I arrest you under the Special Powers Act, Regulation 10, for interrogation."

Arrests under Regulation 11

5. A soldier may arrest any person, except children under the age of 10, on suspicion, under Regulation 11 without prior authorisation from an Officer of the RUC.

6. The soldier making the arrest must say:-
    "I arrest you under the Special Powers Act, Regulation 11 because (as appropriate):

    I suspect you of having committed acts prejudicial to the peace."

OR I suspect you of being about to commit acts prejudicial to the peace."
OR I suspect that this article (document) (letter) (book) which I have found in your possession is intended to be used for a purpose prejudicial to preservation of the peace."
OR I suspect you of being a member of the IRA (or the Sinn Fein, or the UVF, or any other unlawful association as appropriate."

After Arrest

7. Adults arrested under the Special Powers Act are to be handed over as soon as possible to the RUC at the nearest Police Station or Police Holding Centre.

8. Juveniles (ie those under the age of 17) who have been arrested must be taken as soon as possible to the nearest RUC Station and NOT to a Police Holding Centre.

Informing Relatives

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[607] TNA, WO 32/21732, 'Draft for DMO's Monthly Report for June 1972', 22 June 1972, Appendix 4 to Annex A to 408 G TRG dated June 1972.

9. When a person has been arrested you are to leave the appropriate white cars with any relative present at the time. This card contains guidance for relatives on how to obtain information about arrested persons.
10. Where a relative is not present and the person arrested requests that a relative be informed, the police are to be asked to comply with the request.
11. Where a juvenile is arrested, the parent or guardian is to be informed why he is being arrested and where he is being held.

<u>RESTRICTED</u>

The White Card (1972)[608]

ANY ENQUIRY ABOUT A PERSON WHO HAS BEEN ARRESTED SHOULD BE MADE INITIALLY TO R.U.C. HEADQUARTERS, "BROOKLYN" (BELFAST 650222).

IF THE PERSON IS NOT RELEASED WITHIN 48 HOURS OF ARREST THIS WILL USUALLY MEAN THAT HE HAS BEEN REMANDED IN CUSTODY BY A COURT OR THAT HE IS BEING HELD UNDER A DETENTION ORDER. THE NEXT-OF-KIN WILL BE INFORMED, BUT IN CASE OF DOUBT ANY ENQUIRY SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, ROOM 306, DUNDONALD HOUSE (BELFAST 650111, EXT.537).

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[608] TNA, WO 32/21732, 'Draft for DMO's Monthly Report for June 1972', 22 June 1972, Appendix 5 to Annex A to 408 G TRG dated June 1972.

Graph One, British Army Strength in Northern Ireland

British Army Strength in Northern Ireland as of 1st April Each Year

Notes: About thirty thousand troops were deployed in Northern Ireland in the summer of 1972; this peak is used to represent the year 1972, rather than the 14,780 personnel deployed on 1 April 1972. From 2002-03 figures exclude those on secondments and those student officers who have yet to graduate; UDR (a regiment of the British Army recruited in Northern Ireland which formed on 1 April 1970 and merged with the Royal Irish Rangers in July 1992); RIR (established from the merger of the UDR and the Royal Irish Rangers in July 1992).

Source: 1969-1974 UDR/RIR data from Martin Melaugh, Brendan Lynn and F. McKenna, 'Background Information on Northern Ireland Society - Security and Defence', *CAIN Web Service*, https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/ni/security.htm; Remaining data from MoD, *Defence Statistics Compendium* (London: HMSO, 2008), 155 available at https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20140116144933mp_/http://www.dasa.mod.uk/publications/UK-defence-statistics-compendium/2008/2008.pdf.

Graph Two, RUC Strength

Strength of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (PSNI from 2001)

Notes: The RUC became the PSNI on 4 November 2001; From 1 April 1998 the RUC compiled and published its statistics on a financial year basis (31 March); From 2002-03 figures exclude those on secondments and those student officers who have yet to graduate.

Source: Melaugh, Lynn and McKenna

Graph Three, Service Personnel Killed or Injured

Total Service Personnel Killed or Injured in Northern Ireland due to the Security Situation

Notes: By calendar year

Source: MoD, *Defence Statistics Compendium*, 155

Graph Four, Service Personnel Killed or Injured (broken down)

Service Personnel Killed versus Injured in Northern Ireland due to the Security Situation (broken down)

Notes: By calendar year

Source: MoD, *Defence Statistics Compendium*, 155

Graph Five, Cumulative Number of Service Personnel Killed or Injured

Cumulative Number of Service Personnel Killed or Injured in
Northern Ireland due to the Security Situation

Notes: By calendar year

Source: Data provided by the PSNI via MoD, *Defence Statistics Compendium*, 155

Graph Six, Cumulative Number of Service Personnel Injured

Cumulative Number of Service Personnel Injured in Northern
Ireland due to the Security Situation

Notes: By calendar year

Source: Data provided by the PSNI via MoD, *Defence Statistics Compendium*, 155

Graph Seven, Cumulative Number of Service Personnel Killed

Cumulative Number of Service Personnel Killed in Northern
Ireland due to the Security Situation

Notes: By calendar year

Source: Data provided by the PSNI via MoD, *Defence Statistics Compendium*, 155

Graph Eight, Deaths of, and caused by, UK Armed Forces

Deaths of, and caused by, serving UK Armed Forces due to Operations in Northern Ireland, 1969-2007

Notes: Army figure includes Regular Army, Territorial Army, UDR, RIR (from 1992) and other non-regular Army. Navy figure includes Royal Navy and Royal Marines. Figures are for in-service personnel and do not include ex-service personnel who may have been targeted by terrorists; includes deaths that occurred outside of Northern Ireland but deemed to be the result of Irish terrorism; Deaths caused by UK Armed Forces does not include 'Other' deaths e.g. accidents, natural causes, assaults, coroner confirmed suicide or open verdicts, and cause not known.

Source: MoD, *Freedom of Information, Reference: FOI Smyth 02-01-2013-160507-018*. Friendly fire data is from Sutton.

Graph Nine, Deaths of, and caused by, British Security Forces

Deaths of, and caused by, serving British Security Forces due to Operations in Northern Ireland, 1969-2007

Legend: ■ Army ■ RUC ■ Navy ■ RAF ■ Civilians ■ Republican ■ Loyalist ■ Friendly Fire

Notes: Army figure includes the Regular Army, Territorial Army, UDR, RIR (from 1992) and other non-regular Army. Navy figure includes Royal Navy and Royal Marines. Figures are for in-service personnel and do not include ex-service personnel who may have been targeted by terrorists; includes deaths that occurred outside of Northern Ireland but deemed to be the result of Irish terrorism; Deaths caused by UK Armed Forces does not include 'Other' deaths e.g. accidents, natural causes, assaults, coroner confirmed suicide or open verdicts, and cause not known.

Source: MoD, *Freedom of Information, Reference: FOI Smyth 02-01-2013-160507-018*. Friendly fire and deaths for which the RUC (incl. USC) is held responsible is from Sutton.

Graph Ten, Responsibility for Deaths 1966-2006

Responsibility for Deaths ,by organisation
(1966-2006)

- ■ IRA
- □ Other Republican terrorists
- □ Loyalist terrorists
- ■ Army
- ■ Other Security Forces
- □ Unknown

Notes: Derived from *Lost Lives* tables 1, 2, 3, and 5 on pages 1552-55, table 16 on page 1560 and table 17 on page 1561.

Chart One, Deaths of, and caused by, Security Forces on Operations in NI, 1969-2007

|		Deaths of UK Security Forces			Deaths caused by UK Security Forces		
		Terrorist Action	Other	Total	UK Military	RUC/USC	Total
Army	Total	692	689	1381			
	Regular Army	477	337	814			
Royal Irish Regiment	Total	7	60	67			
	General Service	1	3	4			
	Home Service	6	57	63			
	Ulster Defence Regiment	197	284	481			
	Territorial Army	9	8	17			
	Other non-regular Army	2	0	2			
Navy	Total	26	8	34			
	Royal Navy	5	3	8			
	Royal Marines	21	5	26			
RAF		4	22	26			
RUC		300	4	304			
Total		**1022**	**719**	**1741**			
Republican					121	17	138
Loyalist					10	4	14
Civilian					170	31	201
Friendly Fire (Army and RUC)					8	4	12
Total					**309**	**56**	**365**

Notes: Army total figure includes Regular Army, Territorial Army, UDR, RIR (from 1992) and other non-regular Army. Navy total figure includes Royal Navy and Royal Marines. Figures are for in-service personnel and do not include ex-service personnel who may have been targeted by terrorists. Includes deaths that occurred outside of Northern Ireland but deemed to be the result of Irish terrorism. 'Other' deaths include accidents, natural causes, assaults, coroner confirmed suicide or open verdicts, and cause not known. Mills indicates RUC deaths due to friendly fire amounted to 4 but CAIN holds 3 (1 by RUC, 2 by Army), the higher figure is used here. Data is from Mills with the exception of friendly fire which is from Sutton.

Chart Two, Strength of the British Security Forces in NI, 1969-2007

Year	British Army Total Strength	Army Deployment to NI excl UDR/RIR	UDR / RIR Full-Time	UDR / RIR Part-Time	RUC / PSNI Regulars	RUC / PSNI Reserves
1969	179000	2280	-	-	3500	0
1970	174000	6230	-	-	3500	0
1971	173000	9847	323	-	4086	1284
1972	178000	29156	844	-	4257	2134
1973	180000	8656	817	7077	4391	2514
1974	172000	8238	1290	6412	4565	3860
1975	167000	6250	1410	6280	4902	4819
1976	170000	7080	1530	6140	5253	4697
1977	167000	6060	1670	5960	5692	4686
1978	161000	5350	2190	5670	6110	4608
1979	156000	7460	2470	5150	6614	4513
1980	159000	11800	2550	4820	6935	4752
1981	166000	5630	2740	4740	7334	4870
1982	163000	9970	2740	4390	7718	4840
1983	159000	9390	2790	4340	8003	4493
1984	162000	8900	2680	4090	8127	4439
1985	162000	8650	2720	3730	8259	4508
1986	161000	11300	2790	3770	8234	4414
1987	160000	10400	2790	3720	8236	4650
1988	158000	10000	2860	3510	8227	4649
1989	156000	11320	2920	3420	8259	4623
1990	153000	10110	2940	3300	8243	4544
1991	148000	10870	2980	3120	8222	4560
1992	145000	12470	3000	2990	8478	4593
1993	135000	12090	2920	2700	8464	4572
1994	123000	11620	2900	2490	8493	4690
1995	112000	11050	3060	2260	8440	4419
1996	109000	10230	3010	2120	8428	4402
1997	109000	10610	2760	2010	8485	4306
1998	110000	10260	2700	1960	8505	4274
1999	110000	9270	2600	1910	8496	4079
2000	110000	8760	2530	1780	8393	3840
2001	110000	8440	2190	1680	7894	3365
2002	110000	8830	2200	1500	6976	3185
2003	112000	9230	2110	1390	6940	2733
2004	113000	7680	2110	1300	7212	2436
2005	109000	6410	2010	1210	7233	2309
2006	108000	5060	1920	1170	7299	1841
2007	106000	3740	1430	0	7314	1634

Notes: No RUC/PSNI figures available for 1969 and 1970 from CAIN but the strength of the RUC (whose reserve was not formed until 1970), was roughly 3,500 up to March 1970. About thirty thousand troops were deployed in Northern Ireland in the summer of 1972 and this peak is used to represent the year 1972, rather than the 14,780 personnel deployed on 1 April 1972. From 2002-03 figures exclude those on secondments and those student officers who have yet to graduate. The UDR merged with the Royal Irish Rangers in July 1992 to form the RIR.

Source: 1969-1974 UDR/RIR data from Melaugh, Lynn and McKenna. Remaining data from MoD, *Defence Statistics Compendium*.

Chart Three, Service Personnel Casualties due to the Security Situation in NI, 1969-2007

Year	Killed	Injured	Cumulative Number Killed	Cumulative Number Injured
1969	0	54	0	54
1970	0	620	0	674
1971	48	390	48	1064
1972	131	578	179	1642
1973	66	548	245	2190
1974	37	483	282	2673
1975	20	167	302	2840
1976	29	264	331	3104
1977	29	187	360	3291
1978	21	135	381	3426
1979	48	153	429	3579
1980	17	77	446	3656
1981	23	140	469	3796
1982	28	98	497	3894
1983	15	88	512	3982
1984	19	86	531	4068
1985	6	33	537	4101
1986	12	55	549	4156
1987	11	104	560	4260
1988	33	229	593	4489
1989	14	190	607	4679
1990	15	214	622	4893
1991	13	253	635	5146
1992	6	320	641	5466
1993	8	173	649	5639
1994	3	126	652	5765
1995	0	13	652	5778
1996	1	55	653	5833
1997	1	150	654	5983
1998	1	87	655	6070
1999	0	36	655	6106
2000	0	27	655	6133
2001	0	55	655	6188
2002	0	77	655	6265
2003	0	12	655	6277
2004	0	16	655	6293
2005	0	4	655	6297
2006	0	0	655	6297
2007	0	0	655	6297

Source: Data provided by the PSNI via MoD, *Defence Statistics Compendium*

Chart Four, Operation Banner deployments by Unit and by Date

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

3 Inf Bde
25 Feb 73 - 15 Sep 81
01 Jul 88 - 21 Mar 93
22 Mar 93 - 01 Sep 04

5 Airptbl Bde
30 Jun 70 - 13 Oct 70
25 Oct 71 - 25 Feb 72

8 Inf Bde
14 Jun 70

16 Para Bde
09 Feb 71 - 04 Jun 71

19 Airptbl Bde
04 Jun 71 - 26 Oct 71,

24 Inf Bde
19 Aug 69 - 29 Jan 70,
01 Jul 70 - 24 Jul 70,
28 Jul 72 - 28 Sep 72,

39 Airptbl Bde
12 Jan 56 - 31 Dec 71

39 Inf Bde
01 Jan 72 - 01 Jun 07

39 (Irish) Bde
01 Aug 07 -

DEPLOYMENTS BY UNIT

INFANTRY UNITS
1 GREN GDS
29 Dec 69 - 20 Apr 70, Londonderry
19 Aug 71 - 07 Oct 71, Belfast (Ligoniel)
27 Nov 72 - 27 Mar 73, Londonderry (Greggan)
26 Mar 74 - 26 Jul 74, Londonderry (Greggan/S Enclave)
27 Oct 76 - 27 Jan 77, R(S) (Armagh)
14 Nov 78 - 07 Mar 79, R (Bessbrook)

Sep/06 Oct 83 - Mar/18 Feb 84, ARB (Rural Armagh)
28 Sep 86 - 31 Jan 87, Op. Cara Cara
04 Feb 86 - 14 Mar 88, BKY
28 Sep 93 - 28 Mar 94, ARB (Armagh)
Feb 96 - 03 Mar 98, BKL
14 Jun 99 - Nov/15 Dec 99, ETB
15 Nov 01 - 15 May 02, BRB

2 GREN GDS
23 Aug 69 - 23 Jan 70, Londonderry
01 Mar 73 - 15 Mar 73, Belfast
10 Jul 73 - 12 Nov 73, Belfast (Ardoyne/Shankill)
09 Nov 77 - 13 Mar 78, Londonderry (West of Foyle)
07 Mar 80 - 14 Jul 80, Londonderry (West of Foyle)
04 Feb 86 - 14 Mar 88, BKY

1 COLDM GDS
15 Dec 70 - 22 Apr 71, R(N) (Londonderry)
17 Oct 71 - 18 Feb 72, Londonderry (Fort George/Newry)
24 Jul 72 - 29 Sep 72, Londonderry (Creggan)
01 Nov 75 - 02 Mar 76, Belfast (Ballymurphy/Springfield/Whiterock)
29 Oct 78 - 27 Feb 79, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)
07 Sep 82 - 21 Jan 83, R(S) (South Armagh)
08 Sep 88 - 29 Jan 89, BRB
28 Jun 92 - 30 Dec 92, ETB (Dungannon)
05 Mar 86 - Aug 86, ARB (Armagh)
16/17 Sep 99 - Feb/16/17 Mar 00, ARB (Armagh)
11 May 01 - May 03, LDY

2 COLDM GDS
21 Jul 70 - 19 Nov 70, Belfast
10 Dec 72 - 30 Mar 73, Belfast (Springfield)
15 Aug 76 - 17 Mar 78, ERB
28 Mar 82 - 11 Aug 82, Belfast (W Belfast)

Feb 91 - Aug 91, Op. Cara Cara
Mar 96 - Aug 96, ARB (Bessbrook)

1 SG
25 Aug 71 - 29 Dec 71, Belfast
(Clonard/Ballymurphy)
03 May 73 - 04 Sep 73, R(S) (Armagh)
04 Apr 75 - 05 Aug 75, Belfast
(Falls/Divis/Sandy Row/Shankill)
06 Aug 77 - 15 Aug 77, Belfast (Royal
Visit)
27 Aug 78 - 29 Dec 78, R(S)
(Armagh/Dungannon)
20 Mar 80 - 10 Nov 81, Aldergrove
Resident
10 Sep 86 - 21 Jan 87, ARB (Bessbrook)
07 Jun 89 - 18 Oct 89, Lisnaskea
Incremental Roulement
08 May 92 - 04 Nov 92, BRB (Belfast)
28 Jun 94 - 08 Dec 94, ETB (Dungannon)
14 May 96 - 15 Nov 96, BRB (Belfast)
03 Mar 98 - Mar 00, BKL
19 Jun 01 - 15 Nov 01, BRB

2 SG
01 Jul 70 - 18 Jul 70, R(S) (Belfast)
27 Jul 72 - 29 Nov 72, Londonderry
(Creggan)
27 Nov 73 - 27 Mar 74, Belfast
(Ballymurphy/Springfield)
16 Nov 76 - 17 Mar 77, Londonderry
28 May 80 - 12 Oct 80, Belfast
(Springfield/Falls)
14 Oct 87 - 23 Feb 88, ARB (Bessbrook)
11 Mar 90 - 24 Sep 90, PRB

1 IG
16 Nov 92 - 22 May 93, FRB (Fermanagh)
Jun 95 - Dec 95, ETB (Dungannon)
02 Dec 03 - 24 Mar 04, ARB

1 WG
23 Mar 71 - 28 Jul 71, Belfast
(Carnmoney)
17 Jun 72 - 25 Oct 72, Belfast (City
Centre)
14 Nov 73 - 07 Mar 74, R(S) (Bessbrook
(2xCoy in Belfast))
15 Oct 79 - 28 Feb 80, R(S) (Bessbrook)
04 Mar 86 - 04 Jul 86, BRB (Belfast)

Mar 92 - 06 Sep 94, BKY
Mar 97 - 16 Sep 97, ARB (Bessbrook)
May 03 - 12 Dec 03/ 30 Mar 04, LDY

GDS Indep Para Coy
13 Jun 69 - 27 Dec 69,
11 Feb 71 - 19 Jun 71,

1 RS
09 Mar 70 - 29 Jul 70, Belfast (4-17 Jul B
Coy 1 DERR att)
25 May 71 - 28 Jul 71, R(N) (Drumahoe)
17 Oct 81 - 29 Dec 71, Belfast (Ligoniel)
17 Jun 72 - 06 Aug 72, Belfast,
Londonderry
(Holywood/Moscow/Maidstone/Ft
George)
16 Dec 75 - 15 Apr 76, R(S) (Bessbrook)
16 Feb 80 - 29 May 80, Belfast
(Springfield/Falls)
01/06 Mar 81 - 24 Mar 83, BKL
18 Dec 87 - 29 Apr 88, BRB (Belfast)
24 Sep 92 - 27 Mar 93, ARB (Bessbrook)
Oct 95 - Mar 96, ARB (Bessbrook)
03 Jun 97 - 01 Dec 97, RRB (Omagh)
17 Mar 99 - Aug/ 16/17 Sep 99, ARB
(Armagh)
Sep/ 28 Aug 00 - 15 Apr 02, BKY

1 RHF
10 Feb 70 - 21 Jun 70, Londonderry
16 Feb 71 - 17 Jun 71, Belfast
(Shankill/New Lodge)
27 Feb 74 - 27 Jul 74, Belfast
(Andersonstown)
01 Jul 75 - 01 Nov 75, Belfast
(Ballymurphy/Springfield/Whiterock)
15 Dec 76 - 26 Apr 77, Bessbrook
01 Aug 80 - 09 Dec 80, R(S) (Armagh)
05 Mar 83 - 10 Mar 85, HWD
28 May 88 - 28 Sep 88, Lisnaskea
Incremental Roulement
Dec 91 - Feb 92, Op. Luff
15 May 97 - 15 Nov 97, BRB (Belfast)
22 Mar 01 - Sep 03, PRB

1 KOSB
04 May 70 - 10 Sep 70, Belfast
(Girdwood)

09 Jul 71 - 13 Jul 71, Belfast (July Marches)
28 Dec 71 - 26 Apr 72, Belfast (Springfield)
17 Nov 72 - 02 Mar 73, Belfast (Andersonstown)
15 May 75 - 15 Nov 76, HWD
26 Jun 79 - 22 Oct 79, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)
26 Mar 85 - 06 Aug 85, ARB (Bessbrook)
02 Feb 86 - 12 Apr 86, Op. Cara Cara
18 Oct 89 - 03 Mar 90, FRB (Fermanagh)
05 Apr 92 - Dec 94, PRB (Weeton)
14 Nov 95 - 14 May 96, BRB (Belfast)
16 Sep 97 - 16 Mar 98, ARB (Bessbrook)
16/17 Sep 01 - 17 Mar 02, ARB (Bessbrook/Crossmaglen/Newtownhamilton/Forkhill)
15 Jan 04 - Apr 06, OMA

1 BW
28 Jun 70 - 16 Jul 70, Belfast
08 Aug 70 - 19 Aug 70, Londonderry
09 Feb 71 - 25 Jun 71, R(S)
07 Oct 71 - Belfast (East Belfast)
26 Jun 74 - 24 Oct 74, Belfast (Monagh)
24 Jun 75 - 27 Oct 75, Belfast (Monagh)
18 Jul 76 - 25 Jan 78, BKL
21 Dec 82 - 03 May 83, Belfast (West Belfast)
17 Dec 85 - 27 Apr 86, ARB (Bessbrook)
20 Jul 89 - Aug 91, BKL
08 May 95 - 14 Nov 95, BRB (Belfast)
01 Dec 98 - May/ 03 Jun 99, RRB

1 QO HLDRS
21 Nov 71 - 22 Mar 72, Belfast (East Belfast)
28 Jul 72 - 06 Oct 72, R(S) (Dungannon)
04 Dec 73 - 04 Apr 74, B (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row)
27 Apr 78 - 27 Aug 78, R(S) (Armagh/Dungannon)
12 Jun 79 - 25 Oct 79, R(S) (Bessbrook)
11 Nov 83 - 15 Nov 85, Aldergrove Resident
01 Mar 90 - 17 Jul 90, BRB (Belfast)
04 Nov 92 - 06 May 93, BRB (Belfast)

1 HLDRS
Dec 94 - 13 Apr 95, PRB
Apr 95 - Apr 97, LDY
Sep 95 - Apr 97, ERB
03 Jun 98 - Nov/ 01 Dec 98, RRB
04 Jun 00 - 02 Dec 00, RRB (NIBAT 8 Bde)

1 GORDONS
02 May 72 - 06 Sep 72, R(S) (Armagh)
28 Feb 73 - 29 Jun 73, Belfast (Andersonstown)
15 Nov 76 - 20 May 78, HWD
06 Aug 79 - 06 Dec 79, R(S) (Armagh/Dungannon)
13 Feb 85 - 26 Jun 85, Belfast (West Belfast)
17 Jul 90 - 18 Dec 90, BRB (Belfast)

1 A and SH
28 Jul 72 - 28 Nov 72, R(S) (Bessbrook)
15 Mar 73 - 27 Mar 73, Belfast (HMS Maidstone (Border Poll))
12 Nov 73 - 24 Feb 74, Belfast (Shankill/Ardoyne)
11 Jul 75 - 13 Jul 75, Spearhead (July Marches, Tac HQx1 Coy)
02 Dec 75 - 02 Apr 76, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row)
28 Oct 77 - 27 Feb 78, B (Springfield/Falls)
05 Mar 80 - 05 Mar 82, BKY
12 Apr 86 - 28 Jul 86, Op. Cara Cara
18 Dec 90 - 11 May 91, BRB (Belfast)
Mar 92 - Mar/ Apr 92, Op. Luff
07 May 94 - 07/08 Nov 94, BRB (Belfast)
27 Feb 97 - Feb/ 31 Mar 99, PRB
23 Jan 00 - Apr/ 05 May 00, URB (NIBAT 39 Bde)
28 Mar 01 - Sep 03, HWD

1 QUEENS
17 Aug 69 - 13 Dec 69, Londonderry (HMS Sea Eagle)
16 Oct 72 - 16 Feb 73, Belfast (New Lodge/Unity)
16 Oct 73 - 14 Feb 74, Belfast (New Lodge/Unity)
23 May 74 - 04 Jun 74, Belfast (RUC Sunnyside)

04 Feb 75 - 29 May 75, Belfast (New Lodge/Ardoyne)
09 Jul 76 - 16 Nov 76, Londonderry (West of Foyle)
20 Jun 78 - 10 Oct 78, Belfast (Monagh)
25 Nov 82 - 22 Jan 85, OMA
03 Jun 87 - 14 Oct 87, ARB (Bessbrook)
23 Oct 89 - 01 Mar 90, BRB (Belfast)

2 QUEENS
03 Mar 69 - 25 Sep 70, HWD
05 Aug 71 - 17 Sep 71, Belfast (East Belfast)
29 Jul 72 - 29 Nov 72, Londonderry (Creggan)
27 Nov 73 - 28 Mar 74, Londonderry (Creggan)
07 Jan 76 - 14 Jan 76, R(S) (South Armagh (Spearhead, 2xCoy, Whitecross murders))
01 Apr 80 - 01 Aug 80, R(S) (Armagh)
25 Jan 83 - 28 Nov 84, ERB
29 Apr 88 - 08 Sep 88, BRB (Belfast)
Jan 92 - Feb 92, Op. Gypsy

3 QUEENS
20 Apr 70 - 22 Dec 71, BKL
30 Mar 72 - 06 Apr 72, Belfast
06 Aug 72 - 29 Aug 72, Londonderry (Creggan)
27 Oct 75 - 27 Feb 76, Belfast (Monagh)
07 Mar 79 - 05 Jul 79, R(S) (Bessbrook)
02 Feb 87 - 30 May 87, Op. Cara Cara
07 Feb 88 - 15/16 Mar 90, Aldergrove Resident

1 R HAMPS
19 Aug 69 - 28 Nov 69, Belfast
27 Nov 72 - 27 Mar 73, R(S) (Bessbrook)
04 Sep 73 - 03 Jan 74, R(S) (Armagh)
27 Mar 76 - 04 Oct 77, BKY
07 May 79 - 13 Jul 79, Londonderry (West of Foyle)
04 Jan 82 - 17 May 82, R(S) (Fermanagh)
21 Jan 87 - 03 Jun 87, ARB (Bessbrook)
12 Mar 89 - Apr 91, BKY

1 PWRR
10 Sep 93 - Sep 95, OMA

15 Nov 97 - Apr/ 15 May 98, BRB (Belfast)

2 PWRR
20 Nov 93 - 29 May 94, FRB (Enniskillen)
Sep 95 - Sep/ 27 Aug 97, OMA
14 Nov 98 - Apr/14/15 May 99, BRB (Belfast)
14/15 Jun 03 - 14/15 Dec 03, ETB (NIBAT 2)
01 Dec 05 - Mar 08, BKY

1 RRF
16 Jun 70 - 22 Oct 70, Belfast (Shankill/Lower Falls)
05 Feb 71 - 25 Feb 71, Belfast (Holywood)
19 Jun 71 - 21 Jun 71, Belfast (Long Kesh)
11 Aug 71 - 19 Aug 71, Belfast (Ballymurphy)
01 Sep 73 - 05 Mar 75, ERB
02 Mar 76 - 19 Jun 76, Belfast (Springfield/Whiterock/Ballymurphy)
02 May 77 - 12 Jun 77, Spearhead
11 Oct 80 - 25 Feb 81, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)
10 Jan 84 - 04 Feb 86, BKY
20/30 Nov 88 - 12 Apr 89, ARB (Bessbrook)
Jun 91 - Jun 91, Op. Aladdin
Sep 91 - Oct 91, Op. Bronski
Apr 97 - Apr/ 12 May 99, LDY
16/17 Mar 00 - Aug/ 16 Sep 00, ARB (Armagh)

2 RRF
19 Oct 71 - 15 Feb 72, Belfast (New Lodge/Unity)
11 Jul 72 - 10 Nov 72, Belfast (Suffolk)
01 Mar 73 - 23 Mar 73, Belfast (Carnmoney)
26 Jun 73 - 30 Oct 73, Belfast (Monagh)
24 Oct 74 - 25 Feb 75, Belfast (Monagh)
25 Jun 76 - 26 Oct 76, R(S) (Armagh)
07 Jul 78 - 07 Nov 78, Londonderry
06/16 Nov 79 - 06 Apr 81, HWD
Aug 91 - 18 Feb 94, BKL
14 Dec 01 - 14/15 Jun 02, ETB
15 Apr 03 - 15 Aug 03, BRB
Sep 03 - Dec 05, HWD

3 RRF
27 Jan 72 - 22 May 72, R(S) (Dungannon)
13 Jul 72 - 02 Sep 72, Londonderry (Bogside)
05 Jan 73 - 03 May 73, R(S) (Armagh)
03 Jan 74 - 03 May 74, R(S) (Armagh)
16 Aug 75 - 16 Dec 75, R(S) (Bessbrook)
09 Mar 76 - 06 Apr 76, R (Armagh, Spearhead)
20 Oct 88 - 21 Feb 78, Belfast (Monagh)
07 Nov 79 - 06 Mar 80, Londonderry (West of Foyle)
06 Apr 81 - 05 Mar 83, HWD
06 Aug 85 - 17 Dec 85, ARB (Bessbrook)

1 R ANGLIAN
23 Jul 70 - 10 Mar 72, ERB (Enclave/Creggan/Shantallow)
01 Sep 74 - 16 Dec 74, R(S) (Portadown)
13 May 79 - 15 Sep 79, Belfast (Ardoyne/City Centre)
25 Aug 81 - 04 Jan 82, R(S) (Fermanagh)
30 Nov 84 - 15 Jun 87, ERB
28 Aug 89 - 10 Jan 90, ARB (Bessbrook)
28/29 Dec 93 - 27 Jun 94, ETB (Dungannon)
15 Nov 96 - Mar/15 May 97, BRB (Belfast)
12 May 99 - 11 May 01, LDY

2 R ANGLIAN
20 Oct 70 - 11 Feb 71, Belfast
02 Aug 72 - 06 Dec 72, Belfast (Hastings St)
26 Jul 73 - 27 Nov 73, Londonderry (South Enclave/Creggan)
05 Aug 75 - 02 Dec 75, Belfast (Hastings St)
16 Mar 77 - 28 Jun 77, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)
27 Jan 81 - 27 Jan 83, ERB
01 Jan 86 - 02 Mar 86, Op. Cara Cara
27 Apr 86 - 10 Sep 86, ARB (Bessbrook)
29 Jan 89 - 09 Jun 89, BRB (Belfast)
30 Dec 92 - 05 Jul 83, ETB (Dungannon)
15 Nov 00 - 19 Jun 01, BRB (Belfast)
03/04 Jun 02 - 01/02 Dec 02, RRB
17 Feb 04 - 01 Dec 05, BKY

3 R ANGLIAN
12 Apr 72 - 03 Aug 72, Belfast (Hastings St)
26 Mar 73 - 26 Jul 73, Londonderry (South Enclave/Creggan)
20 Nov 74 - 19 Mar 75, Londonderry (Enclave/Creggan/Shantallow)
20 May 78 - 16 Nov 79, HWD
12 Nov 86 - 25 Mar 87, BRB (Belfast)
Apr 91 - Aug 92/Apr 93, LDY

4 R ANGLIAN
Tiger Pl, 09 Feb 71 - 24 Feb 71,
Tiger Coy, 06 Mar 74 - 03 Jul 74, R(S) (Portadown)

1 KINGS OWN BORDER
10 Mar 71 - 31 Mar 71, R(S)
11 Nov 72 - 05 Jul 73, BKL
04 Dec 74 - 04 Apr 75, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row/Unity/Shankill)
17 Jun 76 - 20 Oct 76, Belfast (Springfield)
12 Sep 78 - 14 Jan 79, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge/City Centre/Markets)
29 Feb 80 - 17 Jun 80, R(S) (Bessbrook)
10 Mar 85 - 12 Feb 87, HWD
24 Apr 87 - 12 May 87, S Armagh (1xCoy)
25 Apr 89 - 06 Sep 89, Op. Fondant
Aug 92 - Apr 95, Ebrington

1 KINGS
01 Sep 70 - 05 Jan 71, Belfast (Girdwood/City Centre)
25 Apr 72 - 23 Aug 72, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)
05 Mar 75 - 17 Sep 76, ERB
27 Feb 79 - 26 Jun 79, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)
D Coy, 16 Nov 81 - 05 Feb 82, Maze Gd Gp
11 Jun 84 - 05 Oct 84, BRB (Belfast)
25 May 87 - 26 Sep 87, Omagh
09 Feb 90 - Mar 92, BKY
1 Apr 95 - Oct 95, ARB (Bessbrook)
31 Mar 99 - 22 Mar 01, PRB (Weeton)

1 PWO
24 Apr 69 - 21 Aug 69, Ballykinler
23/25 May 72 - 30 Nov 73, HWD
09 Jul 75 - 11 Nov 75, Londonderry
(Creggan/Shantallow Enclave)
17 Mar 77 - 13 Jul 77, Londonderry (West
of Foyle)
30 Apr 85 - 19 May 87, BKL
13 Nov 91 - 06/08 May 92, BRB (Belfast)
Jun 96 - Dec 96, ETB (Dungannon)
01 Dec 97 - May/03 Jun 96, RRB
(Omagh)
14/15 Nov 99 - Apr/14/15 May00, BRB
(Belfast)
07 Dec 01 - 15 Jan 04, OMA

1 GREEN HOWARDS
30 Jun 70 - 03 Sep 70, Belfast
30 Jul 71 - 29 Nov 71, Belfast (Ardoyne)
05 Oct 72 - 24 Feb 73, Belfast (Suffolk)
27 Apr 74 - 29 Aug 74, R(S) (Portadown)
09 Apr 75 - 15 Aug 75, R(S) (Bessbrook)
05 Apr 76 - 05 May 76, R (Spearhead)
12 Aug 78 - 20 Mar 80, Aldergrove
Resident
03/26 Jun 85 - 05 Nov 85, Belfast (West
Belfast)
20 Jan 87 - 27 Mar 89, ERB
Jun 91 - Jul 91, Op. Clifford
10/20 Jul 92 - 09 Oct 92, DRB (Armagh)
09/14 Oct 92 - 19 Jan 93, GRB (Belfast)
08 Dec 94 - Jun 95, ETB (Dungannon)
14/15 May 99 - Oct/14/15 Nov 99, BRB
(Belfast)
15 Apr 02 - 17 Feb 04, BKY

1 QLR
19 May 70 - 18 Sep 70,
Armagh/Fermanagh/E Tyrone/Co Down
29 Nov 71 - 29 Mar 72, Belfast (Ardoyne)
04 Dec 72 - 04 Apr 73, Belfast (Hastings
St)
10 Jan 75 - 18 Jul 76, BKL
05 Aug 77 - 09 Dec 77, R(S) (Bessbrook)
30 Oct 80 - 13 Mar 81, R(S) (Bessbrook)
25 Mar 87 - 30 Jul 87, BRB (Belfast)
22 Sep 90 - 05 Apr 92, PRB (Weeton)
Sep/27 Aug 97 - Nov/03 Dec 99, OMA
16 Mar 01 - 16/17 Sep 01, ARB
(Catterick)

1 DWR
15 Jun 71 - 21 Oct 71, Belfast (New
Lodge/Unity)
28 Apr 72 - 29 Jul 72, R(S) (Bessbrook)
10 Mar 73 - 26 Sep 74, BKY
08 Jan 76 - 09 Mar 76, R(S) (Armagh
(Spearhead, 2xCoy, 2 QUEENS att))
09 Jul 77 - 09 Nov 77, Londonderry (West
of Foyle)
23 Oct 79 - 16 Feb 80, Belfast
(Springfield/Falls)
11 Dec 81 - 24 Apr 82, Bessbrook
12 Feb 87 - 24 Feb 89, HWD
13 Apr 95 - 27 Feb 97, PRB

1 R IRISH
21 Sep 88 - 05 Feb 89, Lisnaskea
Incremental Roulement
Feb 96 - Jun 96, RRB (Omagh)
14 Dec 97 - 14 Jun 98, ETB (Dungannon)
14 Jun 01 - 14 Dec 01, ETB
(Dungannon/Rear Based (Canterbury))
Sep 03 - 01 Sep 04, PRB

2 R IRISH
12 Jun 90 - 12 Dec 90, FRB (Fermanagh)

1 D and D
26 Jul 70 - 26 Aug 70, Belfast
18 Jan 72 - 02 May 72, R(S) (Armagh)
30 Oct 73 - 31 Mar 74, Belfast (Monagh)
20 Jan 77 - 13 May 77, Belfast
(Ardoyne/New Lodge)
13 Jan 79 - 13 May 79, Belfast
(Ardoyne/City Centre)
26 Jul 81 - 11 Dec 81, R(S) (Bessbrook)
24 Mar 83 - 30 Apr 85, BKL
12 Apr 89 - 28 Aug 89, ARB (Bessbrook)
06 May 93 - 06 Nov 93, BRB (Belfast)
Dec 96 - 3 Jun 97, RRB (Omagh)
16 Sep 00 - 16 Mar 01, ARB (Armagh)
09 Apr 02 - 31 Mar 04, BKY
30 Mar 04 - 16 Jul 04, LDY

1 CHESHIRE
31 Mar 70 - 01 Aug 70, Londonderry
22 Feb 73 - 24 Jun 73, Belfast
(Suffolk/Dunmurry/Lisburn)
27 Mar 74 - 25 Jul 74, Belfast
(Ballymurphy/Springfield/Whiterock)

15 Mar 76 - 09 Jul 76, Londonderry (West of Foyle)
13 Mar 78 - 13 Jul 78, Londonderry (West of Foyle)
05 Mar 82 - 10 Jan 84, BKY
25 May 90 - 19 Oct 90, ARB (Bessbrook)
Mar 91 - Apr 91, Emergency Tour
30 Nov 94 - May 95, FRB (Enniskillen)
Jul 96 - Jul/31 Aug 98, BKY
03 Jun 99 - Nov/02 Dec 99, RRB (NIBAT 8 Bde)
14/15 Jun 02 - 14/15 Dec 02, ETB
Aug 05 - Apr 07, BKL

1 RWF
06 Mar 72 - 08 Sep 73, ERB
17 Oct 74 - 27 Oct 74, Belfast, R(S) (Long Kesh (A Coy 26 Oct - 08 Nov))
28 Feb 75 - 02 Jul 95, Belfast (Ballymurphy/Springfield/Whiterock)
20 Oct 76 - 20 Feb 77, B (Monagh)
01 May 77 - 19 May 77, Belfast
07 Nov 78 - 07 Mar 79, Londonderry (West of Foyle)
26 Feb 81 - 08 Jul 81, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)
15 Jun 86 - 28 Sep 86, Op. Cara Cara
18/19 May 87 - 20 Jul 89, BKL
22 May 93 - 20 Nov 93, FRB (Fermanagh)
Dec 96 - Jul 97, ETB (Dungannon)
Aug 98 - 28 Aug 00, BKY
04 Jun 01 - Dec 01, RRB

1 RRW
28 Jul 69 - 11 Sep 69, R(S)
20 Oct 70 - 18 Feb 71, Belfast (Hastings St)
27 Mar 72 - 28 Jul 72, Belfast (Ardoyne)
30 Nov 73 - 15 May 75, HWD
29 Dec 78 - 26 Apr 79, R(S) (Armagh/Dungannon)
06 May 81 - 08 Jun 81, Belfast (Spearhead)
18 Sep 86 - 03 Feb 84, Belfast (West Belfast)
06 Sep 86 - 31 Jan 87, Op. Cara Cara
06 Sep 94 - Jul 96, BKY
14 Jun 98 - Nov/14 Dec 98, ETB
1 GLOSTERS
02 Dec 69 - 12 Apr 69, Londonderry

05 Jul 70 - 18 Jul 70, (1xCoy)
07 Dec 71 - 14 Apr 72, Belfast (Hastings St)
03 Apr 73 - 02 Aug 73, Belfast (Hastings St)
06 Aug 74 - 04 Dec 74, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row)
04 Oct 77 - 05 Mar 79, BKY
14 Mar 88 - 11 Feb 90, BKY
Dec 91 - Dec 91,

1 WFR
15 Mar 72 - 09 Jun 72, Londonderry (Drumahoe)
26 Sep 74 - 27 Mar 76, BKY
19 Apr 77 - 14 Aug 77, R(S) (Bessbrook)
11 Aug 82 - 21 Dec 82, Belfast (West Belfast)
20 Jan 89 - 15 Feb 91, Omagh Res
29 Mar 94 - 30 Sep 94, ARB (Armagh)
03 Dec 99 - 07 Dec 01, OMA
24 Apr 03 - 02 Dec 03, ARB (Armagh)

1 STAFFORDS
04 Sep 72 - 05 Jan 73, R(S) (Armagh)
24 Jul 74 - 21 Nov 74, Londonderry (West of Foyle)
03 Apr 76 - 02 Aug 76, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row)
07 Sep 79 - 25 Jan 81, ERB
18 Feb 84 - 02 Jul 84, ARB (Bessbrook)
09 May 92 - 16 Nov 92, FRB (Fermanagh)
18 Feb 94 - Feb 96, BKL
15 May 98 - 14/15 Nov 98, BRB
24 Apr 03 - 02 Dec 03, ARB

1 DERR
17 Aug 69 - 13 Dec 69, (1xCoy)
04 Jul 70 - 17 Jul 70, Belfast (B Coy att 1 RS)
22 Apr 71 - 28 May 71, Londonderry
05 Jul 73 - 10 Jan 75, BKL
09 Jul 79 - 08 Nov 79, Londonderry (West of Foyle)
05 Jun 83 - 06 Oct 83, R(S) (Bessbrook)
15 Nov 85 - 07 Feb 88, Aldergrove Resident
12 Dec 90 - 05 May 91, FRB (Fermanagh)
27 Mar 93 - 28 Sep 93, ARB (Bessbrook)

1 LI
21 Jan 68 - 24 Apr 70, BKL
23 Mar 71 - 31 Jul 71, Belfast (Ardoyne)
26 Jul 72 - 24 Nov 72, Belfast (Ardoyne)
16 Jul 73 - 16 Nov 73, R(S) (Bessbrook, Belfast)
20 May 74 - 04 Jun 74, Belfast (UWC Strike)
06 Sep 75 - 07 Oct 75, R(S) (South Armagh (Spearhead))
28 Jun 78 - 28 Oct 78, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)
02 May 83 - 19 Sep 83, Belfast (Springfield)
25 Nov 86 - 20 Jan 89, OMA
24/29 May 94 - 30 Nov 94, FRB (Enniskillen)
Jun 96 - Dec 96, RRB (Omagh)
15 Jun 00 - Nov/15 Dec 00, RRB

2 LI
13 Sep 69 - 17 Jan 70, Belfast
23 Jun 71 - 28 Oct 71, R(S) (Armagh/Dungannon)
05 Feb 72 - 10 Feb 72, R(S)
19 Jun 72 - 20 Oct 72, Londonderry (Fort George)
30 Mar 73 - 26 Jul 73, Belfast (Springfield/Clonard)
19 Mar 75 - 10 Jul 75, Londonderry (West of Foyle)
02 Aug 76 - 02 Dec 76, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row/Shankill)
25 Jan 78 - 27 Jul 79, BKL
25 Apr 82 - 07 Sep 82, R(S) (Bessbrook)
30 Jul 87 - 18 Dec 87, BRB (Belfast)
10 Jan 90 - 25 May 90, ARB (Bessbrook)
Nov 90 - Dec 90,
Sep 91 - Oct 91,
Feb/16 Mar 92 - Jul/24 Sep 92, ARB (Armagh)
05 Jul 93 - 28 Dec 93, ETB (Dungannon)
20 Jan 97 - Feb/22 Mar 99, HWD
02 Dec 99 - May/04 Jun 00, RRB (NIBAT 8 Bde)
01/16 Sep 04 - Dec 04/16 Mar 05, ARB

3 LI
15 Aug 69 - 15 Nov 69, Belfast
06 Feb 71 - 25 Mar 71, Belfast

23 Nov 72 - 11 Mar 73, Belfast (Aldergrove)
05 Apr 74 - 06 Aug 74, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row)
11 Nov 75 - 16 Mar 76, Londonderry (West of Foyle)
28 Jun 77 - 28 Oct 77, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)
11 Oct 82 - 13 Feb 83, R(S) (Fermanagh)
22 Jan 85 - 25 Nov 86, OMA
11 May 91 - 13 Nov 91, BRB (Resident)

1 RGJ
20 Aug 69 - 18 Dec 69, Belfast
04 May 71 - 10 Sep 71, Belfast (Hastings St)
30 Jul 72 - 19 Nov 73, Belfast (Andersonstown)
04 Aug 73 - 04 Dec 73, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row)
04 Apr 74 - 01 May 74, R(S) (2xCoy)
16 Dec 74 - 16 Apr 75, R(S) (Bessbrook)
18 May 77 - 20 Sep 77, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge)
13 Mar 81 - 27 Jul 81, R(S) (Bessbrook)
10 Nov 81 - 11 Nov 83, Aldergrove Resident
13 Mar 86 - 07 Jul 86,
15 Jul 87 - 19 Nov 87,
Jul 91 - Jan 92, DRB (Armagh)
22 Mar 99 - 28 Mar 01, HWD
15 May 02 - 30 Oct/01 Nov 02, BRB
24 Mar 04 - 15/16 Sep 04, ARB

2 RGJ
01 Jun 71 - 10 Mar 73, BKY
04 Apr 74 - 01 May 74, Armagh
01 Nov 74 - 28 Feb 75, Belfast (Ballymurphy/Springfield/Whiterock)
09 Dec 77 - 01 Apr 78, R(S) (Bessbrook)
26 Apr 79 - 06 Aug 79, R(S) (Armagh/Dungannon)
15 Nov 81 - 28 Mar 82, Belfast (West Belfast)
05 Nov 85 - 05 Mar 86, Belfast (West Belfast)
04 Feb 89 - 07 Jun 89, Lisnaskea Incremental Roulement
15 Feb 91 - 10 Sep 93, OMA (merged 1 RGJ in Sep 92)

Jun 95 - 20 Jan 97, HWD
31 Mar 04 - Aug 05, Ballykinler

3 RGJ
29 Jun 70 - 16 Jul 70, Belfast
11 Aug 71 - 09 Dec 71, (B Coy)
23 Aug 72 - 11 Dec 72, Belfast
(Springfield)
26 Jul 73 - 28 Nov 73, Belfast
(Springfield/Clonard/Beechmount)
25 Jul 74 - 01 Nov 74, B
(Ballymurphy/Springfield)
02 May 77 - 22 May 77, Belfast
16 Mar 78 - 01 Sep 79, ERB
05 Oct 84 - 13 Feb 85, Belfast (West
Belfast)
12 Sep 91 - 16 Mar 92, ARB (Bessbrook)

1 RGBW
16 Mar 98 - Aug/16 Sep 98, ARB
10 Apr 00 - 09 Apr 02, BKL
01/02 Dec 02 - 03/04 Jun 03, RRB

1 PARA
12 Oct 69 - 19 Feb 70, Belfast
25 Sep 70 - 25 Mar 72, Holywood
29 Jul 72 - 29 Nov 72, Belfast (Ardoyne)
08 Apr 78 - 15 Jul 78, R(S) (Bessbrook)
18 Nov 81 - 26 Jan 82, R(S)
(Armagh/Border)
17 May 82 - 02 Oct 82, R(S) (Fermanagh)
18 Jul 88 - 30 Nov 88, ARB (Bessbrook)
20 Feb 91 - 04 Jun 93, HWD
07/08 Nov 94 - 08 May 95, BRB (Belfast)
14 Jun 97 - 14/15 Dec 97, ETB
(Dungannon)
15 Dec 00 - 14 Jun 01, RRB
16 Mar 05 - Sep 05, ARB

2 PARA
28 Feb 70 - 24 Jun 70, Belfast
22 Apr 71 - 26 Aug 71, Londonderry,
Belfast (City/Enclave/Springfield)
15 Feb 72 - 15 Jun 72, Belfast
(Carnmoney/Unity)
29 Jul 72 - 28 Sep 72, Belfast (Springfield)
27 Mar 73 - 17 Jul 73, R(S) (Bessbrook)
29 May 75 - 27 Sep 75, Belfast (New
Lodge/Ardoyne)

02 Dec 76 - 16 Mar 77, Belfast
(Ballymurphy/Springfield/Whiterock)
19 Sep 77 - 14 Jan 78, NIPG only
27 Jul 79 - 06 Mar 81, BKL
12 Nov 84 - 26 Mar 85, ARB (Bessbrook)
03 Mar 90 - 12 Jun 90, FRB (Fermanagh)
04/05 Jun 93 - Jun 95, HWD
01 Oct 94 - 01 Apr 95, ARB (Bessbrook)
Aug 96 - Mar 97, ARB (Bessbrook)
14 Dec 98 - May/14 Jun 99, ETB
01 Dec 00 - 04 Jun 01, RRB (NIBAT 8
Bde)
17 Sep 02 - 24 Apr 03, ARB

3 PARA
19 Jan 71 - 03 Jun 71, Belfast, R(S) (Bulls
Tp, 1 Bty RHA att)
10 Mar 73 - 13 Jul 73, Belfast (Ardoyne)
24 Feb 74 - 21 Jun 74, Belfast
(Shankill/Ardoyne)
12 Nov 74 - 02 Dec 74, R(S) (Bessbrook)
07 Jun 75 - 17 Jun 75, Glenshane Pass
09 Sep 75 - 24 Oct 75, South Armagh
15 Apr 76 - 17 Aug 76, R(S) (Bessbrook)
21 Feb 78 - 20 Jun 78, Belfast (Monagh)
09 Dec 80 - 24 Apr 81, R(N) (Armagh)
24 Feb 89 - 20 Feb 91, HWD
Mar 92 - Mar 92, Op. Gypsy
21 Jul 97 - 21 Jan 98, URB (Girdwood,
Maze)
15 Dec 99 - May/15 Jun 00, ETB
01/02 Dec 01 - 03/04 Jun 02, RRB
14/15 May 04 - 01 Sep 04, BRB

40 Cdo RM
15 Jun 72 - 17 Oct 72, Belfast (Unity/New
Lodge)
14 Jun 73 - 17 Oct 73, Belfast (Unity/New
Lodge)
25 Feb 75 - 24 Jun 75, Belfast (Monagh)
17 Aug 76 - 16 Dec 76, R(S) (Bessbrook)
05 Mar 79 - 05 Mar 80, BKY
22 Jan 83 - 05 Jun 83, R(S) (Bessbrook)
23 Feb 88 - 18 Jul 83, ARB (Bessbrook)
06/07 Nov 93 - 07 May 94, BRB (Belfast)
Dec 95 - Jun 96, ETB (Dungannon)
14/15 May 00 - Oct/15 Nov 00, BRB
(Belfast)

41 Cdo RM
29 Sep 69 - 13 Nov 69, Belfast
02 Sep 70 - 13 Nov 70, Belfast
27 Feb 78 - 28 Jun 78, Belfast
(Spring/Falls)
17 Jun 80 - 30 Oct 80, R(S) (Bessbrook)

42 Cdo RM
28 Oct 71 - 18 Jan 72, R(S) (Armagh)
28 Jul 72 - 01 Sep 72, Belfast (East Belfast
(8 Cdo Lt Bty att))
15 Feb 73 - 14 Jun 73, Belfast (New
Lodge/Unity (8 Cdo Lt Bty att))
14 Feb 74 - 13 Jun 74, Belfast (New
Lodge/Unity)
05 Oct 74 - 13 Oct 74, R(S)
(Portadown/Newry/Bessbrook)
07 Oct 75 - 13 Oct 75, R(S) (Armagh
(Spearhead))
27 Feb 76 - 22 Jun 76, Belfast
(Monagh/Andersonstown)
15 Jul 78 - 15 Nov 78, R(S) (Bessbrook)
02 Jul 84 - 12 Nov 84, ARB (Bessbrook)
28 May 87 - 19 Jul 87, Spearhead
09 Jun 89 - 23 Oct 89, BRB (Belfast)
Nov 91 - 09 May 92, FRB (Fermanagh)
01 Oct 94 - 01 Apr 95, ARB (Armagh)
16 Sep 98 - Feb/17 March 99, ARB
(Armagh)
17 Mar 02 - 17 Sep 02, ARB

45 Cdo RM
29 May 70 - 03 Sep 70, Belfast (145 Cdo
Lt Bty att)
10 Aug 71 - 01 Sep 71, Belfast,
Londonderry, R(NI) (145 Cdo Lt Bty att)
17 Oct 71 - 16 Feb 72, Belfast
(Carnmoney)
10 Jul 72 - 28 Jul 72, Belfast (Condor Tp,
59 Indep Cdo Sqn RE att)
02 Jul 74 - 05 Nov 74, R(S) (Bessbrook
(145 Cdo Lt Bty att))
21 Jun 77 - 20 Oct 77, Belfast (Monagh
(Condor Tp, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn RE att))
04 Aug 78 - 30 Aug 78, Spearhead
07 Jul 81 - 15 Nov 81, B
(Springfield/Falls)
04 Jul 86 - 12 Nov 86, BRB (Belfast)
08 Oct 90 - 12 Mar 91, ARB (Bessbrook)
May 95 - Nov 95, ETB (Dungannon)

14/15 Dec 03 - 14/15 Jun 04, ETB

1 KORBR
15 Jun 04 - 01 Sep 04, ETB
01 Sep 04 - 26 Jan 04, PRB

RA UNITS
1 RHA
Regt, 12 Nov 69 - 14 Mar 70, Belfast (City
Centre)
Regt, 12 Sep 72 - 12 Jan 73, R (S) (Long
Kesh)
Regt, 07 Mar 74 - 04 Jul 74, Belfast (City
Centre)
Regt, 03 Mar 76 - 09 Jun 76, Belfast
(Grand Central/City Centre)
2xTps, 31 Mar 78 - 29 Jul 78, R(S)
(Lurgan/Maze (att 7 RHA))

3 RHA
Regt, 07 Sep 70 - 21 Jan 71, R(S)
Regt, 01 Jul 71 - 15 Jul 71, R(S)
Regt, 21 Jul 71 - 17 Aug 71, Ballykelly
Regt, 28 Dec 71 - 27 Apr 72, Belfast (East
Belfast/Andersonstown/Lower Falls)
Regt, 01 Sep 72 - 16 Nov 72, Londonderry
(Victoria RUC Stn/Bogside)
Regt, 24 Jan 76 - 25 May 76, Belfast
(North Queen St)
M Bty, 25 Mar 80 - 18 Jul 80,
Lorgan/Maze (att 16/5 L)
Regt, 9 Oct 82 - 09 Apr 93, DRB
Oct 96 - Mar 97, DRB

7 RHA
F/G Bty, 07 Sep 70 - 21 Jan 71, Omagh
(att 17/21 L)
Regt, 15 Feb 72 - 19 Jun 72, Belfast
(Ligoniel (Gds Para Coy, 3 Div Airhead
Ord Coy & 58 Lt AD Bty att))
Regt, 08 Nov 72 - 11 Mar 73, Belfast (City
Centre)
Regt, 07 Mar 74 - 02 Jul 74, R
(Bessbrook)
Regt, 28 Mar 78 - 28 Jul 78, R(S)
(Lurgan/Maze/Portadown (37 Loc Bty &
2xTp 1 RHA att))
C Bty, 10 Apr 81 - 25 Aug 81,
Armagh/Fermanagh (att 5 INNIS DG)

Regt, 06 Jan 80 - Oct 80, R (Bessbrook)
Jul 99 - Dec 99, URB (NIBAT 39 Bde)

2 Fd Regt
Regt, 16 Mar 72 - 21 Jul 72, Belfast
(Lisburn/Dunmurry/Andersonstown)
Regt, 04 Sep 73 - 03 Jan 74, R(S) (Long
Kesh)
Regt, 06 Jul 75 - 06 Nov 75, Londonderry
(Bogside/City Centre)
Regt, 29 Mar 77 - 28 Jul 77, R(S)
(Lurgan/Maze/Portadown)
Regt, 19 Jan 93 - 21 Jul 93, GRB (Belfast
(retitled 2 Regt RA))

4 Fd Regt
4 Lt Regt, 01 Aug 71 - 09 Nov 71,
Regt, 09 May 72 - 14 Sep 72, R(S) (Long
Kesh)
Regt, 13 Jun 74 - 11 Oct 74, Belfast
(Unit/New lodge/Ardoyne (T Lt AD Bty
att))
Regt, 25 May 76 - 24 Sep 76, Belfast
(Ardoyne/New Lodge (42 Lt AD Bty att))
29 Fd Bty, 10 Apr 81 - 25 Jun 81, Maze
(Gd Gp)
Regt, Jan 91 - Jul 91, TRB (Tyrone)
Regt, 21 Jan 94 - 20 Jul 94, GRB
(Belfast)
03/04 Jun 03 - Dec 03, RRB

5 Regt RA
5 Lt Regt, 04 Apr 70 - 27 Aug 70,
Londonderry, R(N) (1 Lt Bty att)
20 Mar 71 - 26 Apr 71, Londonderry,
R(N) (1 Lt Bty att)
16 Aug 71 - 14 Sep 71, Londonderry,
R(N) - Ballykelly
5 Fd Regt, 06 Mar 75 - 06 Jul 75,
Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre (Unit
retitled))
5 Hy Regt, 27 Sep 77 - 24 Jan 78, R(S)
Armagh (Unit retitled)
15 May 80 - 28 Sep 80, Belfast
(Ardoyne/City Centre (Elms 94 Loc Regt
att))
12 Oct 94 - Apr 95, DRB (Armagh)

12 AD Regt
12 Lt Ad Regt, 25 Nov 71 - 17 Mar 71,
Belfast
(Lisburn/Dunmurry/Andersonstown)
12 AD Regt, 26 Jan 77 - 24 May 77, R(S)
(Armagh/Cookstown (Unit retitled))
27 Nov 79 - 27 Mar 80, R(S)
(Lurgan/Maze/Portadown)
14 Aug 88 - 18 Dec 88,
Apr 98 - Sep 98, DRB
Oct 99 - Mar 00, DRB (NIBAT 3 Bde)
14 Nov 03 - 14/15 May 04, BRB

16 Regt RA
16 Lt AD Regt, 28 Jun 70 - 28 Oct 70,
Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)
14 Nov 72 - 17 Mar 72, Londonderry
(Bogside/City Centre)
15 Mar 74 - 15 Jul 74, Londonderry
(Bogside/City Centre)
29 Jun 76 - 24 Sep 76, R(S)
(Armagh/Dungammon (Unit retitled))
16 AD Regt, 06 Dec 79 - 01 Apr 90, TRB
16 Regt - 32 Bty, 20 Jul 93 - 21 Oct 93,
DRB
Oct 98 - Mar 99,

13 Fd Regt RA
19 Jul 72 - 16 Nov 72, Belfast (Musgrave
Pk)
08 Nov 73 - 07 Mar 74, Belfast (City
Centre/Markets)
14 Jul 80 - 24 Nov 80, R(S)
(Fermanagh/Maze)
Jan 88 - May 88, Q Loc Bty att

20 Med Regt
07 Jun 72 - 11 Oct 72, Londonderry
(Drumahoe)
23 Jun 73 - 26 Oct 73, Londonderry
(Shantallow/North Enclave)
21 Jun 74 - 20 Sep 74, Belfast
(Shankill/Ardoyne)
May 97 - Sep 97, DRB

22 Regt RA
22 Lt AD Regt, 21 Nov 71 - 18 Mar 72,
Londonderry, R(N) (Drumahoe (15 Msl
Bty att))

15 Mar 73 - 17 Jul 73, Londonderry
(Bogside/City Centre)
05 Nov 74 - 05 Mar 75, Londonderry
(Bogside/City Centre)
42 AD Bty, 25 May 76 - 24 Sep 76,
Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge (att 4 Fd
Regt))
22 AD Regt, 28 Nov 78 - 28 Mar 79, R(S)
(Maze/Lurgan (Unit retitled))
29 Sep 87 - 31 Jan 88,
22 Regt, 09 Apr 93 - 07 Oct 93, DRB
(Armagh)
Apr 97 - Nov 97, DRB (Armagh)

25 Fd Regt RA
25 Lt Regt, 25 Jul 71 - 26 Nov 71, Belfast
(Lisburn/Andersonstown)
19 Oct 72 - 28 Feb 73, Londonderry (Fort
George)
25 Fd Regt, 03 Jul 75 - 03 Nov 75, Belfast
(City Centre/Markets (Unit retitled))
10 Feb 77 - 09 Jun 77, Belfast (City
Centre/Markets)
16 Sep 79 - 14 Jan 80, Belfast
(Ardoyne/City Centre)

26 Regt RA
26 Fd Regt, 07 Aug 75 - 05 Dec 75, R(S)
(Long Kesh/Portadown/Lurgan)
30 Nov 77 - 30 Mar 78, R(S)
(Lurgan/Maze/Portadown)
18 Nov 87 - 08 Apr 88, (156 Loc Bty att)
26 Regt, 07 Oct 93 - 12 Oct 94, DRB
(Armagh)

27 Fd Regt
27 Med Regt, 08 Sep 71 - 13 Jan 72, R(S)
(Enniskillen (50 Msl Bty att))
11 Apr 75 - 02 Aug 75, R(S) (Long
Kesh/Portadown/Lurgan)
27 Fd Regt, 29 Jul 77 - 30 Nov 77, R(S)
(Lurgan/Maze/Portadown (Unit retitled))
14 Jan 80 -16 May 80, Belfast
(Ardoyne/City)
21 Feb 87 - 31 May 87,
Dec 91 - Dec 91,

32 Regt RA
32 Lt Regt, 05 Jan 71 - 06 May 71, Belfast
(57 & 156 Loc Bty att)

02 May 73 - 04 Sep 73, R(S) (Long Kesh)
09 Oct 74 - 04 Feb 75, Belfast
(Ardoyne/New Lodge (32 Fd Sqn RE att))
24 Sep 76 - 20 Jan 77, Belfast
(Ardoyne/New Lodge)
16 Dec 88 - 27 Apr 89,
32 Regt RA, 13 Apr 94 - 12 Oct 94, DRB
(Armagh)
Jan 99 - Jun 99, URB

36 Hy AD Regt
27 Mar 73 - 31 Jul 73, Belfast (East
Belfast)
27 Nov 76 - 29 Mar 77, R(S) (Maze)

39 Fd Regt RA
39 Med Regt, 27 Oct 73 - 27 Feb 74,
Londonderry (Shantallow/North Enclave)
05 Dec 75 - 06 Apr 76, R(S)
(Aughnacloy/Maze/Lurgan)
39 Fd Regt, 12 Jan 78 - 11 May 78,
Ardoyne/New Lodge (Unit retitled)
24 Nov 80 - 11 Apr 81, R(S)
(Fermanagh/Maze)
Jul 98 - Dec 98, URB
Apr 00 - Sep 00, DRB
01 Nov 02 - 15 Apr 03, BRB
15 Aug 03 - 14 Nov 03, BRB

40 Fd Regt
23 Feb 73 - 24 Jun 73, Londonderry &
Belfast (Fort George/Ballymurphy)
O3 Mar 75 - 03 Jul 75, Belfast (City
Centre/Markets)
Jan 95 - Apr 95, URB (Girdwood)

42 Hy Regt
04 Apr 70 - 04 May 70, Belfast
26 Sep 70 - 14 Dec 70, Londonderry, R(N)
06 Jul 71 - 16 Jul 71, Belfast
08 Aug 71 - 31 Aug 71, R(S) (Ballykinler)
10 Jul 73 - 08 Nov 73, Belfast (City
Centre/Markets)
06 Nov 75 - 09 Mar 76, Londonderry
(Bogside/City Centre)

45 Fd Regt RA
45 Med Regt, 26 Jul 71 - 25 Nov 71,
Londonderry, R(N) - Drumahoe (H Hy
Bty att)

03 Jul 74 - 06 Nov 74, Belfast (City Centre/Ballymacarratt)
09 Jun 76 - 10 Oct 76, Belfast (City Centre/Ballymacarratt)
45 Fd Regt, 26 Jul 79 - 27 Nov 79, R(S) (Lurgan/Maze/Portadown (Unit retitled))
07 Apr 88 - 15 Aug 88, less 52 Fd Bty, 32 AD Bty att
21 Feb 92 - 20 Jul 92, DRB

47 Regt RA
47 Lt Regt, 16 Jul 73 - 15 Nov 73, R(N) (Bogside/City Centre/Brandywell)
27 Sep 75 - 24 Jan 76, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge (79 Cdo Lt Bty att))
47 Fd Regt, 10 Oct 77 - 12 Feb 78, Belfast (City Centre/Markets (Unit retitled))
4 Fd Bty, 06 Jan 90 - 13 May 90, Aug 96 - Jan 97, URB (Girdwood)

49 Fd Regt
10 Mar 73 - 14 Jul 73, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)
04 Nov 74 - 04 Mar 75, Belfast (City Centre/Unity/Markets)
11 Oct 76 - 11 Feb 77, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)
11 May 78 - 12 Sep 78, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge)

94 Loc Regt
15 Nov 73 - 14 Mar 74, Londonderry (Bogside/City)
73 Bty, 26 Aug 76 - 29 Dec 76, Aldergrove - R Div Sqn (normally RAC role)
152/156 Bty, 16 May 80 - 28 Sep 80, Belfast (Ardoyne/City Centre (att 5 Hy Regt))

RA UNITS (MISCELLANEOUS)
C Atk Bty RHA, 10 Mar 81 - 25 Aug 81, Fermanagh/Aughnacloy (Att 5 INNIS DG)
H Hy Bty, 27 Jul 71 - 28 Nov 71, Att 45 Med Regt
1 Bty RHA - Bulls Tp, 08 Feb 71 - 04 Jul 71, Att 3 PARA
M Bty RHA, 27 Mar 80 - 14 Jul 80, Lurgan/Maze (Att 16/5 L)

T Lt AD Bty, 12 Jun 74 - 23 Oct 74, Belfast (Unity/New Lodge/Ardoyne (Att 4 Fd Regt))
1 Lt Bty, 17 Apr 70 - 23 Aug 70, Att 5 Lt Regt
3 Lt Bty, 28 Jun 70 - 05 Aug 70, Att 16 Lt AD Regt
4 Lt Bty, 06 Nov 69 - 09 Feb 70, Omagh/Armagh (Att 33 Wg RAF Regt)
5 Lt Bty, 03 Apr 70 - 06 May 70, Att 42 Med Regt
7 Cdo Lt Bty, 14 Jul 72 - 17 Oct 72, Belfast (Unity/New Lodge (Att 40 Cdo RM))
7 Cdo Lt Bty, 06 Jun 73 - 17 Oct 73, Att 40 Cdo RM
8 Cdo Lt Bty, 26 Oct 71 - 19 Jan 72, R(S) (Omagh (Att 16/5 L))
8 Cdo Lt Bty, 09 Aug 72 - 09 Sep 72, Belfast (East Belfast (Att 42 Cdo RM))
13 Fd Bty, 15 Jul 80 - 24 Nov 80, Att 42 Cdo RM
15 Msl Bty, 25 Nov 71 - 23 Mar 72, Londonderry, R(N) (Drumahoe (Att 22 Lt Ad Regt))
15 Msl Bty, Nov 91 - Jan 92,
31 Lt Bty, 15 Nov 69 - 12 Mar 70, Att 1 RHA
51 Mst Bty, 07 Sep 71 - 13 Jan 72, Att 27 Med Regt
57 Loc Bty, 05 Jan 71 - 06 May 71, Belfast (Att 32 Hy Regt)
57 Loc Bty, 31 Mar 78 - 29 Jul 78, Maze (Att 7 RHA)
58 Lt AD Bty, 07 Nov 72 - 09 Mar 73, Att 7 RHA
79 Cdo Lt Bty, 27 Sep 75 - 24 Jan 76, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge (Att 47 Lt Regt))
145 Cdo Lt Bty, 01 Jun 70 - 01 Sep 70, Belfast (Att 45 Cdo RM)
145 Cdo Lt Bty, 10 Aug 71 - 01 Sep 71, Belfast, Londonderry, R(N) (Att 45 Cdo RM)
145 Cdo Lt Bty, 17 Oct 71 - 18 Feb 72, Belfast (Carnmoney (Att 45 Cdo RM))
145 Cdo Lt Bty, 04 Jul 74 - 04 Nov 74, R(S) (Bessbrook (Att 45 Cdo RM))
156 Loc Bty, 05 Jan 71 - 06 May 71, Belfast (Att 32 Lt Regt)

156 Loc Bty, 18 Nov 87 - 08 Apr 88, Att
26 Fd Regt

**HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY AND RAC
UNITS**
LG
B Sqn, 17 Aug 69 - 28 Nov 69,
C Sqn, 29 Jun 70 - 03 Sep 70,
Tac HQ, B Sqn, 04 Jul 70 - 03 Sep 70,
Aldergrove
APC Sqn, 15 Aug 71 - 12 Sep 71, With
RH
Regt, 24 Jul 72 - 01 Dec 72, Belfast (E
Belfast (Inf role))
Regt, 01 May 74 - 11 Sep 74, R(S)
(Armagh (Recce Gp RAC 2 Sqns))
B Sqn, 30 Dec 75 - 29 Apr 76, Aldergrove
B Sqn, 28 Apr 77 - 02 Sep 77, Dungannon
A Sqn, 02 Sep 77 - 04 Jan 78, Dungannon
C Sqn, 03 Jan 78 - 27 Apr 78,
Londonderry

RHG/D
A Sqn, 15 Apr 71 - 04 Aug 71, Aldergrove
B Sqn, 09 Nov 71 - 17 Mar 71, Aldergrove
A Sqn, 16 Mar 72 - 03 Jul 72, Aldergrove
B Sqn, 14 Jul 72 - 21 Sep 72, R(N)
(Drumahoe)
C Sqn, 01 Nov 73 - 28 Feb 74, Aldergrove
B Sqn, 27 Feb 74 - 19 Jun 74, Aldergrove
A Sqn, 19 Jun 74 - 31 Aug 74, Aldergrove
C Sqn, 29 Apr 75 - 28 Aug 75, Aldergrove
Regt, 29 Dec 76 - 28 Apr 77, Londonderry
(Shantallow/Enclave (2 Sqn Gp))
Regt, 02 Feb 79 - 05 Jun 79, B Div -
Monagh

QDG
Regt, 27 Feb 74 - 31 May 74, Londonderry
(Shantallow/Enclave)
Regt, 04 Jan 76 - 05 May 76, R(S)
(Armagh/Dungannon (Recce Gp RAC))
3 Tp, A Sqn, 03 Nov 78 - 14 Jan 79,
Omagh (att 13/18 H)
2 Tp, A Sqn, 12 Oct 78 - 02 Feb 79,
Monagh (att 14/20 H)
5 Tp, A Sqn, 13 May 79 - 16 Sep 79,
Omagh (att 2 RTR)

4 Tp, A Sqn, 07 Nov 79 - 08 Mar 80,
Omagh (att 2 RTR)
Regt, 17 Nov 80 - 24 Nov 82, R(S)
(OMA)
Regt, 21 Jan 98 - Jun 98, URB (Maze)
Regt, 14/15 Mar 04 - 16 Jul 04, RRB

SCOTS DG
B Sqn, 06 Jul 70 - 17 Nov 70, Omagh
C Sqn, 05 Feb 71 - 24 Feb 71, Omagh
B Sqn, 20 Mar 71 - 28 Apr 71, Omagh
D Sqn, 17 Aug 71 - 31 Aug 71, Ballykelly
D Sqn, 29 Sep 71 - 14 Jan 72, Gosford
Castle
C Sqn, 07 Oct 71 - 08 Feb 72, Gosford
Castle
RHQ, Air & Log Sqns, 17 Oct 71 - 17 Feb
72, Bessbrook/Long Kesh/Gosford Castle
A Sqn, 08 Feb 72 - 08 Jun 72, Gosford
Castle
B Sqn, 08 Jun 72 - 07 Oct 72, Gosford
Castle
D Sqn, 22 Jun 73 - 01 Nov 73, Aldergrove
Regt, 02 May 74 - 27 Aug 74, R(S) (Long
Kesh (Inf role))
D Sqn, 28 Aug 74 - 29 Dec 74, Aldergrove
Regt, 04 May 76 - 27 Aug 76, R
(Dungannon (Recce Gp RAC))
Regt, 28 Sep 80 - 27 Nov 80, Belfast
(Ardoyne/City Centre)
28 Dec 03 - 14/15 Mar 04, RRB

RDG
Feb 96 - Jun 96, URB (Girdwood)
Apr 99 - Sep 99, DRB (NIBAT 3 Bde)

4/7 DG
A Sqn, 15 May 72 - 16 Sep 72, Gosford
Castle
C Sqn, 24 Jul 72 - 01 Dec 72,
Maidstone/RUC Castlereagh (Inf Role
with LG)
Recce Sqn, 28 Dec 74 - 29 Apr 75,
Aldergrove
B Sqn, 29 Apr 76 - 26 Aug 76, Aldergrove
Regt, 28 Dec 77 - 01 Feb 78, Various
(RHQ + 2 Sqns)

5 INNIS SG
Regt, 10 Apr 81 - 25 Aug 81, R(S)
(Fermanagh (C Atk Bty RHA att))
Regt, 07 Sep 89 - 17 Jan 90,

QOH
RHQ, 15 Feb 72 - 27 Apr 72, Bessbrook
A Sqn, 14 Jan 72 - 15 May 72, Gosford
Castle
Regt, 24 Jun 73 - 21 Oct 73, Belfast
(Suffolk/Dunmurry/Lisburn)
Regt, 24 May 77 - 27 Sep 77, R(S)
(Armagh/Dungannon)
Regt, 05 Jun 79 - 02 Oct 79, Belfast
(Monagh)

9/12 L
C Sqn, 15 Sep 72 - 15 Jan 73, Gosford
Castle
B Sqn, 15 May 73 - 19 Sep 73, Gosford
Castle
Regt, 08 Jan 75 - 08 May 75, R(S)
(Armagh (Recce Gp RAC))
Regt, 22 May 76 - 25 Nov 77, R(S)
(OMA))
Regt, 28 Jul 93 - 21 Jan 94, GRB (Belfast)

RH
Lt Sqn, 28 Apr 71 - 08 Jun 71,
C Sqn, 07 Sep 71 - 30 Sep 71, Belfast
(HMS Maidstone)
A Sqn, 03 Nov 72 - 03 Mar 73, R&B
(Aldergrove)
Regt, 28 Aug 74 - 16 Dec 74, R(S) (Long
Kesh)
Regt, 28 Aug 76 - 29 Dec 76, R
(Dungannon (Recce Gp RAC))
Regt, 03 Jun 78 - 01 Oct 78, Belfast (City
Centre/Markets (Tp 151/9 H att))

13/18 H
Regt, 11 Jan 72 - 10 May 72, R(S) (Long
Kesh (Inf Role 2xSqns 1 RTR att))
Regt, 04 Sep 75 - 04 Jan 76, R(S)
(Armagh/Aughnacloy/Dungannon (Recce
Gp RAC))
Regt, 25 Nov 77 - 25 Nov 79, R(S)
(OMA)

14/20 H
C Sqn, 10 Nov 70 - 10 Mar 71,
A Sqn, 09 Jun 71 - 30 Sep 71, Gosford
Castle
RHQ & C Sqn, 10 Aug 71 - 08 Oct 71,
Gosford Castle
A Sqn, 02 Jul 72 - 04 Nov 72, Belfast
(Albert St Mill)
C Sqn, 14 Jul 72 - 05 Nov 72, Aldergrove
Air Sqn, 17 Sep 72 - 17 Oct 72,
Aldergrove
B Sqn, 03 Oct 73 - 17 Oct 72, Gosford
Castle
A Sqn, 04 Feb 74 - 04 Feb 74, Gosford
Castle
Air Sqn, 31 Jul 74 - 29 Nov 74, Ballykelly
Regt, 10 Oct 78 - 02 Feb 79, Belfast
(Monagh (Sqns deployed throughout SW
Belfast))

15/19 H
Regt, 03 Aug 71 - 09 Dec 71, R(S) (Long
Kesh)
A Sqn, 15 Jan 73 - 17 May 73, Portadown
Regt, 18 Nov 74 - 21 May 76, OMA
2xTps, 02 Jul 78 - 03 Nov 78, Omagh (att
13/18 H)
Tp, Sep 78 - Dec 78, Belfast (att RH)
Tp, 07 Mar 79 - 08 Jul 79, Omagh (att
13/18 H & 2 RTR)

KRH
Regt, 20 Jul 94 - Jan 95, GRB (Belfast)
14/15 Dec 02 - 14/15 Jun 03, ETB
(NIBAT 2)

QRH
Regt, Oct 97 - Mar 98, DRB (Armagh)

16/5 L
Regt, 03 Nov 61 - 17 May 72, OMA (8
Cdo Lt Bty RA att until 19 Jan)
Regt, 25 Jul 76 - 28 Nov 76, R(S)
(Maze/Lurgan/Portadown)
Tp, 02 Mar 78 - 02 Jul 78, Omagh (att
13/18 H)
Tp, 03 Nov 78 - 14 Jan 79, Omagh (att
13/18 H)
Tp, 02 Nov 78 - 07 Mar 79, Omagh (att
13/18 H)

Tp, 02 Feb 79 - 05 Jun 79, Monagh (att RHG/D)
Tp, 05 Jun 79 - 02 Oct 79, Monagh (att QOH)
Tp, 23 Oct 79 - 17 Feb 80, Omagh (att 2 RTR)
Regt, 27 Mar 80 - 15 Jul 80, R(S) (Lurgan/Maze (M Bty RHA & 64 Amph Engr Sqn att))

17/21 L
Regt, 14 May 69 - 05 Nov 71, OMA
A Sqn, 05 Oct 72 - 07 Feb 73, Gosford Castle
B Sqn, 07 Feb 73 - 05 Jun 73, Gosford Castle
C Sqn, 05 Jun 73 - 03 Oct 73, Gosford Castle
Air Sqn, 01 Aug 73 - 02 Dec 73, Ballykelly
Regt, 03 Nov 75 - 03 Mar 76, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)

1 RTR
C & D Sqn, 02 Jan 72 - 10 May 72, Lurgan/Maze (att 13/18 H)
Regt, 17 May 73 - 22 Nov 74, Omagh (att 13/18 H)
Air Sqn, 08 Dec 75 - 10 Apr 76, Aldergrove/Ballykelly (att AAC Sqn)
Regt, 28 Apr 77 - 29 Aug 77, Londonderry (Shantallow/Enclave (2 Sqn Gp))
Tp, 14 Jan 79 - 13 May 79, Omagh (att 13/18 H)
Tp, 08 Jul 79 - 07 Nov 79, Omagh (att 13/18 H)

2 RTR
Badger, 17 Sep 73 - 17 Jan 74, Gosford Castle
Ajax, 17 Jan 74 - 15 May 74, Gosford Castle
Regt, 06 May 75 - 04 Sep 75, R(S) (Armagh (Recce Gp RAC (2xSqn))
Regt, 30 Aug 77 - 28 Dec 77, Londonderry (Shantallow/Enclave/Magherafelt)
Tp, 02 Mar 78 - 03 Jul 78, Omagh (att 13/18 H)
Regt, 26 May 79 - 19 Nov 80, OMA

Ajax, 17 Feb 83 - 03 May 83, (Gd Gp) Maze
Jan 97 - Jul 97, URB (Girdwood)

3 RTR,
Regt, 12 Jan 73 - 03 May 73, R(S) (Long Kesh (Inf Role C Sqn 15/19 H att 1xSqn in Fermanagh))
Regt, 10 Sep 74 - 07 Jan 75, R(S) (Armagh (Recce Gp RAC, 2x Sqns))
A Sqn, 29 Dec 76 - 28 Apr 77, Dungannon
Regt, 24 Jul 90 - 25 Jan 91, TRB

4 RTR
Regt, 06 Apr 76 - 27 Jul 76, R(S) (Lurgan/Long Kesh/Portadown)
Regt, 12 Feb 78 - 03 Jun 78, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)

Para Sqn RAC
20 Nov 69 - 23 Apr 70,
09 Mar 71 - 16 Apr 71,
03 Aug 71 - 09 Nov 71, Aldergrove
03 Mar 73 - 29 Jun 73, Aldergrove
28 Aug 75 - 30 Dec 75, Aldergrove

RLC UNITS AND LATER RTS TOURS
21 Long Sp Regt
RHQ, 05 Apr 93, Lisburn Resident
16 Tpt Sqn, 05 Apr 03,Lisburn Resident
57 Sup Sqn, 05 Apr 03, Kinnegar Resident
84 PC Sqn, 05 Apr 03, Aldergrove Resident
11 EOD Regt - 321 EOD Sqn, 05 Apr 93, Lisburn Resident
ASU NI, 05 Apr 93, Lisburn (RLC Roulement Sqn)
1 GS Regt - 4 Arty Sp Sqn and 4 GS Regt - 6 Arty Sp Sqn, 15 Apr 93 - 18 Oct 93, Moscow (RLC Roulement Sqn)
8 Arty Sp Regt - 12 Arty Sp Sqn, 18 Oct 93 - 16 Apr 94, Moscow (RLC Roulement Sqn)
24 Airmob Bde CSS Bn - 15 Log Sp Sqn RLC, 19 Apr 94, Girdwood (RLC Roulement Sqn)

13 Sqn 8 Arty Sp Regt RC, Aug 96 - Sep 96, RTS
24 Airmob Bde, Oct 96 - Mar 97, RTS
8 Fuel Sqn, 27 Tpt Regt RLC, Mar 97 - Sep 97, RTS
11 Bde Sp Sqn, 2 CS Regt RLC, Oct 97 - Mar 98, RTS
1 Tpt Sqn, 10 Tpt Regt RLC, Apr 98 - Sep 98, RTS
9 Fuel Sp Sqn, 7 Tpt Regt RLC, Oct 98 - Mar 99, RTS
7 Engr & Amb Sqn, 7 Tpt Regt RLC, Apr 99 - Sep 99, RTS
13 Arty Sp Sqn, 8 Arty Sp Regt, Oct 99 - Apr 00, RTS
15 Log Sp Sqn, 13 Air Asslt Sp Regt RLC, May 00 - Sep 00, RTS
9 Fuel Sp Sqn, 7 Tpt Regt RLC, Oct 00 - 03 Apr 01, RTS
8 Fuel Sqn, 27 Tpt Regt RLC, 03 Apr 01 - 01 Oct 01, RTS
4 Tpt Sqn RLC, 4 GS Regt RLC, 01 Oct 01 - Mar 02, RTS
Pnr Sqn, 23 Regt RLC, Mar 02 - 26/27 Sep 02, RTS
2 Tpt Sqn, 1 GS Regt RLC, 26/27 Sep 02 - 26/27 Mar 03, RTS
6 Tpt Sqn, 4 GS Regt RLC, 26/27 Mar 03 - 26/27 Mar 03, RTS
7 Tpt Sqn, 27 Tpt Regt RLC, 26/27 Sep 03 - 26/27 Mar 04, RTS
17 Tpt Sqn, 7 Tpt Regt RLC, 26/27 Mar 04 - 31 Oct 04, Task Line Ceased

RE UNITS & RES
21 Engr Regt
30 Mar 71 - 05 Aug 71, R(S) (Long Kesh)
1 Fd Sqn, 18 Aug 72 - 18 Sep 72,
1 Fd Sqn, 08 Nov 72 - 06 Mar 73, Ballykelly
4 Fd Sqn, 04 Jul 73 - 05 Nov 73, Shackleton Bks/Maze
16 Dec 74 - 10 Apr 75, R(S) (Long Kesh/Lurgan/St Angelo (31 Armd Engr Sqn att))
24 Sep 76 - 30 Dec 76, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)
4 Fd Sqn, 16 Mar 98 - 16 Sep 98, Maze/Antrim

1 Fd Sqn, 23 Jun 78 - 25 Oct 78, Ballykelly

1 Armed Div Engr Regt
28 Mar 79 - 26 Jul 79, R(S) (Lurgan/ Maze Portadown)
Tp 1 Sqn, 21 Jul 81 - 06 Dec 81, Castledillon (att 48 Fd Sqn)
Tp 4 Sqn, 06 Dec 81 - 20 Apr 82, Castledillon (att 8 Fd Sqn)
4 Fd Sqn, 28 Feb 84 - 12 Jul 84, Antrim
4 Fd Sqn, Mar 89 - Jul 89,

22 Engr Regt
3 Fd Sqn, 17 Aug 69 - 16 Jun 70, Antrim
Tp 34 Sqn, 15 Sep 69 - 14 Jan 70, Antrim
8 Fd Sqn, 07 Jan 70 - 13 May 70, Antrim
34 Fd Sqn, 12 Jan 71 - 11 May 71, Antrim
3 Fd Sqn, 11 May 71 - 14 sep 71, Antrim
34 Fd Sqn, 19 Aug 71 - 22 Oct 71, Long Kesh
8 Fd Sqn, 15 Oct 71 - 29 Nov 71, Lurgan
8 Fd Sqn, 11 Jan 72 - 29 Mar 72, Antrim
34 Fd Sqn, 27 Mar 72 - 29 Jul 72, Antrim
Tp 34 Sqn, 11 Apr 72 - 29 Jul 72, Belfast
8 Fd Sqn, 17 Jul 72 - 16 Sep 72, Long Kesh
6 Fd Sqn (-), 30 Jul 72 - 16 Sep 72,
Tac HQ, 01 Aug 72 - 16 Sep 72,
3 Fd Sqn, 20 Nov 72 - 22 Mar 73, Antrim
34 Fd Sqn, 24 Jul 73 - 22 Nov 73, Antrim
8 Fd Sqn, 22 Nov 73 - 21 Mar 74, Antrim
52 Fd Sqn, 12 Feb 74 - 12 Jun 74, Castledillon
3 Fd Sqn, 11 Jun 74 - 13 Oct 74, Castledillon
Tp 34 Sqn, 17 Oct 74 - 26 Oct 74, Antrim
34 Fd Sqn, 12 Jun 75 - 11 Oct 75, Castledillon
8 Fd Sqn, 11 Oct 75 - 11 Feb 76, Castledillon
3 Fd Sqn, 11 Jun 76 - 11 Oct 76, Castledillon
3 Fd Sqn, 02 May 77 - 17 May 77,
52 Fd Sqn, 02 May 77 - 17 May 77,
8 Fd Sqn, 14 Jun 77 - 10 Oct 77, Castledillon
3 Fd Sqn, 11 Oct 78 - 08 Feb 79, Castledillon

8 Fd Sqn, 08 Jun 79 - 09 Oct 79, Castledillon
34 Fd Sqn, 08 Feb 80 - 10 Jun 80, Castledillon
3 Fd Sqn, 08 Mar 81 - 22 Jul 81, Castledillon
8 Fd Sqn, 06 Dec 81 - 19 Apr 82, Castledillon (Tp 4 Fd Sqn, 21 Engr Regt att)
8 Armd Sqn, 14 Sep 94, Maze (RE S Search Tp 33 Engr Regt att)

23 Engr Regt
20 Mar 72 - 24 Jul 72, Belfast (East Belfast)
37 Fd Sqn, 05 Nov 73 - 05 Mar 74, Ballykelly
37 Fd Sqn, 23 Oct 75 - 23 Feb 76, Bellykelly

25 Engr Regt
39 Fd Sqn, 08 May 72 - 11 Jul 72, Ballykelly (64 Amphr Engr Sqn att)
01 Aug 73 - 30 Nov 73, Belfast (East Belfast)
16 Fd Sqn, 26 Jun 74 - 01 Nov 74, Ballykelly
39 Fd Sqn, 27 Jun 75 - 24 Oct 75, Ballykelly
12 Fd Sqn, 27 Feb 75 - 27 Jun 75, Ballykelly

2 Armd Div Engr Regt
09 Jun 77 - 07 Oct 77, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)
43 Fd Sqn, 28 Jun 77 - 24 Oct 77, Ballykelly
12 Fd Sqn, 22 Feb 79 - 21 Jun 79, Ballykelly
43 Fd Sqn, 02 Oct 79 - 26 Jul 80, Belfast (Monagh)
Tp 16 Sqn, 30 May 83 - 16 Oct 83, Omagh
12 Fd Sqn, 10 Nov 88 - 23 Mar 89, 3 Inf Bde Fd Sqn
RHQ + Elms 43 Fd Sp Sqn, 01 Sep 92, Massereene Bks, Antrim (RE Res)

26 Engr Regt
25 Fd Sqn, 29 Dec 72 - 30 Mar 73, Belfast (East Belfast (att 35 Engr Regt))

5 Fd Sqn, 06 Mar 73 - 06 Jul 73, Ballykelly/Long Kesh
08 Jul 74 - 07 Nov 74, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre (73 Amph Engr Sqn att))
25 Fd Sqn, 22 Jun 76 - 23 Oct 76, R (Ballykelly)

3 Armd Div Engr Regt
28 Jul 78 - 20 Nov 79, Lurgan/Maze
25 Fd Sqn, 21 Jun 79, 23 Oct 79, R (Ballykelly)
30 Fd Sqn, 16 Jul 89, 16 Dec 89, 3 Inf Bde Fd Sqn
5 Fd Sqn, 29 Apr 90, 09 Sep 90, 3 Inf Bde Fd Sqn
25 Fd Sqn, 09 Sep 90, 09 Mar 91, 3 Inf Bde Fd Sqn

28 Amph Engr Regt
71 Sqn, 08 Jul 74 - 08 Nov 74, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)
73 Fd Sqn, 09 Mar 76 - 03 Jun 76, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)
64 Sqn, 23 Oct 76 - 23 Jun 77, Ballykelly
23 Sqn, 23 Oct 78 - 22 Feb 79, Ballykelly
73 Fd Sqn, 23 Oct 79 - 22 Feb 80,
64 Sqn, 16 Oct 83 - 16 Feb 84, Omagh
64 Sqn, 28 Jun 88 - 10 Nov 88, 3 Inf Bde Fd Sqn
23 Sqn, Mar 91 - Oct 91, Long Kesh

28 Engr Regt
12 Sqn, 09 Mar 93 - 06 Sep 93, RES (Maze)
23 Amph Engr Sqn, 07 Sep 93 - 09 Mar 94, RES (Maze)

32 Armd Engr Regt
30 Fd Sqn, 08 Nov 71 - 09 Mar 72, Ballykelly
26 Sqn, 30 Jul 72 - 31 Jul 72,
7 Fd Sqn, 10 Jul 72 - 09 Nov 72, Ballykelly
03 Jan 74, 03 May 74, R(S) (Long Kesh (26 Armd Engr Sqn att))
31 Sqn, 12 Dec 74, 11 Apr 75, Long Kesh
09 Mar 76, 30 Jun 76, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre (73 Indep Engr Sqn att))

2 Sqn, 25 Sep 76, 31 Dec 76, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)
7 Fd Sqn, 06 Nov 80, 20 Mar 81, Ballykelly
7 Fd Sqn, 09 Mar 92, 10 Sep 92, RES (Maze)
26 Armd Engr Sqn, 10 Mar 94, 14 Sep 94, RES (Maze)

35 Engr Regt
29 Dec 72 - 30 Mar 73, Belfast (East Belfast (25 Fd Sqn, 26 Engr Regt att))
29 Fd Sqn, 05 Mar 74 - 27 Jun 74, Ballykelly
29 Fd Sqn, 31 Oct 74 - 28 Feb 75, Ballykelly
29 Fd Sqn, 22 Feb 76 - 23 Jun 76, Ballykelly
42 Fd Sqn, 23 Oct 76 - 24 Feb 77, Ballykelly

4 Armd Div Engr Regt
24 Jan 78 - 28 Apr 78, Armagh (Unit retitled)

35 Engr Regt
42 Fd Sqn, 23 Feb 78 - 23 Jun 78, Ballykelly
37 Fd Sqn, 23 Feb 80 - 24 Jun 80, Ballykelly
29 Fd Sqn, 23 Aug 80, 06 Nov 80, Ballykelly
42 Fd Sqn, 20 Mar 81 - 21 Jul 81, Ballykelly
37 Fd Sqn, 18 Jan 83 - 30 May 83, Armagh/Omagh
29 Fd Sqn, Dec 89 - May 90, Long Kesh
? Tp, 19 Feb 88 - 01 Jul 88, 3 Inf Bde Fd Sqn
29 Fd Sqn, 16 Dec 89 - 29 Apr 90,
42 Fd Sqn, Oct 91 - Mar 92, Maze
29 Fd Sqn, 05 Sep 92 - 09 Mar 93, Maze
29 Fd Sqn, 16 Sep 98, Antrim

36 Engr Regt
20 Fd Sqn, 18 Feb 71 - 18 Jun 71, Castledillon
50 Fd Sqn, 08 Feb 72 - 06 Jun 72, Newtownbreda

50 Fd Sqn, 08 Aug 72 - 16 Sep 72, Carnmoney
20 Fd Sqn, 13 Oct 72 - 13 Feb 73, Castledillon
Det 61 Fd Sp Sqn, 19 May 74 - 01 Jun 74, Att 50 Fd Sqn
50 Fd Sqn, 19 May 74 - 01 Jun 74,
50 Fd Sqn, 21 Oct 74 - 12 Dec 74, Maze
25 Oct 74, 07 Dec 74, Maze
20 Fd Sqn, 02 May 77, 17 May 77, 2xTps 52 Fd Sqn att
20 Fd Sqn, 09 Feb 78, 09 Jun 78, Castledillon
9 Para Sqn, 23 Oct 80, 08 Mar 81, Castledillon
Tp 20 Sqn, 03 Sep 82, 18 Jan 83, Armagh
50 Fd Sqn, Nov 88, Dec 88, Ballykelly
20 Fd Sqn, 16 Sep 97, 16 Mar 98, Maze

37 Engr Regt
Tp 10 Sqn, 21 Oct 70 - 12 Jan 71, Antrim (att 60 Fd Sp Sqn)
Tp 10 Sqn, 29 Jul 72 - 01 Nov 72, Long Kesh (att 33 Fd Sqn)

38 Engr Regt
Tp 11 Sqn, 23 Jun 70 - 18 Jul 70,
48 Fd Sqn, 29 Jun 71 - 29 Nov 71, Long Kesh (Tp 51 Fd Sqn att)
11 Fd Sqn, 19 Oct 91 - 08 Feb 72, Castledillon
32 Fd Sqn, 05 Jun 72 - 14 Oct 72, Castledillon
48 Fd Sqn, 12 Feb 73 - 12 Jun 73, Castledillon
11 Fd Sqn, 12 Jun 73 - 17 Oct 73, Castledillon
11 Fd Sqn, 27 May 74 - 03 Jun 74, Castledillon
32 Fd Sqn, 06 Oct 74 - 05 Feb 75, Belfast (Ardoyne)
51 Fd Sqn, 13 Feb 75 - 12 Jun 75, Castledillon
11 Fd Sqn, 05 Nov 75 - 13 Dec 75, Maze/Armagh
11 Fd Sqn, 31 Mar 78 - 30 Nov 78, Ballykinler
51 Fd Sqn, 09 Jun 78 - 10 Oct 78, Castledillon

32 Fd Sqn, 08 Feb 79 - 07 Jun 79, Castledillon
11 Fd Sqn, 09 Oct 79 - 09 Feb 80, Castledillon
32 Fd Sqn, 19 Apr 82 - 02 Sep 82, Castledillon

39 Engr Regt
60 Fd Sqn, 07 Sep 70 - 12 Jan 71, Long Kesh
53 Fd Sqn, 30 Nov 71 - 14 Mar 72, Long Kesh
60 Fd Sqn, 01 Nov 72 - 28 Feb 73, Long Kesh
Tp 48 Sqn, 20 Mar 74 - 24 Jul 74, Antrim (att 59 Indep Cdo Sqn RE)
Tp 48 Sqn, 10 Jan 75 - 08 Mar 75,
Tp 60 Sqn, 09 Mar 76 - 11 Apr 76, Castledillon
Tp 48 Sqn, 15 Jun 76 - 15 Jul 76,
53 Fd Sqn, 10 Feb 77 - 14 Jun 77, Castledillon
48 Fd Sqn, 11 Oct 77 - 09 Feb 78, Castledillon
48 Fd Sqn, 21 Jul 81 - 06 Dec 81, Castledillon (Tp 1 Fd Sqn, 21 Engr Regt att)

9 Indept Para Sqn RE
12 May 70 - 08 Sep 70, Antrim
14 Sep 71 - 11 Jan 72, Antrim (Condor Tp, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn RE att)
20 Mar 73 - 24 Jul 73, Antrim
13 Oct 74 - 13 Feb 75, Castledillon
Tp, 25 Jan 76 - 09 Mar 76,
11 Oct 76 - 10 Feb 77, Castledillon

33 Indep Fd Sqn
25 Aug 70 - 17 Dec 70, Belfast
17 Jun 71 - 19 Oct 71, Long Kesh
29 Jul 72 - 01 Nov 72, Ballykelly
15 Oct 73 - 13 Feb 74, Castledillon
23 Jul 74 - 31 Aug 92, Antrim (RE Resident)
33 Fd Sqn, 01 Sep 92 -, Antrim (Unit retitled, part of 25 Engr Regt)

59 Indep Cdo Sqn
Condor Tp, 17 Oct 71 - 08 Jan 72, Antrim (att 9 Indep Para Sqn)

Condor Tp, 28 Jun 72 - 19 Jul 72, Belfast (att 45 Cdo RM)
24 Jul 72 - 21 Nov 72, Antrim
20 Mar 74, 24 Jul 74, Antrim (Tp 48 Fd Sqn, 39 Engr Regt att)
Condor Tp, 02 Jul 74, 06 Nov 74, 12 Feb 76, 11 Jun 76, Castledillon
Condor Tp, 12 May 76, 12 Jun 76,
Condor Tp, 21 Jun 77, 20 Oct 77, Belfast (Monagh (att 45 Cdo RM))
10 Jun 80, 23 Oct 80, Castledillon

325 Engr Pk,
Pre 1969 - 31 Aug 92, Antrim (RE Resident)

43 Fd Sp Sqn
01 Sep 92 - , Antrim (Unit retitled, part of 25 Engr Regt)
53 Fd Sqn RE
Aug 86 - Oct 96, RES
28 Amph Engr Sqn, 28 Engr Regt RE
Nov 96 - Mar 97, RES
59 Indep Cdo Sqn
May 97 - Sep 97, RES
20 Fd Sqn (Search Tp)
Oct 97 - Feb 98, RES
4 Fd Sqn (Search Tp)
Mar 98 - Aug 98, RES
29 Fd Sqn, 35 Engr Regt
Sep 98 - Feb 99, RES
48 Fd Sqn, 39 Engr Regt
Mar 99 - Aug 99, RES
29 Fd Sqn/49 Fd Sqn
Sep 99 - Dec 99, RES
51 (Airmob) Fd Sqn RE
Jan 00 - Apr 00, RES
9 Para Sqn, 36 Engr Regt RE
May 00 - Sep 00, RES
42 Fd Sqn, 28 Engr Regt RE
Oct 00 - 02 Apr 01, RES
23 Amph Engr Sqn, 28 Engr Regt RE
02 Apr 02 - 02 Oct 01, RES
53 Fd Sqn (Air Sp), 39 Engr Regt RE
02 Oct 01 - May 02, RES
20 Fd Sqn, 36 Engr Regt RE
May 02 - 16/17 Sep 02, RES
42 Fd Sqn, 28 Engr Regt RE
16/17 Sep 02 - 31 Jan 03, RES
73 Armd Engr Sqn, 21 Engr Regt

31 Jan 03 - 28 Oct 03, RES
23 Amph Sqn, 28 Engr Regt
28 Oct 03 - 15/16 Mar 04, RES
49 Fd Sqn (Air Sp), 39 Engr Regt
15/16 Mar 04 - 16 Sep 04, RES
29 Armd Engr Sqn, 35 Engr Regt
16 Sep 04 - 15 Mar 05, RES
42 Fd Sqn, 28 Engr Regt RE
15 Mar 05 –

DEPLOYMENTS BY DATE

1960s
03 Nov 61 - 17 May 72, 16/5 L, Regt, OMA (8 Cdo Lt Bty RA att until 19 Jan)
21 Jan 68 - 24 Apr 70, 1 LI, BKL
Pre-1969 - 31 Aug 92, 325 Engr Pk, Antrim (RE Resident)
03 Mar 69 - 25 Sep 70, 2 QUEENS, HWD
24 Apr 69 - 21 Aug 69, 1 PWO, Ballykinler
14 May 69 - 05 Nov 71, 17/21 L, Regt, OMA
13 Jun 69 - 27 Dec 69, GDS Indep Para Coy
28 Jul 69 - 11 Sep 69 1 RRW, R(S)
15 Aug 69 - 15 Nov 69, 3 LI, Belfast
17 Aug 69 - 13 Dec 69, 1 QUEENS, Londonderry (HMS Sea Eagle)
17 Aug 69 - 13 Dec 69, 1 DERR, (1xCoy)
17 Aug 69 - 28 Nov 69, LG, B Sqn
17 Aug 69 - 16 Jun 70, 22 Engr Regt, 3 Fd Sqn, Antrim
19 Aug 69 - 28 Nov 69, 1 R HAMPS, Belfast
20 Aug 69 - 18 Dec 69, 1 RGJ, Belfast
23 Aug 69 - 23 Jan 70, 2 GREN GDS, Londonderry
13 Sep 69 - 17 Jan 70, 2 LI, Belfast
15 Sep 69 - 14 Jan 70, 22 Engr Regt, Tp 34 Sqn, Antrim
29 Sep 69 - 13 Nov 69, 41 Cdo RM, Belfast
12 Oct 69 - 19 Feb 70, 1 PARA, Belfast
06 Nov 69 - 09 Feb 70, 4 Lt Bty, Omagh/Armagh (Att 33 Wg RAF Regt)
12 Nov 69 - 14 Mar 70, 1 RHA, Regt, Belfast (City Centre)

15 Nov 69 - 12 Mar 70, 31 Lt Bty, Att 1 RHA
20 Nov 69 - 23 Apr 70, Para Sqn RAC
02 Dec 69 - 12 Apr 69, 1 GLOSTERS, Londonderry
29 Dec 69 - 20 Apr 70, 1 GREN GDS, Londonderry

1970
07 Jan 70 - 13 May 70, 22 Engr Regt, 8 Fd Sqn, Antrim
10 Feb 70 - 21 Jun 70, 1 RHF, Londonderry
28 Feb 70 - 24 Jun 70, 2 PARA, Belfast
09 Mar 70 - 29 Jul 70, 1 RS, Belfast (4-17 Jul B Coy 1 DERR att)
31 Mar 70 - 01 Aug 70, 1 CHESHIRE, Londonderry
03 Apr 70 - 06 May 70, 5 Lt Bty, Att 42 Med Regt
04 Apr 70 - 27 Aug 70, 5 Regt RA, 5 Lt Regt, Londonderry, R(N) (1 Lt Bty att)
04 Apr 70 - 04 May 70, 42 Hy Regt, Belfast
17 Apr 70 - 23 Aug 70, 1 Lt Bty, Att 5 Lt Regt
20 Apr 70 - 22 Dec 71, 3 QUEENS, BKL
04 May 70 - 10 Sep 70, 1 KOSB, Belfast (Girdwood)
12 May 70 - 08 Sep 70, 9 Indept Para Sqn RE, Antrim
19 May 70 - 18 Sep 70, 1 QLR, Armagh/Fermanagh/E Tyrone/Co Down
29 May 70 - 03 Sep 70, 45 Cdo RM, Belfast (145 Cdo Lt Bty att)
01 Jun 70 - 01 Sep 70, 45 Cdo Lt Bty, Belfast (Att 45 Cdo RM)
16 Jun 70 - 22 Oct 70, 1 RRF, Belfast (Shankill/Lower Falls)
23 Jun 70 - 18 Jul 70, 38 Engr Regt, Tp 11 Sqn
28 Jun 70 - 16 Jul 70, 1 BW, Belfast
28 Jun 70 - 28 Oct 70, 16 Regt RA, 16 Lt AD Regt, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)
28 Jun 70 - 05 Aug 70, 3 Lt Bty, Att 16 Lt AD Regt
29 Jun 70 - 16 Jul 70, 3 RGJ, Belfast

29 Jun 70 - 03 Sep 70, LG, C Sqn

30 Jun 70 - 03 Sep 70, 1 GREEN HOWARDS, Belfast

01 Jul 70 - 18 Jul 70, 2 SG, R(S) (Belfast)

04 Jul 70 - 17 Jul 70, 1 DERR, Belfast (B Coy att 1 RS)

04 Jul 70 - 03 Sep 70, LG Tac Hq. B Sqn, Aldergrove

05 Jul 70 - 18 Jul 70, 1 GLOSTERS, 1xCoy

06 Jul 70 - 17 Nov 70, SCOTS DG, B Sqn, Omagh

21 Jul 70 - 19 Nov 70, 2 COLDM GDS, Belfast

23 Jul 70 - 10 Mar 72, 1 R ANGLIAN, ERB (Enclave/Creggan/Shantallow)

26 Jul 70 - 26 Aug 70, 1 D and D, Belfast

08 Aug 70 - 19 Aug 70, 1 BW, Londonderry

25 Aug 70 - 17 Dec 70, 33 Indep Fd Sqn, Belfast

01 Sep 70 - 05 Jan 71, 1 KINGS, Belfast (Girdwood/City Centre)

02 Sep 70 - 13 Nov 70, 41 Cdo RM, Belfast

07 Sep 70 - 21 Jan 71, 3 RHA, Regt, R(S)

07 Sep 70 - 21 Jan 71, 7 RHA, F/G Bty, Omagh (att 17/21 L)

07 Sep 70 - 12 Jan 71, 39 Engr Regt, 60 Fd Sqn, Long Kesh

25 Sep 70 - 25 Mar 72, 1 PARA, Holywood

26 Sep 70 - 14 Dec 70, 42 Hy Regt, Londonderry, R(N)

20 Oct 70 - 11 Feb 71, 2 R ANGLIAN, Belfast

20 Oct 70 - 18 Feb 71, 1 RRW, Belfast (Hastings St)

21 Oct 70 - 12 Jan 71, 37 Engr Regt, Tp 10 Sqn, Antrim (att 60 Fd Sp Sqn)

10 Nov 70 - 10 Mar 71, 14/20 H, C Sqn

15 Dec 70 - 22 Apr 71, 1 COLDM GDS, R(N) (Londonderry)

1971

05 Jan 71 - 06 May 71, 32 Regt RA, 32 Lt Regt, Belfast (57 & 156 Loc Bty att)

05 Jan 71 - 06 May 71, 57 Loc Bty, Belfast (Att 32 Hy Regt)

05 Jan 71 - 06 May 71, 156 Loc Bty, Belfast (Att 32 Lt Regt)

12 Jan 71 - 11 May 71, 22 Engr Regt, 34 Fd Sqn, Antrim

19 Jan 71 - 03 Jun 71, 3 PARA, Belfast, R(S) (Bulls Tp, 1 Bty RHA att)

05 Feb 71 - 25 Feb 71, 1 RRF, Belfast (Holywood)

05 Feb 71 - 24 Feb 71, SCOTS DG, C Sqn, Omagh

06 Feb 71 - 25 Mar 71, 3 LI, Belfast

08 Feb 71 - 04 Jul 71, 1 Bty RHA, Bulls Tp, Att 3 PARA

09 Feb 71 - 25 Jun 71, 1 BW, R(S)

09 Feb 71 - 24 Feb 71, 4 R ANGLIAN, Tigel Pl

11 Feb 71 - 19 Jun 71, GDS Indep Para Coy

16 Feb 71 - 17 Jun 71, 1 RHF, Belfast (Shankill/New Lodge)

18 Feb 71 - 18 Jun 71, 36 Engr Regt, 20 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

09 Mar 71 - 16 Apr 71, Para Sqn RAC

10 Mar 71 - 31 Mar 71, 1 KINGS OWN BORDER, R(S)

20 Mar 71 - 26 Apr 71, 5 Regt RA, Londonderry, R(N) (1 Lt Bty att)

20 Mar 71 - 28 Apr 71, SCOTS DG, B Sqn, Omagh

23 Mar 71 - 28 Jul 71, 1 WG, Belfast (Carnmoney)

23 Mar 71 - 31 Jul 71, 1 LI, Belfast (Ardoyne)

30 Mar 71 - 05 Aug 71, 21 Engr Regt, R(S) (Long Kesh)

15 Apr 71 - 04 Aug 71, RHG/D, A Sqn, Aldergrove

22 Apr 71 - 28 May 71, 1 DERR, Londonderry

22 Apr 71 - 26 Aug 71, 2 PARA, Londonderry, Belfast (City/Enclave/Springfield)

28 Apr 71 - 08 Jun 71, RH, Lt Sqn

04 May 71, 10 Sep 71, 1 RGJ, Belfast (Hastings St)

11 May 71 - 14 Sep 71, 22 Engr Regt, 3 Fd Sqn, Antrim

25 May 71 - 28 Jul 71, 1 RS, R(N)

(Drumahoe)
01 Jun 71 - 10 Mar 73, 2 RGJ, BKY
09 Jun 71 - 30 Sep 71, 14/20 H, A Sqn,
    Gosford Castle
15 Jun 71 - 21 Oct 71, 1 DWR, Belfast
    (New Lodge/Unity)
17 Jun 71 - 19 Oct 71, 33 Indep Fd Sqn,
    Long Kesh
19 Jun 71 - 21 Jun 71, 1 RRF, Belfast
    (Long Kesh)
23 Jun 71 - 28 Oct 71, 2 LI, R(S)
    (Armagh/Dungannon)
29 Jun 71 - 29 Nov 71, 38 Engr Regt, 48
    Fd Sqn, Long Kesh (Tp 51 Fd Sqn
    att)
01 Jul 71 - 15 Jul 71, 3 RHA Regt, R(S)
06 Jul 71 - 16 Jul 71, 42 Hy Regt, Belfast
09 Jul 71 - 13 Jul 71, 1 KOSB, Belfast
    (July Marches)
21 Jul 71 - 17 Aug 71, 3 RHA Regt,
    Ballykelly
25 Jul 71 - 26 Nov 71, 25 Fd Regt RA, 25
    Lt Regt, Belfast
    (Lisburn/Andersonstown)
26 Jul 71 - 25 Nov 71, 45 Fd Regt RA, 45
    Med Regt, Londonderry, R(N)
    Drumahoe (H Hy Bty att)
27 Jul 71 - 28 Nov 71, H Hy Bty, Att 45
    Med Regt
30 Jul 71 - 29 Nov 71, 1 GREEN
    HOWARDS, Belfast (Ardoyne)
01 Aug 71 - 09 Nov 71, 4 Fd Regt, 4 Lt
    Regt
03 Aug 71 - 09 Dec 71, 15/19 H, Regt,
    R(S) (Long Kesh)
03 Aug 71 - 09 Nov 71, Para Sqn RAC,
    Aldergrove
05 Aug 71 - 17 Sep 71, 2 QUEENS,
    Belfast (East Belfast)
08 Aug 71 - 31 Aug 71, 42 Hy Regt, R(S)
    (Ballykinler)
10 Aug 71 - 01 Sep 71, 45 Cdo RM,
    Belfast, Londonderry, R(NI) (145
    Cdo Lt Bty att)
10 Aug 71 - 01 Sep 71, 145 Cdo Lt Bty,
    Belfast, Londonderry, R(N) (Att 45
    Cdo RM)
10 Aug 71 - 08 Oct 71, 14/20 H, RHQ &
    C Sqn, Gosford Castle
11 Aug 71 - 19 Aug 71, 1 RRF, Belfast

(Ballymurphy)
11 Aug 71 - 09 Dec 71, 3 RGJ, (B Coy)
15 Aug 71 - 12 Sep 71, LG, APC Cqn,
    With RH
16 Aug 71 - 14 Sep 71, 5 Regt RA,
    Londonderry, R(N) - Ballykelly
17 Aug 71 - 31 Aug 71, SCOTS DG, D
    Sqn, Ballykelly
19 Aug 71 - 07 Oct 71, 1 GREN GDS,
    Belfast (Ligoniel)
19 Aug 71 - 22 Oct 71, 22 Engr Regt, 34
    Fd Sqn, Long Kesh
25 Aug 71 - 29 Dec 71, 1 SG, Belfast
    (Clonard/Ballymurphy)
07 Sep 71 - 13 Jan 72, 51 Mst Bty, Att 27
    Med Regt
07 Sep 71 - 30 Sep 71, RH, C Sqn, Belfast
    (HMS Maidstone)
08 Sep 71 - 13 Jan 72, 27 Fd Regt, 27 Med
    Regt, R(S) (Enniskillen (50 Msl
    Bty att))
14 Sep 71 - 11 Jan 72, 9 Indept Para Sqn
    RE, Antrim (Condor Tp, 59 Indep
    Cdo Sqn RE att)
29 Sep 71 - 14 Jan 72, SCOTS DG   , D
    Sqn, Gosford Castle
07 Oct 71 - 1 BW, Belfast (East Belfast)
07 Oct 71 - 08 Feb 72, SCOTS DG, C
    Sqn, Gosford Castle
15 Oct 71 - 29 Nov 71, 22 Engr Regt, 8 Fd
    Sqn, Lurgan
17 Oct 71 - 18 Feb 72, 1 COLDM GDS,
    Londonderry (Fort George/Newry)
17 Oct 71 - 16 Feb 72, 45 Cdo RM,
    Belfast (Carnmoney)
17 Oct 71 - 18 Feb 72, 145 Cdo Lt Bty,
    Belfast (Carnmoney (Att 45 Cdo
    RM))
17 Oct 71 - 17 Feb 72, SCOTS DG, RHQ,
    Air & Log Sqns, Bessbrook/Long
    Kesh/Gosford Castle
17 Oct 71 - 08 Jan 72, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn,
    Condor Tp, Antrim (att 9 Indep
    Para Sqn)
19 Oct 71 - 15 Feb 72, 2 RRF, Belfast
    (New Lodge/Unity)
26 Oct 71 - 19 Jan 72, 8 Cdo Lt Bty, R(S)
    (Omagh (Att 16/5 L))
28 Oct 71 - 18 Jan 72, 42 Cdo RM, R(S)
    (Armagh)

08 Nov 71 - 09 Mar 72, 32 Armd Engr
     Regt, 30 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly
09 Nov 71 - 17 Mar 71, RHG/D, B Sqn,
     Aldergrove
21 Nov 71 - 22 Mar 72, 1 QO HLDRS,
     Belfast (East Belfast)
21 Nov 71 - 18 Mar 72, 22 Regt RA, 22 Lt
     AD Regt, Londonderry, R(N)
     (Drumahoe (15 Msl Bty att)
25 Nov 71 - 17 Mar 71, 12 AD Regt, 12 Lt
     Ad Regt, Belfast (Lisburn/
     Dunmurry/Andersonstown)
25 Nov 71 - 23 Mar 72, 15 Msl Bty,
     Londonderry, R(N) (Drumahoe
     (Att 22 Lt Ad Regt))
29 Nov 71 - 29 Mar 72, 1 QLR, Belfast
     (Ardoyne)
30 Nov 71 - 14 Mar 72, 39 Engr Regt, 53
     Fd Sqn, Long Kesh
07 Dec 71 - 14 Apr 72, 1 GLOSTERS,
     Belfast (Hastings St)
28 Dec 71 - 26 Apr 72, 1 KOSB, Belfast
     (Springfield)
28 Dec 71 - 27 Apr 72, 3 RHA, Regt,
     Belfast (East
     Belfast/Andersonstown/Lower
     Falls)

1972
02 Jan 72 - 10 May 72, 1 RTR, C & D
     Sqn, Lurgan/Maze (att 13/18
11 Jan 72 - 10 May 72, 13/18 H, Regt,
     R(S) (Long Kesh (Inf Role 2xSqns
     1 RTR att))
11 Jan 72 - 29 Mar 72, 22 Engr Regt, 8 Fd
     Sqn, Antrim
14 Jan 72 - 15 May 72, QOH, A Sqn,
     Gosford Castle
18 Jan 72 - 02 May 72, 1 D and D, R(S)
     (Armagh)
27 Jan 72 - 22 May 72, 3 RRF, R(S)
     (Dungannon)
05 Feb 72 - 10 Feb 72, 2 LI, R(S)
08 Feb 72 - 08 Jun 72, SCOTS DG, A
     Sqn, Gosford Castle
08 Feb 72 - 06 Jun 72, 36 Engr Regt, 50
     Fd Sqn, Newtownbreda
15 Feb 72 - 15 Jun 72, 2 PARA, Belfast
     (Carnmoney/Unity)

15 Feb 72 - 19 Jun 72, 7 RHA, Regt,
     Belfast (Ligoniel (Gds Para Coy, 3
     Div Airhead Ord Coy & 58 Lt AD
     Bty att))
15 Feb 72 - 27 Apr 72, QOH, RHQ,
     Bessbrook
06 Mar 72 - 08 Sep 73, 1 RWF, ERB
15 Mar 72 - 09 Jun 72, 1 WFR,
     Londonderry (Drumahoe)
16 Mar 72 - 21 Jul 72, 2 Fd Regt, Regt,
     Belfast (Lisburn/Dunmurry/
     Andersonstown)
16 Mar 72 - 03 Jul 72, RHG/D, A Sqn,
     Aldergrove
20 Mar 72 - 24 Jul 72, 23 Engr Regt,
     Belfast (East Belfast)
27 Mar 72 - 28 Jul 72, 1 RRW, Belfast
     (Ardoyne)
27 Mar 72 - 29 Jul 72, 22 Engr Regt, 34
     Fd Sqn, Antrim
30 Mar 72 - 06 Apr 72, 3 QUEENS,
     Belfast
11 Apr 72 - 29 Jul 72, 22 Engr Regt, Tp 34
     Sqn, Belfast
12 Apr 72 - 03 Aug 72, 3 R ANGLIAN,
     Belfast (Hastings St)
25 Apr 72 - 23 Aug 72, 1 KINGS, Belfast
     (Springfield/Falls)
28 Apr 72 - 29 Jul 72, 1 DWR, R(S)
     (Bessbrook)
02 May 72 - 06 Sep 72, 1 GORDONS,
     R(S) (Armagh)
08 May 72 - 11 Jul 72, 25 Engr Regt, 39
     Fd Sqn, Ballykelly (64 Amphr
     Engr Sqn att)
09 May 72 - 14 Sep 72, 4 Fd Regt, Regt,
     R(S) (Long Kesh)
15 May 72 - 16 Sep 72, 4/7 DG, A Sqn,
     Gosford Castle
23/25 May 72 - 30 Nov 73, 1 PWO, HWD
05 Jun 72 - 14 Oct 72, 38 Engr Regt, 32
     Fd Sqn, Castledillon
07 Jun 72 - 11 Oct 72, 20 Med Regt,
     Londonderry (Drumahoe)
08 Jun 72 - 07 Oct 72, SCOTS DG, B
     Sqn, Gosford Castle
15 Jun 72 - 17 Oct 72, 40 Cdo RM, Belfast
     (Unity/New Lodge)
17 Jun 72 - 25 Oct 72, 1 WG, Belfast (City
     Centre)

17 Jun 72 - 06 Aug 72, 1 RS, Belfast, Londonderry (Holywood/Moscow/Maidstone/Ft George)

19 Jun 72 - 20 Oct 72, 2 LI, Londonderry (Fort George)

28 Jun 72 - 19 Jul 72, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn, Condor Tp, B (att 45 Cdo RM)

02 Jul 72 - 04 Nov 72, 14/20 H, A Sqn, Belfast (Albert St Mill)

10 Jul 72 - 28 Jul 72, 45 Cdo RM, Belfast (Condor Tp, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn RE att)

10 Jul 72 - 09 Nov 72, 32 Armd Engr Regt, 7 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

11 Jul 72 - 10 Nov 72, 2 RRF, Belfast (Suffolk)

13 Jul 72 - 02 Sep 72, 3 RRF, Londonderry (Bogside)

14 Jul 72 - 17 Oct 72, 7 Cdo Lt Bty, Belfast (Unity/New Lodge (Att 40 Cdo RM))

14 Jul 72 - 21 Sep 72, RHG/D, B Sqn, R(N) (Drumahoe)

14 Jul 72 - 05 Nov 72, 14/20 H, C Sqn, Aldergrove

17 Jul 72 - 16 Sep 72, 22 Engr Regt, 8 Fd Sqn, Long Kesh

19 Jul 72 - 16 Nov 72, 13 Fd Regt RA, Belfast (Musgrave Pk)

24 Jul 72 - 29 Sep 72, 1 COLDM GDS, Londonderry (Creggan)

24 Jul 72 - 01 Dec 72, LG, Regt, Belfast (E Belfast (Inf role))

24 Jul 72 - 01 Dec 72, 4/7 DG, C Sqn, Maidstone/RUC Castlereagh (Inf Role with LG)

24 Jul 72 - 21 Nov 72, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn, Antrim

26 Jul 72 - 24 Nov 72, 1 LI, Belfast (Ardoyne)

27 Jul 72 - 29 Nov 72, 2 SG, Londonderry (Creggan)

28 Jul 72 - 06 Oct 72, 1 QO HLDRS, R(S) (Dungannon)

28 Jul 72 - 28 Nov 72, 1 A and SH, R(S) (Bessbrook)

28 Jul 72 - 01 Sep 72, 42 Cdo RM, Belfast (East Belfast (8 Cdo Lt Bty att))

29 Jul 72 - 29 Nov 72, 2 QUEENS, Londonderry (Creggan)

29 Jul 72 - 29 Nov 72, 1 PARA, Belfast (Ardoyne)

29 Jul 72 - 28 Sep 72, 2 PARA, Belfast (Springfield)

29 Jul 72 - 01 Nov 72, 37 Engr Regt, Tp 10 Sqn, Long Kesh (att 33 Fd Sqn)

29 Jul 72 - 01 Nov 72, 33 Indep Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

30 Jul 72 - 19 Nov 73, 1 RGJ, Belfast (Andersonstown)

30 Jul 72 - 16 Sep 72, 22 Engr Regt, 6 Fd Sqn30 Jul 72 - 31 Jul 72, 32 Armd Engr Regt, 26 Sqn

01 Aug 72 - 16 Sep 72, 22 Engr Regt, Tac HQ

02 Aug 72 - 06 Dec 72, 2 R ANGLIAN, Belfast (Hastings St)

06 Aug 72 - 29 Aug 72, 3 QUEENS, Londonderry (Creggan)

08 Aug 72 - 16 Sep 72, 36 Engr Regt, 50 Fd Sqn, Carnmoney

09 Aug 72 - 09 Sep 72, 8 Cdo Lt Bty, Belfast (East Belfast (Att 42 Cdo RM))

18 Aug 72 - 18 Sep 72, 21 Engr Regt, 1 Fd Sqn

23 Aug 72 - 11 Dec 72, 3 RGJ, Belfast (Springfield)

01 Sep 72 - 16 Nov 72, 3 RHA, Regt, Londonderry (Victoria RUC Stn/Bogside)

04 Sep 72 - 05 Jan 73, 1 STAFFORDS, R(S) (Armagh)

12 Sep 72 - 12 Jan 73, 1 RHA, Regt, R (S) (Long Kesh)

15 Sep 72 - 15 Jan 73, 9/12 L, C Sqn, Gosford Castle

17 Sep 72 - 17 Oct 72, 14/20 H, Air Sqn, Aldergrove

05 Oct 72 - 24 Feb 73, 1 GREEN HOWARDS, Belfast (Suffolk)

05 Oct 72 - 07 Feb 73, 17/21 L, A Sqn, Gosford Castle

13 Oct 72 - 13 Feb 73, 36 Engr Regt, 20 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

16 Oct 72 - 16 Feb 73, 1 QUEENS, Belfast (New Lodge/Unity)

19 Oct 72 - 28 Feb 73, 25 Fd Regt RA, Londonderry (Fort George)

01 Nov 72 - 28 Feb 73, 39 Engr Regt, 60 Fd Sqn, Long Kesh

03 Nov 72 - 03 Mar 73, RH, A Sqn, R&B (Aldergrove)

07 Nov 72 - 09 Mar 73, 58 Lt AD Bty, Att 7 RHA

08 Nov 72 - 11 Mar 73, 7 RHA, Regt, Belfast (City Centre)

08 Nov 72 - 06 Mar 73, 21 Engr Regt, 1 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

11 Nov 72 - 05 Jul 73, 1 KINGS OWN BORDER, BKL

14 Nov 72 - 17 Mar 72, 16 Regt RA, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)

17 Nov 72 - 02 Mar 73, 1 KOSB, Belfast (Andersonstown)

20 Nov 72 - 22 Mar 73, 22 Engr Regt, 3 Fd Sqn, Antrim

23 Nov 72 - 11 Mar 73, 3 LI, Belfast (Aldergrove)

27 Nov 72 - 27 Mar 73, 1 GREN GDS, Londonderry (Greggan)

27 Nov 72 - 27 Mar 73, 1 R HAMPS, R(S) (Bessbrook)

04 Dec 72 - 04 Apr 73, 1 QLR, Belfast (Hastings St)

10 Dec 72 - 30 Mar 73, 2 COLDM GDS, Belfast (Springfield)

29 Dec 72 - 30 Mar 73, 26 Engr Regt, 25 Fd Sqn, Belfast (East Belfast (att 35 Engr Regt))

29 Dec 72 - 30 Mar 73, 35 Engr Regt, Belfast (East Belfast (25 Fd Sqn, 26 Engr Regt att))

1973

05 Jan 73 - 03 May 73, 3 RRF, R(S) (Armagh)

12 Jan 73 - 03 May 73, 3 RTR, Regt, R(S) (Long Kesh (Inf Role C Sqn 15/19 H att 1xSqn in Fermanagh))

15 Jan 73 - 17 May 73, 15/19 H, A Sqn, Portadown

07 Feb 73 - 05 Jun 73, 17/21 L, B Sqn, Gosford Castle

12 Feb 73 - 12 Jun 73, 38 Engr Regt, 48 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

14 Feb 73 - 14 Jun 73, 8 Cdo Lt Bty, Att 42 Cdo RM

15 Feb 73 - 14 Jun 73, 42 Cdo RM, Belfast (New Lodge/Unity (8 Cdo Lt Bty att))

22 Feb 73 - 24 Jun 73, 1 CHESHIRE, Belfast (Suffolk/ Dunmurry/Lisburn)

23 Feb 73 - 24 Jun 73, 40 Fd Regt, Londonderry & Belfast (Fort George/Ballymurphy)

28 Feb 73 - 29 Jun 73, 1 GORDONS, Belfast (Andersonstown)

01 Mar 73 - 15 Mar 73, 2 GREN GDS, Belfast

01 Mar 73 - 23 Mar 73, 2 RRF, Belfast (Carnmoney)

03 Mar 73 - 29 Jun 73, Para Sqn RAC, Aldergrove

06 Mar 73 - 06 Jul 73, 26 Engr Regt, 5 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly/Long Kesh

10 Mar 73 - 26 Sep 74, 1 DWR, BKY

10 Mar 73 - 13 Jul 73, 3 PARA, Belfast (Ardoyne)

10 Mar 73 - 14 Jul 73, 49 Fd Regt, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)

15 Mar 73 - 27 Mar 73, 1 A and SH, Belfast (HMS Maidstone (Border Poll))

15 Mar 73 - 17 Jul 73, 22 Regt RA, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)

20 Mar 73 - 24 Jul 73, 9 Indept Para Sqn RE, Antrim

26 Mar 73 - 26 Jul 73, 3 R ANGLIAN, Londonderry (South Enclave/Creggan)

27 Mar 73 - 17 Jul 73, 2 PARA, R(S) (Bessbrook)

27 Mar 73 - 31 Jul 73, 36 Hy AD Regt, Belfast (East Belfast)

30 Mar 73 - 26 Jul 73, 2 LI, Belfast (Springfield/Clonard)

03 Apr 73 - 02 Aug 73, 1 GLOSTERS, Belfast (Hastings St)

02 May 73 - 04 Sep 73, 32 Regt RA, R(S) (Long Kesh)

03 May 73 - 04 Sep 73, 1 SG, R(S) (Armagh)

15 May 73 - 19 Sep 73, 9/12 L, B Sqn, Gosford Castle

17 May 73 - 22 Nov 74, 1 RTR, Regt, Omagh (att 13/18 H)

05 Jun 73 - 03 Oct 73, 17/21 L, C Sqn, Gosford Castle

06 Jun 73 - 17 Oct 73, 7 Cdo Lt Bty, Att 40 Cdo RM

12 Jun 73 - 17 Oct 73, 38 Engr Regt, 11 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

14 Jun 73 - 17 Oct 73, 40 Cdo RM, Belfast (Unity/New Lodge)

22 Jun 73 - 01 Nov 73, SCOTS DG, D Sqn, Aldergrove

23 Jun 73 - 26 Oct 73, 20 Med Regt, Londonderry (Shantallow/North Enclave)

24 Jun 73 - 21 Oct 73, QOH, Regt, Belfast (Suffolk/Dunmurry/Lisburn)

26 Jun 73 - 30 Oct 73, 2 RRF, Belfast (Monagh)

04 Jul 73 - 05 Nov 73, 21 Engr Regt, 4 Fd Sqn, Shackleton Bks/Maze

05 Jul 73 - 10 Jan 75, 1 DERR, BKL

10 Jul 73 - 12 Nov 73, 2 GREN GDS, Belfast (Ardoyne/Shankill)

10 Jul 73 - 08 Nov 73, 42 Hy Regt, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)

16 Jul 73 - 16 Nov 73, 1 LI, R(S) (Bessbrook, Belfast)

16 Jul 73 - 15 Nov 73, 47 Regt RA, 47 Lt Regt, R(N) (Bogside/City Centre/Brandywell)

24 Jul 73 - 22 Nov 73, 22 Engr Regt, 34 Fd Sqn, Antrim

26 Jul 73 - 27 Nov 73, 2 R ANGLIAN, Londonderry (South Enclave/Creggan)

26 Jul 73 - 28 Nov 73, 3 RGJ, Belfast (Springfield/Clonard/Beechmount)

01 Aug 73 - 02 Dec 73, 17/21 L, Air Sqn, Ballykelly

01 Aug 73 - 30 Nov 73, 25 Engr Regt, Belfast (East Belfast)

04 Aug 73 - 04 Dec 73, 1 RGJ, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row)

01 Sep 73 - 05 Mar 75, 1 RRF, ERB

04 Sep 73 - 03 Jan 74, 1 R HAMPS, R(S) (Armagh)

04 Sep 73 - 03 Jan 74, 2 Fd Regt, Regt, R(S) (Long Kesh)

17 Sep 73 - 17 Jan 74, 2 RTR, Badger, Gosford Castle

03 Oct 73 - 17 Oct 72, 14/20 H, B Sqn, Gosford Castle

15 Oct 73 - 13 Feb 74, 33 Indep Fd Sqn, Castledillon

16 Oct 73 - 14 Feb 74, 1 QUEENS, Belfast (New Lodge/Unity)

27 Oct 73 - 27 Feb 74, 39 Fd Regt RA, 39 Med Regt, Londonderry (Shantallow/North Enclave)

30 Oct 73 - 31 Mar 74, 1 D and D, Belfast (Monagh)

01 Nov 73 - 28 Feb 74, RHG/D, C Sqn, Aldergrove

05 Nov 73 - 05 Mar 74, 23 Engr Regt, 37 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

08 Nov 73 - 07 Mar 74, 13 Fd Regt RA, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)

12 Nov 73 - 24 Feb 74, 1 A and SH, Belfast (Shankill/Ardoyne)

14 Nov 73 - 07 Mar 74, 1 WG, R(S) (Bessbrook (2xCoy in Belfast))

15 Nov 73 - 14 Mar 74, 94 Loc Regt, Londonderry (Bogside/City)

22 Nov 73 - 21 Mar 74, 22 Engr Regt, 8 Fd Sqn, Antrim

27 Nov 73 - 27 Mar 74, 2 SG, Belfast (Ballymurphy/Springfield)

27 Nov 73 - 28 Mar 74, 2 QUEENS, Londonderry (Creggan)

30 Nov 73 - 15 May 75, 1 RRW, HWD

04 Dec 73 - 04 Apr 74, 1 QO HLDRS, B (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row)

1974

03 Jan 74 - 03 May 74, 3 RRF, R(S) (Armagh)

03 Jan 74 - 03 May 74, 32 Armd Engr Regt, R(S) (Long Kesh (26 Armd Engr Sqn att))

17 Jan 74 - 15 May 74, 2 RTR, Ajax, Gosford Castle

04 Feb 74 - 04 Feb 74, 14/20 H, A Sqn, Gosford Castle

12 Feb 74 - 12 Jun 74, 22 Engr Regt, 52 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

14 Feb 74 - 13 Jun 74, 42 Cdo RM, Belfast (New Lodge/Unity)

24 Feb 74 - 21 Jun 74, 3 PARA, Belfast (Shankill/Ardoyne)

27 Feb 74 - 27 Jul 74, 1 RHF, Belfast (Andersonstown)

27 Feb 74 - 19 Jun 74, RHG/D, B Sqn, Aldergrove

27 Feb 74 - 31 May 74, QDG, Regt, Londonderry (Shantallow/Enclave)

05 Mar 74 - 27 Jun 74, 35 Engr Regt, 29 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

06 Mar 74 - 03 Jul 74, 4 R ANGLIAN, Tiger Coy, R(S) (Portadown)

07 Mar 74 - 04 Jul 74, 1 RHA, Regt, Belfast (City Centre)

07 Mar 74 - 02 Jul 74, 7 RHA, Regt, R (Bessbrook)

15 Mar 74 - 15 Jul 74, 16 Regt RA, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)

20 Mar 74 - 24 Jul 74, 39 Engr Regt, Tp 48 Sqn, Antrim (att 59 Indep Cdo Sqn RE)

20 Mar 74 - 24 Jul 74, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn, Antrim (Tp 48 Fd Sqn, 39 Engr Regt att)

26 Mar 74 - 26 Jul 74, 1 GREN GDS, Londonderry (Greggan/S Enclave)

27 Mar 74 - 25 Jul 74, 1 CHESHIRE, Belfast (Ballymurphy/ Springfield/Whiterock)

04 Apr 74 - 01 May 74, 1 RGJ, R(S) (2xCoy)

04 Apr 74 - 01 May 74, 2 RGJ, Armagh

05 Apr 74 - 06 Aug 74, 3 LI, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row)

27 Apr 74 - 29 Aug 74, 1 GREEN HOWARDS, R(S) (Portadown)

01 May 74 - 11 Sep 74, LG, Regt, R(S) (Armagh (Recce Gp RAC 2 Sqns))

02 May 74 - 27 Aug 74, SCOTS DG, Regt, R(S) (Long Kesh (Inf role))

19 May 74 - 01 Jun 74, 36 Engr Regt, Det 61 Fd Sp Sqn, Att 50 Fd Sqn

19 May 74 - 01 Jun 74, 36 Engr Regt, 50 Fd Sqn

20 May 74 - 04 Jun 74, 1 LI, Belfast (UWC Strike)

23 May 74 - 04 Jun 74, 1 QUEENS, Belfast (RUC Sunnyside)

27 May 74 - 03 Jun 74, 38 Engr Regt, 11 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

11 Jun 74 - 13 Oct 74, 22 Engr Regt, 3 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

12 Jun 74 - 23 Oct 74, T Lt AD Bty, Belfast (Unity/New Lodge/Ardoyne (Att 4 Fd Regt))

13 Jun 74 - 11 Oct 74, 4 Fd Regt, Regt, Belfast (Unit/New lodge/Ardoyne (T Lt AD Bty att))

19 Jun 74 - 31 Aug 74, RHG/D, A Sqn, Aldergrove

21 Jun 74 - 20 Sep 74, 20 Med Regt, Belfast (Shankill/Ardoyne)

26 Jun 74 - 24 Oct 74, 1 BW, Belfast (Monagh)

26 Jun 74 - 01 Nov 74, 25 Engr Regt, 16 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

02 Jul 74 - 05 Nov 74, 45 Cdo RM, R(S) (Bessbrook (145 Cdo Lt Bty att))

02 Jul 74 - 06 Nov 74, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn, Condor Tp

03 Jul 74 - 06 Nov 74, 45 Fd Regt RA, Belfast (City Centre/ Ballymacarratt)

04 Jul 74 - 04 Nov 74, 145 Cdo Lt Bty, R(S) (Bessbrook (Att 45 Cdo RM))

08 Jul 74 - 07 Nov 74, 26 Engr Regt, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre (73 Amph Engr Sqn att))

08 Jul 74 - 08 Nov 74, 28 Amph Engr Regt, 71 Sqn Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)

23 Jul 74 - 31 Aug 92, 33 Indep Fd Sqn, Antrim (RE Resident)

24 Jul 74 - 21 Nov 74, 1 STAFFORDS, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

25 Jul 74 - 01 Nov 74, 3 RGJ, B (Ballymurphy/Springfield)

31 Jul 74 - 29 Nov 74, 14/20 H, Air Sqn, Ballykelly

06 Aug 74 - 04 Dec 74, 1 GLOSTERS, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row)

28 Aug 74 - 29 Dec 74, SCOTS DG, D Sqn, Aldergrove

28 Aug 74 - 16 Dec 74, RH, Regt, R(S) (Long Kesh)

01 Sep 74 - 16 Dec 74, 1 R ANGLIAN, R(S) (Portadown)

10 Sep 74 - 07 Jan 75, 3 RTR, Regt, R(S) (Armagh (Recce Gp RAC, 2x Sqns))

26 Sep 74 - 27 Mar 76, 1 WFR, BKY

05 Oct 74 - 13 Oct 74, 42 Cdo RM, R(S) (Portadown/Newry/Bessbrook)

06 Oct 74 - 05 Feb 75, 38 Engr Regt, 32 Fd Sqn, Belfast (Ardoyne)

09 Oct 74 - 04 Feb 75, 32 Regt RA, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge (32 Fd Sqn RE att)

13 Oct 74 - 13 Feb 75, 9 Indept Para Sqn RE, Castledillon

17 Oct 74 - 27 Oct 74, 1 RWF, Belfast, R(S) (Long Kesh (A Coy 26 Oct - 08 Nov))

17 Oct 74 - 26 Oct 74, 22 Engr Regt, Tp 34 Sqn, Antrim

24 Oct 74 - 25 Feb 75, 2 RRF, Belfast (Monagh)

31 Oct 74 - 28 Feb 75, 35 Engr Regt, 29 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

01 Nov 74 - 28 Feb 75, 2 RGJ, Belfast (Ballymurphy/Springfield/ Whiterock)

04 Nov 74 - 04 Mar 75, 49 Fd Regt, Belfast (City Centre/ Unity/Markets)

05 Nov 74 - 05 Mar 75, 22 Regt RA, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)

12 Nov 74 - 02 Dec 74, 3 PARA, R(S) (Bessbrook)

18 Nov 74 - 21 May 76, 15/19 H, Regt, OM

20 Nov 74 - 19 Mar 75, 3 R ANGLIAN, Londonderry (Enclave/Creggan/ Shantallow)

04 Dec 74 - 04 Apr 75, 1 KINGS OWN BORDER, Belfast (Falls/Divis/ Sandy Row/Unity/Shankill)

12 Dec 74 - 11 Apr 75, 32 Armd Engr Regt, 31 Sqn, Long Kesh

16 Dec 74 - 16 Apr 75, 1 RGJ, R(S) (Bessbrook)

16 Dec 74 - 10 Apr 75, 21 Engr Regt, R(S) (Long Kesh/Lurgan/St Angelo (31 Armd Engr Sqn att))

28 Dec 74 - 29 Apr 75, 4/7 DG, Recce Sqn, Aldergrove

1975

08 Jan 75 - 08 May 75, 9/12 L, Regt, R(S) (Armagh (Recce Gp RAC))

10 Jan 75 - 18 Jul 76, 1 QLR, BKL

10 Jan 75 - 08 Mar 75, 39 Engr Regt, Tp 48 Sqn

04 Feb 75 - 29 May 75, 1 QUEENS, Belfast (New Lodge/Ardoyne)

13 Feb 75 - 12 Jun 75, 38 Engr Regt, 51 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

25 Feb 75 - 24 Jun 75, 40 Cdo RM, Belfast (Monagh)

27 Feb 75 - 27 Jun 75, 25 Engr Regt, 12 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

28 Feb 75 - 02 Jul 95, 1 RWF, Belfast (Ballymurphy/Springfield/ Whiterock)

03 Mar 75 - 03 Jul 75, 40 Fd Regt, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)

05 Mar 75 - 17 Sep 76, 1 KINGS, ERB

06 Mar 75 - 06 Jul 75, 5 Regt RA, 5 Fd Regt, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre (Unit retitled))

19 Mar 75 - 10 Jul 75, 2 LI, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

04 Apr 75 - 05 Aug 75, 1 SG, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row/Shankill)

09 Apr 75 - 15 Aug 75, 1 GREEN HOWARDS, R(S) (Bessbrook)

11 Apr 75 - 02 Aug 75, 27 Fd Regt, R(S) (Long Kesh/Portadown/Lurgan)

29 Apr 75 - 28 Aug 75, RHG/D, C Sqn, Aldergrove

06 May 75 - 04 Sep 75, 2 RTR, Regt, R(S) (Armagh (Recce Gp RAC (2xSqn))

15 May 75 - 15 Nov 76, 1 KOSB, HWD

29 May 75 - 27 Sep 75, 2 PARA, Belfast (New Lodge/Ardoyne)

07 Jun 75 - 17 Jun 75, 3 PARA, Glenshane Pass

12 Jun 75 - 11 Oct 75, 22 Engr Regt, 34 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

24 Jun 75 - 27 Oct 75, 1 BW, Belfast (Monagh)

27 Jun 75 - 24 Oct 75, 25 Engr Regt, 39 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

01 Jul 75 - 01 Nov 75, 1 RHF, Belfast (Ballymurphy/Springfield/ Whiterock)

03 Jul 75 - 03 Nov 75, 25 Fd Regt RA, 25 Fd Regt, Belfast (City Centre/ Markets (Unit retitled))

06 Jul 75 - 06 Nov 75, 2 Fd Regt, Regt, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)

09 Jul 75 - 11 Nov 75, 1 PWO, Londonderry (Creggan/Shantallow Enclave)

11 Jul 75 - 13 Jul 75, 1 A and SH, Spearhead (July Marches, Tac HQx1 Coy)

05 Aug 75 - 02 Dec 75, 2 R ANGLIAN, Belfast (Hastings St)

07 Aug 75 - 05 Dec 75, 26 Regt RA, 26 Fd Regt, R(S) (Long Kesh/ Portadown/Lurgan)

16 Aug 75 - 16 Dec 75, 3 RRF, R(S) (Bessbrook)

28 Aug 75 - 30 Dec 75, Para Sqn RAC, Aldergrove

04 Sep 75 - 04 Jan 76, 13/18 H, Regt, R(S) (Armagh/Aughnacloy/Dungannon (Recce Gp RAC))

06 Sep 75 - 07 Oct 75, 1 LI, R(S) (South Armagh (Spearhead))

09 Sep 75 - 24 Oct 75, 3 PARA, South Armagh

27 Sep 75 - 24 Jan 76, 47 Regt RA, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge (79 Cdo Lt Bty att))

27 Sep 75 - 24 Jan 76, 79 Cdo Lt Bty, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge (Att 47 Lt Regt))

07 Oct 75 - 13 Oct 75, 42 Cdo RM, R(S) (Armagh (Spearhead))

11 Oct 75 - 11 Feb 76, 22 Engr Regt, 8 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

23 Oct 75 - 23 Feb 76, 23 Engr Regt, 37 Fd Sqn, Bellykelly

27 Oct 75 - 27 Feb 76, 3 QUEENS, Belfast (Monagh)

01 Nov 75 - 02 Mar 76, 1 COLDM GDS, Belfast (Ballymurphy/ Springfield/Whiterock)

03 Nov 75 - 03 Mar 76, 17/21 L, Regt, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)

05 Nov 75 - 13 Dec 75, 38 Engr Regt, 11 Fd Sqn, Maze/Armagh

06 Nov 75 - 09 Mar 76, 42 Hy Regt, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)

11 Nov 75 - 16 Mar 76, 3 LI, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

02 Dec 75 - 02 Apr 76, 1 A and SH, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row)

05 Dec 75 - 06 Apr 76, 39 Fd Regt RA, R(S) (Aughnacloy/Maze/Lurgan)

08 Dec 75 - 10 Apr 76, 1 RTR, Air Sqn, Aldergrove/Ballykelly (att AAC Sqn)

16 Dec 75 - 15 Apr 76, 1 RS, R(S) (Bessbrook)

30 Dec 75 - 29 Apr 76, LG, B Sqn, Aldergrove

1976

04 Jan 76 - 05 May 76, QDG, Regt, R(S) (Armagh/Dungannon (Recce Gp RAC))

07 Jan 76 - 14 Jan 76, 2 QUEENS, R(S) (South Armagh (Spearhead, 2xCoy, Whitecross murders))

08 Jan 76 - 09 Mar 76, 1 DWR, R(S) (Armagh (Spearhead, 2xCoy, 2 QUEENS att))

24 Jan 76 - 25 May 76, 3 RHA, Regt, Belfast (North Queen St)

25 Jan 76 - 09 Mar 76, 9 Indept Para Sqn RE, Tp

12 Feb 76 - 11 Jun 76, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn, Castledillon

22 Feb 76 - 23 Jun 76, 35 Engr Regt, 29 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

27 Feb 76 - 22 Jun 76, 42 Cdo RM, Belfast (Monagh/Andersonstown)

02 Mar 76 - 19 Jun 76, 1 RRF, Belfast (Springfield/Whiterock/ Ballymurphy)

03 Mar 76 - 09 Jun 76, 1 RHA, Regt, Belfast (Grand Central/City Centre)

09 Mar 76 - 06 Apr 76, 3 RRF, R (Armagh, Spearhead)

09 Mar 76 - 03 Jun 76, 28 Amph Engr Regt, 73 Fd Sqn, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)

09 Mar 76 - 30 Jun 76, 32 Armd Engr

Regt, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre (73 Indep Engr Sqn att))

09 Mar 76 - 11 Apr 76, 39 Engr Regt, Tp 60 Sqn, Castledillon

15 Mar 76 - 09 Jul 76, 1 CHESHIRE, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

27 Mar 76 - 04 Oct 77, 1 R HAMPS, BKY

03 Apr 76 - 02 Aug 76, 1 STAFFORDS, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row)

05 Apr 76 - 05 May 76, 1 GREEN HOWARDS, R (Spearhead)

06 Apr 76 - 27 Jul 76, 4 RTR, Regt, R(S) (Lurgan/Long Kesh/Portadown)

15 Apr 76 - 17 Aug 76, 3 PARA, R(S) (Bessbrook)

29 Apr 76 - 26 Aug 76, 4/7 DG, B Sqn, Aldergrove

04 May 76 - 27 Aug 76, SCOTS DG, Regt, R (Dungannon (Recce Gp RAC))

12 May 76 - 12 Jun 76, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn, Condor Tp

22 May 76 - 25 Nov 77, 9/12 L, Regt, R(S) (OMA))

25 May 76 - 24 Sep 76, 4 Fd Regt, Regt, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge (42 Lt AD Bty att))

25 May 76 - 24 Sep 76, 22 Regt RA, 42 AD Bty, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge (att 4 Fd Regt))

09 Jun 76 - 10 Oct 76, 45 Fd Regt RA, Belfast (City Centre/ Ballymacarratt)

11 Jun 76 - 11 Oct 76, 22 Engr Regt, 3 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

15 Jun 76 - 15 Jul 76, 39 Engr Regt, Tp 48 Sqn

17 Jun 76 - 20 Oct 76, 1 KINGS OWN BORDER, Belfast (Springfield)

22 Jun 76 - 23 Oct 76, 26 Engr Regt, 25 Fd Sqn, R (Ballykelly)

25 Jun 76 - 26 Oct 76, 2 RRF, R(S) (Armagh)

29 Jun 76 - 24 Sep 76, 16 Regt RA, R(S) (Armagh/Dungammon (Unit retitled))

09 Jul 76 - 16 Nov 76, 1 QUEENS, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

18 Jul 76 - 25 Jan 78, 1 BW, BKL

25 Jul 76 - 28 Nov 76, 16/5 L, Regt, R(S) (Maze/Lurgan/Portadown)

02 Aug 76 - 02 Dec 76, 2 LI, Belfast (Falls/Divis/Sandy Row/Shankill)

15 Aug 76 - 17 Mar 78, 2 COLDM GDS, ERB

17 Aug 76 - 16 Dec 76, 40 Cdo RM, R(S) (Bessbrook)

26 Aug 76 - 29 Dec 76, 94 Loc Regt, 73 Bty, Aldergrove - R Div Sqn (normally RAC role)

28 Aug 76 - 29 Dec 76, RH, Regt, R (Dungannon (Recce Gp RAC))

24 Sep 76 - 20 Jan 77, 32 Regt RA, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge)

24 Sep 76 - 30 Dec 76, 21 Engr Regt, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)

25 Sep 76 - 31 Dec 76, 32 Armd Engr Regt, 2 Sqn, Londonderry (Bogside/City Centre)

11 Oct 76 - 11 Feb 77, 49 Fd Regt, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)

11 Oct 76 - 10 Feb 77, 9 Indept Para Sqn RE, Castledillon

20 Oct 76 - 20 Feb 77, 1 RWF, B (Monagh)

23 Oct 76 - 23 Jun 77, 28 Amph Engr Regt, 64 Sqn, Ballykelly

23 Oct 76 - 24 Feb 77, 35 Engr Regt, 42 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

27 Oct 76 - 27 Jan 77, 1 GREN GDS, R(S) (Armagh)

15 Nov 76 - 20 May 78, 1 GORDONS, HWD

16 Nov 76 - 17 Mar 77, 2 SG, Londonderry

27 Nov 76 - 29 Mar 77, 36 Hy AD Regt, R(S) (Maze)

02 Dec 76 - 16 Mar 77, 2 PARA, Belfast (Ballymurphy/Springfield/ Whiterock)

15 Dec 76 - 26 Apr 77, 1 RHF, Bessbrook

29 Dec 76 - 28 Apr 77, RHG/D, Regt, Londonderry (Shantallow/Enclave (2 Sqn Gp))

29 Dec 76 - 28 Apr 77, 3 RTR, A Sqn, Dungannon

1977

20 Jan 77 - 13 May 77, 1 D and D, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge)

26 Jan 77 - 24 May 77, 12 AD Regt, R(S) (Armagh/Cookstown (Unit retitled))

10 Feb 77 - 09 Jun 77, 25 Fd Regt RA, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)

10 Feb 77 - 14 Jun 77, 39 Engr Regt, 53 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

16 Mar 77 - 28 Jun 77, 2 R ANGLIAN, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)

17 Mar 77 - 13 Jul 77, 1 PWO, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

29 Mar 77 - 28 Jul 77, 2 Fd Regt, Regt, R(S) (Lurgan/Maze/Portadown)

19 Apr 77 - 14 Aug 77, 1 WFR, R(S) (Bessbrook)

28 Apr 77 - 02 Sep 77, LG, B Sqn, Dungannon

28 Apr 77 - 29 Aug 77, 1 RTR, Regt, Londonderry (Shantallow/Enclave (2 Sqn Gp))

01 May 77 - 19 May 77, 1 RWF, Belfast

02 May 77 - 12 Jun 77, 1 RRF, Spearhead

02 May 77 - 22 May 77, 3 RGJ, Belfast

02 May 77 - 17 May 77, 22 Engr Regt, 3 Fd Sqn

02 May 77 - 17 May 77, 22 Engr Regt, 52 Fd Sqn

02 May 77 - 17 May 77, 36 Engr Regt, 20 Fd Sqn, 2xTps 52 Fd Sqn att

18 May 77 - 20 Sep 77, 1 RGJ, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge)

24 May 77 - 27 Sep 77, QOH, Regt, R(S) (Armagh/Dungannon)

09 Jun 77 - 07 Oct 77, 2 Armd Div Engr Regt, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)

14 Jun 77 - 10 Oct 77, 22 Engr Regt, 8 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

21 Jun 77 - 20 Oct 77, 45 Cdo RM, Belfast (Monagh (Condor Tp, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn RE att))

21 Jun 77 - 20 Oct 77, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn, Condor Tp, Belfast (Monagh (att 45 Cdo RM))

28 Jun 77 - 28 Oct 77, 3 LI, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)

28 Jun 77 - 24 Oct 77, 2 Armd Div Engr Regt, 43 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

09 Jul 77 - 09 Nov 77, 1 DWR, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

29 Jul 77 - 30 Nov 77, 27 Fd Regt, R(S) (Lurgan/Maze/Portadown (Unit retitled))

05 Aug 77 - 09 Dec 77, 1 QLR, R(S) (Bessbrook)

06 Aug 77 - 15 Aug 77, 1 SG, Belfast (Royal Visit)

30 Aug 77 - 28 Dec 77, 2 RTR, Regt, Londonderry (Shantallow/Enclave/Magherafelt)

02 Sep 77 - 04 Jan 78, LG, A Sqn, Dungannon

19 Sep 77 - 14 Jan 78, 2 PARA, NIPG only

27 Sep 77 - 24 Jan 78, 5 Regt RA, 5 Hy Regt, R(S) Armagh (Unit retitled)

04 Oct 77 - 05 Mar 79, 1 GLOSTERS, BKY

10 Oct 77 - 12 Feb 78, 47 Regt RA, 47 Fd Regt, Belfast (City Centre/Markets (Unit retitled))

11 Oct 77 - 09 Feb 78, 39 Engr Regt, 48 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

28 Oct 77 - 27 Feb 78, 1 A and SH, B (Springfield/Falls)

09 Nov 77 - 13 Mar 78, 2 GREN GDS, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

25 Nov 77 - 25 Nov 79, 13/18 H   Regt, R(S) (OMA)

30 Nov 77 - 30 Mar 78, 26 Regt RA, R(S) (Lurgan/Maze/Portadown)

09 Dec 77 - 01 Apr 78, 2 RGJ, R(S) (Bessbrook)

28 Dec 77 - 01 Feb 78, 4/7 DG, Regt, Various (RHQ + 2 Sqns)

1978

03 Jan 78 - 27 Apr 78, LG, C Sqn, Londonderry

12 Jan 78 - 11 May 78, 39 Fd Regt RA, 39 Fd Regt, Ardoyne/New Lodge (Unit retitled)

24 Jan 78 - 28 Apr 78, 4 Armd Div Engr Regt, Armagh (Unit retitled)

25 Jan 78 - 27 Jul 79, 2 LI, BKL

09 Feb 78 - 09 Jun 78, 36 Engr Regt, 20 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

12 Feb 78 - 03 Jun 78, 4 RTR, Regt, Belfast (City Centre/Markets)

21 Feb 78 - 20 Jun 78, 3 PARA, Belfast (Monagh)

23 Feb 78 - 23 Jun 78, 35 Engr Regt, 42 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

27 Feb 78 - 28 Jun 78, 41 Cdo RM, Belfast (Spring/Falls)

02 Mar 78 - 02 Jul 78, 16/5 L, Tp, Omagh (att 13/18 H)

02 Mar 78 - 03 Jul 78, 2 RTR, Tp, Omagh (att 13/18 H)

13 Mar 78 - 13 Jul 78, 1 CHESHIRE, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

16 Mar 78 - 01 Sep 79, 3 RGJ, ERB

28 Mar 78 - 28 Jul 78, 7 RHA, Regt, R(S) (Lurgan/Maze/Portadown (37 Loc Bty & 2xTp 1 RHA att))

31 Mar 78 - 29 Jul 78, 1 RHA, 2 x Tps, R(S) (Lurgan/Maze (att 7 RHA))

31 Mar 78 - 30 Nov 78, 38 Engr Regt, 11 Fd Sqn, Ballykinler

08 Apr 78 - 15 Jul 78, 1 PARA, R(S) (Bessbrook)

27 Apr 78 - 27 Aug 78, 1 QO HLDRS, R(S) (Armagh/Dungannon)

11 May 78 - 12 Sep 78, 49 Fd Regt, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge)

20 May 78 - 16 Nov 79, 3 R ANGLIAN, HWD

03 Jun 78 - 01 Oct 78, RH, Regt, Belfast (City Centre/Markets (Tp 151/9 H att))

09 Jun 78 - 10 Oct 78, 38 Engr Regt, 51 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

20 Jun 78 - 10 Oct 78, 1 QUEENS, Belfast (Monagh)

23 Jun 78 - 25 Oct 78, 21 Engr Regt, 1 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

28 Jun 78 - 28 Oct 78, 1 LI, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)

02 Jul 78 - 03 Nov 78, 15/19 H, 2 x Tps, Omagh (att 13/18 H)

07 Jul 78 - 07 Nov 78, 2 RRF, Londonderry

15 Jul 78 - 15 Nov 78, 42 Cdo RM, R(S) (Bessbrook)

28 Jul 78 - 20 Nov 79, 3 Armd Div Engr Regt, Lurgan/Maze

04 Aug 78 - 30 Aug 78, 45 Cdo RM, Spearhead

12 Aug 78 - 20 Mar 80, 1 GREEN HOWARDS, Aldergrove Resident

27 Aug 78 - 29 Dec 78, 1 SG, R(S) (Armagh/Dungannon)

Sep 78 - Dec 78, 15/19 H, Tp, Belfast (att RH)

12 Sep 78 - 14 Jan 79, 1 KINGS OWN BORDER, Belfast (Ardoyne/New Lodge/City Centre/Markets)

10 Oct 78 - 02 Feb 79, 14/20 H, Regt, Belfast (Monagh (Sqns deployed throughout SW Belfast))

11 Oct 78 - 08 Feb 79, 22 Engr Regt, 3 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

12 Oct 78 - 02 Feb 79, QDG, 2 Tp, A Sqn, Monagh (att 14/20 H)

23 Oct 78 - 22 Feb 79, 28 Amph Engr Regt, 23 Sqn, Ballykelly

29 Oct 78 - 27 Feb 79, 1 COLDM GDS, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)

02 Nov 78 - 07 Mar 79, 16/5 L, Tp, Omagh (att 13/18 H)

03 Nov 78 - 14 Jan 79, QDG, 3 Tp, A Sqn, Omagh (att 13/18 H)

03 Nov 78 - 14 Jan 79, 16/5 L, Tp, Omagh (att 13/18 H)

07 Nov 78 - 07 Mar 79, 1 RWF, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

14 Nov 78 - 07 Mar 79, 1 GREN GDS, R (Bessbrook)

28 Nov 78 - 28 Mar 79, 22 Regt RA, R(S) (Maze/Lurgan (Unit retitled))

29 Dec 78 - 26 Apr 79, 1 RRW, R(S) (Armagh/Dungannon)

1979

13 Jan 79 - 13 May 79, 1 D and D, Belfast (Ardoyne/City Centre)

14 Jan 79 - 13 May 79, 1 RTR, Tp, Omagh (att 13/18 H)

02 Feb 79 – 05 Jun 79, RHG/D, Regt, B Div - Monagh

02 Feb 79 - 05 Jun 79, 16/5 L, Tp, Monagh (att RHG/D)

08 Feb 79 - 07 Jun 79, 38 Engr Regt, 32 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

22 Feb 79 - 21 Jun 79, 2 Armd Div Engr Regt, 12 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

27 Feb 79 - 26 Jun 79, 1 KINGS, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)

05 Mar 79 - 05 Mar 80, 40 Cdo RM, BKY

07 Mar 79 - 05 Jul 79, 3 QUEENS, R(S) (Bessbrook)

07 Mar 79 - 08 Jul 79, 15/19 H, Tp, Omagh (att 13/18 H & 2 RTR)

28 Mar 79 - 26 Jul 79, 1 Armed Div Engr Regt, R(S) (Lurgan/ Maze Portadown)

26 Apr 79 - 06 Aug 79, 2 RGJ, R(S) (Armagh/Dungannon)

07 May 79 - 13 Jul 79, 1 R HAMPS, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

13 May 79 - 15 Sep 79, 1 R ANGLIAN, Belfast (Ardoyne/City Centre)

13 May 79 - 16 Sep 79, QDG, 5 Tp, A Sqn, Omagh (att 2 RTR)

26 May 79 - 19 Nov 80, 2 RTR, Regt, OM

05 Jun 79 - 02 Oct 79, QOH, Regt, Belfast (Monagh)

05 Jun 79 - 02 Oct 79, 16/5 L, Tp, Monagh (att QOH)

08 Jun 79 - 09 Oct 79, 22 Engr Regt, 8 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

12 Jun 79 - 25 Oct 79, 1 QO HLDRS, R(S) (Bessbrook)

21 Jun 79 - 23 Oct 79, 3 Armd Div Engr Regt, 25 Fd Sqn, R (Ballykelly)

26 Jun 79 - 22 Oct 79, 1 KOSB, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)

08 Jul 79 - 07 Nov 79, 1 RTR, Tp, Omagh (att 13/18 H)

09 Jul 79 - 08 Nov 79, 1 DERR, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

26 Jul 79 - 27 Nov 79, 45 Fd Regt RA, 45 Fd Regt, R(S) (Lurgan/Maze/ Portadown (Unit retitled))

27 Jul 79 - 06 Mar 81, 2 PARA, BKL

06 Aug 79 - 06 Dec 79, 1 GORDONS, R(S) (Armagh/Dungannon)

07 Sep 79 - 25 Jan 81, 1 STAFFORDS, ER

16 Sep 79 - 14 Jan 80, 25 Fd Regt RA, Belfast (Ardoyne/City Centre)

02 Oct 79 - 26 Jul 80, 2 Armd Div Engr Regt, 43 Fd Sqn, Belfast (Monagh)

09 Oct 79 - 09 Feb 80, 38 Engr Regt, 11 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

15 Oct 79 - 28 Feb 80, 1 WG, R(S) (Bessbrook)

23 Oct 79 - 16 Feb 80, 1 DWR, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)

23 Oct 79 - 17 Feb 80, 16/5 L, Tp, Omagh (att 2 RTR)

23 Oct 79 - 22 Feb 80, 28 Amph Engr Regt, 73 Fd Sqn

07 Nov 79 - 06 Mar 80, 3 RRF, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

07 Nov 79 - 08 Mar 80, QDG, 4 Tp, A Sqn, Omagh (att 2 RTR)

06/16 Nov 79 - 06 Apr 81, 2 RRF, HWD

27 Nov 79 - 27 Mar 80, 12 AD Regt, R(S) (Lurgan/Maze/Portadown)

06 Dec 79 - 01 Apr 90, 16 Regt RA, TRB

06 Jan 80 - Oct 80, 7 RHA, Regt, R (Bessbrook)

1980

14 Jan 80 - 16 May 80, 27 Fd Regt, Belfast (Ardoyne/City)

08 Feb 80 - 10 Jun 80, 22 Engr Regt, 34 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

16 Feb 80 - 29 May 80, 1 RS, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)

23 Feb 80 - 24 Jun 80, 35 Engr Regt, 37 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

29 Feb 80 - 17 Jun 80, 1 KINGS OWN BORDER, R(S) (Bessbrook)

05 Mar 80 - 05 Mar 82, 1 A and SH, BKY

07 Mar 80 - 14 Jul 80, 2 GREN GDS, Londonderry (West of Foyle)

20 Mar 80 - 10 Nov 81, 1 SG, Aldergrove Resident

25 Mar 80 - 18 Jul 80, 3 RHA, M Bty, Lorgan/Maze (att 16/5 L)

27 Mar 80 - 14 Jul 80, M Bty RHA, Lurgan/Maze (Att 16/5 L)

27 Mar 80 - 15 Jul 80, 16/5 L, Regt, R(S) (Lurgan/Maze (M Bty RHA & 64 Amph Engr Sqn att))

01 Apr 80 - 01 Aug 80, 2 QUEENS, R(S) (Armagh)

15 May 80 - 28 Sep 80, 5 Regt RA, Belfast (Ardoyne/City Centre (Elms 94 Loc Regt att))

16 May 80 - 28 Sep 80, 94 Loc Regt, 152/156 Bty, Belfast (Ardoyne/City Centre (att 5 Hy Regt))

28 May 80 - 12 Oct 80, 2 SG, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)

10 Jun 80 - 23 Oct 80, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn, Castledillon

17 Jun 80 - 30 Oct 80, 41 Cdo RM, R(S) (Bessbrook)

14 Jul 80 - 24 Nov 80, 13 Fd Regt RA, R(S) (Fermanagh/Maze)

01 Aug 80 - 09 Dec 80, 1 RHF, R(S) (Armagh)

23 Aug 80 - 06 Nov 80, 35 Engr Regt, 29 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

28 Sep 80 - 27 Nov 80, SCOTS DG, Regt, Belfast (Ardoyne/City Centre)

11 Oct 80 - 25 Feb 81, 1 RRF, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)

23 Oct 80 - 08 Mar 81, 36 Engr Regt, 9 Para Sqn, Castledillon

30 Oct 80 - 13 Mar 81, 1 QLR, R(S) (Bessbrook)

06 Nov 80 - 20 Mar 81, 32 Armd Engr Regt, 7 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

17 Nov 80 - 24 Nov 82, QDG, Regt, R(S) (OMA)

24 Nov 80 - 11 Apr 81, 39 Fd Regt RA, R(S) (Fermanagh/Maze)

09 Dec 80 - 24 Apr 81, 3 PARA, R(N) (Armagh)

1981

27 Jan 81 - 27 Jan 83, 2 R ANGLIAN, ERB

26 Feb 81 - 08 Jul 81, 1 RWF, Belfast (Springfield/Falls)

01/06 Mar 81 - 24 Mar 83, 1 RS, BKL

08 Mar 81 - 22 Jul 81, 22 Engr Regt, 3 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

10 Mar 81 - 25 Aug 81, Catk Bty RHA, Fermanagh/Aughnacloy (Att 5 INNIS DG)

13 Mar 81 - 27 Jul 81, 1 RGJ, R(S) (Bessbrook)

20 Mar 81 - 21 Jul 81, 35 Engr Regt, 42 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

06 Apr 81 - 05 Mar 83, 3 RRF, HWD

10 Apr 81 - 25 Aug 81, 7 RHA, C Bty, Armagh/Fermanagh (att 5 INNIS DG)

10 Apr 81 - 25 Aug 81, 5 INNIS SG, Regt, R(S) (Fermanagh (C Atk Bty RHA att))

06 May 81 - 08 Jun 81, 1 RRW, Belfast (Spearhead)

07 Jul 81 - 15 Nov 81, 45 Cdo RM, B (Springfield/Falls)

21 Jul 81 - 06 Dec 81, 1 Armed Div Engr Regt, Tp 1 Sqn, Castledillon (att 48 Fd Sqn)

21 Jul 81 - 06 Dec 81, 39 Engr Regt, 48 Fd Sqn, Castledillon (Tp 1 Fd Sqn, 21 Engr Regt att)

26 Jul 81 - 11 Dec 81, 1 D and D, R(S) (Bessbrook)

25 Aug 81 - 04 Jan 82, 1 R ANGLIAN, R(S) (Fermanagh)

17 Oct 81 - 29 Dec 71, 1 RS, Belfast (Ligoniel)

10 Nov 81 - 11 Nov 83, 1 RGJ, Aldergrove Resident

15 Nov 81 - 28 Mar 82, 2 RGJ, Belfast (West Belfast)

18 Nov 81 - 26 Jan 82, 1 PARA, R(S) (Armagh/Border)

06 Dec 81 - 20 Apr 82, 1 Armed Div Engr Regt, Tp 4 Sqn, Castledillon (att 8 Fd Sqn)

06 Dec 81 - 19 Apr 82, 22 Engr Regt, 8 Fd Sqn, Castledillon (Tp 4 Fd Sqn, 21 Engr Regt att)

11 Dec 81 - 24 Apr 82, 1 DWR, Bessbrook

1982

04 Jan 82 - 17 May 82, 1 R HAMPS, R(S) (Fermanagh)

05 Mar 82 - 10 Jan 84, 1 CHESHIRE, BKY

28 Mar 82 - 11 Aug 82, 2 COLDM GDS, Belfast (W Belfast)

19 Apr 82 - 02 Sep 82, 38 Engr Regt, 32 Fd Sqn, Castledillon

25 Apr 82 - 07 Sep 82, 2 LI, R(S) (Bessbrook)

17 May 82 - 02 Oct 82, 1 PARA, R(S) (Fermanagh)

11 Aug 82 - 21 Dec 82, 1 WFR, Belfast
    (West Belfast)
03 Sep 82 - 18 Jan 83, 36 Engr Regt, Tp
    20 Sqn, Armagh
07 Sep 82 - 21 Jan 83, 1 COLDM GDS,
    R(S) (South Armagh)
09 Oct 82 - 09 Apr 93, 3 RHA, Regt, DRB
11 Oct 82 - 13 Feb 83, 3 LI, R(S)
    (Fermanagh)
25 Nov 82 - 22 Jan 85, 1 QUEENS, OMA
21 Dec 82 - 03 May 83, 1 BW, Belfast
    (West Belfast)

1983
18 Jan 83 - 30 May 83, 35 Engr Regt, 37
    Fd Sqn, Armagh/Omagh
22 Jan 83 - 05 Jun 83, 40 Cdo RM, R(S)
    (Bessbrook)
25 Jan 83 - 28 Nov 84, 2 QUEENS, ERB
05 Mar 83 - 10 Mar 85, 1 RHF, HWD
24 Mar 83 - 30 Apr 85, 1 D and D, BKL
02 May 83 - 19 Sep 83, 1 LI, Belfast
    (Springfield)
30 May 83 - 16 Oct 83, 2 Armd Div Engr
    Regt, Tp 16 Sqn, Omagh
05 Jun 83 - 06 Oct 83, 1 DERR, R(S)
    (Bessbrook)
Sep/06 Oct 83 - Mar/18 Feb 84, 1 GREN
    GDS, ARB (Rural Armagh)
16 Oct 83 - 16 Feb 84, 28 Amph Engr
    Regt, 64 Sqn, Omagh
11 Nov 83 - 15 Nov 85, 1 QO HLDRS,
    Aldergrove Resident

1984
10 Jan 84 - 04 Feb 86, 1 RRF, BKY
18 Feb 84 - 02 Jul 84, 1 STAFFORDS,
    ARB (Bessbrook)
28 Feb 84 - 12 Jul 84, 1 Armed Div Engr
    Regt, 4 Fd Sqn, Antrim
11 Jun 84 - 05 Oct 84, 1 KINGS, BRB
    (Belfast)
02 Jul 84 - 12 Nov 84, 42 Cdo RM, ARB
    (Bessbrook)
05 Oct 84 - 13 Feb 85, 3 RGJ, Belfast
    (West Belfast)
12 Nov 84 - 26 Mar 85, 2 PARA, ARB
    (Bessbrook)
30 Nov 84 - 15 Jun 87, 1 R ANGLIAN,
    ERB

1985
22 Jan 85 - 25 Nov 86, 3 LI, OMA
13 Feb 85 - 26 Jun 85, 1 GORDONS,
    Belfast (West Belfast)
10 Mar 85 - 12 Feb 87, 1 KINGS OWN
    BORDER, HWD
26 Mar 85 - 06 Aug 85, 1 KOSB, ARB
    (Bessbrook)
30 Apr 85 - 19 May 87, 1 PWO, BKL
03/26 Jun 85 - 05 Nov 85, 1 GREEN
    HOWARDS, Belfast (West
    Belfast)
06 Aug 85 - 17 Dec 85, 3 RRF, ARB
    (Bessbrook)
05 Nov 85 - 05 Mar 86, 2 RGJ, Belfast
    (West Belfast)
15 Nov 85 - 07 Feb 88, 1 DERR,
    Aldergrove Resident
17 Dec 85 - 27 Apr 86, 1 BW, ARB
    (Bessbrook)

1986
01 Jan 86 - 02 Mar 86, 2 R ANGLIAN,
    Op. Cara Cara
02 Feb 86 - 12 Apr 86, 1 KOSB, Op. Cara
    Cara
04 Feb 86 - 14 Mar 88, 1 GREN GDS,
    BKY
04 Feb 86 - 14 Mar 88, 2 GREN GDS,
    BKY
04 Mar 86 - 04 Jul 86, 1 WG, BRB
    (Belfast)
05 Mar 86 - Aug 86, 1 COLDM GDS,
    ARB (Armagh)
13 Mar 86 - 07 Jul 86, 1 RGJ
12 Apr 86 - 28 Jul 86, 1 A and SH, Op.
    Cara Cara
27 Apr 86 - 10 Sep 86, 2 R ANGLIAN,
    ARB (Bessbrook)
15 Jun 86 - 28 Sep 86, 1 RWF, Op. Cara
    Cara
04 Jul 86 - 12 Nov 86, 45 Cdo RM, BRB
    (Belfast)
Aug 86 - Oct 96, 53 Fd Sqn RE, RES
06 Sep 86 - 31 Jan 87, 1 RRW, Op. Cara
    Cara
10 Sep 86 - 21 Jan 87, 1 SG, ARB
    (Bessbrook)
18 Sep 86 - 03 Feb 84, 1 RRW, Belfast
    (West Belfast)

28 Sep 86 - 31 Jan 87, 1 GREN GDS, Op. Cara Cara

12 Nov 86 - 25 Mar 87, 3 R ANGLIAN, BRB (Belfast)

25 Nov 86 - 20 Jan 89, 1 LI, OMA

1987

20 Jan 87 - 27 Mar 89, 1 GREEN HOWARDS, ERB

21 Jan 87 - 03 Jun 87, 1 R HAMPS, ARB (Bessbrook)

02 Feb 87 - 30 May 87, 3 QUEENS, Op. Cara Cara

12 Feb 87 - 24 Feb 89, 1 DWR, HWD

21 Feb 87 - 31 May 87, 27 Fd Regt

25 Mar 87 - 30 Jul 87, 1 QLR, BRB (Belfast)

24 Apr 87 - 12 May 87, 1 KINGS OWN BORDER, S Armagh (1xCoy)

18/19 May 87 - 20 Jul 89, 1 RWF, BKL

25 May 87 - 26 Sep 87, 1 KINGS, Omagh

28 May 87 - 19 Jul 87, 42 Cdo RM, Spearhead

03 Jun 87 - 14 Oct 87, 1 QUEENS, ARB (Bessbrook)

15 Jul 87 - 19 Nov 87, 1 RGJ

30 Jul 87 - 18 Dec 87, 2 LI, BRB (Belfast)

29 Sep 87 - 31 Jan 88, 22 Regt RA

14 Oct 87 - 23 Feb 88, 2 SG, ARB (Bessbrook)

18 Nov 87 - 08 Apr 88, 26 Regt RA, (156 Loc Bty att)

18 Nov 87 - 08 Apr 88, 156 Loc Bty, Att 26 Fd Regt

18 Dec 87 - 29 Apr 88, 1 RS, BRB (Belfast)

1988

Jan 88 - May 88, 13 Fd Regt RA, Q Loc Bty att

07 Feb 88 - 15/16 Mar 90, 3 QUEENS, Aldergrove Resident, 15-Mar-90

19 Feb 88 - 01 Jul 88, 35 Engr Regt, ? Tp, 3 Inf Bde Fd Sqn

23 Feb 88 - 18 Jul 83, 40 Cdo RM, ARB (Bessbrook)

14 Mar 88 - 11 Feb 90, 1 GLOSTERS, BKY

07 Apr 88 - 15 Aug 88, 45 Fd Regt RA, less 52 Fd Bty, 32 AD Bty att

29 Apr 88 - 08 Sep 88, 2 QUEENS, BRB (Belfast)

28 May 88 - 28 Sep 88, 1 RHF, Lisnaskea Incremental Roulement

28 Jun 88 - 10 Nov 88, 28 Amph Engr Regt, 64 Sqn, 3 Inf Bde Fd Sqn

18 Jul 88 - 30 Nov 88, 1 PARA, ARB (Bessbrook)

14 Aug 88 - 18 Dec 88, 12 AD Regt

08 Sep 88 - 29 Jan 89, 1 COLDM GDS, BRB

21 Sep 88 - 05 Feb 89, 1 R IRISH, Lisnaskea Incremental Roulement

20 Oct 88 - 21 Feb 78, 3 RRF, Belfast (Monagh)

Nov 88 - Dec 88, 36 Engr Regt, 50 Fd Sqn, Ballykelly

10 Nov 88 - 23 Mar 89, 2 Armd Div Engr Regt, 12 Fd Sqn, 3 Inf Bde Fd Sqn

20/30 Nov 88 - 12 Apr 89, 1 RRF, ARB (Bessbrook)

16 Dec 88 - 27 Apr 89, 32 Regt RA

1989

20 Jan 89 - 15 Feb 91, 1 WFR, Omagh Res

29 Jan 89 - 09 Jun 89, 2 R ANGLIAN, BRB (Belfast)

04 Feb 89 - 07 Jun 89, 2 RGJ, Lisnaskea Incremental Roulement

24 Feb 89 - 20 Feb 91, 3 PARA, HWD

Mar 89 - Jul 89, 1 Armed Div Engr Regt, 4 Fd Sqn

12 Mar 89 - Apr 91, 1 R HAMPS, BKY

12 Apr 89 - 28 Aug 89, 1 D and D, ARB (Bessbrook)

25 Apr 89 - 06 Sep 89, 1 KINGS OWN BORDER, Op. Fondant

07 Jun 89 - 18 Oct 89, 1 SG, Lisnaskea Incremental Roulement

09 Jun 89 - 23 Oct 89, 42 Cdo RM, BRB (Belfast)

16 Jul 89 - 16 Dec 89, 3 Armd Div Engr Regt, 30 Fd Sqn, 3 Inf Bde Fd Sqn

20 Jul 89 - Aug 91, 1 BW, BKL

28 Aug 89 - 10 Jan 90, 1 R ANGLIAN, ARB (Bessbrook)

07 Sep 89 - 17 Jan 90, 5 INNIS SG, Regt

18 Oct 89 - 03 Mar 90, 1 KOSB, FRB (Fermanagh)

23 Oct 89 - 01 Mar 90, 1 QUEENS, BRB
(Belfast)

Dec 89 - May 90, 35 Engr Regt, 29 Fd
Sqn, Long Kesh

16 Dec 89 - 29 Apr 90, 35 Engr Regt, 29
Fd Sqn

1990

06 Jan 90 - 13 May 90, 47 Regt RA, 4 Fd
Bty

10 Jan 90 - 25 May 90, 2 LI, ARB
(Bessbrook)

09 Feb 90 - Mar 92, 1 KINGS, BKY

01 Mar 90 - 17 Jul 90, 1 QO HLDRS,
BRB (Belfast)

03 Mar 90 - 12 Jun 90, 2 PARA, FRB
(Fermanagh)

11 Mar 90 - 24 Sep 90, 2 SG, PRB

29 Apr 90 - 09 Sep 90, 3 Armd Div Engr
Regt, 5 Fd Sqn, 3 Inf Bde Fd Sqn

25 May 90 - 19 Oct 90, 1 CHESHIRE,
ARB (Bessbrook)

12 Jun 90 - 12 Dec 90, 2 R IRISH, FRB
(Fermanagh)

17 Jul 90 - 18 Dec 90, 1 GORDONS, BRB
(Belfast)

24 Jul 90 - 25 Jan 91, 3 RTR, Regt, TRB

09 Sep 90 - 09 Mar 91, 3 Armd Div Engr
Regt, 25 Fd Sqn, 3 Inf Bde Fd Sqn

22 Sep 90 - 05 Apr 92, 1 QLR, PRB
(Weeton)

08 Oct 90 - 12 Mar 91, 45 Cdo RM, ARB
(Bessbrook)

Nov 90 - Dec 90, 2 LI

12 Dec 90 - 05 May 91, 1 DERR, FRB
(Fermanagh)

18 Dec 90 - 11 May 91, 1 A and SH, BRB
(Belfast)

1991

Jan 91 - Jul 91, 4 Fd Regt, Regt, TRB
(Tyrone)

Feb 91 - Aug 91, 2 COLDM GDS, Op.
Cara Cara

15 Feb 91 - 10 Sep 93, 2 RGJ, OMA
(merged 1 RGJ in Sep 92)

20 Feb 91 - 04 Jun 93, 1 PARA, HWD

Mar 91 - Apr 91, 1 CHESHIRE,
Emergency Tour

Mar 91 - Oct 91, 28 Amph Engr Regt, 23
Sqn, Long Kesh

Apr 91 - Aug 92/Apr 93, 3 R ANGLIAN,
LDY

11 May 91 - 13 Nov 91, 3 LI, BRB
(Resident)

Jun 91 - Jun 91, 1 RRF, Op. Aladdin

Jun 91 - Jul 91, 1 GREEN HOWARDS,
Op. Clifford

Jul 91 - Jan 92, 1 RGJ, DRB (Armagh)

Aug 91 - 18 Feb 94, 2 RRF, BKL

Sep 91 - Oct 91, 1 RRF, Op. Bronski

Sep 91 - Oct 91, 2 LI

12 Sep 91 - 16 Mar 92, 3 RGJ, ARB
(Bessbrook)

19 Oct 91 - 08 Feb 72, 38 Engr Regt, 11
Fd Sqn, Castledillon

Nov 91 - 09 May 92, 42 Cdo RM, FRB
(Fermanagh)

Nov 91 - Jan 92, 15 Msl Bty

13 Nov 91 - 06/08 May 92, 1 PWO, BRB
(Belfast)

Dec 91 - Feb 92, 1 RHF, Op. Luff

Dec 91 - Dec 91, 1 GLOSTERS

Dec 91 - Dec 91, 27 Fd Regt

1992

Jan 92 - Feb 92, 2 QUEENS, Op. Gypsy

21 Feb 92 - 20 Jul 92, 45 Fd Regt RA,
DRB

Feb/16 Mar 92- Jul/24 Sep 92, 2 LI, ARB
(Armagh)

Mar 92- 06 Sep 94, 1 WG, BKY

Mar 92- Mar/ Apr 92, 1 A and SH, Op.
Luff

Mar 92- Mar 92, 3 PARA, Op. Gypsy

09 Mar 92 - 10 Sep 92, 32 Armd Engr
Regt, 7 Fd Sqn, RES (Maze)

05 Apr 92 - Dec 94, 1 KOSB, PRB
(Weeton)

08 May 92 - 04 Nov 92, 1 SG, BRB
(Belfast)

09 May 92 - 16 Nov 92, 1 STAFFORDS,
FRB (Fermanagh)

28 Jun 92 - 30 Dec 92, 1 COLDM GDS,
ETB (Dungannon)

10/20 Jul 92 - 09 Oct 92, 1 GREEN
HOWARDS, DRB (Armagh)

Aug 92 - Apr 95, 1 KINGS OWN
BORDER, Ebrington

01 Sep 92 - 2 Armd Div Engr Regt, RHQ + Elms 43 Fd Sp Sqn, Massereene Bks, Antrim (RE Res)

01 Sep 92 - 33 Fd Sqn, Antrim (Unit retitled, part of 25 Engr Regt)

01 Sep 92 - 43 Fd Sp Sqn, Antrim (Unit retitled, part of 25 Engr Regt)

24 Sep 92 - 27 Mar 93, 1 RS, ARB (Bessbrook)

09/14 Oct 92 - 19 Jan 93, 1 GREEN HOWARDS, GRB (Belfast)

04 Nov 92 - 06 May 93, 1 QO HLDRS, BRB (Belfast)

16 Nov 92 - 22 May 93, 1 IG, FRB (Fermanagh)

30 Dec 92 - 05 Jul 83, 2 R ANGLIAN, ETB (Dungannon)

1993

19 Jan 93 - 21 Jul 93, 2 Fd Regt, Regt, GRB (Belfast (retitled 2 Regt RA))

09 Mar 93 - 06 Sep 93, 28 Engr Regt, 12 Sqn, RES (Maze)

27 Mar 93 - 28 Sep 93, 1 DERR, ARB (Bessbrook)

05 Apr 93 - 21 Long Sp Regt, RHQ, Lisburn Resident

05 Apr 93 - 11 EOD Regt - 321 EOD Sqn, Lisburn Resident

05 Apr 93 - ASU NI, Lisburn (RLC Roulement Sqn)

09 Apr 93 - 07 Oct 93, 22 Regt RA, 22 Regt, DRB (Armagh)

15 Apr 93 - 18 Oct 93, 1 GS Regt - 4 Arty Sp Sqn, Moscow (RLC Roulement Sqn)

15 Apr 93 - 18 Oct 93, 4 GS Regt - 6 Arty Sp Sqn

06 May 93 - 06 Nov 93, 1 D and D, BRB (Belfast)

22 May 93 - 20 Nov 93, 1 RWF, FRB (Fermanagh)

04/05 Jun 93 - Jun 95, 2 PARA, HWD

05 Jul 93 - 28 Dec 93, 2 LI, ETB (Dungannon)

20 Jul 93 - 21 Oct 93, 16 Regt RA, 16 Regt - 32 Bty, DRB

28 Jul 93 - 21 Jan 94, 9/12 L, Regt, GRB (Belfast)

07 Sep 93 - 09 Mar 94, 28 Engr Regt, 23 Amph Engr Sqn, RES (Maze)

10 Sep 93 - Sep 95, 1 PWRR, OMA

28 Sep 93 - 28 Mar 94, 1 GREN GDS, ARB (Armagh)

07 Oct 93 - 12 Oct 94, 26 Regt RA, 26 Regt, DRB (Armagh)

18 Oct 93 - 16 Apr 94, 8 Arty Sp Regt – 12 Arty Sp Sqn, Moscow (RLC Roulement Sqn)

06/07 Nov 93 - 07 May 94, 40 Cdo RM, BRB (Belfast)

20 Nov 93 - 29 May 94, 2 PWRR, FRB (Enniskillen)

28/29 Dec 93 - 27 Jun 94, 1 R ANGLIAN, ETB (Dungannon)

1994

21 Jan 94 – 20 Jul 94, 4 Fd Regt, Regt, GRB

18 Feb 94 - Feb 96, 1 STAFFORDS, BKL

10 Mar 94 - 14 Sep 94, 32 Armd Engr Regt, 26 Armd Engr Sqn, RES (Maze)

29 Mar 94 - 30 Sep 94, 1 WFR, ARB (Armagh)

13 Apr 94 - 12 Oct 94, 32 Regt RA, 32 Regt RA, DRB (Armagh)

19 Apr 94 - 24 Airmob Bde CSS Bn – 15 Log Sp Sqn RLC, Girdwood (RLC Roulement Sqn)

07 May 94 - 07/08 Nov 94, 1 A and SH, BRB (Belfast)

24/29 May 94 - 30 Nov 94, 1 LI, FRB (Enniskillen)

28 Jun 94 - 08 Dec 94, 1 SG, ETB (Dungannon)

20 Jul 94 - Jan 95, KRH, Regt, GRB (Belfast)

06 Sep 94 - Jul 96, 1 RRW, BKY

01 Oct 94 - 01 Apr 95, 2 PARA, ARB (Bessbrook)

01 Oct 94 - 01 Apr 95, 42 Cdo RM, ARB (Armagh)

12 Oct 94 - Apr 95, 5 Regt RA, DRB (Armagh)

07/08 Nov 94 - 08 May 95, 1 PARA, BRB (Belfast)

30 Nov 94 - May 95, 1 CHESHIRE, FRB (Enniskillen)

Dec 94 - 13 Apr 95, 1 HLDRS, PRB
08 Dec 94 - Jun 95, 1 GREEN
      HOWARDS, ETB (Dungannon)

1995
Jan 95 - Apr 95, 40 Fd Regt, URB
      (Girdwood)
Apr 95 - Apr 97, 1 HLDRS, LDY
01 Apr 95 - Oct 95, 1 KINGS, ARB
      (Bessbrook)
13 Apr 95 - 27 Feb 97, 1 DWR, PRB
May 95 - Nov 95, 45 Cdo RM, ETB
      (Dungannon)
08 May 95 - 14 Nov 95, 1 BW, BRB
      (Belfast)
Jun 95 - Dec 95, 1 IG, ETB (Dungannon)
Jun 95 - 20 Jan 97, 2 RGJ, HWD
Sep 95 - Apr 97, 1 HLDRS, ERB
Sep 95 - Sep/ 27 Aug 97, 2 PWRR, OMA
Oct 95 - Mar 96, 1 RS, ARB (Bessbrook)
14 Nov 95 - 14 May 96, 1 KOSB, BRB
      (Belfast)
Dec 95 - Jun 96, 40 Cdo RM, ETB
      (Dungannon)

1996
Feb 96 - 03 Mar 98, 1 GREN GDS, BKL
Feb 96 - Jun 96, 1 R IRISH, RRB
      (Omagh)
Feb 96 - Jun 96, RDG, URB (Girdwood)
Mar 96 - Aug 96, 2 COLDM GDS, ARB
      (Bessbrook)
14 May 96 - 15 Nov 96, 1 SG, BRB
      (Belfast)
Jun 96 - Dec 96, 1 PWO, ETB
      (Dungannon)
Jun 96 - Dec 96, 1 LI, RRB (Omagh)
Jul 96 - Jul/31 Aug 98, 1 CHESHIRE,
      BKY
Aug 96 - Mar 97, 2 PARA, ARB
      (Bessbrook)
Aug 96 - Jan 97, 47 Regt RA, URB
      (Girdwood)
Aug 96 - Sep 96, 13 Sqn 8 Arty Sp Regt
      RC, RTS
01 Oct 96 - Mar 97, 3 RHA, DRB
Oct 96 - Mar 97, 24 Airmob Bde, RTS
Nov 96 - Mar 97, 28 Amph Engr Sqn, 28
      Engr Regt RE, RES

15 Nov 96 - Mar/15 May 97, 1 R
      ANGLIAN, BRB (Belfast)
Dec 96 - 3 Jun 97, 1 D and D, RRB
      (Omagh)
Dec 96 - Jul 97, 1 RWF, ETB
      (Dungannon)

1997
Jan 97 - Jul 97, 2 RTR, URB (Girdwood)
20 Jan 97 - Feb/22 Mar 99, 2 LI, HWD
27 Feb 97 - Feb/ 31 Mar 99, 1 A and SH,
      PRB
Mar 97 - 16 Sep 97, 1 WG, ARB
      (Bessbrook)
Mar 97 - Sep 97, 8 Fuel Sqn, 27 Tpt Regt
      RLC, RTS
Apr 97 - Apr/ 12 May 99, 1 RRF, LDY
Apr 97 - Nov 97, 22 Regt RA, DRB
      (Armagh)
May 97 - Sep 97, 20 Med Regt, DRB
May 97 - Sep 97, 59 Indep Cdo Sqn, RES
15 May 97 - 15 Nov 97, 1 RHF, BRB
      (Belfast)
03 Jun 97 - 01 Dec 97, 1 RS, RRB
      (Omagh)
14 Jun 97 - 14/15 Dec 97, 1 PARA, ETB
      (Dungannon)
21 Jul 97 - 21 Jan 98, 3 PARA, URB
      (Girdwood, Maze)
Sep/27Aug 97 - Nov/03 Dec 99, 1 QLR,
      OMA
16 Sep 97 - 16 Mar 98, 1 KOSB, ARB
      (Bessbrook)
16 Sep 97 - 16 Mar 98, 36 Engr Regt, 20
      Fd Sqn, Maze
Oct 97 - Mar 98, QRH, Regt, DRB
      (Armagh)
Oct 97 - Mar 98, 11 Bde Sp Sqn, 2 CS
      Regt RLC, RTS
Oct 97 - Feb 98, 20 Fd Sqn (Search Tp),
      RES
15 Nov 97 - Apr/ 15 May 98, 1 PWRR,
      BRB (Belfast)
01 Dec 97 - May/03 Jun 96, 1 PWO, RRB
      (Omagh)
14 Dec 97 - 14 Jun 98, 1 R IRISH, ETB
      (Dungannon)

1998

21 Jan 98 - Jun 98, QDG, Regt, URB (Maze)

Mar 98 - Aug 98, 4 Fd Sqn (Search Tp), RES

03 Mar 98 - Mar 00, 1 SG, BKL

16 Mar 98 - Aug/16 Sep 98, 1 RGBW, ARB

16 Mar 98 - 16 Sep 98, 21 Engr Regt, Maze/Antrim

Apr 98 - Sep 98, 12 AD Regt, DRB

Apr 98 - Sep 98, 1 Tpt Sqn, 10 Tpt Regt RLC, RTS

15 May 98 - 14/15 Nov 98, 1 STAFFORDS, BRB

03 Jun 98 - Nov/ 01 Dec 98, 1 HLDRS, RRB

14 Jun 98 - Nov/14 Dec 98, 1 RRW, ETB

Jul 98 - Dec 98, 39 Fd Regt RA, URB

Aug 98 - 28 Aug 00, 1 RWF, BKY

Sep 98 - Feb 99, 29 Fd Sqn, 35 Engr Regt, RES

16 Sep 98 - Feb/17 March 99, 42 Cdo RM, ARB (Armagh)

16 Sep 98 - 35 Engr Regt, 29 Fd Sqn, Antrim

Oct 98 - Mar 99, 16 Regt RA

Oct 98 - Mar 99, 9 Fuel Sp Sqn, 7 Tpt Regt RLC, RTS

14 Nov 98 - Apr/14/15 May 99, 2 PWRR, BRB (Belfast)

01 Dec 98 - May/ 03 Jun 99, 1 BW, RRB

14 Dec 98 - May/14 Jun 99, 2 PARA, ETB

1999

Jan 99 - Jun 99, 32 Regt RA, URB

Mar 99 - Aug 99, 48 Fd Sqn, 39 Engr Regt, RES

17 Mar 99 - Aug/ 16/17 Sep 99, 1 RS, ARB (Armagh)

22 Mar 99 - 28 Mar 01, 1 RGJ, HWD

31 Mar 99 - 22 Mar 01, 1 KINGS, PRB (Weeton)

Apr 99 - Sep 99, RDG, DRB (NIBAT 3 Bde)

Apr 99 - Sep 99, 7 Engr & Amb Sqn, 7 Tpt Regt RLC, RTS

12 May 99 - 11 May 01, 1 R ANGLIAN, LDY

14/15 May 99 - Oct/14/15 Nov 99, 1 GREEN HOWARDS, BRB (Belfast)

03 Jun 99 - Nov/02 Dec 99, 1 CHESHIRE, RRB (NIBAT 8 Bde)

14 Jun 99 - Nov/15 Dec 99, 1 GREN GDS, ETB

Jul 99 - Dec 99, 7 RHA, URB (NIBAT 39 Bde)

Sep 99 - Dec 99, 29 Fd Sqn/49 Fd Sqn, RES

16/17 Sep 99 - Feb/16/17 Mar 00, 1 COLDM GDS, ARB (Armagh)

Oct 99 - Mar 00, 12 AD Regt, DRB (NIBAT 3 Bde)

Oct 99 - Apr 00, 13 Arty Sp Sqn, 8 Arty Sp Regt, RTS

14/15 Nov 99 - Apr/14/15 May00, 1 PWO, BRB (Belfast)

02 Dec 99 - May/04 Jun 00, 2 LI, RRB (NIBAT 8 Bde)

03 Dec 99 - 07 Dec 01, 1 WFR, OMA

15 Dec 99 - May/15 Jun 00, 3 PARA, ETB

2000

Jan 00 - Apr 00, 51 (Airmob) Fd Sqn RE, RES

23 Jan 00 - Apr/ 05 May 00, 1 A and SH, URB (NIBAT 39 Bde)

16/17 Mar 00 - Aug/ 16 Sep 00, 1 RRF, ARB (Armagh)

Apr 00 - Sep 00, 39 Fd Regt RA, DRB

10 Apr 00 - 09 Apr 02, 1 RGBW, BKL

May 00 - Sep 00, 15 Log Sp Sqn, 13 Air Asslt Sp Regt RLC, RTS

May 00 - Sep 00, 9 Para Sqn, 36 Engr Regt RE, RES

14/15 May 00 - Oct/15 Nov 00, 40 Cdo RM, BRB (Belfast)

04 Jun 00 - 02 Dec 00, 1 HLDRS, RRB (NIBAT 8 Bde)

15 Jun 00 - Nov/15 Dec 00, 1 LI, RRB

Sep/ 28 Aug 00 - 15 Apr 02, 1 RS, BKY

Oct 00 - 03 Apr 01, 9 Fuel Sp Sqn, 7 Tpt Regt RLC, RTS

Oct 00 - 02 Apr 01, 42 Fd Sqn, 28 Engr Regt RE, RES

15 Nov 00 - 19 Jun 01, 2 R ANGLIAN, BRB (Belfast)

01 Dec 00 - 04 Jun 01, 2 PARA, RRB
(NIBAT 8 Bde)

15 Dec 00 - 14 Jun 01, 1 PARA, RRB

2001

16 Mar 01 - 16/17 Sep 01, 1 QLR, ARB
(Catterick)

22 Mar 01 - Sep 03, 1 RHF, PRB

28 Mar 01 - Sep 03, 1 A and SH, HWD

03 Apr 01 - 01 Oct 01, 8 Fuel Sqn, 27 Tpt
Regt RLC, RTS

11 May 01 - May 03, 1 COLDM GDS,
LDY

04 Jun 01 - Dec 01, 1 RWF, RRB

14 Jun 01 - 14 Dec 01, 1 R IRISH, ETB
(Dungannon/Rear Based
(Canterbury))

19 Jun 01 - 15 Nov 01, 1 SG, BRB

16/17 Sep 01 - 17 Mar 02, 1 KOSB, ARB
(Bessbrook/Crossmaglen/
Newtownhamilton/Forkhill)

01 Oct 01 - Mar 02, 4 Tpt Sqn RLC, 4 GS
Regt RLC, RTS

02 Oct 01 - May 02, 53 Fd Sqn (Air Sp),
39 Engr Regt RE, RES

15 Nov 01 - 15 May 02, 1 GREN GDS,
BRB

01/02 Dec 01 - 03/04 Jun 02, 3 PARA,
RRB

07 Dec 01 - 15 Jan 04, 1 PWO, OMA

14 Dec 01 - 14/15 Jun 02, 2 RRF, ETB

2002

Mar 02 - 26/27 Sep 02, Pnr Sqn, 23 Regt
RLC, RTS

17 Mar 02 - 17 Sep 02, 42 Cdo RM, ARB

02 Apr 02 - 02 Oct 01, 23 Amph Engr
Sqn, 28 Engr Regt RE, RES

09 Apr 02 - 31 Mar 04, 1 D and D, BKY

15 Apr 02 - 17 Feb 04, 1 GREEN
HOWARDS, BKY

May 02 - 16/17 Sep 02, 20 Fd Sqn , 36
Engr Regt RE, RES

15 May 02 - 30 Oct/01 Nov 02, 1 RGJ,
BRB

03/04 Jun 02 - 01/02 Dec 02, 2 R
ANGLIAN, RRB

14/15 Jun 02 - 14/15 Dec 02, 1
CHESHIRE, ETB

16/17 Sep 02 - 31 Jan 03, 42 Fd Sqn, 28
Engr Regt RE, RES

17 Sep 02 - 24 Apr 03, 2 PARA, ARB

26/27 Sep 02 - 26/27 Mar 03, 2 Tpt Sqn, 1
GS Regt RLC, RTS

01 Nov 02 - 15 Apr 03, 39 Fd Regt RA,
BRB

01/02 Dec 02 - 03/04 Jun 03, 1 RGBW,
RRB

14/15 Dec 02 - 14/15 Jun 03, KRH, ETB
(NIBAT 2)

2003

31 Jan 03 - 28 Oct 03, 73 Armd Engr Sqn,
21 Engr Regt, RES

26/27 Mar 03 - 26/27 Mar 03, 6 Tpt Sqn. 4
GS Regt RLC, RTS

05 Apr 03 - 21 Long Sp Regt, 16 Tpt Sqn,
Lisburn Resident

05 Apr 03 - 21 Long Sp Regt, 57 Sup Sqn,
Kinnegar Resident

05 Apr 03 - 21 Long Sp Regt, 84 PC Sqn,
Aldergrove Resident

15 Apr 03 - 15 Aug 03, 2 RRF, BRB

24 Apr 03 - 02 Dec 03, 1 WFR, ARB
(Armagh)

24 Apr 03 - 02 Dec 03, 1 STAFFORDS,
ARB

May 03 - 12 Dec 03/ 30 Mar 04, 1 WG,
LDY

03/04 Jun 03 - Dec 03, 4 Fd Regt, RRB

14/15 Jun 03 - 14/15 Dec 03, 2 PWRR,
ETB (NIBAT 2)

15 Aug 03 - 14 Nov 03, 39 Fd Regt RA,
BRB

01 Sep 03 - Dec 05, 2 RRF, HWD

01 Sep 03 - 01 Sep 04, 1 R IRISH, PRB

26/27 Sep 03 - 26/27 Mar 04, 7 Tpt Sqn,
27 Tpt Regt RLC, RTS

28 Oct 03 - 15/16 Mar 04, 23 Amph Sqn,
28 Engr Regt, RES

14 Nov 03 - 14/15 May 04, 12 AD Regt,
BRB

02 Dec 03 - 24 Mar 04, 1 IG, ARB

14/15 Dec 03 - 14/15 Jun 04, 45 Cdo RM,
ETB

28 Dec 03 - 14/15 Mar 04, SCOTS DG,
RRB

2004
15 Jan 04 - Apr 06, 1 KOSB, OMA
17 Feb 04 - 01 Dec 05, 2 R ANGLIAN,
        BKY
14/15 Mar 04 - 16 Jul 04, QDG, Regt,
        RRB
15/16 Mar 04 - 16 Sep 04, 49 Fd Sqn (Air
        Sp), 39 Engr Regt, RES
24 Mar 04 - 15/16 Sep 04, 1 RGJ, ARB
26/27 Mar 04 - 31 Oct 04, 17 Tpt Sqn, 7
        Tpt Regt RLC, Task Line Ceased
30 Mar 04 - 16 Jul 04, 1 D and D, LDY
31 Mar 04 - Aug 05, 2 RGJ, Ballykinler
14/15 May 04 - 01 Sep 04, 3 PARA, BRB
15 Jun 04 - 01 Sep 04, 1 KORBR, ETB
01 Sep 04 - 26 Jan 04, 1 KORBR, PRB
01/16 Sep 04 - Dec 04/16 Mar 05, 2 LI,
        ARB
16 Sep 04 - 15 Mar 05, 29 Armd Engr
        Sqn, 35 Engr Regt, RES

2005
15 Mar 05 - 42 Fd Sqn, 28 Engr Regt RE
16 Mar 05 - Sep 05, 1 PARA, ARB
Aug 05 - Apr 07, 1 CHESHIRE, BKL
01 Dec 05 - Mar 08, 2 PWRR, BKY

PRISON GUARD FORCE (1974-1994)

1974
07 Nov 74 - 07 Dec 74, 4 Battery Royal
        Artillery

1976
06 Mar 76 - 06 Jul 76, 41 Army Sp Regt
        - Det (Magilligan),
28 Oct 76 - 28 Mar 77, 6 Squadron Royal
        Corps of Transport,
04 Nov 76 - 18 Dec 76, 40 Cdo RM
        (Magilligan, Composite Coy with
        41 Cdo RM)
05 Nov 76 - 16 Dec 76, 145 Cdo Lt Bty
        (Magilligan)

1977
Nov 77 - Mar 78, 6 Battery 27 Regiment
        Royal Artillery

1978
Mar 78 - Jul 78, 76 Battery 14 Regiment
        Royal Artillery
Jul 78 - Nov 78, 57 Battery 32nd
        Regiment Royal Artillery
Nov 78 - Mar 79, 2 Squadron 2 Engineer
        Regiment

1979
Mar 79 - Jul 79, 42 Battery 22nd Regiment
        Royal Artillery
28 Mar 79 - 26 Jul 79, 5 Squadron 16
        Signal Regiment,
Jul 79 - Nov 79, 45 Squadron 21 Engineer
        Regiment
Nov 79 - Mar 80, 52 Battery 45 Regiment
        Royal Artillery

1980
Mar 80 - Jul 80, T Battery 12 Regiment
        Royal Artillery
15 Jul 80 - 24 Nov 80, 13 Battery Royal
        Artillery
24 Nov 80 - 10 Apr 81, 13 Battery 19
        Regiment Royal Artillery

1981
10 Apr 81 - 25 Jun 81, 29 Battery 4
        Regiment Royal Artillery
25 Jun 81 - 08 Sep 81, A Squadron 1
        Royal Tank Regiment
08 Sep 81 - 21 Nov 81, G Battery 7 Royal
        Horse Artillery

1982
05 Feb 82 - 22 Apr 82, D Squadron Life
        Guards
Apr 82 - 07 Jul 82, B Squadron 3 Royal
        Tank Regiment, 22
07 Jul 82 - 21 Sep 82, C Squadron 9/12
        Royal Lancers
21 Sep 82 - 04 Dec 82, A Squadron 15/19
        Hussars
04 Dec 82 - 17 Feb 83, A Squadron 17/21
        Lancers

1983
17 Feb 83 - 03 May 83, Ajax 2 Royal
        Tank Regiment

03 May 83 - 17 Aug 83, E Battery 1 Royal
        Horse Artillery
17 Aug 83 - 01 Oct 83, L Battery 2
        Regiment Royal Artillery
01 Oct 83 - 15 Dec 83, 31 Battery 47
        Regiment Royal Artillery
15 Dec 83 - 27 Feb 84, C Squadron
        Queen's Royal Irish Hussars

1984
Feb 84 - May 84, 156 Battery 94 Regiment
        Royal Artillery
May 84 - Jul 84, A Squadron 15/19
        Hussars
Nov 84 - Dec 84, 34 Battery 14 Regiment
        Royal Artillery
12 Nov 84 - 19 Dec 84, 34 Battery 39
        Regiment Royal Artillery
19 Dec 84 - 14 Feb 85, A Squadron 4/7
        Dragoon Guards

1985
14 Feb 85 - Apr 85, 13 Battery 19
        Regiment Royal Artillery
Apr 85 - Jul 85, C Battery 3 Royal Horse
        Artillery
Jul 85 - Sep 85, P Battery 5 Regiment
        Royal Artillery
06 Sep 85 -21 Nov 85, B Squadron 13/18
        Royal Hussars
21 Nov 85 - Jan 76, 49 Battery 27
        Regiment Royal Artillery

1986
Jan 86 - Apr 86, C Squadron Royal
        Hussars
Apr 86 - Jun 86, 88 Battery 4 Regiment
        Royal Artillery
19 Jun 86 - 28 Aug 86, Squadron 4 Royal
        Tank Regiment
28 Aug 86 - 06 Nov 86, 9 Battery 12
        Regiment Royal Artillery
06 Nov 86 - 12 Jan 87, B Squadron 1
        Royal Tank Regiment

1987
12 Jan 87 - 26 Mar 87, A Squadron
        Queens Own Highlanders
26 Mar 87 - 02 Jun 87, O Battery 2
        Regiment Royal Artillery

02 Jun 87 - Aug 87, D Squadron 4/7
        Dragoon Guards
Aug 87 - Oct 87, 74 Battery 32
        Regiment Royal Artillery
Oct 87 - 26 Dec 87, 137 Battery 40
        Regiment Royal Artillery
26 Dec 87 - 12 Mar 88, A Squadron 16/5
        Royal Lancers

1988
12 Mar 88 - 18 May 88, 127 Battery 49
        Regiment Royal Artillery
May 88 - Jul 88, 64 Squadron 28 Engineer
        Regiment
28 Jul 88 - 07 Oct 88, 518 Company Royal
        Pioneer Corps
07 Oct 88 - 15 Dec 88, 3 Battery 47
        Regiment Royal Artillery
15 Dec 88 - 22 Feb 89, 187 Company
        Royal Pioneer Corps

1989
22 Feb 89 - 04 May 89, Huntsman 2 Royal
        Tank Regiment
04 May 89 - 14 Jul 89, A Squadron 1 The
        Queen's Dragoon Guards
14 Jul 89 - 28 Sep 89, C Squadron 1 Royal
        Tank Regiment
28 Sep 89 - 30 Nov 89, 518 Company
        Royal Pioneer Corps
30 Nov 89 - 10 Feb 90, K Battery 5
        Regiment Royal Artillery

1990
10 Feb 90 - 20 Apr 90, 143 Battery 49
        Regiment Royal Artillery
20 Apr 90 - 20 Jul 90, B Squadron 14/20
        King's Hussars
20 Jul 90 - 19 Oct 90, 43 Squadron 2
        Engineer Regiment
19 Oct 90 - 21 Jan 91, D Squadron Queens
        Own Highlanders

1991
21 Jan 91 - 21 Apr 91, C Squadron 4/7
        Dragoon Guards
Apr 91 - Nov 91, A Squadron 1 Royal
        Tank Regiment

1992
19 Jan 92 - 21 Apr 92, Squadron 5
        Inniskilling Dragoon Guards
21 Apr 92 - 22 Jul 92, Squadron 9/12
        Lancers
22 Jul 92 - 20 Oct 92, 36 Battery Royal
        Artillery
20 Oct 92 - 21 Jan 93, 17 Battery 26
        Regiment Royal Artillery

1993
21 Jan 93 - 19 Apr 93, D Squadron Queens
        Own Highlanders
19 Apr 93 - 20 Jul 93, 12 Battery 12
        Regiment Royal Artillery

20 Jul 93 - 21 Oct 93, 32 Battery 16
        Regiment Royal Artillery
21 Oct 93 - 19 Jan 94, B Squadron 1st The
        Queen's Dragoon Guards

1994
19 Jan 94 - 19 Apr 94, 21 Battery 47
        Regiment Royal Artillery
20 Apr 94 - 23 Jul 94, 43 Battery 47
        Regiment Royal Artillery
23 Jul 94 - 21 Oct 94, D Squadron 1 Royal
        Tank Regiment
21 Oct 94 - Nov 94, 201 Signal Squadron
        1 (UK) Div Signal Regiment

All units bar Army Air Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Royal Corps of Transport, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Royal Military Police, Royal Pioneer Corps, and Royal Signals.

LEGEND

ARB – Armagh Roulement (later retitled NIBAT 1)
BKL – Ballykinler Resident
BKY – Ballykelly Resident
BRB – Belfast Roulement (later retitled NIBAT 3)
DRB – Drumadd Roulement (later retitled NIBAT 3 Bde)
ERB – Ebrington Resident
ETB – East Tyrone/Dungannon Roulement (later retitled NIBAT 2)
FRB – Fermanagh Roulement
GRB – Girdwood Roulement
HWD – Holywood Resident
LDY – Londonderry Resident
OMA – Omagh Resident
PRB – Province Reinforcement
R(N) – Rural North
RRB – Rural Roulement (later retitled NIBAT 2, 8 Bde and NIBAT 4)
R(S) – Rural South
URB – Urban Roulement (later retitled NIBAT 39 Bde)

Units with 10 tours or more*

2 LI	18	2 RRF	12
2 PARA	17	1 LI	12
1 GREEN HOWARDS	15	1 PARA	12
1 RGJ	15	45 Cdo RM	12
3 PARA	15	1 COLDM GDS	11
SCOTS DG	15	1 RHF	11
42 Cdo RM	15	2 RGJ	11
1 KOSB	14	1 KINGS	10
1 A and SH	14	1 KINGS OWN BORDER	10
1 RRF	14	1 PWO	10
1 GREN GDS	13	1 QLR	10
1 SG	13	1 QUEENS	10
1 RS	13	1 RRW	10
2 R ANGLIAN	13	3 RRF	10
1 D and D	13	14/20 H	10
1 CHESHIRE	13	40 Cdo RM	10
1 RWF	13	LG	10
1 BW	12	RHG/D	10

*Not including prison guard duties.

Abbreviations

AOR — Area of Responsibility

BAOR — British Army of the Rhine

CAIN — Conflict Archive on the Internet

CDS — Chief of the Defence Staff

CGS — Chief of the General Staff

CLF — Commander Land Forces

COIN — Counterinsurgency

COP — Close Observation Platoon

D/Int — Director of Intelligence

DCI — Director and Coordinator of Intelligence

ECHR — European Commission of Human Rights

ECtHR — European Court of Human Rights

EOD — Explosive Ordnance Disposal

FRU — Field (later Force) Research Unit

GOC — General Officer Commanding

HQ — Headquarters

HQNI — Headquarters Northern Ireland

HUMINT — Human Intelligence

IJS — Irish Joint Section

INLA — Irish National Liberation Army

IRA — Irish Republican Army

IRSP — Irish Republican Socialist Party

ISG — Intelligence and Security Group

JIC — Joint Intelligence Committee

JSIW — Joint Services Interrogation Wing

MAC-P — Military Aid to the Civil Power

MI5 — Security Service

MI6 — Secret Intelligence Service

MMS — Minimum Manning Strength

MoD — Ministry of Defence

MPSB — Metropolitan Police Special Branch

MRF — Military Reaction Force

NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO — Non-commissioned Officer

NICRA — Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association

NIO — Northern Ireland Office

NISOP — Northern Ireland Standard Operating Procedure

NITAT — Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Team

OIRA — Official Irish Republican Army

PIRA — Provisional Irish Republican Army

PRG — Peace and Reconciliation Group

PRONI — Public Record Office of Northern Ireland

PSNI — Police Service of Northern Ireland

PWO — Prince of Wales's Own Regiment of Yorkshire

RAF — Royal Air Force

RIR — Royal Irish Regiment

RUC — Royal Ulster Constabulary

SAS — Special Air Service

SB — Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch

SDLP — Social Democratic and Labour Party

SMIU — Special Military Intelligence Unit

SRU — Special Reconnaissance Unit

SSNI — Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

TAOR — Tactical Area of Responsibility

TCG — Tasking and Coordination Group

UDA — Ulster Defence Association

UDR — Ulster Defence Regiment

UFF — Ulster Freedom Fighters

UK — United Kingdom

UKLF — United Kingdom Land Forces

USC — Ulster Special Constabulary (a.k.a. B Specials)

UVF — Ulster Volunteer Force

UWC — Ulster Workers' Council

XMG — Crossmaglen

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